Trends in Terrorism and the Future of New Forms

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The future trends of Terrorism and discuss the law of
unintended consequences on policies, politics and
throughout the world
Trends and Future of Terrorism

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The Origins of New Terrorism
Tends in Terrorism
 1980’s: High point for number of terrorist attacks:
 Over 600 attacks annually between 1985-1988
 After 1988 attacks decreased to fewer than 450 / yr reaching recent low
point in the years 1996-1998 when averaged about 300
 UBL and Al-Qaeda were prime examples but not only form of apocalyptic,
catastrophic terrorism
 Aum Shinrikyo, Japanese religious cult - gas attack in Tokyo
 American Christian Identity terrorist attacks - OKBOMB
 David Rapport:
 Religious terrorism is the Fourth wave in evolution of terrorism
1. Breakup of empires
2. De-colonization
3. Anti-Westernism

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 Fanaticism rather than political interests is more often the
Motivation and terrorist are more unrestrained then ever
 UBL quotes from the Quranic Concept of War:
“Terror struck in to he hears of the enemies is not only a means, it is
in the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is
obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the
means and the ends meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing
decision upon the enemy: it is the decision we wish to impose upon him”
 Terror has evolved from being a means to an end, to becoming the
END IN ITSELF!
 Religiously motivated terrorist groups grew six-fold from 1980-1992
Tends in Terrorism

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 Secular terrorists may view random violence as immoral
 Religious terrorists: Indiscriminate violence may not be only morally
justified but constitute a righteous and necessary advancement of their
religious cause
 Most dangerous cults are fascinated by visions of the end of the world
“Cults are a particularly dangerous form of religious terrorism because
they can appear quickly without warning, have no rational goals, and can
become agitated due to the apprehension and hostility with which they are
viewed by the society at large.”
 Religious terrorists: Violence is a divine duty…executed in direct response
to some theological demand….and justified by scripture~ Hoffman
Tends in Terrorism

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 Mark Juergensmeyer: Identified three elements that
Islamist, radical Christians, and other religious terrorists share
1. Perceive their objective as defense of basic identity and dignity
2. Losing the struggle would be unthinkable
3. Struggle is deadlocked, cannot be won in real time or terms
 Cultural features among new international terrorist groups
1. Concept of righteous killing-as-healing
2. Total social destruction as part of a process of ultimate purification
3. Preoccupation with weapons of mass destruction
4. Cult of personality: Leader dominates his followers who seek
to become perfect clones
** One of the major consequences of globalization has been a deterioration
of the power of the state
Tends in Terrorism

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The Islamic State and Boko Haram:
Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups
Tends in Terrorism
 Islamic State and Boko Haram are characterized by
cultish practices and a millenarian ideology
 Theories that all terror networks are rational have been attacked
o Takfiri terrorism and millenarian violence seems particularly
resistant to rational explanation
 French Revolutionaries, Bolsheviks and Nazis examples of quazi-
religious passions
o Paul Berman, rational paradigm fails to account for theological
imperatives
o Robert Nalbandov: Rational perspectives are poorly designed to
analyze Islamic terrorism
 Jihadism: Unique terrorism driven by mystical “prophetic” forces
 Jeffery Kaplan: 5th wave of terror - precedent in Khmer Rouges

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Tends in Terrorism
 5th Wave theory:
 Refines David Rapoport’s four-wave theory of modern terrorism
 Four wave (anarchist, colonial, left-revolutionary and Islamist)
 Rapoport: Revolutions in communication/ travel have accelerated global
reach of terrorists spreading their ideals among radicalized Diaspora’s
 Khmer Rouge fifth wave prototype:
 KR broke from the left-revolutionary phase
 A cult-like organization exacerbated by Maoist principles of localism
and millenarian desire to remake the world
 KR and LRA - Kaplan develops 5th wave terrorism theory
o Islamist quest for a united Ummah prevents 5th wave devolution

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Tends in Terrorism
 Kaplan:
 Janjaweed violence against Darfur’s black population exhibits
5th wave hallmarks
 Efraim Karsh:
 Ethnic tribal divisions prevent attaining a unified caliphate
 Walid Phares:
 Arabic /Islamist animus for Kurds, Berbers, Copts, Sudanese Muslims
reflects atavistic desire to rule over ethno-religious minorities
 Che Guevara’s “el foci” insurgency theory
 Islamists hope their micro communities will catalyze populist revolt

