Unions' Impact on Education: The Good, the Bad and the Unknown

Unions and Schools:
The good, the bad, and the unknown of education influence
Cassady Rebecca Palmer
Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
May 2014
Professor Gerald Wright (Thesis Advisor)
Laura Bucci (Second Reader)
Professor Jack Bielasiak

Unions and Schools:
The good, the bad, and the unknown of education influence
Cassady Rebecca Palmer
Honors Thesis
Submitted to the Department of Political Science in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors Notation
Indiana University Bloomington
May 2014
Thesis Advisor: ________________________________
Professor Gerald Wright
Reader: _____________________________________
Laura Bucci
Director of Honors Program: _____________________
Professor Jack Bielasiak
Date: ____________

Acknowledgments
Thanks first go to Professor Gerald Wright, Professor Jack Bielasiak and to Laura Bucci
for helping me to navigate this crazy world that is research. I would never have been
able to do it without you. I’d also like to thank Professor Tim Hellwig for sparking my
interest in Y395 which seems so long ago now.
Thanks to my roommates Sammie, Sarah, and Rosa for at least trying to help me keep
my sanity and for always being willing to be a sounding board, even if you had no idea
what I was actually saying. Also thanks for making caffeine runs with me, especially
when I was in no state to drive.
But the biggest thanks of all go out to my family, all the way down the tree, those who
are blood and those who are as good as. You have always been my inspiration to keep
pushing myself, even when I was out of my comfort zone and exhausted. Words cannot
even come close to expressing how grateful I am for my dad, mom, and brother. I
would not be who I am today if it were not for you, and yes, that’s a good thing. Thank
you to Daddy for showing me the path to politics, even if you didn’t have to go far out of
your way. I’ll always be your Bitty Girl. Thank you Mama for opening my eyes to the
wonder of books and all of those nights reading together. It always has and always will
serve me well and it’s something we will always share. Thank you Bubby for always
being there and for just being you. You can do anything you put your mind to, and you’ll
always have KK here cheering you on.

Abstract
This research asks the question “How does the differing strength of unions at the state
level impact education?” It is a quantitative work using all 50 states as cases. The
theory put forth states that states which have strong unions, both general unions and
teachers unions specifically, will also exhibit strong public education systems, with the
specific points of influence coming in the areas of elections, policies, and student
academic outcomes. The results indicated there are some ways in which strong unions
help education, such as working to elect candidates who will implement favorable
education policies, there are some ways in which it could be considered they have a
negative impact on students, such as opposing school-choice voucher programs, and
there are countless ways in which the influence of unions is truly not fully known. Many
similar works focus exclusively on teachers unions and upon their collective bargaining
power while little attention is paid to how unions in general can affect education. This
thesis is a springboard for this vein of research, one which is being almost ignored.

TABLE of CONTENTS: PAGE:
INTRODUCTION 1
LITERATURE REVIEW 4
HYPOTHESES 11
METHODOLOGY 12
RESULTS 19
CONCLUSION 26
BIBLIOGRAPHY 31

LIST of TABLES and FIGURES: PAGE
TABLES
Table 1: List of Hypotheses 12
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for All Continuous Variables 18
Table 3: List of Hypotheses and Expected Results 18
Table 4: Regression of Percentage of Democrats in State Legislature
by Percentage of Workers Unionized 19
Table 5: Logistic Regression of Existence of School-Choice Programs
by Percentage of Workers Unionized, Controlling for Free/Reduced
Lunch Percentage 21
Table 6: Comparing Collective Bargaining Rank and Percentage of
Education Funds used on Salaries between Top and Bottom States 22
Table 7: Regression of Percentage of Education Funds used for
Teacher Salaries by Collective Bargaining Rank 23
Table 8: Regression of Per Pupil Spending by Percentage of Workers
Unionized, Controlling for Per Capita Income 23
Table 9: Regression of Student-to-teacher Ratio by Percentage of
Teachers Unionized 24
Table 10: Regression of SAT Scores by Percentage of Teachers
Unionized, Controlling for Percent Free/Reduced Lunch and Percent
Students Taking Test 25
Table 11: Regression of High School Graduation Rates by Percentage of
Teachers Unionized, Controlling for Percent Free/Reduced Lunch 26
Table 12: List of Hypotheses, Expected Results, and Outcomes 27
FIGURES
Figure 1: Scatterplot of Election Results vs Rate of Unionization 20

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Introduction
In “Message for American Education Week,” President Franklin Roosevelt stated:
Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared
to choose wisely. The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education. It
has been well said that no system of government gives so much to the
individual or exacts so much as a democracy. Upon our educational system
must largely depend the perpetuity of those institutions upon which our
freedom and our security rest. To prepare each citizen to choose wisely and to
enable him to choose freely are paramount functions of the schools in a
democracy (Roosevelt, 1938).
An educated citizenry is required not only to inform the government of its needs and desires, but
also to ensure that the government is indeed doing as the citizenry demands. Education is so
important, in fact, that every state constitution includes it as a right of its citizens, with some
states even going so far as to mandate that education is a key factor in maintaining a free
government. For example, the state of Indiana begins Article 8 of the state constitution with the
sentiment, “Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential
to the preservation of free government… (IN Const. art. VIII, §1).” Yet these same states do not
provide equal education, nor do their students perform at an equal level. In 2009, for example,
87.6% of those who entered high school in Maine graduated whereas only 50.5% of those who
entered high school in Nevada could say the same (NCHEMS, 2012). These numbers are
drastically different and this difference is important, especially to the student actually entering
school in Nevada or any one of several states with similar rates.
This research looks at the decline of union strength and its impact on public education.
There are two basic schools of thought with regard to this issue; the first school of thought states
that unions, in particular the teachers’ unions, push for higher wages and therefore put more of a
financial strain on public school systems and, by extension, degrade the level of education
provided. This argument is misleading. While unions can and do lobby for benefits for their

