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Why did the Palestinians fail to achieve statehood in 1948?
PIED – 2066: Palestine & the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Student I.D: 200778264
Dr. Hendrik Kraetzschmar
Word Count: 2,197

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I will invoke three general reasons for why statehood was never established in
1948, and clarify the significance of one major factor over the others in the failure of
a Palestinian state. Firstly, I will provide some background on the Jewish and
Palestinian situation prior to the failure of Palestinian statehood in 1948, and then
begin to elaborate on the key reasons in each section. I will be arguing that the
failure of Palestinians not achieving statehood in 1948 is due to the empowerment of
the Yishuv and Zionist forces which triumphed over fragile Palestinian and Arab
factions in achieving Zionist aspirations.
Palestinian statehood would have been a modern notion for the Palestinians, as
the rise of secular nationalism had developed out of the European Westphalian
system of statehood. The transition to statehood after the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire was difficult concerning the fragility of the Arab region. Furthermore, political
motivations to create a Palestinian state were somewhat introduced by Najib Azuri
who compelled the idea in his 1905 publication condoning Arab Nationalism.1 Before
WWI Jewish immigration into Palestine and Labour Zionism was causing tension
between Arabs and the Jews but it was only slight and economic in nature.
Palestinian statehood was immediately undermined after WWI when the British
mandate of Palestine announced the Balfour declaration in 1917. Formally
establishing and safeguarding the Yishuv (Jewish community) in a majority Arab
Palestine to establish a national home.
The role of Jewish capital and immigration hindering Palestinian statehood
Concerning the process of Jewish capital being gradually invested over the 50
years preceding 1948, these investments by the Jewish bourgeoisie expanded and
advanced the Yishuv. Ultimately the Yishuv became capable of organising advanced
militias, institutions and infrastructure which alienated the Palestinians in terms of
economic discrepancy when compared to the Yishuv. Davis demonstrates this
claiming capital influx had generated $375 million from U.S Zionist individuals and
organisations alone in the 1930s, and an annual average growth rate of 13.2%
between 1922-48.2 The growing influence of the Yishuv as a result of this capital
influx is stated by Lucas who recognises that most of the Jewish investments prior to
1948 were aimed at settlement and land purchases.3 When considering the main
focus of Zionist investment was the pursuit of land ownership, it is important to
recognise the implications on the Arab population involving dispossession.
Dispossession being a key process in the extension of the Yishuv, and was mainly
prominent in the 1940s when forced dispossession was rife.
1 Dowty, A. 2005.Israel/Palestine. UK, Cambridge: Polity Press.Pp.65-66
2 Khalidi,R.2007. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. GB, Oxford: Oneworld
Publications.Pp.13-14
3 Lucas,N. 1975. The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd. Pp. 120

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Dispossession of land through land purchases complimented the Jewish
migrant influxes throughout the first half of the 20th Century. Of which composed of
Jews who fled European persecution post the Dreyfus affair, pogroms and most
prominently the rise of Fascism in Europe. The scale of Jewish immigration is
illustrated by the four waves of immigration known as aliyas, since the end of the 19th
Century which resulted in an increase of over 400,000 Jews in Palestine after 1939,
with only 1 in 10 being born in Palestine.4 Jewish immigration did reinforce the
Jewish National Home as a nucleus for Zionist aspirations. It was the land ownership
implications of the aliyas which directly motivated the 1939 Arab revolt and growing
tension over each community’s right to statehood.
It is clear that the growth of the new Yishuv through Jewish investment and
immigration which favour Zionist goals did enhance the legitimacy of the Jewish
community and extend its influence. However, the economic and immigration
implications of Zionism would not have undermined Palestinian statehood alone
completely. As shown by the 1947 partition plan as 57% of land was allocated to
Jews despite only 7% of former Palestinian land being owned by the Jews.5
Although Arabs were still a majority by 1948 in terms of demography and land
ownership, Palestinian statehood still failed to materialise. The combination of land
ownership dispossession with international support and militarising of pre-state Israel
were the conditions which trumped Palestinian statehood.
International actors that constituted the undermining of Palestinian statehood
Great Britain and its Mandate in Palestine after WWI is one of the more important
actors that affected Palestinian statehoods hindrance. The Jewish Agency (JA) was
recognised by the mandate after the Balfour declaration and Lord Rothschild’s
support of the Zionist aspiration for a Jewish homeland.6 The consent the British
gave to international Zionist actors opened the opportunity for Zionists to begin to
encourage political Zionism for all of Palestine. Some Zionists like Chaim Weizmann
aimed for gradual political Zionism, whilst others like Ben-Gurion (head of the World
Zionist organisation in the 1930s) were pushing for a direct Zionist transformation of
the British Mandate. Ergo Britain’s complacency to the Balfour declaration enabled
Zionists to gradually undermine Palestinian statehood by advancing Zionist interests.
Furthermore, Zionist interests were additionally promoted by later committees and
organisations such as the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Clement Atlee and
Bevin initially established this to address mass Jewish immigration, but later
benefited the political Zionist project.7 U.S president Harry Truman advocated Jewish
immigration and aimed to dismantle immigration barriers from within the Anglo-
4 Ibid.Pp. 109, 70
5 Davis,U. 2003. Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within. London: Zed Books Ltd. Pp. 63-64
6 Ibid.Pp. 27
7 Smith, C.D. 2007.Palestineand the Arab-Israeli conflict:A History with Documents. New York: Bedford/St.
Martins.Pp. 187-189