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Tends in Terrorism
 Distinctive qualities
1. Devolution from a preexisting terror wave
2. “Hopeful” extreme idealism
3. Physical withdraw into the hinterland
4. Desire to recreate a past “golden age” by beginning the calendar anew
5. Intent to destroy the old world and create a pure new society
6. Inability to compromise and use force against internal dissidents
7. Belief in perfectibility of humans and creation of a new man
8. Quest for anew society leading to genocidal violence
9. Violence as a way of group life
10. Emphasis on the subjugation of women and children
11. Recruitment of child soldiers and child brides
12. Use of rape as a terror tactic
13. Continuous cycle of violence engaged by the group across generation
14. Particularistic emphasis on racial purity and ethno-tribal centrism
15. Pragmatic reliance on foreign allies to enhance groups survival
16. Charismatic and authoritarian leadership
17. Apocalyptic world view buttressed by intense religious commitment

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“Transnational Terrorism”
Tends in Terrorism
 Theories:
1. ISIS that transnational terrorism poses an existential
threat to the security of the U.S.
2. Transnational terrorism does not pose a security threat and that it
should be treated as a crime
 Total number of attacks has declined and absolute numbers are low
 Domestic not transnational groups have carried out almost all attacks
 Fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks have been low (except 9/11)
 Black swans
 High improbability
 High impact
 Explicable only after the event
2nd reason: Transnational terrorism is treated as an existential security
threat is that level of destruction could approximate that seen in war

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“Transnational Terrorism”
Tends in Terrorism
 Biologics: More likely threat for the future
 Ability to develop biological weapons is becoming more widespread
 Questions of proportionality
 Transnational terrorism will continue to be treated as an existential
threat rather than a criminal activity because of the way in which
human being confront low probability bur potentially large loss events
 Daniel Khaneman
 Type 1 thinking –emotive, intuitive, non-reflective
 Type 2 rational and calculating
 U.S. Government is devoting too many resources to CT activities

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Trends in of Terrorism
Future Forms of Terrorism
 Terror is becoming more sophisticated in at least two new
directions:
 More funds to buy hypermodern devices to be “capitalists of death”
 Easily remote control mechanisms and state-of-the-art communication
 Harness technological devices to disrupt a regions communications, disable
the transport system of a city, or to cause wholesale flight of refugees from
terror
 Chemical weapons used in two ways:
1. Attacks planned to lead to mass devastation
2. Cause economic damage or result in blackmail
 Advantages:
Chemical weapons are easier to produce than biological weapons
(materials and equipment are readily available commercially)

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 Biological weapons: Designed as mass destructive agents
and not for small-scale specific targeting
 Since 1968: 8000 terrorist attack, less than 60 were attempts to
use chemical or biological weapons
 Known market for “weapons-grade” biological agents subsist in Libya,
Iran, Syria and Iraq
Anthrax: 21 countries
 Conclusion random exercise that it probably was not the action of any
well-known terrorist group (little to gain)?
Most effective defenses against terrorist threat use of WMD
1. Good intelligence
2. Efficient procedures to control the entry of people in material
3. Means to respond effectively to incidents

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 Terrorist organization maybe more dangerous than
sovereign states:
 Deterred politically from engaging in WMD attacks - moral scruples?
 Publicity is one thing that counts for terrorists
 Cyber terrorism
 Logic Bombs, computer virus
o Manuals are available on the Internet
o General assumption is hacking is part curious, part pertinent play
about young people with too much time on their hands
 Remarkable thing is that “so far” the civilized world has not been thrown
into complete disarray by those defined as “terrorists”

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 Containing nonconventional terrorism
 Only secure approach to containment is to curb proliferation
o Dual use technology
o United Nations treaties
 Biological weapons convention of 1972
 Unique and banning a whole class weapons
 Convention does not provide systematic and total reliable means
of verifying compliance with prohibition rules
 50 countries employed nuclear energy and have well over 600
research reactors. Fissionable material are therefore widely spread
 1957: International Atomic Energy Authority set up to attempt
to control atomic energy and regulate its contribution to peace,
health and prosperity