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members, their success is highly variable and there are other aspects of education for which
unions fight. Second, the presence of unions may have a positive impact on public education
because teachers’ unions provide a necessary outlet for teachers to voice their concerns and to
solve problems. Unions, in general, negotiate for higher wages, increasing per capita income and
thereby growing school funding through taxes. This lower level of poverty positively influences
education because those who live in lower income households are more likely to struggle in
school. From this I develop the hypothesis that states in which there exist stronger unions will
exhibit stronger public education systems. I will examine the effect of strong unions on three
fronts: elections, education policies, and student outcomes.
Perhaps one factor leading to the differences in public education state to state is the
uneven decline in union strength across the states. Unions were once a fixture in American life;
they helped to set the 40-hour work week, provide paid vacations and holidays, and prevent child
labor. Throughout the latter half of the 20th
Century, unions were a voice of the working class
against business owners, with private- and public-sector workers alike joining their unions,
seeing dues as worth the help and protection the unions provided (Chaison, 2006). Union
approval reached 75% in 1957, at the same time as disapproval was at a low of 14%. But by the
early 2010s the public viewpoint on unions had soured. According to a 2012 Gallup poll, labor
unions had a 52% approval rating by the American public and disapproval was at 42%, three
times the level of 1957 (Jones, 2012).
General union strength influences the quality of public education in several different
ways. Unions function not only to protect employees within the workplace, but also to advocate
for their members in the political sphere. While at the same time wages are a primary focus,
policy initiatives and elections, particularly at the state level, are also important. For example,

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strong unions can increase wages and therefore income; they can also influence policies at the
state-level, including the blocking of implementation of so-called right-to-work legislation. All
of these influences can have an impact on socioeconomic status within states, thus affecting the
outcomes of public education. This occurs because parents of students in the lower
socioeconomic status typically do not have the resources to provide the same extra forms of
academic stimulation as do wealthier parents; even time spent working with their children on
homework can be a resource which is not available for less wealthy parents. These effects can
accumulate, with the academic gap between poor and wealthy students getting larger with each
passing year (Sirin, 2005).
Public-sector unions, particularly teachers’ unions, have faced an even higher level of
displeasure compared with labor unions in general. Teachers’ unions also have higher rates of
membership than many other occupations; in fact, the only occupation type within 15 percentage
points of education’s 35.4 percent in 2012 was protective service occupations at 34.8 percent
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). However, teachers’ unions are seeing an unprecedented
decline in membership recently. According to the National Education Association (NEA) its
membership has dropped an estimated 16 percent, approximately 300,000 full-time teachers,
since 2010 (Toppo, 2012). In a nationally-representative poll conducted by Harvard’s Program
on Education Policy and Governance in 2012, 22% of respondents expressed a positive view of
teachers’ unions, a seven-point drop from the year prior (Peterson, 2012). This shift in the
popularity of labor unions is one to keep in mind as more and more states pass so-called right-to-
work laws and similar legislation in an effort to limit the power and influence of these unions. A
recent remarkable example came with the passage of right-to-work legislation by the Michigan
legislature on the same day it was introduced in 2012. The bills were signed into law as quickly

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as legally allowed five days later (Watkins, 2012). While this may be an extreme example,
almost half of the states have enacted similar legislation, and could set the stage for analysis of
research pertaining to the results of decreasing union strength as other states consider
implementing such policies. These results could be useful to lawmakers in the decision-making
process and could potentially influence the subsequent legislation.
Literature Review
Until recently, unions had been a major provider of on-the-ground election campaign
work, mobilizing large numbers of volunteers and voters. In the most recent elections,
campaigns have worked to do this leg work independently from unions, although union members
are involved as well. Chaison (2006), in his overview of the political actions of unions, includes
that unions will almost always back Democratic candidates, whether that be through
groundwork, funding, or often a combination of the two. Taylor E. Dark III (2000) corroborates
this for the 1998 midterm elections, examining the work of the AFL-CIO. While both are
discussing unions and elections at the federal level, the findings can be assumed to extend to
state-level legislative elections as well because these same union members work to get as many
Democrats elected as possible, whether they be local, state, or national candidates. This will be
tested in this research.
Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler (2007) offer a slightly different perspective on the
effect of unions on elections in their work “Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the U.S.
Electorate, 1964-2004.” In it they discuss the idea of union members themselves being more
likely to vote in presidential and congressional elections, even if they do little else to promote the
candidates. They also look at the effects of a decline in union membership on voter turnout,
seeing that the decrease led to decreases in voter turnout at all levels of income. While their

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article does not speak to unions at the state level, it suggests that states in which unions are
weaker would have lower voter turnout, particularly of those who would otherwise be mobilized
by the unions. As unions, along with those who have pro-union tendencies, are more likely to
support Democratic candidates, a lower voter turnout in these states could potentially lead to a
shift in the control party in the state legislatures. If the unions are not as strong and do not
mobilize voters to the same extent as in other states, we should see some degree of difference in
the Democratic strength in these state legislatures.
Much literature pertaining to the relationship between unions and education is limited to
the effects of teachers’ unions and is setting out to answer a normative question, such as “Should
teachers’ unions be allowed to collectively bargain?” or “Are teachers’ unions good or bad for
public education?” (Eberts, 2007; Moe, 2011; Kurth, 1987). Such research provides little
beyond assumptions, interpretations, and anecdotal evidence toward an answer as opposed to a
more evidence-based approach. This tendency makes it somewhat difficult to transfer the
findings of this literature toward a quantitative research design. The only literature that did not
pose a largely normative research question were pieces that provided background information on
how teachers’ unions developed and how they function. Literature related to how teachers’
unions have an impact within schools has the tendency to focus mostly, or even exclusively, on
collective bargaining as the measure of teachers’ union strength. While collective bargaining is
an important part of the work done by teachers’ unions, it is not the only aspect and is limited or
nonexistent in some areas of the country. The literature in this section also often fits into one of
two categories: somewhat dated studies and current and not-yet-completed studies. Each poses
its own challenge, with the former having the difficulty of potentially no longer reflecting the
current situation and the latter not yet having conclusive and tested results.

