1. ‘The Question of Palestine: The Ineffectiveness of the UNSCOP”
Berkeley C. Arakawa
“Even the United Nations, which was created to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war and reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights so that justice could always be
maintained, failed to consider the juridical aspects of the Palestine question.” [1]
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) is a branch of the United
Nations created in 1947, to solve the “question of Palestine” as its referred to in UN Resolution

2. 181. This question will be addressed in full, focusing on the four points of ineffectiveness of the
Special Committee. In detail, 1) Why did Britain give up its Mandate on Palestine; 2) What
countries were chosen to serve on the UNSCOP; 3) the method of powers by UNSCOP
members, and testimonies received; 4) and, the Partition Majority Plan. Next, the outcome of
the Majority Plan will be discussed in full, followed by how UNSCOP could have made more
appropriate decisions, and in conclusion, what is left to do at this time in the 21st century. As
stated by the United Kingdom in 1947, “We have tried for years to solve the problem of
Palestine. Having failed so far, we now bring it to the United Nations, in the hope that it can
succeed where we have not. If the United Nations can find a just solution, which will be
accepted by both parties, it could hardly be expected that we should not welcome such a
solution”. [2]
UNSCOP is the result of a proposal made by the United Kingdom, ready to abandon
Palestine after a 25-year regional occupation in the form of the ‘British Mandate’. On 2 April
1947, the United Kingdom delegation requested that the question of Palestine be placed on the
General Assembly (GA) agenda and, further, that a special session of the General Assembly be
summoned for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for
consideration of the Palestine. [3] From the United Kingdom’s request in the 21st GA, to the
98th meeting of the special session of the GA, Palestine’s fate was passed to 11 ‘neutral’
countries that would form UNSCOP. UNSCOP was to conduct investigations in Palestine,
receive and examine written or oral testimony where it deemed appropriate, and give
consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity. [4] The
committee report of UNSCOP findings was to be submitted by September of 1947, only four
months after its initial approval.
Following the four months of research, visits and testimonies, the Majority partition
plan submitted by UNSCOP was approved in the GA in November of 1947. This plan gave 56
percent of the Palestinian land to the Zionists’ Jewish state of Israel, despite less than 10 per
cent land ownership by Jewish settlers, and left Jerusalem as an international city for multiple
religious factions. It is possible that the creation and enforcement of the policies of UNSCOP
were the tipping point for the last half century of violence in the Middle East, specifically

3. Palestine. Although the infiltration of the Zionist movement began long before the creation of
the United Nations, no prior internationally recognized division(s) was in place. Let’s now look
at the four clear points of ineffectiveness that made up the Special Committee on Palestine.
After WWI, the League of Nations conferred upon the United Kingdom the British
Mandate in Palestine, one of its primary responsibilities was to secure the development of self-
governing institutions, and safeguard the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants in Palestine.
[5] However, Britain’s Mandate charter for Palestine also incorporated the 1917 Balfour
Declaration and, with it, Britain’s promise to the Zionist movement to secure a ‘homeland’ for
the Jews in Palestine. [6] From 1921 until 1947, Britain’s bias for the Zionist cause made life for
Palestinians impossible. Politically, British officials viewed Palestinians as citizens in status only
– without a defined set of citizenship rights – stripped of their Ottoman nationality [7].
Economically it was the British colonial policy to maintain supremacy at the lowest level
possible of government expenditure; in this case, twelve per cent investments towards public
works benefited indigenous agricultural development. [8] In addition, the consistent addition of
taxation policies and tithes based on fertility rather than annual income, and the land
settlement program allowing unfertile land transferred to the Jewish settlement agencies,
drove Palestine into debt and discriminated city labor. It would be these political and economic
factors, naming only a few, which lead to the Arab Revolt of 1936.
From the end of the revolt in 1939, until its request to the United Nations in 1947, the
British made ill-fated attempts to achieve both the Mandate and the Zionist promise. Ilan
Pappé specifically pointed out the creation of a bi-national state, and a Swiss model of a
canonized Palestine. [9] The Jewish community, and the Zionist movement, rejected both, its’
desire of complete partition unwavering. Following the creation of the United Nations (UN), the
British requested the ‘question of Palestine’ be given to the young international organization.
Naturally, multiple groups put forward agenda requests. In the interests of Palestine, a group of
five Member States (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia) requested to the Secretary-
General the following item be placed on the agenda of the special session: ‘The termination of
the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence’. [10] This was denied