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The Impact of ISIS’ Mentoring of
North Africa’s Jihadist Groups”
 ISIS goal in North Africa:
 Assist insurgency groups to establish Islamic states in their countries
 Global power struggle between al-Qaeda and ISIS provided offers
for ISIS to deepen ties with insurgents in Africa
 Tunisian government: Findings show that 2560 citizens have fought in
Syria
 80% are believed to have been recruited into ISIS.
 Algerian Group Soldiers of the Caliphate led by Gouri Abdelmalek
 Faction of AQIM - Broke away and declared allegiance to ISIS
after Abdel Malek Droukdel, renewed AQIM’s allegiance to AQ and
rejected ISIS vision of an Islamic Caliphate
Gouri Abdelmalek

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The Impact of ISIS’ Mentoring of
North Africa’s Jihadist Groups
 2014: Public feuding occurred between AQ Syrian
affiliate al Nusra Front and ISIS affiliated jihadists
 Rival jihadist groups seemed to favor the younger, more vibrant ISIS.
 Libya: Serves as part of a widespread arm trafficking route linking the
Sahel, Western Africa and Middle East that supplies Jihadists
 Ansar al Sharia’s declaration of a Caliphate in Benghazi
 Ansar bayt al Maqdis in the Sinai peninsula
 Indicative of broader impact ISIS is having on African Jihadism
 ISIS: Influences Jihadis on ideational rather than operational level
 Attempts by AQ to stem exodus of defections of former affiliated
groups across Africa
 Shift from radical extremists to extreme extremists is troubling for the
region and international partners with stakes in North Africa

Counter-Terrorism (II)
Wormwood Street, London

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Counter-Terrorism
Countering Terrorism in Democracies:
Fighting Fire with Fire?
 Facing acts of exceptional physical and symbolic violence,
States may be tempted to maximize their repressive actions
 May breach their constitutional and/or international constraints
 Council of Europe Committee for Prevention of Torture
o Alarming illustration of possible drifts in reaction to terrorist attacks
 European convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
 Democratic states must address issue of conciliating opposed objectives
o Right to security on one side
o Individual rights and freedoms on other side
 Preservation of public order justifies dissolution of political parties
calling to violence or praising terrorism
 ECHR prohibition of torture, enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention
 ECHR Constitution under article 15 forbids use of torture

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Counter-Terrorism
Countering Terrorism in Democracies:
Fighting Fire with Fire?
 Democratic systems may accept deviant means
 Pardon convicted torturers, comforts torturers in validity of methods
 Consequently, systemic failures lead to the fall of system as a Democracy
 Fighting Fire with Fire as the Worst Response to Terrorism
 Torture: Ineffective as, water boarding, “walling” and other
“enhance interrogation techniques”
o Conclusions of CIA’s report on detention /interrogation program *
 Torture: Would echo terrorist claims that Institutions are violent and
oppressive and use of torture could be used to justify their attacks
 Use of torture would break “social contract’ infringe Rule of Law
and annihilate citizen’s trust in their State

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Counter-Terrorism
Countering Terrorism
 Popular support can be a two-edged sword:
 Insensitive to their needs, the people can turn to
authorities outside of the ruling government for support
 Similarly, when movements act without concern toward the people, the
people can reject their movements in favor of the ruling government
 Case Study # 1: “Propaganda of the Deed”
 ‘An-Archy’ (Anarchy): Philosophical belief that people could prosper
without government, lack of government results in equality and justice
 Pierre Proudhon: Believed the individual was a pawn, to be controlled
and abused at the whim of the governing (propertied) classes
 Originally, Anarchist movement was dedicated toward non-violence
o Engage in violent acts to achieve desired end:
o Replace hierarchical societies with flat, and theoretical equal society

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 Credo of violent Anarchists: “Propaganda of the Deed”
 Acts of anarchist bombers and assassins (“Propaganda of the Deed”)
 Anarchist burglars (“individual re-appropriation”) - expressed their
desperation and personal violent rejection of an intolerable society
 The Bonnot Gang: Most famous group to embrace illegalism:
 Violent acts against symbols of bourgeois (establishment) such as
public officials, infrastructure, or events, constituted a political
statement against that establishment
“We preach not only action in and for itself, but also action as propaganda."
~ Johann Most.
Counter-Terrorism