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Nevertheless, the literature on this topic is nearly unanimous: teachers’ unions are a
hindrance to education. Some, including Terry M. Moe (2011), argue teachers’ unions make it
difficult, bordering on impossible, to fire incompetent teachers, and that when cuts do need to be
made, new teachers are released first, regardless of ability (Moe, 2011; Toch, 2010; Lieberman,
1997). Teachers, in a similar manner as most employees regardless of occupation, are primarily
concerned with their individual self-interest. The teachers’ unions therefore advocate for
anything which makes it easier for their members to continue teaching and making money, even
if those teachers are not competent. Teachers who are dues-payers are preferred the longer they
have paid dues, creating a system of seniority. Subpar teachers are allowed to remain in schools
at the expense of new teachers who are at the cutting edge with regard to teaching techniques and
best practices. The studies use as example one or a few school districts or even individual
schools within districts. However, examining a small number of cases at the level of the district
or school is not typically able to be generalized beyond those individual schools and districts.
While there may be high-profile examples of teachers’ unions working to prevent
teachers from being fired within specific schools, these anecdotes do not necessarily indicate that
teachers’ unions throughout the country work to achieve such extreme measures. Similarly, this
research assumes that teachers’ unions and tenure are synonymous concepts without providing
beyond anecdotal evidence from a small number of cases supporting this, thereby exaggerating
the influence that this minority of cases may have. There is nothing wrong with providing some
anecdotal evidence; relying on this evidence on the other hand can lead to some faulty
assumptions and premises. Also, education is not the only place where seniority plays an
influential role, it is common in many lines of work in both the public and private sectors. By
making teachers’ unions and tenure synonymous, the leap comes that the use of seniority in

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education must have a negative impact on education, again with the evidence coming from a
small number of cases that are typically more extreme negative examples of the possible range of
influence of seniority. For example, Eberts (2007) argues that incompetent older teachers are
allowed to remain in schools too long and claims they are almost impossible to fire. He also
mentions that when cuts do need to be made, it is the new, young teachers who are first on the
chopping block, making it impossible for such teachers to gain any traction. This theory
emphasizes youth at the expense of experience; the teachers who have been within schools long
enough to gain any degree of seniority also have that many years of experience, honing methods
of effectively educating their students. To discount the importance of this experience because of
occasional instances of incompetent veteran teachers would be similar to fielding a professional
sports team of only rookies because there have been instances of veteran players staying past
their prime. The assumptions of this reasoning lead to questionable conclusions.
The second theory is focused specifically and exclusively on the effects of teacher
collective bargaining on education. More quantitative, it uses as evidence a correlation between
higher collective bargaining capability and the percentage of education funds used for teacher
salaries (Eberts, 1984; Lieberman, 1987; Loveless, 2000). This examination, however, does not
tend to be conducted nationwide, using selected cases rather than utilizing every state. For
example, Eberts (1984) frequently uses the work and data of McDonnell and Pascal from 1979,
which references only 152 school districts across the country. To put this number of school
districts in context, the state of Indiana, which is ranked 16th
in population according to the
Census Bureau, has 294 school districts according to the state Department of Education. While
the findings may be completely valid for those 152 school districts, the limited number of cases
leads to issues in generalizing the findings beyond the specific cases studied.

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According to these studies, collective bargaining rights lead to higher teacher salaries
which then leads to an increased percentage of education funding being used for teacher salaries
as compared to other spending areas. By setting aside a higher proportion of funding to pay
teachers, less money is available for other areas of education such as classroom supplies,
technology, facility construction and maintenance, and events such as speakers or field trips.
Eberts sees this as decreasing the quality of education, as these are all areas which, given greater
funding, could influence the academic outcomes for students, even if higher salaries could
possibly attract higher quality teachers. The primary assumption is that higher teacher salaries
inherently have a negative impact on education. Little-to-nothing is done to explicitly lay out the
logic behind the assumption, simply stating it as common knowledge. Eberts even concludes
that, using the same data of collective bargaining, educational outcomes as measured by
standardized test scores shows no conclusive diminishing results in pro-collective-bargaining
districts, with some actually showing gains in math scores.
In his book Unions in America, Gary Chaison (2006) gives a comprehensive overview of
unionization in the United States, addressing unions’ histories, current practices, and political
scope. Chaison specifically looks at unions in politics, highlighting some areas in which unions
are influential. These include the minimum wage and overtime legislation, labor law reform,
election influence, and the fight against NAFTA. Each of these were examined fairly
superficially at the national level, providing an overview of each topic while avoiding specific
examples. Chaison (2006) does point out that, in the situation of the minimum wage battle,
unions do tend to have more success getting legislation implemented at the state level as opposed
to the national level. The work itself is designed to provide an introductory-level understanding
of unions rather than to analyze the specific actions taken by unions at the state level. In their