4. unanimously, leaving the United Kingdom’s account of its administration of the Palestine
Mandate to the General Assembly as the sole item on the agenda for special session.
On the opening of the Special Session in April of 1947, a central issue was the
composition of UNSCOP. While the participation of the five permanent members of the Security
Council was strongly supported by the Zionist leadership, the British and Americans would give
the USSR no part in their Middle East sphere(s) of influence. It was declared by the United
States that the committee be made up of neutral states, with no direct interests in the question
of Palestine, therefore the Security Council states would not be included. [12] This also
eliminated both Palestine and the Arab States from taking part in the decisions, were the
‘neutral’ American proposal to be adopted. However, it was the Australian resolution of 11
uninvolved parties that was adopted. It is interesting to note that the approval of the parties
was 13 to 11 in favor, with 29 abstentions. [13] These countries consisted of Australia, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
Although not an approved participant, it is clear the United States and Britain, both countries
having worked directly with Zionist leadership, were to be heavily involved in the committee
makeup.
It was decided in the General Assembly in May of 1947, which established UNSCOP, to give
the Committee broad powers. Paragraph 4 of that Resolution permits it conducts its
investigations ‘wherever it may deem useful’. [14] This Resolution also allowed it to receive and
examine testimony not only from Palestinians, but also ‘from such organizations and individuals
necessary’. [15] These groups and individuals included but were not limited to the Higher Arab
Committee and the World Zionist Organization; both considered non-governmental
organizations (NGO’s) but nonetheless allowed to speak after much protest. The Zionists
pressured the committee to conduct work in the Jewish DP Camps in Europe, encouraging
UNSCOP to ‘investigate In Palestine and any other place it will see fit’. [16]
In the summer of 1947, it was decided by UNSCOP members to request statements in
writing from the Jewish Agency of Palestine and Higher Arab Committee, each of who had
asked to be heard previously in New York. [17] In preparatory talks conducted by the Arab
League states, it was clear there were disagreements. Egypt held a moderate stance, preferring

5. to leave initiative of hearings to the British. On the other hand, Iraq considered a serious
warning must be issued to the British and Americans, that unless immediate independence of
Palestine was recognized, their overall involvement in UNSCOP would be questioned.
[18] Eventually, the Arab League and the Arab High Committee boycotted UNSCOP negotiations
and requested guidance, unintentionally allowing Zionist leadership to write the future of ‘their
Holy Land’.
Although Israel will attempt to argue that the self-made decision to boycott UNSCOP is
proof the Palestinians are held responsible for the land division, as pointed out by Walid
Khalidi, the UN ignored objections made clear in the Balfour Declaration. “The native people of
Palestine, like the native people of every other country in the Arab world, Asia, Africa, America,
and Europe, refused to divide the land with a settler community”. [19] Since the beginning of
the British Mandate in 1918, and the supported invasion of the Zionist movement, Palestine
had long been opposed to the partitioning of their homeland. The Zionists made every effort to
influence the committee in support of the Majority Plan of Partition. It can be believed that by
broadening the scope of the Special Committee’s authority, the UN prejudiced the fate of the
Palestinian Arabs. In October of 1947, prior to even the adoption of the UNSCOP Partition,
Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion was found telling his inner circle that, “in light of the Arab
refusal to cooperate with the UN, there are ‘no territorial boundaries for the future Jewish
state’”. [20]
Not surprising, UNSCOP decided to sponsor the Majority Partition Plan as the guiding
principle for a future solution, an idea long favored by the Zionist leadership. When one takes
into consideration the majority’s recommendations and the enthusiasm with which these
recommendations were accepted by the Zionist leadership, then one can indeed affirm the
favoritism. [21] “Its members deliberated for a while over the possibility of making all of
Palestine one democratic state – whose future would then be decided by the majority vote of
the population – but they eventually abandoned idea”. [22] Apropos the morality of the UN
partition resolution, the arm-twisting tactics utilized by Washington to pressure the smaller
nations on UNSCOP to vote in its favor against better judgment have been amply documented.
Palestine would be divided into two entities, sharing Jerusalem as a corpus separatum,