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 Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876)
 Blowing up public events was an acceptable form of
political protest against the empowered establishment
o Similarly, theft from the rich was acceptable
 The “deed,” against the symbols and members of the ruling elites was
seen, and supported, by the politically and economically dispossessed as
legitimate forms of protest (OWS)
Leon Czolgosz: Murdered President McKinley in 1901, influenced by anarchist
 France’s lois scélérates of 1894, represent aggressive anti-anarchist
responses by authorities threatened by this unfettered violence
Authorities: Not always sensitive to needs of common people, they benefitted
when the violent anarchists became extreme and indiscriminate in their targets
 That split the extremists from their base of support
Counter-Terrorism

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 Case Study #2: “Malayan Emergency” 1948 -1960
 British forces vs. Malayan Communist Party (MCP)
 MCP outgrowth of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement during WWII
 Drew on support of Malayan Chinese, who were upset with the British
o October 1951, MCP assassinated Sir Henry Guerney
 Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs: Recommended active anti-guerrilla
operations and cutting guerrillas off from communities likely to help them
 Key feature of the “Briggs Plan” ; cut MCP off from supporters
o Jungle inhabitants supplying MLNA with food from the jungle
o MLNA supporters in the villages on the edges of the jungle
Part 1: Relocate half-million Malayans, from villages on edges of forests and
into guarded camps called “New Villages”
 Better living standards and sanitation conditions in the “New Villages”
 Grant villagers money / ownership of the land they lived on
o Prior British experience with forced relocations (Boer War)
Counter-Terrorism

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Part 2: Use overwhelming force: 40,000 vs. 7–8K guerrillas
Part 3: “Hearts and minds campaign." Giving medical aid and food to
Malayan’s
 End of British regime meant rapid and massive change in economic and
political environment
o Durkheim: Social upheaval, would motivated some to violate
existing norms prohibiting violence
 Authorities’ labeled some factions, which may have hardened positions
o Tannenbaum, Lemert, and Schur:
• This labeling drove the sides further apart, created an
“us-them paradigm”, and thereby promoted violent means
 Example where authorities intentionally targeted support mechanisms for
terrorists, both through kinetic action and through “soft power”
Counter-Terrorism

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 Case Study #3: Boston Marathon bombings
 April 15, 2013: Explosive devices killed 3 and wounded 260
o Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
o Dzhokhar was a naturalized American citizen
o Tamerlan was a permanent resident alien
 Dzhokhar: Motivated by extremist beliefs and wars in Iraq /
Afghanistan
o Self-radicalized and unconnected to any outside terrorist groups
o Online magazine of the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen (Inspire)
 Authorities credited massive outpouring of public support in aiding
their rapid identification, location, and interdiction of the two suspects
Counter-Terrorism

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 When immediate needs are met, the populace did not
have a stake in whether the insurgents succeeded
 As such insurgents became isolated, easier to identify, and target
 Understanding connection between extremists and the population at large
 CS #1: Anarchists connection was severed
1: “Deeds” of the anarchists had become too extreme
2: Failed to deliver results that benefitted the common man
 CS#2: MCP in Malaya, authorities quickly separated insurgents from
their bases of support
1: Offered something that benefitted villagers for complying with
draconian measures
2: Deprived insurgents of support, isolated them physically from the
people
Counter-Terrorism

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 Anarchist movement;
 Social and political change in Western societies
undermined some of the causes complaints of the violent actors
 Malaysian Emergency;
 Social change undermined the support enjoyed by the insurgency
(relocation, security , economic benefits, better living conditions)
 Relocation strategy enabled government authorities to better engage in
strategic communication, deprived insurgency of initiative.
 Formula for better government that denies terrorists a friendly environment
“DIME”
 Diplomatic: Engage populations to identify issues of concern
 Information: Encourages populations to invest in their environments
 Military: Employs power that promote security and confidence
 Economic: Direct investment into economically hard-hit areas
Counter-Terrorism

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Violent anarchism, acts of extremists
themselves caused the rift between
themselves and their base support
Counter-Terrorism
Malayan Emergency: “Briggs Plan” was
to separate the violent terrorist from
populations that might provide support
Boston Marathon bombings: No
support with populace