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book What Do Unions Do?, Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff (1984) corroborate the
idea presented by Chaison (2006) that unions do increase wages and incomes, both for union and
nonunion employees, at the national level.
The topic of school-choice programs is particularly timely, as many states begin to set up
such programs or to further expand them. These programs include both school vouchers and tax
credits because, while they are slightly different in procedure, they both achieve the same goal of
transferring children from the public school systems to charter or private schools. Much of the
literature focuses primarily on the impact of school-choice programs after they have been
implemented, with little talk on how these programs came to exist or which groups of people
supported them (Levin, 1998; Metcalf, 2002; Moe, 2001). A common idea amongst this
literature is that, while the results for individual students involved in school-choice programs are
mixed, such programs are seen to negatively affect public school systems by removing funds and
potentially segregating schools based upon socioeconomic status with public schools serving
those of lower socioeconomic status. While the normative debate on the impact of school-choice
programs on educational outcomes is a worthwhile one, it does little to help determine the effect
of strong unions within a state on the implementation of such programs. Edward Gokcekus,
Joshua J. Phillips, and Edward Tower (2004) look at both the normative question of outcome of
school-choice programs along with the question of what conditions create a scenario of a likely
“yay” or “nay” vote on the voucher portion of the 2001 “No Child Left Behind Act” (NCLB) in
their work “School Choice: Money, Race, and Congressional Voting on Vouchers”. Their study
indicated, among other things, that representatives who received more funding from teachers’
unions, whether they be Republican or Democrat, were more likely to vote “no” on the school
voucher portion of NCLB. A logical extension of this would say that a state in which there is a

10
stronger teacher union presence, where a larger proportion of state legislators receive significant
funding from teachers’ unions, would be less likely to pass legislation enacting a school-choice
program. This, however, does not tell the entire story of the impact of unions on the existence of
school-choice programs, as unions across a variety of occupations often have the tendency to
work together to either support or block a piece of legislation, as is discussed by Kevin W. Hula
(1999). As such, it may be more appropriate to use a measure geared toward general
unionization levels as opposed to a more narrowly defined measure of teacher unionization. I
have not found studies examining the relationship between general unions and school-choice
programs.
The literature review of the effect of levels of unionization on state-level per-pupil
spending holds many of the same difficulties as that of school-choice programs. Much of the
research fits into three situations: normative research, either a national-level or a single-state
focus, and exclusively based upon teachers’ unions (Hartney, 2011; Marlow, 2000; Spring,
1998). For example, “Spending, school structure, and public education quality. Evidence from
California” by Michael L. Marlow (2000) suggests that teachers’ unions work at the district
level, and to some extent the state level, to increase per-pupil expenditures. He then places a
normative value to this increase in spending, saying that it is a negative action on the part of
teachers’ unions because increased spending does not necessarily result in improved scores,
therefore wasting state money (Marlow, 2000). It would be logical that there could be a similar
effect of unions increasing education expenditures in other states, at least enough logic that it
would be a reasonable question to study. As with the impact on school-choice programs, a
narrow focus on the impact of teachers’ unions on per-pupil expenditures is not sufficient, and a

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discussion of the impact of levels of general unionization on per-pupil spending does not seem to
exist.
Hypotheses
From this literature comes seven hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that unions, through
voter mobilization, work to impact state-level elections, typically to elect Democrats. This leads
to policies which are more beneficial to education than if Republicans are elected. The previous
literature indicates that this is the case at the national level, however, there is little discussion of
the state level. This hypothesis is attempting to ensure that the logic extends from the national
level to the state.
Hypotheses two through five all fall under the category of the impact of unions on
education policies. The second hypothesis states that unions work to prevent the passage of
school-choice programs within their states. As is stated in the literature review, school-choice
programs are generally seen as harmful to public schools, and unions work both through election
and through lobbying to prevent such policies from being enacted. The third hypothesis tests the
assumption from previous works that stronger collective bargaining rights for teachers leads to
an increase in the percentage of education funding used for teacher salaries. The opposite has
been assumed in previous literature but has not been statistically tested. The fourth hypothesis
states that the work of unions leads to an increase in per-pupil spending at the state level. This
comes through lobbying at primarily the state and local levels to increase the funding provided,
including the raising of local property taxes. The fifth hypothesis states that teachers’ unions
work to lower the student-to-teacher ratio within their schools. There are several ways these
unions can affect student-to-teacher ratio, such as collectively bargaining with the school district

12
or by working to increase education spending, which can then lead to more teachers being hired
and therefore resulting in fewer students per teacher.
The final two hypotheses focus on the impact of teachers’ unions on student academic
outcomes. The sixth hypothesis states that teachers’ unions have an effect on student
performance in that SAT scores improve, and the seventh hypothesis proposes that teachers’
unions have the same impact on high school graduation rates. These both take into account
multiple conditions within schools for which teachers’ unions fight but which are also difficult to
quantify at the state level, such as the availability of new textbooks, regular use of technology,
and even building conditions.
Table 1: List of Hypotheses
1. Election Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will elect more Democrats.
2. School-choice Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will be less likely to
implement school-choice programs.
3. Salary Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will not have a higher percentage
of education expenditures used for teacher salaries than states with weaker
unions.
4. Per-pupil Spending Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will have higher per
pupil spending.
5. Student-teacher Ratio Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will have lower
student-to-teacher ratios.
6. SAT scores Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will have higher average
SAT scores.
7. Graduation Rate Hypothesis: States with stronger unions will have higher high
school graduation rates.
Methodology
This is a statistical analysis of union strength and its consequences for education in the
fifty states. By not focusing on the study of an individual or small group of states, I hope to