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American committee, Zionist lobbyists and members of the WZO and JA strived for
partition in Palestine.8 This suggests how Zionist figures in international agencies
were highly represented in advancing Zionist interests within the international
community, whilst Arab representation was not as prominent. Resulting in
international support for a UN partition plan, endorsed by the Anglo-American
committee as formal Arab opposition was not legitimately recognised.
The British Mandate’s role in Palestine has been treated as sympathetic towards
the Arabs in various historical accounts. Although the British did increase Arab
literacy rates by a third,9 and attempted to represent Palestinian interests through the
1939 White Paper limiting Zionist immigration aspirations but there was no long-term
political benefits to the Palestinians.10 The British were attempting to curtail Zionism
due to Jewish-British tensions after the Struma disaster and theft of British arms by
Zionist militias in the 1920s, but the British failed to protect Palestinian interests. The
Arab revolt (1936-1939) illustrates this, the revolt being a direct reaction to rising
Jewish immigration and land ownership and Britain’s passivity to the arms imports
for the Zionist militias and assassination of the Palestinian Sheikh Al-Qassam.11 The
revolt left the Arabs weak and fragmented and lacked the economic and political
prowess of the new Yishuv. The Arabs were just as dissatisfied with the British
mandate as the Jews were after the Struma incident, but Jewish society maintained
integrity and stability politically and economically; generally giving the Yishuv the
advantage to establish a permanent homeland in Palestine.
Most Arab states were fragile after WWI but ambivalent relations between the
British and the Jews can be matched with the Yishuv’s relations with Transjordan.
Similarly, the Jordanians were complicit in the empowering of the Yishuv. Generally
perceiving the Jewish community within Palestine as potentially mutually benefiting
and maintained a ‘clandestine relationship’.12 The monarchy of Jordan condoned the
Jewish homeland’s establishment prior to the partition plan and planned to use the
Jews to advance Jordanian international interests.13 On the other hand, Transjordan
did intervene in the Arab-Jewish war in 1948. Transjordan has been described as the
strongest Arab army in the region during 1948, only the pre-Israel forces rivalled
them.14 The failure of Transjordan’s efforts in defending the Palestinians chance of
statehood whilst Zionist militias advanced on Arab cities was the product of a weak
Arab region.
Bar-Joseph shows how the historical narrative of Transjordan and Israel being
definite rivals was not the case when considering the acceptance and passivity of
8 Ibid.Pp. 189-190
9 Lucas,N. 1975. The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd. Pp. 100
10 Ben-Eliezer, U. 1998. The Making of Israeli Militarism. U.S, Indiana:IndianaUniversity Press.Pp.102
11 Tessler,M. 1994.A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Indiana:Indiana University Press.Pp.230-231
12 Bar-Joseph, U. 2013. The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the war of 1948.New York: Routledge.
Pp. 1-5
13 Ibid.Pp. 1-5
14 Tessler,M. 1994.A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.Indiana:Indiana University Press.Pp.204-206