6. administered by the United Nations. Originally wanting over 80 per cent of Palestinian land,
UNSCOP agreed to give the Zionists 56 per cent. It was the Catholic participant countries who
supported an international city, given its religious significance to not only the Jewish
community, but also the Muslim and Christian communities. [23]
The members of UNSCOP believed both states would thrive on economic unity, its only
division now being demographics. The UN blatantly ignored ethnic composition of Palestine,
dividing country by land mass rather than ethnicity. At the end of the British Mandate, the
indigenous Palestinians still made up the two-third majority. This two thirds controlled the
countryside, while the Jewish settlers barricaded themselves in cities – only 5.8 percent of
cultivated land in Palestine was owned by Jews. Within the borders of their UN- proposed state,
the Jews owned only eleven per cent of the land, and were the minority in every district. The
Zionists promised the UNSCOP members solely there was a mass migration of post-Holocaust
victims underway. [24]
“Partitioning the country – overwhelmingly Palestinian – into two equal parts has
proven so disastrous because it was carried out against the will of the indigenous population”.
[25] The UN violated its 1st article of its Charter, violating basic human rights in exchange for a
‘cheap fix’ solution to the United Kingdom’s problem. Palestinians attempted to demand
legality in International Court of Justice, a United Nations branch founded in 1946, to ask for its
decision on (a) its independence promised by Britain at the end of WWI; (b) whether partition
was consistent with the objectives clearly stated in the British Mandate; (c) whether partition
was consistent with the principles of the UN charter; (d) whether its adoption and execution
were within jurisdiction of the UN; and, (e) whether it was in legal power of the UN to
implement partition without consent of the majority living within the country. [26] After
discussions, the voting on the competence to partition Palestine was carried by 21 to 20 votes,
with 25 abstentions. At the height of ideological struggle, this type of colonialist action(s)
condoned by the United Nations proved there was no border the Western worlds hadn’t
breached.
Ilan Pappé states that the partition was the spark to the first Arab-Israeli war, law and order
collapsing in on the indigenous. With Palestine divided into three parts, it was to create a

7. political nightmare for the Zionist leadership. If viewing a map of Resolution 181, the
Palestinian declared land surrounded the corpus separtum of Jerusalem, as well as controlled
half of the Mediterranean port accessible land. It is important to note the partition
incorporated the most fertile land in the proposed Jewish state, as well as almost all of the
Jewish urban and rural space in Palestine. [27]
Upon approval of Resolution 181, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion accepted and ignored
the UN partition. According to Pappé, Ben Gurion said in his letters, “Israeli borders will be
determined by force and not by the partition resolution”. [28] Between November 1947 and
May 1948, Palestine experienced overwhelming military defeat by the armed forces of the
Zionist movement. “These decisive victories over the Palestinians brought about the wholesale
flight and expulsion of much of the Arab population of Palestine”. [29] The majority of its
citizens displaced into Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, the same countries whose governments were
placing the highest bids on the partitioned land of UNSCOP. Palestine was no longer an Arab
state as intended, but ‘a people without a land.’ This mass exodus, referred to by R. Khalidi as
“the lost years” is important to recognize, as it’s resulted in the loss of major cities necessary to
Israel’s long-term victory such as Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, but also the beginning of Pan-
Arabism that would lead to the first Arab-Israeli War. [30]
Understanding the poor development and management of the Special Committee provides
an evidentiary foundation for the following 60 years of ideological conflict. One has to only
recall how consistently the UN 1947 partition resolution is explicitly assumed to be the defining
moment in which a legal, moral, fair, balanced, pragmatic, practicable “compromise” formula
was accepted by one party and brusquely objected by the other. [31] With its’ humble
beginnings based on the failure of the British Mandate, its’ committee member make-up,
outside organization influence(s), and ill-favored majority partition plan, how could the 1947
partition resolution have possibly turned out beneficial? Based on critical hypothesis(s), had the
United Kingdom handed over its Mandate with an administrative agreement with the Arab
League, the indigenous might not have been so opposed to a settlement. Although made clear
the Palestinians never would agree to such a partition, the minority plan proposed by the
UNSCOP offered a federal state with no defined national religious affiliation(s). As Palestine

