Suicide bombers book' draft 2004

Suicide Bombers: A History, Profile, and
Guide to Countermeasures for
Commanders
CAS3 Group 276
15 May 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE #
1-3 Introduction to Suicide Bombers
4-5 Chapter 1: Sri Lanka History: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
6-13 Chapter 2: History of Terror in Israel
14-19 Chapter 3: Suicide Bombings in Iraq
20-26 Chapter 4: Employment of Suicide Bombings by Insurgents in Cechnya,
Russia
27 Chapter 5: Conclusion: The Dynamic Menace
28-31 Appendix A: Profile and Statistical Analysis, What does a suicide bomber
look like?
32-34 Appendix B: Types of Bombs and Delivery Systems
35-37 Appendix C: Considerations for the Defense
38-39 Appendix D: Suicide Bomber Blast Overlay and Blast Effects Template
40-42 Appendix E: Suicide Bomber Doctrinal Template
43-47 Appendix F: Suicide Bomber Focused Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield
48-68 Appendix G: Pre-Deployment Suicide Bomber Briefing

Introduction
The use of suicide bombers is a relevant and dangerous threat to the United States Army.
Currently the Army has over 330,000 forces forward deployed in 120 countries. The Global War
on Terrorism places Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen in a direct fight against
unconventional forces -- the most complex of which is the tactic of suicide bombing. All service
members need to be aware of the threat suicide bombers pose. Soldiers stationed domestically,
forward deployed, or engaged in direct combat in Afghanistan and Iraq are all susceptible to
attack.
The suicide attack is an “operational method in which the very act of the attack is
dependent upon the death of the perpetrator”.1
The terrorist is fully aware of his or her death in
the conduct of the attack. Most suicide attacks are executed by activating explosives carried on
the terrorist’s body, carried outside the clothing in a bag, or planted in a vehicle driven by the
suicide bomber.2
The suicide bomber becomes a ‘human time-bomb’. He or she selects the time
and place to activate the attack to cause the maximum damage to the target.3
Suicide terrorism
has many tactical advantages: “It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes
or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage; there is
no fear that the interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths
are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming
sense of helplessness)”.4
The use of suicide terrorists is a form of warfare employed throughout history. Suicide
terrorism has its roots in ancient times, as early as the 1st
century with the Jewish Sicaris and the
Moslem Hashishiyun in the 11th
Century.5
Other examples can be seen in the 1916 Battle of the
Somme during WWI. The concept of self-sacrifice can be seen during the shoulder-to-shoulder
advance of the British Army’s Newfoundlander Regiment against the well-fortified German’s.
Of the 801 Newfoundlanders, only 68 were unwounded by the end of the day.
The method of suicide terrorism has changed in recent history. Suicide attacks have
evolved from self-sacrifice for the protection of comrades or as a last resort to the deliberate,
planned act of destroying oneself or others to inflict harm on the enemy. During WWII the
Japanese kamikaze pilots used the tactic of suicide bombing on the attack of Pearl Harbor. In the
Middle East hundreds of suicide bombings have occurred over the last few decades.
The roots of current suicide bombers’ tactics are seen in the infamous attacks on US sites
in Beirut. It is believed that the Hezbollah conducted suicide bombings at the US Embassy and
US Marine Barracks in 1983. The Marine Barracks bombing killed 241 soldiers and wounded
100 more when a truck full of explosives detonated on 23 October 1983.6
Suicide bombings have become particularly popular with guerrilla groups such as the
Tamil Tigers, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. The Tamil Tigers are one of the more prominent users
of suicide attacks. Over the past 20 years they have committed nearly 168 suicide bombings,
including the assassination of a president, a prime minister and dozens of government officials.7
The best laboratory for observing suicide bombings has been in Israel. The Israeli
experience is also the most instructive. The tactic of suicide bombings against Israel was
introduced 16 April 1994, by the Islamic group Hamas, when an attacker parked his car between
two buses, detonated a bomb, and remained inside.8
From 1994 to 1999 there were 17 cases of
suicide attacks. Since the beginning of the second Al-Aqsa Intifada on 28 September 2000, the

use of suicide bombers has increased significantly, resulting in over 81 suicide bombings
occurring between 2000 and early 2004.9
Since 1994 there are over 98 suicide attacks on Israeli
targets resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of wounded.
The effectiveness of suicide attacks has resulted in a formidable form of unconventional
warfare. The profile and complexity of suicide attacks is changing. The al-Qaeda attacks
against the United States on 11 September 2001 forced an expanded view of suicide bombers to
include many more profiles than a young male religious fundamentalist.10
During the first year of the Coalition occupation of Iraq, there have been at least 26
suicide bombings directed against a variety of targets. The current militant groups operating in
Iraq are incorporating tactics like those used by the Palestinian terrorist groups in their attacks on
Israel. In Israel, the typical suicide bomber attempts to influence popular fear by targeting soft
targets with no consideration for civilian casualties. In Iraq the typical target seems to be
military, governmental, or political, and like Israel, the bomber has no regard for civilian
casualties. Attacks against targets ranging from the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, petroleum
facilities, and police stations serve to influence the international media and work towards
accomplishing the terrorists’ goals.11
On 3 May 2004, CAS3 Staff Group 276 was asked to assist the Rapid Equipping Force
(REF) in identifying tactics, techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to mitigate suicide bombers and
reduce high value target (HVTs) vulnerabilities. We were asked to focus on the mission pairing
of suicide bombers versus HVTs. In attacking this problem, we used a modified form of the
Army problem solving process. The model provided an excellent framework. We developed the
following problem statement: CAS3, Class 04-04, Staff Group 276, in support of the current day
Global War on Terrorism, determines Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) designed to
help coalition junior leaders mitigate vulnerabilities associated with suicide bombers attacking
HVTs.
We adapted the preliminary model developed by CAS3 04-03 Staff Group 276. Initially,
we broke up into several groups to gather information on the historic trends and employment of
suicide bombers. Facts came from multiple sources, to include AARs from units participating in
Operation Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, the internet, and books. Once this was accomplished, we
created two groups, the red cell and the blue cell, and sorted the information amongst them. The
historical examples were used to create tactical vignettes. Each group was responsible for
developing their side of the vignette, conducting a mission pairing analysis by phase, and
developing courses of action. We then conducted course of action analysis (war-gaming) to
identify vulnerabilities on both sides.
The red cell was the suicide bomber group. This group identified the possible TTPs of
suicide bombers recruitment, planning, reconnaissance, movement, detonation, and information
operations/exploitation. The blue cell was the coalition force. This group identified possible
TTPs of coalition force mission analysis, counter-reconnaissance, pre-combat checks,
fortification of positions, presence patrols, security, react to contact with bomber, rescue and aid,
and cordoning off areas.
The results of war-gaming each vignette were used to create products to assist junior
leaders fighting the Global War on Terrorism. We learned that the most important method to
combat the effectiveness of suicide bombers is education. Increased knowledge on this subject
will make soldiers and leaders at all levels more aware of the threat they face and arm them with
tools to prevent and combat this method of attack.

We developed a commander’s guide, a generic pre-deployment awareness briefing, and a
Graphic Training Aid (GTA) documenting the effects of suicide bombers, methods to combat
them, and force protection measures. The goal of the commander’s handbook is to educate
company level leaders throughout the Army. The historical background and TTPs will enable
leaders to develop and supervise training. The GTA provides a cursory list of information that
any soldier can use to prevent and identify a suicide bomber. The pre-deployment briefing
provides the same information and TTPs in a more graphic measure to increase a unit’s
awareness prior to deploying to OIF or OEF. We hope to provide easily accessible information
to the service members fighting the war on terrorism in the hopes to combat the use of suicide
bombers.
The rise of suicide bombing and the proliferation of terrorist organization throughout the
world make for a difficult contemporary operating environment. While no methods may be
completely effective in eliminating suicide bombers, increasing the knowledge base of this
subject throughout our fighting force will certainly reduce their effectiveness. Stopping suicide
bombers will be a major victory in the Global War on Terrorism.
1
Ganor, Bohaz, “Suicide Terrorism; An Overview. Countering Suicide Terrorism,” 2000;Erzila:
ICT
2
Ibid
3
Schweitzer, Yoram, “Suicide Bombings – The Ultimate Weapon?” available from
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=373; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
4
Sprinzak, Ehud. 2000. “Rational Fanatics.” Foreign Policy, 120:66-73
5
Schweitzer, Yoram; “Suicide Bombings – The Ultimate Weapon?” available from
6
Schweitzer, Yoram. 2004“Suicide Terrorism: Martyrdom and Murder,” The Economist.
7
Schweitzer,Yoram. 2000. “Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics” available from
8
Schweitzer, Yoram. 2001. “Suicide Bombings – The Ultimate Weapon?” available from
9
Schweitzer, Yoram. 2004“Suicide Terrorism: Martyrdom and Murder,” The Economist.
10
Calway, Jim 2004. “Suicide Bombings: TTPs,” ADCSINT-Threats Ft. Leavenworth, KS
11
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). 2004. “Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Devices in Worldwide Terrorism.”

CHAPTER 1: SRI LANKA HISTORY: LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM
To understand the motivation behind suicide bombings, it is essential to understand the
root cause of the conflict. Sri Lanka is not different from other countries that engage in civil
wars to settle political and religious differences. It gained its independence from Britain in 1947.
The majority of conflict in Sri Lanka is between the minority, Tamil separatists, mostly Hindu
and the ruling, Sinhalese majority, mostly Buddhist. The Sinhalese have dominated the
country’s government since their independence. The Tamil separatists, also known as the Tamil
Tigers, continue to fight for an independent homeland in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.
According to the Tamil national leader, Hon. Velupillai Pirapaharan, “the Tamil war for
independence is the result of the systematic oppression of our people by the Sri Lankan state... It
is the Sri Lanka government which has failed to learn the lessons from the emergence of the
struggles for self determination in several parts of the globe and the innovative structural changes
that have taken place.”1
Civil war broke out between the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese-
controlled government with a decisive series of riots in 1983. In 1987 the Tamil Tigers
progressed to using suicide bombings. This form of asymmetric warfare allows a relatively
small force to inflict substantial damage against an overwhelmingly powerful force.
THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EALAM
Sri Lanka and Palestine generate the most suicide bombings in the world.2
The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have emerged as one of the most ruthless and
dangerous terrorist groups in the World. They target anyone considered to be traitors to and
anyone who stands in the way of their rebel cause. The LTTE
fund their terrorist activities in many ways to include extorting
money from individuals and businesses, drug trafficking,
supplying arms to other terrorist groups for cash, and
smuggling illegal immigrants into the west for cash. The most
disturbing funding method used is obtaining education grants
from the government for poor refugees and orphaned children. This method provides the means
for obtaining human lives for suicide bombing missions.3
THE MAKING OF A SUICIDE BOMBER (LTTE METHODOLOGY)
The LTTE has a process for manufacturing human bombs where they collect young
children from refugee camps who have lost their parents and isolate them from the rest of the
world. They take these young recruits to a hidden camp in the jungle where they are given
special status and primed to become suicide bombers. The difference between the LTTE and
other terrorist organizations is that other bombers usually understands what they are doing and