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 St. Augustine of Hippo: Jus ad Bellum (just cause for war)
 Legitimized warfare for a religion based upon peace
 Times and circumstances justified a nation engaging in war
o Christian’s duty to punish sin
o Soldier’s duty is to act justly to protect the state
 Augustine: “Soldier’s failure to act in obedience with legitimate
authority would itself be a sin.”
 When justified in going to war?
 Just cause = Engage in a conflict must involve a sense of justice
 Comparative justice = Injustice suffered / outweigh who would suffered
 Competent authority = Only duly constituted authority may wage war
 Right intention = Use force only with the intent of achieving a just end
 Probability of success = Violence verboten if there is no hope of success
 Last resort = When all other peaceful alternatives exhausted
 Proportionality = War proportionate to its expected evils or harms
Counter-Terrorism

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 Jus in Bello (just, or lawful, acts in war):
 How combatants are to act:
o Support hinges on sense people are supporting “right side”
o “Just” warrior distinguishes between combatants or lawful targets
 Proportionality = “Just war” must be tempered by proportionality
 Military necessity = Governed by principle of minimum necessary force
 Fair treatment of non-combatants = Civilians or POWs
 No malum in se = Soldiers may not use weapons / methods of warfare
which are considered evil;
o Mass rape
o Forcing soldiers to fight against their own side
o Using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled (e.g. WMD)
 Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are relevant, and can be the difference
between success and failure on a strategic and political level
Counter-Terrorism

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 Case Study(s): Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Abu Ghraib
 Iraq: Many nations opposed to invasion
o Facts for war proved to be inaccurate, unreliable, and even false
o Then: Saddam Hussein’s internal record of human rights abuses
o Now: War no longer about a state’s inherent right to defend
itself, but establish an idealist & moralist regime in Iraq
 Abu Ghraib revelations were receiving wide-spread publication
o Revelations of Abu Ghraib, combined with reports of torture
caused significant domestic political debate
 Gitmo: “Enhanced interrogation techniques,” (i.e. water boarding)
 Fracture of American body politic undermined previously unbounded
support, both at home and internationally, for military operations abroad
Counter-Terrorism

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 Pros and Cons: Law enforcement vs military action
 Criminal prosecutions vs. military tribunals (GTMO detainees), etc.?
o Prosecution in criminal courts: Likely only last until a case against
a suspected terrorist were either thrown out or over-turned due to
what might be perceived by the population as “technicalities”
o Military tribunals: Secrecy provisions, misunderstandings of
procedural rights, and a lack of info on the process generally
 Regardless of procedures used: We must understand strategic implications
of our actions, even those that might seem innocuous
 Decisions made, at the tactical, operational, strategic, and policy levels of
government, can (and did) cause major damage to prestige of the U.S.
Counter-Terrorism

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Deterring Terrorists:
What Israel Has Learned
 Strategy against terrorist should focus on prevention
disruption, and offensive action in order to eradicate them
 Failed Deterrence
 Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000
 Outbreak of second Intifada
 Attacks of September 11
 Indian struggle against the Jihadi movement in Kashmir
 Relationship between state and nonstate F.T.O is inherently asymmetric
 Terrorist take advantage of:
1. Western commitment to international norms and conventions,
2. Create humanitarian crisis, which is left on state’s doorstep
3. Exploit media to create image of terror potential which
far exceeds what terrorist organizations is really capable
4. Neutralizing advantage of the state superior power by decentralized
command-and-control
Counter-Terrorism

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 Organizations that pose formidable terrorist threat have
been highly motivated ideologically
 Salient attributes:
1. Culture and ideology-religious tenets existence of a religious agenda
2. Sources of authority leadership / instruments of command-and-control
3. Leadership assesses the nature of the situation as it attempts to fulfill
its goals, self assessment, assessments of its allies capability and
assessment of identity, capabilities, and will of its enemies
4. Affinity with the host population / state with actual control over
territory and existence of social agenda, commitment toward people
5. Patron proxy relationship, financial logistic and channels of supply
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 Ultimately deterrence is result of mutual perceptions,
self-image and image of the enemy
 Goal of a nationalist ideology is to achieve independence for nation
 Strategy of Islamic terrorists organizations divine dictates
o Entering the fray against all odds the mujahedin is proving his
unconditional faith in Allah and will be rewarded accordingly
o Declared strategic goals of this organization-the total destruction of
the enemy - restricts the tactical room for maneuver
o Compounded by movement that subscribes to a apocalyptic
worldview, an expectation of End-of-Days-an event horizon
which all pragmatic laws of balance of power and realpolitik
collapse
Counter-Terrorism