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achieve a more general understanding of how a decline in union strength can lead to a decline in
public education. Each of the hypotheses has its own dependent and independent variables, and
the statistical analyses used consist primarily of regression models in order to determine that the
variables are in fact related as expected.
The test on the hypothesis pertaining to the impact of high levels of unionization on
elections uses the state legislative election results as the dependent variable and the percentage of
workers unionized as the independent variable. The former variable includes the results of the
2008 state house and state senate elections and is the percentage of Democrats in the legislature.
Data is omitted for Nebraska in this analysis, as this state has a unicameral nonpartisan
legislature. These election results are compiled by Polidata in their Demographic and Political
Guides (2013). The variable for unionization is the percentage of workers who are members of a
union for the year 2008. This data comes from the work of Barry T. Hirsch (2001), which also
includes data from the Current Population Survey. A regression is the test run, and I expect to
see that an increase in unionization leads to an increased likelihood of Democrats being elected.
The section discussing unionization’s impact on education policies includes hypotheses
two through five. The second hypothesis includes existence of school-choice programs as the
dependent variable with general union strength the independent variable and percentage of
students in the free-and-reduced lunch program as a control variable. The issue of school-choice
programs is also one dealt with predominantly at the state level, making general union strength
the better option because of the previously-mentioned tendency of unions from different
industries to work together in lobbying efforts. It should also be noted that there is a pairwise
correlation of .83 between general union strength and teachers’ union strength, indicating there
should be minimal difference in the regressions. As a general rule, if the dependent variable is

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concentrated at the state level, the general union strength variable is used, and when the
dependent variable is primarily concerned with the local level the teachers’ union variable is
used. These school-choice policies create a system in which public funds are used, either in the
form of vouchers or tax credits, to aid students to transfer from public to private or charter
schools with varying limitations from state to state. The variable of school-choice programs is
binary; 0 represents no such program within a state and 1 indicates that a state has some school-
choice program. The control variable of percentage of students in free-and-reduced lunch
programs is used as a proxy for poverty which is directly related to education; some see that the
proposed goal of school-choice programs is reportedly to help lower-income students enter
private schools. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), an integral aspect of the decision was the
understanding of this as a primary purpose, aiding the U.S. Supreme Court in its narrow 5-4
decision that these school-choice programs are not unconstitutional. It would then follow that
states with higher levels of students in free-lunch programs would be more likely to implement
school-choice programs compared to states with lower levels of poverty. The statistical test run
is a binary logistic regression, and I expect that as the rate of unionization increases, the
likelihood of a state enacting such a policy will decrease.
The third hypothesis tests the assumption from previous literature that strong teachers’
unions result in a higher percentage of education expenditures being used on teacher salaries. In
this case, the percentage of education expenditures used on salaries is the dependent variable
while teacher collective bargaining strength is the independent variable. The dependent variable
is exactly what it says: the percentage of education expenditures which are used on teacher
salaries. This data comes from the National Education Association (2009). In this situation, the
measure of the independent variable is the strength of teacher collective bargaining rights

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because the argument brought forth by Eberts (1984) in the literature review focuses on the
effect of collective bargaining. This information is provided by Winkler et al. (2012) and is a
compilation ranking based upon the criteria of the legal status and scope of collective bargaining,
the right to automatically collect dues and/or use automatic payroll deductions, and the legal
status of teacher strikes. The test run is a regression with the expected outcome that the previous
assumption proves to either be inconclusive or false.
The fourth hypothesis uses per-pupil spending as the dependent variable and general
union strength as the independent variable, while controlling for per capita income. This
independent variable of general union strength has already been defined in previous sections.
Per-pupil spending is the amount of money spent by the state and local governments on
education per student; as it is on a per-pupil basis it helps to account for differences in
population. This data is reported by the NCES in the “National Public Education Financial
Survey” (2009). Again, a regression test is conducted for the year 2008. I expect that in this test
an increase in the percentage of workers unionized will lead to an increase in per-pupil spending.
I also expect that an increase in income will increase per-pupil spending because on average
approximately 92% of school funding comes from state and local sources, most of this coming
from taxes (Zhou, 2010).
The fifth hypothesis is a regression with student-to-teacher ratio as the dependent variable
with teacher union strength as the independent variable. Student-to-teacher ratio is an oft-cited
factor in the educational success of students and is one of the working and learning conditions
for which teachers’ unions bargain. It would make sense, therefore, that states with strong
teachers’ unions would have lower student-to-teacher ratios. The dependent variable of student-
to-teacher ratio is simply the average number of students per teacher for the year 2008 as

16
reported by the U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
in the “State Nonfiscal Public Elementary/Secondary Education Survey” (2008). Teachers’
union strength is defined as the percentage of teachers unionized as reported by Winkler, et al.
(2012). These numbers are also for the year 2008. A simple regression is run with the expected
results that increased unionization results in a lower student-to-teacher ratio.
The sixth hypothesis is a regression using SAT scores as the dependent variable and
teachers’ union strength as the independent variable, controlling for percentage of students in
free-and-reduced lunch program and the percentage of students taking the test. The SAT is used
because it is identical no matter where it is taken, whether that be Alabama, Wyoming, or any
other state. Controlling for the percentage of students taking the test helps to counter the
potential downside to this measure that not every student takes the SAT. Both the SAT scores
and percentage of students taking the test are compiled by the College Entrance Examination
Board (2009). The independent variable of teachers’ union strength is again defined as the
percentage of teachers who are union members. The percentage of students in the free-or-
reduced lunch program, which has strict income limitations, is the within-school poverty
measure of choice. This data is again provided by the NCES, this time in its “Public
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey” (2009). Once again, the test is a regression, and
I expect that an increase in teacher unionization will lead to an increase in test scores, while
increases in the percentage of students in free-and-reduced lunch programs and the percentage of
students taking the test will lead to decreases in test scores.
The final hypothesis examining the effect of teachers’ union strength on high school
graduation rate is also tested using a regression similar to the previous hypothesis. It has
graduation rate as the dependent variable, teachers’ union strength as the independent variable,