are committed to a cause. This is not the case with LTTE suicide bombers. They are raised in a
“school” where social and psychological conditioning takes place. The human bombers know of
only one leader for whom they will ultimately die for. They meet their leader only once and that
meeting takes place right before their bombing mission. The bombers have a “Last Supper”,
take a photo with their leader and then conduct their suicide bombing mission.4
These human
bombers have no idea that their bombing contributes toward the Tamils’ cause. They are simply
doing what they have been trained to do.
MODUS OPERANDI
The LTTE to date have perpetrated over 200 suicide bombing attacks. This organization
is the only one in the world to succeed in the assassination of two heads of state. 5
In addition to
training the bomber, the LTTE has research units that test blast effects on animals to ensure an
attack’s success. This organization is financially conscious when selecting their bombing
methods. There are six types of suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These include the
human-borne suicide IED, also known as the suicide bodysuit; the vehicle-borne suicide IED; the
motorcycle-borne suicide IED; naval craft-borne suicide IED; scuba diver-borne suicide IED;
and aerial-borne (microlight, glider, mini-helicopter) suicide IED.
The LTTE’s preferred methods include human, vehicle, motorcycle,
and naval borne suicide IEDs. Israel is leading the world in suicide
bombing attack prevention. One preventive measure used by Israel
is the use of canine explosive sniffer dogs to detect explosives. The
LTTE is also using canines to monitor the ability of sniffer dogs,
which will aid them in developing a method to diminish the dogs’
role. The LTTE terrorist organization is the suicide bombing expert
because they are proactive in finding ways around our bombing
prevention methods.6
This is the key. To combat this form of
asymmetric warfare, we too must be proactive in understanding and
identifying suicide bombing tactics and techniques.
1
Chimes Newsletter, “Tamil Suicide Bombing Kills Three in Sri Lanka”,
November 2001, available from http://www-stu.calvin.edu/chimes/2001.11.02/wor3.html;
Internet; accessed 6 May 2004
2
Frontline World, “Living with Terror”, May 2002; available from
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/srilanka/feature.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004
3
LTTE Terrorism, “U.S. Bans LTTE”, March 1996; available from
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/umberto/; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
4
Frontline World, Making of a Suicide Bomber, May 2002; available from
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/srilanka/feature.html; Internet; accessed 6 May.
5
Jewish Virtual Library, Suicide Attacks, 2004; available from http://www.us-
israel.org/jsource/Terrorism/suicide.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
6
Janes, Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat, October 2000; available from
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtml;
Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF TERROR IN ISRAEL
BACKGROUND
The United Nations created the state of Israel in 1947
with the intentions of creating a Palestinian state adjacent to the
new Jewish state; however, the subsequent invasions of the Arab
nations (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) prevented
the creation of the Palestinian nation in their drive to destroy
Israel. Even though Israel defeated the Arab nations, these
nations maintained control of lands intended for an eventual
Palestinian state. Egypt controlled the Sinai Peninsula and the
Gaza Strip while Jordan maintained control of the West Bank.
Syria controlled the Golan Heights, which is a tactical advantage
point in order to fire artillery and rocket fire deep into Israel.
Israel and the Arab nations would fight several wars, but it was
the Six Day War that would have the greatest impact on the
Intifadah. Not only was the Israeli Army able to defeat the Arab
nations in six days, it took control and occupied the Gaza strip
and the West Bank where the Israeli army was able to take
control of Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. As a result of the wars fought
by the Israelis and the Arabs, millions of Palestinians became refugees moving to neighboring
Arabs states while the majority continued to reside in the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The
chart below illustrates where the refugees relocated.
As a result of the Six Day War, the Palestinians’ ability to demand an independent state
was severely limited. This led to the creation of several Palestinian liberation organizations that
would employ terrorist tactics in order to achieve their goals. “There are three far-left
Palestinian nationalist groups (Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command)
that formed after the Six Day War of 1967 and pioneered terrorist strategies in the early 1970s.”1
These groups began using tactics such as hijacking of aircraft, kidnappings, and murder. The
most famous in the 1970s was the kidnapping and deaths of 11 Israeli athletes in the 1972
Munich Olympic Games by Palestinian terrorists. The three groups fell under the umbrella of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chaired by Yassir Arafat, though over the years,
many of these groups have splintered off due to personal and ideological reasons.
In the late 1970s a new group emerged called Hezbollah. “Hezbollah is a Lebanese
group of Shiite militants that have evolved into a major force in Lebanon’s society and politics.
It opposes the West, seeks to create a Muslim fundamentalist state modeled on Iran, and is a

better foe of Israel. The group’s name means Party of God. Hezbollah and its affiliates have
planned or been linked to a lengthy series of terrorist attacks against the US, Israel, and other
Western targets. Hezbollah has been responsible for launching rocket attacks against Israel from
southern Lebanon, which made it a safe haven for terrorist organization to this day. Its actions
resulted in Israel invading Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah and the PLO operating from Lebanon.
It was during the conflict in Lebanon that the tactic of using suicide bombers became a preferred
method of attacking the superior Israeli forces. “An initial cease-fire was declared, which
allowed the PLO to relocate to neighboring countries with the safety of thousands of Palestinian
refugees being guaranteed; however, a large-scale massacre occurred in the refugee camps of
Sabra and Shatila that outraged the Arab world.” 2
With the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Lebanon and Jordan giving up its claim to the West Bank, the Palestinians took matters into
their own hands and began to organize a resistance movement within Israel. “In December 1987,
a mass uprising against the Israeli occupation began in the occupied Palestinian territory (the
Intifadah). Methods used by the Israeli forces during the uprising resulted in mass injuries and
heavy loss of life among the civilian Palestinian population.”3
PALESTINIAN INTIFADAH OF 1987-1994
“Relations between Israel and the Palestinians entered a new phase in the 1980s with the
Intifadah, a series of uprisings in the occupied territories that included demonstrations, strikes,
and rock throwing attacks on Israeli soldiers. ” 4
The Intifadah was a result of events that
occurred during the creation of Israel, its subsequent decades in relation to its Arab neighbors,
and the conditions that led to the first Intifadah in the late 1980s. Most Palestinians living in the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank lived in extreme poverty levels, high unemployment, judicial
mistreatment by the Israelis, and are politically powerless to determine their fate. As a result,
these conditions bread the Intifadah. The harsh response by the Israeli government drew
criticism from both the US and the UN. The goal of the Intifadah was for the world to recognize
the plight of the Palestinian people, its desire for a Palestinian state and a resolution of issues that
have been plaguing the area for decades. The issues included (1) Right of return for Palestinian
refugees to Israel, (2) Status of the occupied territories, and (3) Political empowerment for the
Palestinian people. With the series of uprisings, came employment of suicide bombers that
would terrorize Israeli people. This led to an escalation in the violence even while peace talks
were occurring simultaneously.
THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING
The Intifadah was a Palestinian response to
Israeli injustices. Peaceful protests turned violent,
as Palestinians threw rocks and Molotov cocktails
at Israeli police and military forces. Israeli forces
responded with non-lethal means, but escalated to
using rubber bullets and live rounds killing scores
of protesters. The majority of casualties were
young men; however, children, women, and older
Palestinians were being caught in the crossfire.
As the uprising continued, the local economy
Palestinians throwing rocks and burning tires.

collapsed as people were unable to shop in the market, homes were destroyed, and children
unable to attend school.
The Palestinians feel they have many reasons for their Intifadah. One reason is that
“Israel denies full human rights to the Palestinians. In the meantime, Jewish settlers enjoy the
full privileges and protection of the Jewish state. Palestinians must seek the permission of the
Israelis as they go about their daily lives. Travel outside and within Palestine requires an
“occupation signed permit”-this also occurs when Palestinians need to travel to pray.” 5
Another
reason is that “Israel controls all the ports and roads into and out of Palestine. Israel has not
allowed the Palestinians to build their own port. Every shipment of food and medicine must pass
under the Israeli supervision and approval. On many occasions Israel collectively punishes the
Palestinians by closing the roads and ports.”6
Palestinians also protest the use of torture by the
Israelis. They claim “Israel law effectively permits the use of torture. Their statute books refer
to it as physical pressure.”7
On a religious and spiritual matter, the Palestinians protest the Israel
occupation of Jerusalem. They claim that “Israel has desecrated the sanctuary of Muslim and
Christian shrines regularly. Aqsa Mosque was nearly burned down in 1969. It is still threatened
with demolition by the Israelis. Frequently, Muslims are prevented from attending prayers by
the Israeli army.” 8
“Though many claim that Yassir
Arafat was responsible for starting the
Intifadah, the reality was that it was started-
spontaneously by young
Palestinians without any
PLO involvement. Arafat
asserted his leadership of the
Intifadah only after it was
well underway and had
attracted international
attention.”9
The violent response by the Israeli’s brought about worldwide condemnation for
their actions and for the plight of the Palestinian people. Support for the Palestinians would
grow until events in 1990, which forced the world to reevaluate the Palestinian cause.
RESOLUTION OF THE INFITADA
In August of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait claiming it as its 19th
province. In response, the
US along with its coalition partners mobilized military forces to Saudi Arabia. This caused a
major rift in the Arab world as some countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Syria
mobilized forces against Saddam Hussein. For the Palestinians, Yassir Arafat publicly supported
Iraq and visited Saddam Hussein to express his support. Western nations feared that the two
were making an alliance to draw Israel into the war against Iraq, which would split the coalition.
Arafat’s support of Saddam lost him vital support in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and especially Syria.
The Coalition was able to defeat the Iraqis in 1991 with a 100-hour ground war. Because of
receiving support from the Arab members of the coalition, the US promised to focus on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