8. had always been a religiously diverse nation, the greatest change would be the existing
international regulations of Jerusalem. In addition, this plan allowed both the Zionist Jewish
population and the Palestinians access to any and all available land in the state – neither
received more fertile land, more coastal access, or uprooted and/or alienated its citizens from
their homes.
Even prior to the August 31st decisions, what if the committee had been given a longer
timeframe for unilateral research, rather than the four hasty months granted by the special
session of April 1947? As the 11 countries were ‘neutral,’ how could they not accept
suggestions and influence from such willing parties like the Zionist Organization and the United
States? Briefly mentioning these influencing groups, what if the special session had not only
forbade involved countries, but also forbade associated NGOs? Ben-Gurion of the World Zionist
Organization held both a political affiliation to the requested state of Israel, as well as a
religious affiliation in the Zionist leadership. He had been set on war since removing Chaim
Weizmann from presidency of the affiliated NGO, considering him ‘incapable of guiding Zionism
down the tortuous road to a state and not built to lead the nation in the war to establish it.’
[32] Although a question defined by hypocrisy and amnesia, each of these four suggestions
offers a critically better answer to the forgotten ‘question of Palestine.’
Moving forward, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine has been adjourned for
nearly 70 years. The partition resolution has had many consequences: its removed scrutiny
from the expulsion of nearly 1 million Palestinian townspeople from their original homes,
legitimized the immobility of Palestinian properties and its citizens in gridlocked territories, and
above all, become a justificatory umbrella for all Israeli actions, including the continuous
destruction and capture of the remains of the Gaza Strip . What is most striking about the
Zionist version of the background, nature, circumstances, and aftermath of 1947 partition
resolution is the extent to which it has become the paradigm through which the history of the
Zionist-Arab conflict itself is viewed and judged. [33] Today, we cannot change the decisions of
the 1947 UNSCOP Partition Resolution, nor those of the 1978 Camp David Accords or the 1993
Oslo Accords. However, we can clean the clouded lens of the Western world, using both
questions and answers discussed as well as the technological and modern access available

9. today. With more access to information than ever before, brave scholars like Ilan Pappé are
providing previously disclosed information to the wary public. His book, The Ethnic Cleansing of
Palestine, gives access to privy information including unaccounted toll numbers, war
statements by the previously devout religious Zionist leadership, and blatant Israeli disregard
for the humanity of the Palestinian people. As this information is uncovered, those in the
Western world are sharing this throughout the classrooms, newsrooms, and social media.
Social Media such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs like ‘The Angry Arab’ also allow access to
information that was previously not printed in sources such as The Washington Post or The
New York Times. These sources provide immediate access to events such as the loss of all
power to the Gaza Strip due to Israeli tank(s), the truth behind the three Israeli teenagers
captured and murdered by Palestinians, and the racial enigma that is the 21st century Israeli
right-wing. These sources challenge the authenticity of Al Jazeera, and have no corporation
controlling what can or cannot be printed. Both through print and social outlets, it is imperative
this information is shared about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict half a world away. The more
information released to the Western public, the more the truth will be discovered about the
deviance of our lessons, textbooks, and laughable news stories. Individuals may not be able to
change the world, but thousands of individuals can inform the world.
Lastly, governments do affect what a society can achieve concerning the ‘question of
Palestine.’ For example, France has passed a law against the protesting of the Israeli occupation
in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The United States has funded Israel from the 1960’s;
most recently with a $600 million grant for the Israeli Defense Fund of the Iron Dome weapons
systems. However with the removing of the dirty lens of individuals, why can’t other
governments affect change in their states? Recently the Federal Aviation Association (FAA)
halted all flights in and out of Jerusalem – why can’t this kind of action take place for all flights
to Israel from other countries? If tourism were threatened for the ‘Holy land,’ an economic
incentive could be enough motivation to enact discussions of resolution. If passports were no
longer accepted from Israeli citizens to these same countries, there would be distress by
innocent Israeli citizens within their borders. If the International Court of Justice of the United
Nations was pressured by enough Member-States in the General Assembly, how could an

10. internationally recognized body not accept a challenge to the Israeli actions in Palestine? Now
all that is needed is the pressure.
The legal aspects of the 1947 Partition Resolution may today appear merely academic,
outdated events of the past, fit for oblivion and without relevance to the future. The future,
however, is determined by the accumulation of past events, and no reasonable concern for the
future can possibly exclude a firm grasp. [34] The ineffectiveness of UNSCOP has been
addressed, the outcome of the Majority Partition Plan of 1947 revealed, alternative outcomes
and choices discussed, and how to move forward having analyzed the foundations of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Half a world away, the Middle East seems like a problem that can be
escaped by a click of a remote. However this conflict continues to define the human race. The
United Nations, the world’s international recognized authority, disregards its Charter daily to
maintain international peace security, taking effective measures to suppress acts of aggression
or breaches of the peace. [35] The United States, the most powerful country in the world,
continues to support a state for the sole purpose of a point of access in the sphere of the
Middle East. We must answer the question of Palestine swiftly, with the knowledge of the past
and capabilities of the present, or there will be no future but extinction for the nation of
Palestine. Rashid Khalidi quotes Golda Meir, “There was no such thing as Palestinians… They did
not exist.” [36]
[1] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved July
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11. [2] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved July
26, 2014, from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3
[3] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved July
26, 2014, from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3
[4] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved July
26, 2014, from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3
[5] Yazbak, M. From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak of the 1936 Rebellion
in Palestine (pp. 93). Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, 93-113.
[6] Pappé, Ilan (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 31). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[7] Banko, L (2012) The creation of Palestinian citizenship under an international mandate:
legislation, discourses and practices, 1918-1925.Citizenship Studies, 16:5-6, 641-655. DOI:
10.1080/13621025.2012.698487
[8] Yazbak, M. From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak of the 1936 Rebellion
in Palestine (pp. 95). Middle Eastern Studies, 36, 93-113.
[9] Pappé, Ilan (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 31). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[10] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved
July 26, 2014,
from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3