17
and controls for the percentage of students participating in free-and-reduced lunch program.
High school graduation is used in this case to confirm that teachers’ unions impact student
academic performance throughout the entire student population and not simply those who plan to
attend college and therefore will take the SAT. The independent and control variables in this
regression are the same as in the previous hypothesis, and the dependent variable is the
percentage of students who graduate from high school. This data is provided by the National
Center for Higher Education Management Systems (2012). As with the previous hypothesis, I
expect that an increase in the percentage of teachers unionized will lead to an increase in
graduation rate and an increase in the percentage of students participating in free-and-reduced
lunch programs will lead to a decrease in graduation rate.
The descriptive statistics of the variables, as detailed in Table 2, show the mean, median,
minimum value, and maximum value for each of the continuous variables. All of the variables
have means and medians which are close to each other, indicating a normal distribution. The
percentage of students taking the SAT does have a slightly larger difference between mean and
median because there is a large increase in the variable after the median, going from 26% to
42%. The minimum and maximum values show the range of each variable, which indicates that
there is in fact variation in the variable. The smallest range comes in the student-to-teacher ratio
variable, however it does represent a difference of 13 students per teacher, a large amount. The
binary variable of the existence of school-choice programs is not included in the table because,
with possible values of only 0 and 1, the mean, minimum value, and maximum value are not
useful. The variable does have frequencies of 30 for 0 and 20 for 1, showing there are ten more
states which do not have school-choice programs than have them.

18
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for All Continuous Variables
Variable Mean Median Minimum (State) Maximum (State)
Percentage
Workers Unionized
11.5% 10.65% 3.5% (North Carolina) 24.9% (New York)
Percentage
Democrats in State
Legislature
55% 57% 24% (Idaho) 90% (Rhode Island)
Percentage
Free/Reduced
Lunch
40.38% 37.7% 18.1% (New Hampshire) 66.9% (Mississippi)
Percentage Teacher
Salary
32% 32% 24% (Alaska) 48% (Nebraska)
Percentage
Teachers Unionized
73.57% 76.6% 26.9% (South Carolina) 98.8% (Connecticut)
Students per
Teacher
15.16 14.8 10.7 (Vermont) 23.7 (Utah)
Per Capita Income $39,798 $39,736 $30,659 (Mississippi) $56,121 (Connecticut)
SAT scores 538.2 527.5 467.5 (Maine) 612.5 (Iowa)
Percent taking SAT 36.34% 26% 3% (Iowa, North Dakota,
South Dakota)
90% (Maine)
Graduation Rate 72.16% 72.81% 47.56% (Nevada) 86.63% (Vermont)
Table 3: List of Hypotheses and Expected Results
List of Hypotheses Expected Results
1. Election Hypothesis: States with stronger
unions will elect more Democrats.
An increase in the percentage of
workers unionized will lead to a higher
percentage of Democrats in the state
legislature.
2. School-choice Hypothesis: States with
stronger unions will be less likely to
implement school-choice programs.
workers unionized will lead to a
decreased likelihood of a state
implementing school-choice programs.
3. Salary Hypothesis: States with stronger
unions will not have a higher percentage of
education expenditures used for teacher
salaries than states with weaker unions.
The previous assumption of stronger
collective bargaining rights leading to
an increase in percent of education
expenditures used for teacher salaries
will not hold to be true.
4. Per-pupil Spending Hypothesis: States with
stronger unions will have higher per pupil
workers unionized will lead to an

19
spending. increase in per-pupil spending.
5. Student-teacher Ratio Hypothesis: States
with stronger unions will have lower
student-to-teacher ratios.
An increase in the number of teachers
unionized will lead to a decrease in the
number of students per teacher.
6. SAT scores Hypothesis: States with stronger
unions will have higher average SAT
scores.
unionized will lead to an increase in
SAT scores.
7. Graduation Rate Hypothesis: States with
stronger unions will have higher high school
graduation rates.
unionized will lead to an increase in
high school graduation rates.
Results
The test of the impact of strong unions on state-level election results is fairly
straightforward, as it is more of a confirmation of what previous literature indicated rather than a
completely new concept. The goal is simply to see if there is in fact a relationship between states
with strong unions and the results of elections. For every one-percent increase in unionization,
the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature increases by approximately 1.4%. Even with
outliers, as shown by states such as Idaho, Alaska, and New York in Figure 1, the results match
what would be suspected based upon the previous research indicating that unions affect election
outcomes, and it is statistically significant (p < .001). Because the focus of those works was
national it was important to ensure that the logic did actually extend to the state level as well.
Table 4: Regression of Percentage of Democrats in State
Legislature by Percentage of Workers Unionized
Variable Coefficient (95% CI) Std. Err. t p> │t│
Rate of
Unionization
1.434 (.793 to 2.074) 0.318 4.5 .000
Note: R-squared = .3016, Root MSE = 12.89.
CI = Confidence Interval; Std. Err. = Standard Error

20
The next test is that of school-choice programs. For each one-percent increase in
unionization, holding the free-and-reduced lunch variable constant, this logit decreases by .15
and is statistically significant (p < .05). These results also matched what was expected through
the hypothesis, with an increase in unionization corresponding with a decreased likelihood of
participating in school-choice programs. While the percentage of students in free-and-reduced
lunch programs did not match the initial prediction that an increased poverty level would result
in an increased likelihood of implementing school-choice programs, it was not statistically
significant.

21
Table 5: Logistic Regression of Existence of School-Choice Programs
by Percentage of Workers Unionized,
Controlling for Free/Reduced Lunch Percentage
Variable Coefficient 95% CI Std. Err. z p>│z│
Rate of
Unionization
-.151 -.282 to -.020 .067 -2.27 .023
Percentage on
Free/Reduced
Lunch
-.009 -.072 to .053 .032 -0.29 .773
Note: CI = Confidence Interval; Std. Err. = Standard Error
Existence of School-Choice Programs within a State is the reference category
The third hypothesis tested is of a commonly held assumption that strong collective
bargaining rights for teachers leads to a higher percentage of education expenditures used for
teacher salaries. A cursory analysis of the data indicates that this is not necessarily the case and
is detailed in Table 5. The states with the top five collective bargaining rights rankings
according to Winkler (2012) (California, Minnesota, Illinois, Alaska, and Oregon) would
therefore be expected to spend a higher percentage of expenditures on teacher salaries. In fact,
according to the NEA, these states come in 15th
, 19th
, tenth, third, and first respectively in lowest
percentage of expenditures used on salaries (National Education Association, 2005). On the
other end of the spectrum, the four states that come in last place in collective bargaining rights
(Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia) would be expected to have lower percentages of
spending used on salaries; in reality they have the eigth, 13th
, fifth, and 12th
highest percentages
(National Education Association, 2005).