After a series of conferences on the
matter, the various parties compromised on
the Oslo Accord in 1993. The Oslo Accords
called for Israel to grant the Palestinians semi-
autonomy, eventual withdrawal from the
occupied authority, and allowed exiled leader
Yassir Arafat to return to the Gaza to establish
Palestinian Authority. “The Palestinian
Authority (PA) is an autonomous government
that was established by some early series of 1990s Israeli-Palestinian peace pacts to rule over
most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and probably become the basis for a full blown
Palestinian state later in the peace process. The PA lacks many powers associated with a state-
such as complete control of its territories-but responsible for providing such varied government
services as education, criminal justice, healthcare, and trash collection for some 3 million
Palestinians.”10
It was during the time of the peace negotiations that Palestinian groups splintered from
the PLO and began their opposition to any settlement with Israel. One group would stand out
among the rest as one of the most violent and feared Palestinian organizations. This group was
Hamas.
HAMAS AND THE SUICIDE ATTACKS
“Hamas (aka. Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement) is the
Palestinian’s major Muslim fundamentalist movement. With an extensive social service network
and a terrorist wing that plots suicide bombings in Israel, it is the main
opposition to Yassir Arafat’s Palestinian Authority, a determined foe of the
Israeli-Palestinian peace, and a major player in the current Middle East
Crisis.”11
“Hamas has made it abundantly clear that they are committed to
opposing any final peace with Israel and are seeking to challenge the
authority of the PA in order to lead the Palestinian people.”12
“It’s founder
and spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin was involved in the Muslim
Brotherhood and founded the Hamas organization with the goal of liberating all of Palestine to
create an Islamic state. Much of Hamas’ appeal comes from its social welfare programs which
include vocational training, health care and job creation. Hamas is particularly strong in Gaza,
where economic conditions are worse than in the West Bank.”13
“Hamas’ leadership is
dispersed throughout the Gaza strip and West Bank with a few
senior leaders residing in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf
States.”14
“Much of Hamas’ funding comes from Palestinian
expatriates, as well as from private donors in Saudi Arabia and
other oil-rich Persian Gulf states. Iran also provides significant
support, which some diplomats say could amount to between
$20-30 million dollars per year. Moreover, some Muslim
charities in the US, Canada, and Western Europe funnel money
into Hamas-backed social service groups.”15

“The first Hamas suicide bombing took place in April 1993, a few months before the
Oslo Accords.”16
The tactic employed by Hamas was to have operatives carry explosive belts
around their bodies and to detonate them when they were on Israeli buses, in crowded shopping
areas, and in shops. They used car bombs in crowded neighborhoods. One of the most
dangerous tactics was driving a car next to an Israeli bus and
then detonating it with little or no warning of the attack. “Hamas
recruits operatives and has them undergo an intensive religious
indoctrination, attend lectures, and undertake long fast. The
week before the bombing, two Hamas activists watch for any
signs of wavering. Shortly before the “scared explosion,” as
Hamas calls it, the bomber records a video testament. To draw
inspiration, he watches this video and the video made by his
predecessors repeatedly and then set off for his would-be
martyrdom after performing a ritual ablution and donning clean cloths. The bombers are assured
by Hamas clerics that their deaths will be painless, and they will be met in paradise by dozens of
virgins. The cost of an average bombing itself runs around $150.00 US dollars. Since 1994,
Hamas has dispatched more than 80 suicide bombers. The terrorists have blown up buses in
major Israeli cities, as well as shopping malls, cafes, and other civilian targets. Eventually,
Hamas’ suicide bombings became so widely accepted by the Palestinians, that Fatah began using
them to win back followers.” 17
CESSATION OF VIOLENCE
“In response to the increasing attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian group, a group of
extremist Israelis formed a terrorist group called the Kach and Kahane Chai, which was
responsible for the killing of 29 Muslim worshipers at the West Bank Mosque in 1994. The
Israeli government outlawed these groups. Members of this group are believed to be responsible
for the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.” 18
After the death of Yitzhak
Rabin and the establishment of the PA, the Intifadah slowly came to an end enforced by Yassir
Arafat when he began to crack down on extremist. This was short lived for six years later in
2000, a second Intifadah broke out.
AL-AQSA INTIFADA OF SEPTEMBER 2000
The second Intifada (uprising) began on September 28, 2000
when Ariel Sharon, the Israeli opposition leader, visited a shrine in
east Jerusalem -- a holy site for Muslims know as the Noble
Sanctuary (al-Aqsa Mosque) and by Jews as the Temple Mount.
Sharon claimed his visit would promote peace; however, backed by
over 1000-armed bodyguards, he called the area “eternal Israeli
territory”. The controversial comments and visit sparked riots and
violence between the Palestinians and Israelis.19
After many deaths
in the following weeks, Palestinian militants attacked Israeli civilians
for the first time in two years which ignited the current wave of
terror attacks.20
Al-Asqa Mosque in Jerusalem

On September 30, 2000 the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade formed as an offshoot of Fatah,
Yassir Arafat’s secular Palestinian nationalist movement. Al-Aqsa’s ideology is based on
Palestinian nationalism and not political Islam.21
Their name is derived from the al-Aqsa
Mosque because Muslim tradition believes that the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven
from it. Many of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade members were students during the first Intifada and
are heavily popular among poor Palestinians.22
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade’s main objective is to establish a Palestinian state with
Jerusalem as its capital. They attempt to drive out Israeli forces occupying the West Bank and
the Gaza strip by invoking terror in the form of shooting, ambushes, and car bombs. Initially, the
group vowed to only target Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
However, they shifted their focus to civilians in January 2002. Inspired by the popular support
Hamas and Islamic Jihad have received for attacks in Israel and Gaza, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
adopted suicide bombings (often targeting women and children) as their main tactic in early
2002. Since then, they have conducted more suicide attacks on Israelis than Hamas and Islamic
Jihad.23
On January 27, 2002, the first-ever female suicide bomber
detonated herself in the center of Jerusalem killing one person and
injuring 172 others. Some Palestinians argue that using women as
suicide bombers signifies a rising status for women in Arab
culture, while others say it suggests their marginalization in Arab
society. Nevertheless, women draw less suspicion than men. For
example, a woman wearing an explosive belt can be made to look
like she is pregnant and will therefore go through less rigorous
security checks.24
Some of the most severe suicide attacks include:25
• March 2, 2002: a suicide bomber detonated himself in a Beit Yisrael neighborhood in
Jerusalem during a bar-mitzvah celebration killing 10 and injuring more than 50
• March 21, 2002: a suicide bomber detonated a bomb packed with metal spikes and nails
in a Jerusalem shopping center killing 3 and injuring 86
• March 27, 2002: a suicide bomber detonated himself in a crowded dining room of the
Park Hotel in Netanya killing 30 and injuring 140; nicknamed the “Passover Massacre”
• April 12, 2002: a female suicide bomber detonated herself at a bus stop next to
Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market killing 7 and injuring 107 (to include 9 Arabs)
• June 18, 2002: a suicide bomber detonated a bag stuffed with ball bearings in a bus at
Beit Safafa killing 19 (to include schoolchildren) and injuring 74
• November 28, 2002: a suicide bomber detonated himself in the lobby of Israeli-owned
Paradise Hotel (frequented almost exclusively by Israeli tourists) in Kenya killing 13 (3
Israelis, 10 Kenyans) and injuring 81 (21 Israelis, 60 Kenyans)
January 27, 2002 suicide bombing
aftermath

• January 5, 2003: two suicide bombers detonated themselves near Old Central Bus Station
in Tel Aviv killing 23 (to include 8 foreign nationals) and injuring 120
• August 19, 2003: a suicide bomber detonated himself on a bus in Jerusalem killing 23
(several children) and injuring 136
• February 22, 2004: a suicide bomber detonated himself on a bus in Jerusalem killing 8
and injuring 70; the bombing took place one day prior to the start of hearings at the
International Court of Justice regarding the Israeli West Bank barrier
1
“History of the Palestine Problem,” available from
http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/ngo/history.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
2
The Council of Foreign Relation, “Terrorism: Questions and Answers,” Encyclopedia Online of
Terrorism from the Council of Foreign Relations; available from http://www.cfr.org; Internet;
accessed 6 May 2004.
3
Ibid.
4
“Interactive Timeline of Palestinian Conflict,” available from http://www.palestinereport.org;
5
Ibid
6
“Why Intifadah?” available from http://www.intifada.com/w.html; Internet; accessed 6 May
2004.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
The Council of Foreign Relation, “Terrorism: Questions and Answers’” Encyclopedia Online
of Terrorism from the Council of Foreign Relations; available from http://www.cfr.org; Internet;
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Paul Jabber, “Impact of the War on Terror on certain aspects of US Policy in the Middle East,”
27 December 2001; available from http://www.odci.gov/nic/confreport_warterror.html; Internet;

14
“Strategic Forecasting, Hotspots-Middle East,” available from
http://www.stratfor.biz/hotspots.neo?showhotspots=1&hrId=7; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
15
Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,
Appendix B-Background of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Available from
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ris/P/gtrpt/2003/311711.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
16
The Council of Foreign Relation, “Terrorism: Questions and Answers’” Encyclopedia Online
of Terrorism from the Council of Foreign Relations; available from http://www.cfr.org; Internet;
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
“Al-Aqsa Intifada,” available from http://www.en.wikipedia.org; Internet; accessed 6 May
2004.
20
“Attacks since start of Al-Aqsa Intifada – A CNN Timeline,” available from
http://www.cnn.com/202/world/meast/06/20/terror.attacks.chronology/; Internet; accessed 6 May
2004.
21
“Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” available from http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/alaqsa/;
22
“In the Spotlight: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” available from
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aqsa-pr; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
23
Ibid.
24
http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Female_suicide_bomber/; Internet; accessed 6 May 2004.
25
“Recent Terrorist Attacks in Israel,” available from http://www.adl.org/Israel/israel_attacks/;

CHAPTER 3: SUICIDE BOMBINGS IN IRAQ
FIRST IRAQI USE OF SUICIDE BOMBING IN COMBAT
On 29 March 2003, a suicide bomber killed three soldiers from the Army’s 1st Brigade, 3rd
Infantry Division that were conducting checkpoint operations.
“Ali Jaffar Moussa Hamadi al-Nomani was the first Iraqi combatant known to stage a suicide
attack. Not even during the uprising against British rule did an Iraqi kill himself to destroy his
enemies. Nomani was also a Shia Muslim – a member of the same sect the Americans faithfully
believed to be their secret ally in their invasion of Iraq. Even the Iraqi government initially
wondered how to deal with his extraordinary action, caught between its desire to dissociate
themselves from an event that might remind the world of Osama bin Laden and its determination
to threaten the Americans with more such attacks.”1
The 50-year-old bomber was a soldier in the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and volunteered to fight in the
1991 Gulf War. Though he was overage for further
fighting, Nomani volunteered to fight the Coalition
invasion. Without telling his commander and in his
own car, he drove into the US checkpoint outside Najaf.
According to witnesses, a taxi stopped close to the
checkpoint, and the driver appeared to wave for help.
As soldiers approached the car, it exploded. According
to the current rules of engagement (ROE) the “taxi
driver” appeared to be non-threatening so the soldiers
approached to help him. The bomber’s technique
draws in potential victims by appearing unassuming while the soldiers’ desire to help the civilian
populace resulted in four deaths. The ROE was immediately changed, and US troops challenged
all civilians, more intensely, especially those in vehicles.
Shortly after the attack, the Iraqi government promised more attacks. "It's the blessed
beginning," said a statement released by the Iraqi government, alluding to the suicide attack.
"He wanted to teach the enemy a lesson in the manner used by our Palestinian brothers." Iraqi
Vice President Yassin Ramadan said there will be more suicide attacks in the weeks ahead.
"Any method that stops or kills the enemy will be used. What are they doing in our land? Let
them pack and go," he told a news conference. "The United States will turn the whole world to
martyrs against it. What do they expect? The Arabs and Muslims are not allowed to develop
missiles and bombs as powerful as theirs.” Thousands of Arab volunteers were arriving in Iraq
to fight the invading US and British forces, he added.2
Also following the attack, the Palestinian militant group Islamic Jihad announced that it had
sent suicide bombers to Iraq to help defend Baghdad. "Al-Quds Brigades [the military force of
Islamic Jihad] brings to our people and nation the good news of the arrival of its first martyrdom
to the heart of Baghdad," said a statement faxed to news organizations. "This is to fulfill the
holy duty of defending Arab and Muslim land," it said.3
Wreckage of US Checkpoint Bombing Near
Najaf