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 Aversion of Western democracies intervention in religious affairs has
precluded any effort to coerce religious authorities in a manner to serve
Western deterrence goals
 Primary method of deterrence: Take advantage of image of the
deterring entity held by the target
 An important component of deterrence is perception by terrorists
organization that the deterring state enjoys “intelligence dominance”
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 Relations with host population:
 Nationalist movement is usually rooted in interests
of its constituency as it has no alternative to that population
 Proxy patron relationships
1. Surrogates: Terrorist organizations which are not separate from the
state that supports them and are in fact directed and controlled by state
2. Proxies: Organizations indentured by states for their own
purposes. These organizations serve as proxies of states while they are
under their patronage but can move from one patron to another as
their own interests dictate
3. Partnerships: Relates to terrorists organizations that have assets of
their own but form a relationship with a state
4. Reverse proxyship: Tail wagging the dog
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 Deterring terrorists organizations based on four main pillars
1. Direct military deterrence toward the terrorist leadership
2 Threatening institutionalized assets of the host country
3 Pressuring the host population
4. Covert “human influence” operations (Psyops)
5. Pressuring the terrorist organizations patron entities
 Distinction between strategic and tactical deterrence
 Tactical deterrence through day-to-day actions, adds up to an ever
shifting perception of object of deterrence
 Deterrence towards terrorist organizations is possible
 Israel’s tactical deterrence has been achieved by actual application of
force and by inducing the fear that the force would be reapplied and
even increased (Proportionality?)
 Effective deterrence has an element of dramaturgy
 Speak loudly and periodically use a big stick!
Counter-Terrorism

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Bombshells: Women and Terror
 Muriel Degauque
 Sajida Atrous al Rishawi
 Jihad Jane Colleen La Rose and Jihad Jamie Ramirez in the US
 Roshonara Choudhyr’s assassinations attempt against Labour MP Stephen Timmis
 Nicole Lynn Mansfield
Between 1985- 2010, female bombers committed over 257 suicide attacks (25%).
 December 25, 2010 a Pakistani kill 46 and injured over 100 at UN center
 Virtually every religious terrorist organization eventually began to employ
female operatives as a part of their strategic adaptation
 Media that fetishizes female terrorists and contributes to the belief that there is
something unique, something just not right about the women who kill
 Terrorists explore gender stereotypes and culture clichés to their advantage
 Common assumption is that female terrorists must be even more depressed,
crazier, more suicidal, or more psychopathic than their male counterparts

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Russian anarchists Vera Zasulich of the Narodnaya Volya
 1/3 of the core leadership of the People’s Will were women
 Women have supported revolutions, constructed the identities and ideologies
of children and funnel arms and ammunition to men during conflicts in Africa,
the Middle East, Europe and domestic terrorist organizations like the KKK.
 Syrian socialist nationalist party (SSNP), sent first female suicide bomber
 Sana’s Mehaydali (17) blow herself up near an Israeli convoy Lebanon in 1985
o 12 suicide attacks conducted by the SSNP, women took part in five
 Terrorist movements make cost benefit calculations.
 Female terrorists are often the deadliest because their element of surprise
 More successful at reaching the targets and have higher kill rates than men
o Kill on average four times more people of their male counterparts
 Greater propaganda value
o Female operatives garner more media attention than men (8 :1)
 Shame the man into action rather than letting women do their job

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 Manipulation of traditional gender roles is a powerful effect on
male sensibilities and feeling of individual obligations.
 Emasculated the men challenges them to step up and become more proactive
 Some feminist scholars argue that even asking whether women are motivated
differently than men imply sexism
 Media search for alternative explanations behind women’s participation vs.
coverage of male suicide bombers ideology taken at face value
 Schweitzer thinks women reacted to loneliness, rejection, or some imperfection
that makes martyrdom more attractive than living.
 Spending time in prison facilitates process of focus radicalization.
 Deborah Galvan argues women are recruited into terrorist groups by boyfriends
 Women’s involvement terrorism across a number of conflicts be motivated by
four R’s: Revenge, Redemption, Relationships and Respect
o Not mutually exclusive