22
Table 6: Comparing Collective Bargaining Rank and
Percentage of Education Funds used on Salaries
between Top and Bottom States
State Collective
Bargaining Rank
Percentage Education
Funds Used on Salaries
Rank of Salary
Percentage
CA 50 29.57% 15
MN 49 30.38% 19
IL 48 28.41 10
AK 47 23.60% 1
OR 47 26.10% 3
GA 1 36.32% 43
NC 1 35.55% 38
TX 1 37.35% 46
VA 1 35.88% 39
Note: 1 = Weakest Collective Bargaining Rank/Lowest Salary Percentage
50 = Strongest Collective Bargaining Rank/Highest Salary Percentage
This test shows that for every one-unit increase in the collective bargaining rank, the
percentage of education funds used for teacher salaries decreases by .14% and is statistically
significant (p < .001). The test matched the hypothesized outcome, as the goal was to test a
previously held assumption with the result of refuting it. The results designated this because,
despite the assumption that stronger collective bargaining rights lead to an increase in the percent
of education expenditures utilized for teacher salaries, the results were actually statistically
significant that the opposite is true. This matches the cursory examination of the findings, which
showed that there are many instances of collective bargain strength and salary percentage not
matching up at all.

23
Table 7: Regression of Percentage of Education Funds used for Teacher Salaries by
Collective Bargaining Rank
Variable Coefficient 95% CI Std. Err. t p> │t│
Collective
Bargaining
Rank
-.139 (-.221 to -.058) .0410 -3.44 .001
Note: R-squared = .1974, Root MSE = 4.216
The fourth test looks at the relationship between per-pupil spending and union
membership. The independent variable of the percentage of workers unionized and the control
variable of per capita income were both statistically significant: union membership (p <.01), per
capita income (p <.001). For every one-percent increase in union membership an increase of
$147 is predicted, and for every $1,000 increase in income a small increase of $0.26 is expected.
The results from this test again support my hypothesis, as I expected that both union strength and
per capita income would result in higher per pupil spending.
Table 8: Regression of Per pupil Spending by Percentage of Workers Unionized,
Controlling for Per Capita Income
Percentage
Workers
Unionized
146.890 57.18 to 236.60 44.5900 3.29 .002
Per Capita
Income
.260 .175 to .355 .0448 5.91 .000
Note: R-squared = .6349, Root MSE = 1601

24
The next statistical test run examines the relationship between teachers’ unions and
student-to-teacher ratio. Though the coefficient is negative, showing that the number of students
per teacher decreases by one one-thousandth of a student when the rate of unionization increases
by one percent, these results do not attain statistical or substantive significance. However, with
using only one independent variable, there are other causes of variation, as evidenced by the low
R-squared statistic in Table 8. The results did not come out as expected, because while the
outcome of a negative relationship between the variables was hypothesized, I expected a larger
and more significant result.
Table 9: Regression of Student-to-teacher Ratio by Percentage of Teachers
Unionized
Percentage
Teachers
Unionized
-.001 -.037 to .035 .0180 -0.06 .953
The sixth test run is that examining the relationship between student test scores and
teachers’ union strength. As the percentage of teachers unionized increases by one percent, SAT
scores also increase by .155 points; however, it does not gain statistical significance. While
expected mathematically, the percent of students taking the SAT had an impact on the test scores
themselves, with every one-percent increase resulting in a decrease of over a point. These results
also did not come out as hypothesized. To begin, I expected that teacher unionization would lead
to an increase in SAT scores, however these tests do not provide support. The impact of the

25
percentage of free-and-reduced lunch participants and the percentage of students takings the test
had the expected effect, with an increase in each corresponding with a decrease in test scores.
Table 10: Regression of SAT Scores by Percentage of Teachers Unionized,
Controlling for Percent Free/Reduced Lunch and Percent Students Taking Test
Percentage
Teachers
Unionized
.155 -.127 to .436 .140 1.11 .275
Percent
Free/Reduced
Lunch
-.891 -1.450 to -.332 .278 -3.21 .002
Percent of
Students Taking
Test
-1.265 -1.431 to -1.099 .083 -15.31 .000
The final hypothesis tested is that pertaining to the relationship between teachers’ union
strength and high school graduation rates. As the percentage of teachers unionized increases by
one percent, the high school graduation rate increases by .04% as well. Once again, however,
these results do not meet the threshold for statistical significance. The percent of students
participating in free-and-reduced lunch programs has a similar result as in the regression on SAT
scores, as a one-percent increase leads to a decrease in graduation rate of .5%. As with the
previous hypothesis, these results did not match the expectations because statistical significance
was not achieved.

26
Table 11: Regression of High School Graduation Rates by Percentage of Teachers
Unionized, Controlling for Percent Free/Reduced Lunch
Percentage
Teachers
Unionized
.038 -.077 to .153 .0570 0.66 .509
Percent
Free/Reduced
Lunch
-.491 - .720 to -.261 .1140 -4.30 .000
Conclusion
Determining the impact of unions on public education is by no means an easy,
straightforward task. The previous literature surrounding the topic suggested as much, with
several instances of reputable sources providing information contradicting the work of each
other. While this work does not provide all of the answers, it does garner some interesting
preliminary results. Each of the hypotheses hold its own challenges and produce its own rewards
as well. The sections discussing the effects of strong unions on election results and on state
policies line up closely with what was expected when this research began, with each signifying a
relationship in which union strength had statistically significant influence on the various
dependent variables, as described in Table 12. The section examining student educational
outcomes, on the other hand, do not match what was expected in the hypotheses.