SECOND IRAQI SUICIDE BOMBING KILLS 3 SOLDIERS
On 2 April 2003 about 10 miles southwest of the Haditha Dam and 80 miles east of Syria, a
car exploded at a U.S. checkpoint. The three soldiers killed were members of the 3rd Battalion
of the 75th Ranger Regiment, based at Fort Benning, Ga.
"A pregnant female stepped out of the vehicle and began
screaming in fear," a US Central Command statement said. "At this
point the civilian vehicle exploded, killing three coalition force
members who were approaching the vehicle and wounding two
others."4
After the bombing, Iraqi television broadcast statements by the
two Iraqi women who blew themselves up in this attack. The
women and driver were killed by the blast.
"These are not military actions. These are terrorist actions," said
Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks, Central Command deputy director of
operations.
Both women were wearing long, loose-fitting dresses.
WORLD WIDE REACTIONS TO SUICIDE BOMBINGS IN IRAQ
The use of suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom was perceived in a multitude of
views. The US military was initially shocked by this tactic but quickly took active measures to
defend against these types of attacks. The Arab-Muslim people became more motivated for their
cause by these actions of their fellow Muslims.
Islamic Jihad will step up attacks in Israel as a show of support for Iraq -- a day after a
suicide attack wounded 49 Israelis outside a packed cafe. Sunday's blast in the coastal town of
Netanya appears to have thrust both Israelis and Palestinians
closer to the war in Iraq, with both sides making the connection to
that conflict after largely watching it from the sidelines. Islamic
Jihad said the Netanya bombing was "Palestine's gift to the heroic
people of Iraq" and that there would be more attacks.
However, the leader of a second Palestinian militia, the Al
Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade linked to Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement,
said Monday he has ordered a halt to all attacks on Israelis for the
duration of the Iraq war. Military analyst Roni Shaked wrote in
the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot that the Iraqis seemed to be
copying the tactics of Palestinian militants. "It is only a question
of time before the culture of suicide in Basra and Baghdad —
exactly as in Gaza and Nablus — becomes an inseparable part of
the war." Islamic Jihad said it has dispatched several dozen
Palestinian volunteers from Arab countries to Baghdad to carry
out suicide missions against American and British soldiers. "It's
Rubble of Iraqi Military
Base Near Haditha Dam
Palestinian jumping over a
burning homemade Israeli flag
during a demonstration against
the war in Iraq

not many fighters, just symbolic," Azzam said. 5

SUICIDE ATTACKS CONTINUE AFTER FALL OF SADDAM’S REGIME
Just days after the fall of Saddam’s regime and during the initial stages of US occupation
to secure Baghdad US forces are struck by two more suicide bombings. One attack took place in
Saddam City in northeast Baghdad killing one soldier. The suicide bomber approached soldiers
manning a checkpoint and detonated himself. The other attack killed four Marines manning a
checkpoint near the Palestine Hotel.
A man approached a US checkpoint near the Palestine Hotel and exploded a bomb,
killing and injuring many marines. The attack occurred near the hotel where most foreign
journalists are staying and close to the square where a statue of President Saddam was
toppled on Wednesday. A US Marine captain, Joe Plenzler, said that "a man strapped
with explosives approached a marine checkpoint and detonated himself".6
These attacks were just the beginning of an outbreak of suicide bombing attacks across
the entire region directed at coalition forces’ occupation of Iraq.
IRAQI SUICIDE BOMBINGS DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT PHASE
INTRODUCTION
A “modern” suicide attack is defined as a violent, politically motivated attack, carried out
in a deliberate state of awareness by a person who blows himself up together with his chosen
target. The pre-meditated certain death of the perpetrator is the pre-condition for the success of
the attack.7
Modern suicide terrorism is unique and unlike its predecessors. In the last two
decades suicide attacks have been carried out by one or more persons who were aware that they
are “human time-bombs.” The suicide bomber carries the explosives on his body or in a vehicle
driven by himself and, by personal choice and with full self-awareness, he approaches a
previously chosen target and blows himself up. The suicide bomber himself, in accordance with
the prevailing circumstances, chooses the time and place to execute the explosion so that it will
cause the maximum damage to the target. Special consideration needs to be taken when
directing soldiers how to identify and react to suicide bombers.
BACKGROUND
Although the military operation in Iraq was swift and successful, the United States has
encountered several challenges since the fall of Baghdad in May 2003. The phenomenon of
suicide bombing had little impact on the Iraqi population prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
regime. Although funding and a safe haven were often given to organized groups that committed
these actions (Al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam), Hussein rarely used such tactics due to his need to
have positive control over military operations. The first bombings began nine days after fighting
erupted and by March 2004 had claimed 660 lives8
. In the past year at least 24 suicide bombings
have been committed including four where more than one attacker struck at the same time.
The goals of these attacks are to deliver two messages; to the Iraqis they are saying as long as
you link your future to the West, there will be no security. To the West, the message is that there
is a huge price to pay for staying in Iraq.9
There are two types of suicide attacks that have been
in evidence in Iraq: those specifically directed against United States military forces, and those

specifically directed against noncombatant targets.10
Early suicide bombers primarily focused on
military forces due to early success and shock value. As attacks increased, soldier’s self-
protection and skills had improved, and attacks began to lose effectiveness. At that time,
bombers started engaging noncombatant targets such as embassies, political officials,
international agencies, police stations, hotels and mosques.
SUICIDE TECHNIQUES AND IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS
The terrorist tactic of choice is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). An IED is a device
placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.
They are inexpensive to produce, low risk for perpetrator and an attention getter.11
There are six
primary delivery methods for suicide IEDs: the human-borne suicide IED (also known as the
suicide bodysuit); the vehicle-borne suicide IED; the motorcycle-borne suicide IED; naval craft-
borne suicide IED; scuba diver-borne suicide IED; and aerial-borne (microlight, glider, mini-
helicopter) suicide IED. All these categories have been used in South Asia and the Middle
East.12
Vehicle-borne and human-borne deliveries are the two preferred methods used in Iraq.
Vehicle-borne attacks were the first used
by terrorist groups. Ambulances, cabs and
small trucks have all been used to deliver
explosives to target areas. Areas that
explosives can be hidden in include but are
not limited to; under the dashboard, under the
seats, the cargo area, the front grill, all wheel
wells, the exhaust system on the undercarriage
and the gas tanks. Some clues to look for are;
lights that don’t work, new or broken welds,
unusually clean components, thick floors and
spare items/tanks that appear to have no use.13
Human-borne attackers can carry explosive devices up to 50kg
plus ball bearings or shrapnel. The only identifiable characteristics to
the bombers are that they wear coats or large garments such as saris
or sports jerseys. Their actions may include; obvious or awkward
attempts to “blend” into a group, repeated handling of parts of
clothes, attempts to stay away from security personnel and hesitant,
nervous muttering.14
PROFILE AND MOTIVATION
There is no clear-cut profile for a suicide bomber. Typically, they are male, early 20’s, from
diverse social backgrounds. They have average or above average education and alter appearance
to blend in with their surroundings.15
Recently, the percentage of female suicide bombers has
been on the rise. Many feel that this is due to the status that is placed with being a martyr or
“Shahid.”
Suicide vest with pull cords.

From the perspective of the individual attacker, the act of “martyrdom” may offer an
opportunity to impress an audience and be remembered, an act that may be a powerful incentive
for individuals who perceive their lives as having little significance otherwise.16
Suicide
attackers are sometimes widows or bereaved siblings who wish to take vengeance for their loved
one’s violent death. In the case of widows, for example, the death of the spouse may cut the
woman off from productive society and/or leave her with a sense of hopelessness especially in
very traditional societies.
OPERATIONAL PHASES AND INDICATORS
Terrorist groups need seven “operational” tools to sustain a series of successful attacks:
command and control, weapons, operational space, operational security, training, intelligence,
and money.17
Command and control is the mechanism that terrorist groups use to plan, coordinate, and
execute their attacks. Notably, terrorist leaders often attempt to build a degree of redundancy,
which also increases the risk of leaks or penetrations. Since 1968, terrorists have employed a
wide range of weapons, from knives to assault rifles to toxic chemicals. Explosives still remain
the most common weapon used by terrorist groups. From April 2001 to April 2002,
approximately 60 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide included the use of bombs or other
explosive devices. Operational space is the space need to plan, train for, and execute their
attacks. It can range from urban neighborhoods to state sanctuaries, and relies on the active and
passive support of communities—local, national, and transnational. Operational security is
distinct from command and control or operational space because it incorporates the ability of
terrorist groups to keep security forces from discovering the plans and people involved in a
particular attack. It is expected that terrorists expend considerable resources to protect the
integrity of their operations. In addition to weapons and reliable weapon sources, Training is
needed to provide their members with the technical skills to conduct attacks successfully. These
skills could include bomb making, weapon handling, and even operational security techniques.
Extensive rehearsals and “dry runs” are necessary to ensure stealth and speed during attack.
Intelligence is defined as the basic information that terrorists need to identify a potential target,
conduct reconnaissance on target to identify access weaknesses and the constant surveillance of
target required up to the attack. Extensive rehearsals and “dry runs” are necessary to ensure
stealth and speed during attack. Money is the financial resource that aids a group in conducting a
series of successful attacks. It is best considered an operational tool, rather than a tool that
promotes group cohesion over the long term. The intelligence phase is the best time to spot a
possible attack. Indicators could be: Personnel observed parking, standing, or loitering in the
same area over a multiple day period with no apparent reasonable explanation, dry runs to
identify hazards or security checkpoints and personnel using or carrying
video/camera/observation equipment with high magnification lenses around access/ check points.
1
http://www.middleeastinfo.org/article.php?sid=2365
2
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june03/suicide_3-27.html

