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1. 5/24/2020 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala - Office of the Historian
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d151 1/2
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954, GUATEMALA
[Page 287]
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151. Memorandum for DC/P and CIP, Central Intelligence Agency1
Washington, May 16, 1954.
SUBJECT
Acts of Force Before D-Day
In view of repeated observations by Guatemalans to the e ect that the anti-Communist forces must prove their strength by deeds as well as words, as well as the
need for accelerating the psychological pressure on Guatemalans, certain limited, speci c acts of violence prior to D-Day are hereby proposed.
The acts are as follows:
D–12. Raid on Arbenz’ Finca, “El Cajon.” This raid should be a combination of arson and demolitions work, but should not attack personnel. It should be
conducted in the absence of Arbenz from the nca. The purpose of this raid would be to focus public attention on the fact that Arbenz is the enemy of the anti-
Communists and that more dire things are in store for him later.
D–10. Disposal of [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed]. This would be the rst anti-personnel action. Its purpose, beyond that of helping to
paralyze [less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed], is to show the public that the anti-Communists resent the Soviet-style [less than 1 line of source text not
declassi ed] system and consider [less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed] a prime symbol of oppression.
D–8. Disposal of [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed], for the same reasons as the disposal of [name not declassi ed]. The disposal of [name not
declassi ed] and [name not declassi ed] would make the anti-Communist protest against the [less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed] character of the
Arbenz regime perfectly clear.
D–6. Disposal of [name and 1 line of source text not declassi ed]. This action documents the anti-Communist character of the revolution and leaves [less than 1
line of source text not declassi ed] leaderless.
D–4. Disposal of [name not declassi ed]. With this, opposition to both the [less than 1 line of source text not declassi ed] character and the [less than 1 line of source
text not declassi ed] regime will have been e ectively displayed.
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2. 5/24/2020 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala - Office of the Historian
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d151 2/2
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D–1 or D-Day before H-hour. Disposal of [name not declassi ed]. It is apparent, from Page’s debrie ng of [name not declassi ed]2
and many other indications,
that the fate of [name not declassi ed] may well be the key to the entire D-Day situation. With [name not declassi ed] still on the scene, he would undoubtedly be
able to command certain support which would render the task of friendly forces more di cult. If the issue were in doubt, his personal ability and prestige could
tip the scales unfavorably. An attempt should therefore be made to have victory grow out of the disposal of [name not declassi ed], rather than reckoning with
[name not declassi ed] after victory. This action must be carried out as close to D-Day as possible; otherwise members [less that 1 line of source text not
declassi ed] or non PBSUCCESS forces might ll the vacuum before Calligeris could.3
In any program of this sort, the possibilities of reprisals and their damaging e ect on the D-Day objective must be considered. The above actions would
undoubtedly invite some reprisals and lead to an attempt on the part of the government to tighten security. However, such government actions in the period D–14
to D-Day must be expected anyway. On the other hand, successful accomplishment of the above actions should cause panic among the government sympathizers
and possibly negate their increased vigilance. At the same time, friendly forces should be greatly heartened and mobilized. The program as described above would
give enough time for both enemy disintegration and friendly mobilization prior to D-Day. On balance, it is believed that these shows of friendly strength and these
e orts to “soften up” the enemy would be bene cial and would decrease the risk of putting all PBSUCCESS eggs in the D-Day basket. It may also be that the
government reaction to one or the other proposed acts of violence would provide signi cant guidance to existing friendly D-Day plans.
It should be emphasized that the success of only one or two of the proposed actions would be insu cient and would give a “ ash-in-the-pan” impression to the
public. Execution of the whole program, with proper KUGOWN exploitation, would be not only physically impressive but psychologically most explicit and
signi cant.
If the foregoing program is approved, C/FI should be immediately requested to obtain, under the direction of C/PM, the requisite information relative to the
personal habits, movements, etc., of the target personalities and appropriate data on Arbenz’s nca. Chief of Station, Guatemala, has indicated his ability to
procure such information on short notice. The rst three proposed actions have been suggested by him, either orally or by dispatch.4
1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.↩
2. Cryptonym for a high-ranking military o cer.↩
3. A handwritten marginal note next to this sentence reads: “True—but perhaps good.”↩
4. A handwritten marginal note next to this paragraph reads: “Should work up some questions for submission on this point—”↩