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Revenge: For the death of a close family member is most often cited
as the key factor for women’s involvement.
Redemption: Trying to redeem themselves by a willing act of Martyrdom
 Fallen women
Relationships: Crucial towards understanding women’s violent mobilization
 Woman will engage in terrorist violence if she is related to a known insurgent
 Jihadist cells and Indonesia have you strategic marriage to submit the linkages
within Jamaah Islamiyya (JI) network and prevent defections
o Sisters or daughters of the leaders in one seller married off to the leader of
other cells forming tight bonds of family connections
Respect: By engaging in violence they can demonstrate that they are just as dedicated
and committed to the cause as the men of the society
 Fame and notoriety are powerful pull factors
 Pull of wanting to do something important with your life to achieve fame and
notoriety is a powerful incentive for women and men alike.

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 Earning the respect of one’s peers can lure women and violence
instilled in the sense of greater purpose.
Rape: An increase in the sexual expectation women worldwide to coerce them into
terrorism.
 Deliberately targeted for sexual exploitation to generate new recruits
 Trauma of the attack makes women highly suggestive to participate in violence
and the women are unable to resist the lure of annulling the shame
 Samira Ahmed Jassim, mother of the faithful, was arrested for having
orchestrated the rapes of 80 girls in Baghdad and Diyala province to recruit
them a suicide bombers for Anser al Sunnah
 Terrorist organizations themselves we use these attacks as propaganda to
mobilize men women into the movement.
o Female suicide bombers (Shahidas) are portrayed as chaste wives

46
 Suggestion that the occupiers raping Muslim women in the same
way that they are raping land resonates with young Muslim men in Europe, UK,
and North America, inspiring many to join the jihad
 Terrorist leaders count on the oppressive state targeting women in gender
specific ways in subjugating the civilian population and punitive actions
 Other side stops engaging in sexual atrocities, the fact that it ever happened
remains a powerful motivator and source propaganda
Mia Bloom suggest replacing the five R’s of women’s motivation with 3-D’s:
 Delegitimize
 Deglamorize
 Demobilize

47
Untangling the Terror Web:
Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of
Crossover Between Terrorist Groups
 Concerted action against terrorist financing is one of the best ways to
advance national security priorities
 Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace
 Stabilization of Iraq
 Counterterrorism: Not about defeating terrorist?
 Constricting operating environment-making it harder for terrorists to
operate at every level:
o Conducting operations
o Procuring and transferring false documents
o Ferrying fugitives
o Financing, laundering and transferring funds
 Al-Taqwa banking system: Established 1988 with money from Muslim
Brotherhood. HAMAS member’s and individuals tied to al-Qaeda feature
prominently among its shareholders.
Counter-Terrorism

Ali Khaled Steitiye
48
Untangling the Terror Web…..
 Portland Six;
 Ali Khaled Steitiye:
o HAMAS supporter
o Unindicted co-conspirator in the Portland Case,
o Weapons training w/Seikh Mohammed Abdirahman Kariye
o Cofounder of designated al-Qaeda front Global Relief Foundations
 Abu Musab al Zarqawi
 Double suicide bombings in Istanbul in November 2003
 Assassination of US AID Lawrence Foley in Amman.
 Led Jund al Shams, an Islamic extremists group and al-Qaeda affiliate
operating primarily in Syria and Jordan (now ISIS).
 Soliman Biheiri, “the U banker of the Muslim Brotherhood”
 BMI Inc., in New Jersey:
Counter-Terrorism

Soliman Biheiri
49
 3 national security priorities dominate US foreign policy agenda:
 The war on terror
 The war in Iraq and
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Serious action must be taken toward restricting the financing of terrorism
which is indeed one of the most effective ways to advance the war on terror, the
roadmap to Israeli Palestinian peace and the stabilization of Iraq.
The war on terror will be most effective if it has a strategic focus on the full
matrix of international terrorism rather than a tactical focus on al-Qaeda.
Untangling the Terror Web…..
Counter-Terrorism

Trends in Terrorism and the Future of New Forms

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