3
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june03/suicide_3-27.html
4
http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/5561924.htm
5
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-31-palestinian_x.htm
6
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/story.jsp?story=396045
7
Schweitzer, Yoram, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics”, ICT website
(www.ict.org.il), 21st
April 2000.
8
“AP Tally: Iraq Suicide Bombs Killed 660,”Government Custom Wire; 03/09/2004; http://
search.epnet.com/direct.asp?CX2004079W2306&db=mth
9
Cronin, Audrey Kurth Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, August 28, 2003
10
Unit Antiterrorism Advisor Course, USAMPS, ALETD, 2003.
11
“Suicide terrorism: a global threat”,
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtml
12
Vehicle Inspection Checklist, 1st
Edition, pssubgroup@TSWG.gov
13
“Terror: Only Together Cam We Stop It”, Israel Pamplete, Sep 02
14
“Likely Suicide Bombers Include Some Profiles You’d Never Suspect”, Wall Street Journal-
Eastern Edition, 4/4/2003, Vol. 241, Issue 66, pB1.
15
Atran, Scott “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, 7 March 2003, Vol.
299, p. 1534.
16
“The Dynamic Terrorist Threat An Assessment of Group Motivations
and Capabilities in a Changing World”, Cragin, Kim and Sara A. Daly, Prepared for the
United States Air Force, Published 2004 by the RAND Corporation,
www.rand.org/publications/MR/MRI1782.pdf.

Chechnya
CHAPTER 4: EMPLOYMENT OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS BY INSURGENTS IN
CECHNYA, RUSSIA
SITUATIONAL NARRATIVE. Suicide bombings are used as a tool of resistance by the
Chechen separatists to achieve Chechnya’s independence from Russian Federation.
HISTORICAL VENUE.
The first Chechen War began in 1991.
Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the
former Soviet Air Force general Djohar Dudaev,
formally declared Chechnya’s independence1
.
Initially, Russian leadership did not formally
react and let Chechnya maintain its de-facto
independence until December of 1994, at which
time a military force was sent into the region to
restore Russian constitutional rule. During the
battle for Chechnya’s capital of Grozny from 31
December 1994 to 6 March 1995, Dudaev’s
forces offered fierce resistance and caused tremendous casualties to the Russian side. After the
Russians captured Grozny, Chechen separatists launched guerrilla operations from bases in the
mountainous region of southern Chechnya. They conducted ambushes against the Russian
forces and launched several hostage-taking operations into southern Russia that were the cause
of great embarrassment to Yeltsyn’s government. Due to the extremely low popularity of the
war in Russia, coupled with the abysmal state of the Russian Armed Forces, on 31 August 1996
the Russian government representatives signed the infamous Hasav-Yurt Pact with the acting
Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov (Djohar Dudaev was eliminated by the Russians a few
months earlier). They agreed on face-saving measures that provided for withdrawal of the
Russian troops and allowed the Chechens to maintain de-facto independence2
. There were no
reported cases of suicide bombings during what came to be known as the First Chechen War.
The second Chechen War
began in n September of 1999.
After the Chechen incursion into
Dagestan (a neighboring
autonomous republic in Russian
Federation), the Russian
government launched a second
expedition into Chechnya with the
purpose of reestablishing the
constitutional order once and for
all3
. Even though Russian forces
were better equipped, trained and
led, the separatists once again
employed guerilla tactics. Despite
the fact that Grozny was captured
Djohar Dudaev Aslan Maskhadov

relatively quickly and bloodlessly4
, the Russians were unable to deal a decisive blow to the
Chechen guerillas. The Chechen guerillas to this day continue to ambush Russian military
convoys and launch terrorist raids against Russian garrisons and government installations in
Chechnya and in Russia proper5
. It is in this context that suicide bombings came into
prominence.
During the second period of its quasi-independence from 1996 to 1999, Chechnya saw a
significant influx of international hard-line Muslim volunteers. They were primarily from
former Soviet Muslim republics and Arab countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Europe.
These volunteers brought with them the ideology of Wahhabism – a very strict brand of Islam
that is dominant in Saudi Arabia. Whereas the Chechen separatist resistance in the first war had
only nationalistic character, during the second war it increasingly acquired fundamentalist
Muslim undertones6
.
The Chechen resistance is nominally headed by Aslan Maskhadov, the last president of
Chechnya. According to pro-independence sources, he was legally elected by the people of
Chechnya in 1997. Maskhadov maintains a network of emissars in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar
and Malaysia, as well as in Europe and the US7
. The resistance is operationally organized by the
Sharia Committee of Defense and is tactically led by field commanders who plan operations (to
include the suicide operations) at tactical and operational levels8
. The degree of coordination
between these commanders varies greatly. The most prominent commanders are Shamil Basaev9
and Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem, a.k.a. Khattab, a Saudi by nationality. He was an active
protagonist of Wahhabism in Chechnya, and is reported to have had close dealings with Bin
Laden. Khattab was eventually eliminated by FSB in March-April of 2002.
On 15 February 2000, the
prominent Qatari Muslim cleric,
Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi issued a
fatwa stating that the Chechens are
fighting a jihad and, therefore,
whoever dies in the struggle will
become a shaheed10
. This fatwa is
believed to have made suicide
bombings acceptable to the Chechen
separatists11
.
EMPLOYMENT OF SUICIDE
BOMBERS
As mentioned earlier, the
Chechen guerrillas conducted
suicide attacks inside Chechnya proper as well as in Russia (including Moscow). Since methods
of execution of the attacks in Russia proper are quite different from the methods used by the
separatists in Chechnya, this study will only concentrate on the attacks that took place within the
borders of Chechnya. The two most prominent are: the destruction of the main Russian
government building in Grozny on 27 December 2002 and the attack on a local government
compound in the town of Znamenskoe on 12 May 2003. In both instances, Basaev claimed the
responsibility12
.
Khattab Shamil Basaev

CHOICE OF THE TARGET
The choice of the target must be considered in relation to the separatists’ overall tactical,
operational and strategic objectives.
Tactical objectives. Both attacks targeted local and regional seats of the Russian
government that simultaneously served as police and the FSB (Federal Security Service)
headquarters. The obvious objective was to hit as many government agencies as possible while
causing the maximum possible number of casualties and level of destruction.
Operational objectives. The objective is to create an unfavorable security environment
by intimidating the Russian authorities, exacting vengeance on the Chechens who collaborate
with the Russians and by creating a rift between the authorities and the local Chechen
population.
Strategic objectives. The overall objective of the suicide attacks, as well as of all other
Chechen guerilla operations, is to achieve the independence of Chechnya from Russian
Federation.
EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS
Methods of delivery. Both operations used military-model cargo trucks loaded with
explosives. During the attack in Znamenskoe, a KAMAZ 6-ton cargo truck moving at a high
speed rammed the security gate that controlled access to the target area leaving no time for
security personnel to react in any meaningful way13
.
2-story residential buildings
2-story residential buildings
KAMAZ truck
loaded with explosives
government compound
police
station
grassyfield
ground
zero
police
checkpoint
market isle
market isle
zone of complete destruction
zone of partial destruction
local
administration
agriculture
depart ment
local
FSB
office
direction from which the operation was videotaped
Suicide attack in Znamenskoe on 12 May 2002
In Grozny, a combination of a UAZ jeep and a KAMAZ cargo truck were used. The
Kavkaz-Center separatist website claims that the perpetrators penetrated for layers of police

checkpoints before reaching the target. Both vehicles detonated within several seconds of each
other with UAZ detonating first followed by KAMAZ 30 seconds later14
.
Executors. Both operations were “family ventures.” In Znamenskoe, it was a young female
accompanied by two young males15
. It is very likely that the female was a “black widow” i.e. a
widow whose husband became a shaheed while fighting the Russians. While there is no account
of how they were recruited, similar known cases suggest that all three were isolated right after
the death of their loved one and they were subjected to a protracted period of vigorous religion-
based mental conditioning.
In Grozny, it was a 43-year-old father and his 17-
year-old daughter riding KAMAZ while the younger 15
year old son drove the UAZ. According to the
separatists’ internet-based sources, his wife was killed
by the Russian aerial bombardment during the attack
on Grozny in 199916
. There is also no account of how
they were recruited to execute the operation.
Additionally, a case of 43-year old male choosing to
serve in the role of suicide bomber is very unusual for
Chechnya.
Explosives. In Znamenskoe, the explosion left a crater 12 meters in diameter and 5-6 meters
in depth. It is estimated that the explosive charge equaled approximately 1.5 metric tons of TNT
equivalent17
. It was later discovered that a homemade mixture of niter, cement and aluminum
dust was actually used18
. In Grozny, the explosion left a crater 15 meters in diameter and 10
meters in depth19
. According to the separatists’ claims,
the UAZ jeep was packed with 600 kg of military-
grade TNT and the KAMAZ truck carried additional 4
metric tons of TNT20
.
Planning and external control. The operation in
Grozny was planned, organized and executed by
Shamil Basaev’s “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance
and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs”
organization21
. In 2003 US Secretary of State Powell
had officially designated the Riyadus-Salikhin
organization as a terrorist organization22
. The attack
in Znamenskoe was organized by either Basaev, or the
late Khatabb’s replacement Abu Ahl’-Valid (although
Basaev claimed the responsibility for both
operations).23
According to a variety of sources, all
three vehicles in question were either stolen from the
pro-Russian Chechen police or Russian military, or
acquired through the black-market channels24,25
.
There is speculation that in both cases some security
personnel (i.e. pro-Moscow Chechen policemen) were
bribed in advance to allow the trucks to pass through
UAZ
KAMA Z
Attack in Grozny, as videotaped by the co-conspirators
Crater Left by the Explosion in Grozny

the checkpoint. In the case of Znamenskoe, it is known that a truck was stopped at a checkpoint
at the entrance to the town and the driver had to show his ID and drivers’ license. However,
whoever checked the vehicle occupants’ documents did not bother to look inside the cargo
compartment26
.
During both operations, personnel were present near the scene to monitor the flow of
operation27
Additionally, in Znamenskoe, the truck detonated several seconds too early. By
some accounts, it had about 60 meters to go before reaching the buildings. This opens room for
suggestion that there was a remotely detonating device and that someone other than the driver
detonated the explosives28
. In both cases, the operations were recorded, and the video feeds were
posted on a separatist website29
.
EFFECTS
Level of destruction. In Znamenskoe, the FSB building (which was assumed to be the
primary target) sustained a large amount of damage. Some buildings in the residential area were
completely destroyed30
. In Grozny, the main government building was turned into a burned out
skeleton.31
Casualties of the attack in Grozny
1
Evgeny Putilov, Hronologia Chechenskoi Voini (Chronology of the Chechen War),(website
www.genshtab.ru “Genshtab”).
2
Ibid.
3
Genady Troshev, Moya Voina – Chechenskiy Dnevnik Okopnogo Generala (My War – The
Chechen Diary of a Foxhole General), (Moscow: Vagrius Publishing House, 2001) 113-117
4
Ibid., 136-147.
5
Ibid., 166-177.