27
Table 12: List of Hypotheses, Expected Results, and Outcomes
List of Hypotheses Expected Results Outcomes
1. Election Hypothesis: States
with stronger unions will
elect more Democrats.
An increase in the
percentage of workers
unionized will lead to a
higher percentage of
Democrats in the state
legislature.
Expected results met;
increase in union percentage
leads to increase in
percentage of Democrats in
the state legislature.
2. School-choice Hypothesis:
States with stronger unions
will be less likely to
implement school-choice
programs.
An increase in the
unionized will lead to a
decreased likelihood of a
state implementing
school-choice programs.
leads to decreased likelihood
of state implementing school-
choice programs.
3. Salary Hypothesis: States
with stronger unions will not
have a higher percentage of
education expenditures used
for teacher salaries than
states with weaker unions.
The previous assumption
of stronger collective
bargaining rights leading
to an increase in percent
of education expenditures
used for teacher salaries
will not hold to be true.
previous assumption refuted;
stronger collective bargaining
rights lead to a decrease in
percent of education
expenditures used for teacher
salaries.
4. Per-pupil Spending
Hypothesis: States with
stronger unions will have
higher per pupil spending.
An increase in the
unionized will lead to an
increase in per-pupil
spending.
Expected results met; an
leads to an increase in per-
pupil spending.
5. Student-teacher Ratio
Hypothesis: States with
stronger unions will have
lower student-to-teacher
ratios.
An increase in the number
of teachers unionized will
lead to a decrease in the
number of students per
teacher.
Expected results not met;
while the directionality was
as expected, the results were
not statistically significant.
6. SAT scores Hypothesis:
will have higher average
SAT scores.
lead to an increase in SAT
scores.
not statistically significant
7. Graduation Rate Hypothesis:
will have higher high school
graduation rates.
lead to an increase in high
school graduation rates.
not statistically significant.

28
One issue which could arise from the findings of this thesis is that the year 2008
witnessed the beginning of the Great Recession, with funding being cut drastically and teachers
fired en masse (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). This sort of crisis could create a
temporary external factor influencing the results of the statistical tests. Running these statistical
tests again once the economy has fully recovered and all of the data are available could provide
different results, either strengthening or refuting the results of this thesis. Another possibly
confounding factor could be the 2008 General Election, which was unique in the number of
young people becoming active and involved. Keeter (2008) reports that these young people
overwhelmingly supported the Democrats; at the same time, however, the young people are not
likely to be members of unions themselves, even if they are supportive of unions. This could
influence the findings of this thesis because the effect of this increase in youth participation
could mask a possible declining effect of unions on elections. As rates of participation amongst
youth have remained elevated since the 2008 Election, the tests examining the effect of
unionization on state legislative election results could be run for earlier years to see if the
relationship remains the same.
Overall, there remains much to suggest that strong unions do have a positive effect on
education as a whole. Through influencing the results of elections and lobbying the elected state
officials unions are able to help shape state policies, many of which have an impact on education.
Recently there has been little focus on unions in social science research, particularly as there is a
continued decline in union membership along with favorability. Unions are seen somewhat as
entities of the past, a remnant of the time when manufacturing was king of the American
economy, with little to do with the service-based economy of today. At the same time, however,
unions should not be quickly dismissed. As an example, look to the teachers’ unions of Indiana

29
in the 2012 election of now-Superintendent of Public Instruction Glenda Ritz. Ritz was facing
the poster-child of education reform, incumbent Tony Bennett, in a fight for a position which had
not been held by anyone other than a Republican in 40 years. Through the mobilization of the
teachers’ unions, along with parents, Ritz was able to overtake Bennett despite being massively
outspent. To dismiss unions as antiquated and outdated is a rash judgment which also discounts
the political power of the working class.
I like to believe that this thesis would at least encourage readers to understand that
unions, particularly teachers’ unions, are not only self-serving, and that unions can have both
positive and negative aspects. Overall, I hope that a reader comes away thoughtful of those ways
in which unions can have a positive influence on education, even if he or she does not
completely buy into the argument yet, and perhaps have a more favorable opinion of these
unions. Further work in this topic could go a long way toward closing a gap in the understanding
of the impact of strong unions on education. As legislatures at the state level continue to act in
such a manner as to weaken unions more available knowledge may lead to wiser decisions being
made.
As President Roosevelt expressed, education is a cornerstone of democracy; it is one of
the most important areas in which we, as citizens, must be involved. The general belief of both
the public and the state legislatures is that unions have a negative influence on education, and
teachers’ unions are considered particularly harmful. Unions have been vilified by the
assumption that union workers are only looking out for themselves and do not have any sort of
greater good in mind. Teachers and other public employees seem to have borne the brunt of this
suspicion, with every action and motive being scrutinized. I do not mean to imply that this is a
simple conclusion and that unions should only be viewed through rose-colored glasses. To the

30
contrary, this is a complex topic and any work which appears to treat it in more absolute terms is
flawed. There are several examples across the country of unions taking extreme actions, such as
the Chicago teachers’ strike in 2012. However, to discount all of the positive work performed by
unions because of some examples of the opposite being done is short-sighted. Perhaps if a
concerted campaign were conducted with research such as this thesis in mind, the idea of unions
as an entirely negative force in the realm of education could be dispelled to some extent and the
public would be more open to seeing the good, the bad, and the unknown of education influence.

31
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