12. [11] Ben-Dror, Elad. The Arab struggle against partition: The international arena of summer
1947 (pp.262). Middle Eastern Studies, 43:2, 259-293, DOI: 10.1080/00263200601114117
[12] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved
July 26, 2014,
from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3
[13] UN Special Committee on Palestine: Summary Report. (1947, August 1). . Retrieved ,
from http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/miscdocuments/fulltext/unscopsummaryreport.
htm
[14] Elaraby, N. Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949
Armistice Agreements (pp. 100). Law and Contemporary Problems,33, 97-109
[15] Ben-Dror, Elad. The Arab struggle against partition: The international arena of summer
1947 (pp.263). Middle Eastern Studies, 43:2, 259-293, DOI: 10.1080/00263200601114117
[16] A/364 of 3 September 1947. (1947, November 1). A/364 of 3 September 1947. Retrieved
July 26, 2014,
from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3
[17] Ben-Dror, Elad. The Arab struggle against partition: The international arena of summer
1947 (pp. 261). Middle Eastern Studies, 43:2, 259-293, DOI: 10.1080/00263200601114117
[18] Khalidi, W. (1997). Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution (pp. 15).Journal of Palestine
Studies. Vol. 27, pp. 5-21. DOI: 10.2307/2537806

13. [19] Ben-Dror, Elad. The Arab struggle against partition: The international arena of summer
1947 (pp. 264). Middle Eastern Studies, 43:2, 259-293, DOI: 10.1080/00263200601114117
[20] Pappé, Ilan (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pg. 37). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[21] Ben-Dror, Elad. The Arab struggle against partition: The international arena of summer
1947 (pp. 259). Middle Eastern Studies, 43:2, 259-293, DOI: 10.1080/00263200601114117
[22] Pappé, Ilan (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 31). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[23] Pappé, Ilan (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 32). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[24] Pappé, Ilan. (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 34). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[25] Pappé, Ilan. (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 32). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[26] Khalidi, W. (1997). Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution. Journal of Palestine
Studies (pp. 10). University of California Press. 27, pp. 5-21. 10.2307/2537806
[27] Pappé, Ilan. (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (pp.34). Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published)
[28] P Pappé, Ilan. (2006). Partition and Destruction: UN Resolution 181 and its Impact. The
Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (pp. 36-37) Oxford: Oneworld. (Original work published).

14. [29] Khalidi, R. (1997). The Reemergence of Palestinian Identity. Palestinian identity: The
Construction of Modern National Consciousness (pp. 180). New York: Columbia University Press.
[30] Khalidi, R. (1997). The Reemergence of Palestinian Identity. Palestinian identity: The
Construction of Modern National Consciousness (pp. 178). New York: Columbia University Press.
[31] Khalidi, W. (1997). Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution. Journal of Palestine
Studies (pp. 6). University of California Press. 27, pp. 5-21. 10.2307/2537806
[32] Khalidi, W. (1997). Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution. Journal of Palestine
Studies (pp. 8). University of California Press. 27, pp. 5-21. 10.2307/2537806
[33] Khalidi, W. (1997). Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution. Journal of Palestine
Studies (pp. 18). University of California Press. 27, pp. 5-21. 10.2307/2537806
[34] Elaraby, N. Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949
Armistice Agreements (pp. 97). Law and Contemporary Problems, 33, 97-109
[35] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS
XVI, http://www.unwebsite.com/charter.
[36] Khalidi, R. (1997). The Reemergence of Palestinian Identity. Palestinian identity: The
Construction of Modern National Consciousness (pp .181). New York: Columbia University Press.