6
Ibid., 76-81.
7
www.chchen.org - Historical and Cultural Heritage of Chechens
8
http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/article.php?id=20494 –Kavkaz Center – News, Facts, Analysis
9
Genady Troshev, Moya Voina – Chechenskiy Dnevnik Okopnogo Generala (My War – The
Chechen Diary of a Foxhole General), (Moscow: Vagrius Publishing House, 2001) 37-39
10
“Ask the Scholar” section of Islam Online at
http://www.islamonline.net/fatwaapplication/english/display.asp?hFatwaID=18231
11
Svoboda Vibora (Freedom of Choice), (http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/article.php?id=20099 -
Kavkaz Center – News, Facts, Analysis)
12
Various articles from http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/photo/grozny_blast/page1.shtml -
Kavkaz Center – News, Facts, Analysis)
13
Vzorvannaya Planerka (Detonated Meeting),(
http://www.compromat.ru/main/chechya/znamenskoe.htm - Kompromat website)
14
Fotodokumenti ob Unichtozhenii Okupacionnoi Administratsii (Photo & Documents about
Destruction of the Occupation Administration), 27 December 2002,
(http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/photo/grozny_blast/page1.shtml - - Kavkaz Center – News,
Facts, Analysis).
15
http://www.compromat.ru/main/chechya/znamenskoe.htm - Kompromat website)
16
Fotodokumenti ob Unichtozhenii Okupacionnoi Administratsii (Photo & Documents about
Destruction of the Occupation Administration), 27 December 2002,
(http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/photo/grozny_blast/page1.shtml - - Kavkaz Center – News,
Facts, Analysis).
17
http://www.compromat.ru/main/chechya/znamenskoe.htm - Kompromat website).
18
Teract Organizovali Arabi (Arabs Organized That Terrorist Act),
http://www.compromat.ru/main/chechya/znamenskoe1.htm -Kompromat website.
19
Zdanie Pravitel’stva Chechni Vzorvano Shahidami na Mashinah KAMAZ and UAZ (The
Chechen Government Building Was detonated by Shaheeds Who Used KAMAZ and
UAZ),(Novosti Rossii (News of Russia) website,
http://www.newsru.com/russia/27Dec2002/exo.html).
20
Kadirovskaya Administraciya Unichtozhena Brigadoy Riyadus-Salikhin (Kadyrov’s
Administration Was Destroyed by Riyadus-Salikhin Brigade),(

http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/article.php?id=3878 - Kavkaz Center – News, Facts,
Analysis).
21
Various articles from http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/photo/grozny_blast/page1.shtml -
Kavkaz Center – News, Facts, Analysis).
22
Patterns of Global Terrorism, Eurasia Overview, Russia, (Official website of the US
Department of State -http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31621.htm).
23
http://www.compromat.ru/main/chechya/znamenskoe1.htm -Kompromat website
24
Kadirovskaya Administraciya Unichtozhena Brigadoy Riyadus-Salikhin (Kadyrov’s
Administration Was Destroyed by Riyadus-Salikhin Brigade),(
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/article.php?id=3878 - Kavkaz Center – News, Facts,
Analysis).
25
26
Ibid.,
27
“Kavkaz Center” website repeats this claim in various articles. Additionally, the website’s
video section features video recordings of both operations.
28
http://www.compromat.ru/main/chechya/znamenskoe1.htm -Kompromat website.
29
Video section of the website http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/russ/photo.html - Kavkaz Center –
News, Facts, Analysis).
.
30
31
Zdanie Pravitel’stva Chechni Vzorvano Shahidami na Mashinah KAMAZ and UAZ (The
Chechen Government Building Was detonated by Shaheeds Who Used KAMAZ and
UAZ),(Novosti Rossii (News of Russia) website,
http://www.newsru.com/russia/27Dec2002/exo.html).

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION, THE DYNAMIC MENACE
By their very nature, suicide bombers are an extremely dangerous enemy. The
willingness to sacrifice their lives to kill others and damage property makes combating the threat
a difficult task. It has also been shown that suicide bombers are dynamic in their operations and
methodology. They change tactics, targets, and delivery methods in response to our policies,
which adds to the difficulty of deterring or interdicting their operations. Education is the one
thing that can help our forces identify suicide bombers and make a defensive plan that will have
the best probability of stopping them.
This guide is a comprehensive resource that provides the data necessary for commanders
and soldiers to combat suicide bombers. The history chapters not only show how prevalent the
problem is in the world today, but also provide background information on terrorist groups and
some tactics they have employed in the past. Knowledge of history cannot stop tactics that
constantly evolve and change, but it can form the basis of an understanding on specific groups
and regions.
To compliment the historical section this book has also provided a statistical profile of a
typical suicide bomber. Although there are trends in the data that suggest a semi-ubiquitous
suicide bomber, caution must be taken to not stereotype these terrorists as they continue to use
bombers that will have the best chance of defeating our defenses and expectations. To aid in the
education of how to identify our high value targets and how to protect them, the focused IPB,
doctrinal suicide bomber template, and considerations for the defense chapters provide general
information that planners and commanders may use when defending against suicide bombers.
Detailed information on blast effects and a recommended blast overlay are included to
provide the reader with specific tools for use in the field. And lastly, the book includes a sample
briefing on suicide bombers that can be given to all soldiers during the pre-deployment phase of
training for operational deployments.
Terrorism may never fully be controlled. Even a country with refined anti-terrorism
techniques, such as Israel, is not successful at stopping or deterring all suicide attacks. Israel has,
however, through education and experience, developed effective ant-terrorism policies. This
book is intended to focus on education, and hopefully, through the application of the tools and
information contained herein, form the basis of understanding for identifying and combating
suicide bombers.

Can you identify the bomber? The lady on the left is
just moments from blowing herself up and killing her
target.
APPENDIX A: PROFILE AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, WHAT DOES A SUICIDE
BOMBER LOOK LIKE?
A suicide bomber does not fit any
single or specific mold. The
graphs below describe suicide
bombers by statistically
quantified attributes. Our data
presents a historical basis used to
identify potential bombers by
extremist group and/or religious
affiliations, age, gender,
education level (secular and
religious), and marital status.
Extremist groups and religious factions commit most suicide bombings. Often these
groups indicate the possibility of future attacks to receive added exposure to their cause. When
considering the following data, keep in mind that terrorist groups constantly change their
doctrine in response to changes in security. Although the statistical data can help identify and
typical bomber, terrorist organizations will choose a method and type of person that will most
likely defeat security measures.
Homicide Bomber Wafa Idris

3.7
30.1
26.4
39.8
Hamas Fatah
PIJ PFLP
2000-2003
3.7
30.1
26.4
39.8
Hamas Fatah
PIJ PFLP
2000-2003
Figure 1: Percentage of total terrorist attacks between 2000 and 2003 perpetrated by each
terrorist group.
Figure 2: Percentage of Bombers by age.
36%
53%
47%
35%
17%
12%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
16-21 22-27 27-UP
Suicide Non-Suicide

Figure 3: Average education type of bombers.
Figure 4: Marital Status of bombers.
84% 80%
16% 20%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Unmarried Married
Suicide Non-Suicide
17%
36%
83%
64%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Secular Religious
Suicide Non-Suicide

Figure 5: Average gender of bombers.
99%
1%
97%
3%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Suicide Non-Suicide
Male Female

Composition C4
Trigger device
APPENDIX B: TYPES OF BOMBS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Suicide bombs are inexpensive, accurate, and
effective. Costing about $150, the bomb consists of the
explosive substance, fragmentation, and an initiation
device.1
The most common types of explosives are
TATP (triacetone triperoxide), TNT (trinitrotoluene),
and composition C4 or other types of explosives. 2
TATP is widely available and simple, but
dangerous, to prepare. Its components can easily be
procured without arousing suspicion. Most household
stores stock the items
needed to produce TATP: hydrogen peroxide (used to
bleach hair), acetone (used to remove nail polish), and an
electrolyte solvent. TATP also has the advantage over other explosives since it cannot be
detected by bomb-sniffing dogs.3
TNT is a stronger explosive than TATP. However, it
cannot be produced in home conditions and is, therefore, not a
convenient explosive for suicide bombers. Sources of TNT
include old mines, artillery shells, bombs, stolen military stocks, or
illegally imports. Suicide bombers using TNT normally use a bag
or suitcase instead of a vest or belt. TNT requires real TNT
detonators to initiate the explosion.4
C4 is far more explosive than TATP and roughly 20%
stronger than TNT. Considerably more difficult to obtain than
TATP or TNT, suicide bombers rarely have a chance to use C4.
However, it can be molded into any shape which makes it easy to
conceal under clothing.5
Since suicide bombs use relatively small
amounts of explosives, the
actual explosion is moderately
small. Most of the injuries caused in the explosion come
from the fragmentation of the jacket and its contents. Ball
bearings 3-7 millimeters in diameter are the most dangerous
and most commonly used pieces of shrapnel. Other
shrapnel types include nuts, bolts, nails, and screws. Nuts
and washers are frequently glued together to form tiny
plates that are easily concealed. Once the bomb explodes,
fragments are launched in all directions creating a flying
wall of lethal projectiles.6
Suicide bombers use four types of initiation devices
to detonate the explosive. Trigger / toggle switches are normally located in the pocket or in the
hand of the bomber. Pressure pads can be located anywhere on the body. Some triggers may
operate on a pressure release that could set off the bomb when the bomber is neutralized. Timers
coupled with switches give the bomber an automatic countdown to detonation. An accomplice
monitoring the bomber can remotely activate radio-controlled triggers using a cell phone or other
types of RF devices.
17-yr old girl killed by nail

SUICIDE BOMB CATEGORIES
Worldwide, suicide bombings are categorized into three basic groups:7
Type I – Carried in bag, box, or another object
Type II – Worn under or as part of clothing
Type III – Concealed in vehicle
Type I devices include explosives and fragmentation
usually weigh from 5-15 kilograms (kg). The bomb is
usually concealed in ordinary everyday items, such as
backpacks, duffel bags, or boxes, that blend into the target
environment. For example, on August 9, 2001, a suicide
bomber entered a Jerusalem restaurant and detonated an
IED concealed in a guitar case. The guitar case did not
draw attention because the restaurant was near a music
academy and numerous music shops. Normally, the trigger
is a push-button switch connected to a wire from the
explosive and into the hand carrying the device.8
Type II devices are typically ½-10 kg in size,
depending on the ability to disguise the device under
clothing. This popular and effective method allows the
bomber to infiltrate close to the intended target and adjust
quickly if conditions change. Type II explosive devices
can be worn as a canvas or denim belt or be built into an
outer garment. When the bomber requires a greater
fragmentation effect, powder or crystalline explosives are
packed into metal or plastic pipes sewn into a vest. When
more explosives are used, the bomber requires additional
clothing to conceal the bulkiness of the device. “Body
bomb” attacks usually target places with large crowds, such
as restaurants, discos, and buses. Power for the initiation
device can be a 9-volt or larger battery. The switch may be hidden in the bomber’s pants pocket,
vest pocket, or run through the sleeve to the hand.9
Type III explosive devices vary based on target characteristics, available materials, and
the bomb maker’s technical knowledge. Triggers are often electrical switches mounted near the
driver of the vehicle. Bombers are often instructed to detonate the device with a grenade if the
primary initiation system fails.11
1
Bruce Hoffman, “ The logic of Suicide Terrorism,” available from
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/06/hoffman.htm;.Internet; accessed 10 May 2004.
2
“Mechanics of a Living Bomb,” available from http://www.waronline.org/en/terror/suicide.htm; Internet; accessed
10 May 2004.
3
Ibid
Fragmentation objects
Hamas suicide bomber demonstration

4
Ibid
5
Ibid
6
Ibid
7
Michael W. Fanning, “Improvised Explosive Devices Used in Suicide Bombing Incidents,” Bomb Data Center
Intelligence Summary 2002-4, IRS, (May 2002).
8
Ibid
9
Ibid
10
Ibid

APPENDIX C: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE HIGH VALUE TARGET DEFENSE
PLANNING:
Upon determining a site to be a high value target, a staff must provide all the resources
necessary for the ground commander to fortify the site, and must also oversee the successful
fortification of the site. Interviews from failed Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel indicate that
suicide bombers are less likely to target fortified sites. It is therefore imperative to apply, at a
minimum, whatever fortification assets are available to a site that is deemed a high value target.
Likewise, a staff must also analyze prior suicide attacks in the area and any significant upcoming
cultural, religious, or political events to determine if a site is a likely target for a suicide bomber.
See Appendix A for graphic depiction of HVT defense.
Considerations:
1. Consider possible targets that would provide the terrorists the desired effects.
2. Consider possible methods of attack (i.e., vehicular, individual).
3. Consider possible avenues of approach.
4. Consider available resources and prioritization.
5. Consider casualty evacuation.
6. Consider recon by terrorists.
PREPARATION AND COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE:
Enemy reconnaissance is a key element in target selection and is conducted in a
systematic approach with respect to the target and intended effects. This is also a major enemy
vulnerability and a time during which friendly forces can prevent a suicide mission from
occurring. At a minimum, the enemy will conduct reconnaissance of a target one time, and they
will utilize maps, camera, and/or videos to use during rehearsals. The enemy attempts to
maintain surveillance on an area for pattern analysis and to study coalition response measures to
crowds, riots, or firefights. US forces must therefore continually vary their response measures
and send out counter reconnaissance forces when responding to any crowds, riots, or firefights.
Considerations:
1. Consider sealing HVT from traffic and blast effects. (Use the Blast Effects Overlay
in Annex A when planning a defense).
2. Consider observation points beyond the immediate area.
3. Consider fields of fire.
4. Consider suicide bomber training procedures and familiarity with bomb equipment.
5. Consider layout security arrangements with restricted access points.
6. Consider blast effects when establishing access points.
7. Consider movement of civilians through fortification.
8. Consider movement of civilians within the HVT area.
9. Consider suicide bomber profile when conducting surveillance.

Tools:
1. Control Screening conveyor x-ray machine
2. Raytheon thermal sites (Appendix B)
3. Control Screening walk through metal detectors (Appendix C)
4. Control Screening metal detector wands (Appendix D)
5. Sandia National Laboratory chemical pre-concentrator technology (Appendix E)
6. Concrete barriers
7. Fences/ concertina wire
8. U.S Army radiac meters (Appendix F)
9. Kevlar blanket (Appendix G)
EXECUTION:
Pattern analysis of previous suicide attacks reveals that dismounted suicide bombers are
typically dropped off 75-200 meters from their intended target. Vehicular suicide bombers are
also likely to detonate at the first sign of coalition defense measures. Coalition observers,
snipers, and spotters should focus their attention in a radius of 75-200 meters from the HVT at
likely locations for drops-offs or vehicle exchanges. Additionally, an isolation force that will
create favorable conditions for the suicide bomber to carry out their attack usually accompanies
suicide terrorists. This isolation force also videotapes the effects of the attack for recruitment
and exploitation purposes. Anyone spotted near an HVT with video or camera equipment should
be immediately detained and questioned.
Considerations:
1. Consider quick reaction force in the event of an attack.
2. Consider dissemination of movement procedures in/around HVT.
3. Consider increase of force protection in attack.
4. Consider civilian removal plan.
5. Consider defusing procedures/actions.
6. Consider medical assistance.
7. Consider possible locations of teams filming attack.
8. Consider limiting the freedom of movement of the press.
Tools:
1. Bomb sniffing dogs (Appendix H)
2. REMOTEC Inc. Robots (Appendix I)
3. EVD-3000 Hand held explosives detector (Appendix J)
4. Bomb suit (Appendix K)
5. Use radiac meters to ensure a dirty bomb was not used.

SUMMARY:
For successful defense against suicide terrorists, soldiers must be taught how to think, not
what to think. Commanders must explain the fundamental steps that suicide bombers take
during their preparation and execution cycles, and explain what to look for during these steps. It
is nearly impossible to stop a determined suicide bomber once planning and reconnaissance are
complete; however, by remaining alert and identifying signs of an impending attack one can
greatly mitigate the effects and minimize injury and loss of life.

APPENDIX D: SUICIDE BOMBER BLAST OVERLAY AND BLAST EFFECTS
TEMPLATE
This annex is a compliment to Considerations for High Value Target Defense.
Information is presented on the blast effects of typical bombs that will help soldiers plan when
arranging their obstacle systems and access control points around a high value target.
Table 1 illustrates the damage (by distance) to a two–story wooden building with 1,600
ft2 floor space, 32ft x 25ft with stud load bearing walls, plywood roof decking, asphalt shingles,
and plank sheathe siding of the various devices listed. Tables 2 and 3 give the definitions of the
damage categories to the building and people.
Table 1: Distance for Specified Damage and Injury
3806501,0002,6003,50040,000Semi-Truck
1753104801,0601,4004,000Box Van
952102704608751,000
Passenger
Van
65162220270580500Sedan
48115151159375220Compact
2552618013050Suitcase
Severe
Damage
Heavy
Damage
Moderate
Damage
Minor
Damage
Minimal
Damage
Charge
Weight
(lbs)
DescriptionDevice
Distance for Specified Damage and Injury (feet)
3806501,0002,6003,50040,000Semi-Truck
1753104801,0601,4004,000Box Van
952102704608751,000
Passenger
Van
65162220270580500Sedan
48115151159375220Compact
2552618013050Suitcase
Severe
Damage
Heavy
Damage
Moderate
Damage
Minor
Damage
Minimal
Damage
Charge
Weight
(lbs)
DescriptionDevice
Distance for Specified Damage and Injury (feet)

The following example illustrates the practical application of the data. If defending a site against
a sedan car bomb, minimal damage and injury occur at distances of up to 580 feet. The
defending unit can place their access control point at a distance beyond 580 feet to safeguard the
site. With observation of key avenues of approach at distances greater than 580 feet, the unit can
halt a suspicious vehicle or person before they close to a unsafe distance.
Table 2: Physical Damage Legend Table 3: Injury Description Legend
Another tool is the Blast Effects Overlay
shown in Figure 1. Depending on the scale of
the map the unit is using, the overlay can be
constructed and placed with it’s center in the
middle of a HVT. The overlay can be used in
conjunction with data from tables 1 and 4 to
help in planning a defense.
Yes
Window damage extensive, light
or local damage to
nonstructural members.
0 to 10Minimal
Most probably
Little or no damage to major
structural members, some
damage to nonstructural mbrs.
10 to 20Minor
Possible
Some deformation of structural
members, and extensive
nonstructural damage.
20 to 40Moderate
Very unlikely
Large deformation of structural
members. Major nonstructural
component damage.
40 to 60Heavy
No
Frame collapse/massive
destruction. Little left standing.
60 to 100Severe
Repairable
Reusable
Damage Description
Percent
Damaged
Damage
Category
Yes
Window damage extensive, light
or local damage to
nonstructural members.
0 to 10Minimal
Most probably
Little or no damage to major
structural members, some
damage to nonstructural mbrs.
10 to 20Minor
Possible
Some deformation of structural
members, and extensive
nonstructural damage.
20 to 40Moderate
Very unlikely
Large deformation of structural
members. Major nonstructural
component damage.
40 to 60Heavy
No
Frame collapse/massive
destruction. Little left standing.
60 to 100Severe
Repairable
Reusable
Damage Description
Percent
Damaged
Damage
Category
PERSONNEL SUFFER SUPERFICIAL LACERATIONS FROM
WINDOW FRAGMENTS OR NONSTRUCTURAL MEMBER DEBRIS.
Minimal
PERSONNEL SUFFER MOSTLY SUPERFICIAL & SOME SERIOUS
LACERATIONS & BLUNT TRAUMA FROM WINDOW FRAGMENTS
OR NONSTRUCTURAL MEMBER DEBRIS.
Minor
MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL SUFFER SERIOUS LACERATIONS & BLUNT
TRAUMA FROM WINDOWS FRAGMENTS OR NONSTRUCTURAL MEMBER
DEBRIS. 0% TO 10% OF PERSONNEL SUFFER FATALITIES.
Moderate
MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL SUFFER SERIOUS INJURIES. 10% to
40% OF PERSONNEL SUFFER FATALITIES.
Heavy
Severe
Injury Description
Injury
Level
MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL SUFFER CATASTROPHIC INJURIES
AND FATALITIES.
PERSONNEL SUFFER SUPERFICIAL LACERATIONS FROM
WINDOW FRAGMENTS OR NONSTRUCTURAL MEMBER DEBRIS.
Minimal
PERSONNEL SUFFER MOSTLY SUPERFICIAL & SOME SERIOUS
LACERATIONS & BLUNT TRAUMA FROM WINDOW FRAGMENTS
OR NONSTRUCTURAL MEMBER DEBRIS.
Minor
MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL SUFFER SERIOUS LACERATIONS & BLUNT
TRAUMA FROM WINDOWS FRAGMENTS OR NONSTRUCTURAL MEMBER
DEBRIS. 0% TO 10% OF PERSONNEL SUFFER FATALITIES.
Moderate
MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL SUFFER SERIOUS INJURIES. 10% to
40% OF PERSONNEL SUFFER FATALITIES.
Heavy
Severe
Injury Description
Injury
Level
MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL SUFFER CATASTROPHIC INJURIES
AND FATALITIES.
250m
750m
500m
1000m
2000m
250m
750m
500m
1000m
2000m
Figure 1: Blast Effects
Overlay

APPENDIX E: SUICIDE BOMBER DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE
FOUR PHASES OF SUICIDE BOMBING OPERATION
I. Planning
a. Recruitment
b. Mission Analysis
II. Preparation
a. Reconnaissance
b. Rehearsal
c. Construction
III. Execution
a. Movement
b. Detonation
IV. Post-Execution
a. IO/Exploitation
I. PLANNING
a. Recruitment
i. Terrorist is typically part of organization
ii. Actual bomber is only involved in execution and not planning
iii. Profile
1. Average Age-22 years old
2. Male
3. Single
4. Very devout religious beliefs
5. Employed, but in lower 1/3 socio-economic scale
6. Education is secular and religious
7. Experienced in Terrorism operations
8. Recruit is usually active (recruit is chosen, not volunteered)
9. Recruit is not usually from target area
b. Mission Analysis
i. Typically, 4 different cells are involved (6-12 men in each
cell)•Information, Command, Logistics and Attack
ii. Mission usually effects based rather than target based
iii. Mission intent derived with central authority; execution becomes
decentralized
iv. Computers and training manuals are used to plan in conjunction with
videos and photos gathered from recon
v. Timeline is driven by local cell
vi. Internet, radio, and
vii. Once target is designated, it usually remains on the target list until
execution

II. PREPARATION
a. Reconnaissance
i. Usually conducted for significant period, however, timelines in Iraq
appear condensed due to operational pressure
ii. Camcorders, still cameras, binoculars, laptops, cell phones, maps are
typically used
iii. Bomber does not participate in reconnaissance
iv. Reconnaissance products include photos, maps, written descriptions,
patterns of security, patterns of operations, crowds
v. Reconnaissance is conducted near and on objective
vi. Initially used to locate target to achieve desired effect; once target located,
reconnaissance used to confirm and gather information
vii. Wigs and disguises are often used during reconnaissance
b. Rehearsals
i. Rehearsals typically include actual bomber
ii. Rehearsals include mock-ups, videos, photos and full-force rehearsals on
actual objective
c. Bomb Construction
i. Include vests, briefcases, vehicles, motorcycles and boats
ii. In Iraq, 21 of 29 incidents are vehicle bombs
iii. Vehicles are disguised to represent government or NGO vehicles
iv. Logistics cell typically builds bomb far from objective
v. Most bomb components are organic to local area
vi. Bombs are detonated using active, passive, or remote detonation (active is
preferred method)
III. EXECUTION
a. Movement
i. Route is determined during reconnaissance and usually includes link-up
site for last minute reconnaissance dump
ii. Dismounted bombers are typically dropped off 75-150m away from
objective
iii. Usually includes blocking force and isolation force to draw attention away
from actual bomber movement
iv. Observers watch movement to objective
v. Multiple vehicles can be used to deliver vehicle bomb; one acts as decoy
and second or third vehicle is weapon
b. Execution
i. Bomber remains at site only long enough to locate target
ii. Target can be person, building, or event
iii. Observers watch movement of bomber to detonation and continue
observation beyond rescue and aid efforts
iv. Secondary bomb(er) can be used to harm aid/rescue workers

IV. POST-EXECUTION
a. Information Operations/Exploitation
i. Contact of media agencies
ii. Families of suicide bombers can be compensated
iii. Groups not involved will claim responsibility

APPENDIX F: SUICIDE BOMBER FOCUSED INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLEFIELD
I. DETERMINE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
A. Identify significant characteristics of environment.
i. Local Terrorism Indicators. Some conditions that may indicate politically
motivated violence in certain locations are as follows:
a. Dissent for political, social, or ethnic reasons. Charges brought against
local government.
b. Formation of radical groups, branches of national subversive groups, or
secret societies.
c. Antigovernment, anti-US agitation; identification of government or US as
the root of the problems.
d. New spokesmen for the people's causes' emerging; out-of-town organizers
arriving.
e. Meetings, rallies, and demonstrations being organized; grievances taking
political overtones; inflammatory speeches and charges made; provocation of authorities to
intervene, or overreact; police or military brutality charged.
f. Appearance of antiestablishment posters, leaflets, underground press;
taking people's concern into political arena; politicization of social causes.
g. Use of known personalities as draws for rallies, especially those that have
been identified with radical causes.
h. Demonstrations, civil disobedience, or protest marches with causes
overshadowed by political rhetoric.
i. Increased recruiting, by known front groups and radical organizations;
support sought among workers.
j. Increased activism in political spheres at colleges and universities.
k. Speeches and communications stating violence as the only means of
solution.
l. Identification of foreign influence or aid.
m. Threats against public works, utilities, or transportation; threats of
violence against prominent personalities.
n. Agitation in refugee, minority, or foreign communities; polarization;
arming segments of society.
o. Reports of stolen firearms and explosives; raids on armories, and sporting
goods stores.
p. Violence against property, looting, destruction, and arson; mainly during
demonstrations, marches, or mob actions.
q. Violence against persons, murders, attempted murders, beatings, threats,
abductions, or public targeting of people.
r. Increased purchases of high-performance weapons; appearance of
automatic weapons.

B. ID limits of command’s AO and battlespace, Establish Limits of Area of Interest.
C. Establish Limits of the Area of Interest.
i. Consider:
a. Known terrorist activity.
b. Terrorist activities in nations that sponsor terrorist groups.
c. International and national support to the terrorists. Include sources of
moral, physical, and financial support.
d. If US presence, or potential presence, by itself could be a catalyst for
terrorist activity.
e. The identity of recent worldwide anti-US terrorist activity, or intent to
conduct such activity.
f. Types of activity to consider:
i. Identify the demographic issues that make protected areas or personnel
attractive to terrorists.
ii. Identify any time constraints that might limit the availability of a
target.
iii. Coordinate with supporting Military Police and MI activities when
preparing initial threat analyses and their updates.
D. ID amount of detail required and feasible within time available
E. Evaluate existing databases and ID intelligence gaps
F. Collect material and intelligence required to conduct remainder of IPB
i. Priority Intelligence Requirements. The following terrorist concerns can assist
the intelligence officer in developing PIR:
a. Organization, size, and composition of group
b. Motivation, long-range goals, and short-range goals.
c. Religious, political, ethnic affiliation, or a combination of these.
d. International and national support (moral, physical, financial).
e. Recruiting methods, locations, and targets (students).
f. Identities of group leaders, opportunist, and idealists.
g. Group intelligence abilities.
h. Sources of supply/support.
i. Important dates (religious holidays, martyrdom anniversaries).
j. Planning competence.
k. Degree of discipline.
l. Preferred tactics and operations.
m. Willingness to kill.
n. Willingness for self-sacrifice (professed or demonstrated).

o. Group skills (sniping, demolitions, masquerade, forged documents,
industrial sabotage, airplane/boat operations, tunneling, underwater electronic surveillance,
poisons/contaminants).
p. Equipment and weapons on hand and required.
q. Transportation on hand and required.
r. Medical support available.
s. Freedom of access to media and skill in using it.
II. DESCRIBE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
A. Analyze battlefield environment
i. Demographics.
a. What demographic issues make a target attractive to terrorists?
b. How do these demographic issues shape terrorist COAs? For example, the
political grievances of a terrorist organization might make some targets more attractive than
others. Religious convictions might cause terrorists to disregard assassinations in favor of
kidnapping.
c. Targets and routes.
d. Identify the susceptibility of targets to terrorists.
e. Identify infiltration routes and AAs.
ii. Terrain Analysis
a. Obstacles
b. Avenues of Approach
c. Key Terrain
d. Observation and Fields of Fire
e. Cover and Concealment
iii. Weather Analysis
B. Describe battlefields effects on threat and friendly capabilities
III. EVALUATE THE THREAT DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE
A. Update or create threat models
i. Convert threat doctrine to graphics
ii. Describe threat’s tactics and options
iii. Evaluate the Threat:
a. Determine the type of terrorist groups you might face. Are they state
supported, non-state supported, or state directed?
b. Identify which terrorist groups are present, thought to be present, or have
access to your AO.
c. Conduct OB analysis for each group, to include—
i. Organization and cellular composition.
ii. Internal discipline.
iii. Long-and short-range goals.
iv. Dedication (willingness to kill or die for the cause).

v. Religious, political, and ethnic affiliations of the groups.
vi. The identity of leaders, trainers, opportunists, and idealists.
vii. Group skills and specialties of each organization such as sniping,
demolition, air or water operations, electronic surveillance, tunneling.
viii. Describe the preferred tactics of each organization. These might
include assassination, arson, bombing, hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping, maiming, raids,
seizure, sabotage, hoaxes, or use of chemical or biological weapons. Consider the international
writings on terrorist and insurgent operations such as Mao or Che Guevarra.
ix. Describe or template demonstrated terrorist activity over a period of
time in the local area.
iv. Identify HVTs
a. Sensitive night vision and communication items.
b. Arms.
c. Ammunition.
d. Command and control facilities.
e. Explosives.
f. Military officer training facilities.
g. Areas catering to personal needs (mess halls, barracks, post
exchange, commissary, gyms, religious activities, bars, community
centers).
g. Hydroelectric plants, dams, gas pipelines, nuclear facility sites.
h. Communication lines/facilities, computer facilities.
i. Chemical storage sites.
J. Equipment warehouses.
i. Transportation centers, parking lots, airports, railheads, bus depots,
rail lines, shipyards.
j. Members of military force and their dependents.
k. Key leaders of the military.
l. Post offices and mail trucks.
v. ID threat capabilities
IV: DETERMINE THREAT POSSIBLE COAS
A. ID threat’s likely objectives and desired end state
i. Immediate Goals.
a. Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause.
b. Force government reaction, overreaction, and repression leading to
immediate public dissension.
c. Harass, weaken, or embarrass government, military, or other security
forces.
d. Obtain money or equipment.
e. Show a government's inability to protect its citizens.
f. Disrupt or destroy primary means of mobility or communications.
g. Demonstrate power or threat credibility.
h. Prevent or delay decisions or legislation.

Suicide bombers book' draft 2004

Suicide bombers book' draft 2004

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