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Zionism by the Jordanians.15 Despite an Arab league being formed in 1945 to
advance Arab nationalist sentiment and interest, a collective response or even an
early Jordanian response to Zionism would have altered the outcome for
Palestinians in 1948. Therefore, Transjordan played a role in the failure of
Palestinian statehood to some extent, by not prioritising Palestinian national interests
in respect to the Arab league. The Arab league represented a priority to protect the
Palestinian interest of self-determination but clearly positive relations with the Jews
and Jordanians were prioritised, compromising Palestinian statehood.
The Zionist militia’s advantage over the Arabs
The Zionist militia’s development from ill-equipped disorganised defense forces
in the 1920s into advanced military actors in Palestine was the most important
nuance leading up to the 1948 failure of Palestinian statehood in my argument. The
militias include the Haganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang, these Zionist defense forces
aimed at protecting the Yishuv and were ideologically driven.
Zionist militias, mainly the Haganah, were heavily involved in early Zionist
policies which ultimately benefited the militias and the aspiration for a Jewish state.
Initially the Haganah which formed around 1920 began to engage in conflict with
Palestinians during 1929 which the relatively weak Haganah triumphed in.16 The
Haganah’s influence and military prowess flourished in the 1920s when 3000
policeman were recruited, by 1939 there were 20,000 members of the Haganah and
the British began to train many of these officials despite mutual hostility over the theft
of British arms in the 1920s.17 It soon became a core principle to undermine
Palestinian statehood, the Palmach attempted to reverse British restrictions of
Jewish land purchases by directly critiquing the policy in a 1942-3 document.18 The
Haganah’s goal of political Zionism was evidently perpetuating and advancing the
aspiration for a Jewish state over a Palestinian state.
However, it was at the expense of a weak Arab society in which these militias
secured the establishment of Jewish statehood over Palestinian statehood. After the
1947 partition the militias conquered Arab cities to expand and ensure Jewish
statehood. Overall 400-500 cities were ambushed, several Arab state armies were
defeated as the militias were better equipped and organised.19 Irgun and Stern gang
massacred 250 Arabs, known as the Deir Yasin massacre, one month prior to the
establishment of Israel.20 Ultimately this was the Zionist militias acting on their
political aspirations directly, conscious of the fact Jewish owned land only constitutes
15 Bar-Joseph, U. 2013. The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the war of 1948.New York: Routledge.
Pp. 1-5
16 Khalidi,R.2007. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. GB, Oxford: Oneworld
Publications.Pp.4-5
17 Lucas,N. 1975. The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd. Pp. 179-184
18 Ben-Eliezer, U. 1998. The Making of Israeli Militarism. U.S, Indiana:IndianaUniversity Press.Pp.143
19 Davis,U. 2003. Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within. London: Zed Books Ltd. Pp. 31
20 Ibid.Pp. 18

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7% of Palestine, and they aimed to expand this. The militia operations concerning
the attacks on Arab cities were clearly tactical and organised. Without the pre-Nakba
campaigns of driving out the Palestinians the statehood of the native population
would not have been as vulnerable to partition plan land allocations. The Zionist
militias actions in 1948 had essentially created an informal political presupposition of
Jewish sovereignty over Arab land which provoked the UN to allocate 57% of
Palestinian land to the Jews.
In contrary to perceiving the Zionist militia attacks of 1947-48 as a fundamental
hindrance to Palestinian statehood, traditional Zionist narrative claims the
abandoning of properties by Palestinians was the reason for Palestinians not
achieving statehood.21 In retrospect, it was clearly not in the interest of the
Palestinians to abandon land they had been striving to maintain sovereignty over for
the last 50 years. As previously stated, the weakness of the Arabs in terms of
political and military capacity left the Palestinians and their interests vulnerable.
Lucas shares this notion claiming they could not defend their borders and land from
intrusion, rather than simply choosing to leave and dismiss any chance of Palestinian
statehood.22
The advantage of the militias over the weak Arab community is exemplified by the
characteristics of Palestinian local authority and government, military weaknesses
and social fragmentation. The collapse of the Arab higher committee in 1945 and
factional political rivalries which involved the Istiqlal campaigning for heavy
restrictions on Zionist immigration whilst other factions had more moderate goals is
an example of the disorganised political structure in Palestine.23 Comparing the
political and social fragmentation of the Arab community to the Pre-Israeli militias
which unified in the 1940s, the fragility and divisions of the Palestinian community
explains the ease in which Zionist forces triumphed over Palestinian statehood.
Conclusion:
The gradual emergence of the Zionist project in Palestine throughout the first half
of the 20th Century had led to the economic and political empowerment of the Jewish
community in Palestine. The influx of Jewish capital and immigration primarily from
Europe had non-Zionist and Zionist motivations but played a major role in the
expansion and advancement of the Yishuv. The Jewish investments and immigration
solely cannot constitute the reason for Palestinian statehood’s failure, international
agencies and actors had a crucial role.
Various International actors maintained ambivalent relations with the Jewish
Community in Palestine shortly before Israel’s establishment. Great Britain gave
Zionists the opportunity to create a Jewish homeland before imposing limited anti-
21 Ibid.Pp. 35
22 Lucas,N. 1975. The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd. Pp. 196
23 Smith, C.D. 2007. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A History with Documents. New York: Bedford/St.
Martins.Pp. 179-182

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Zionist restrictions, whilst Transjordan (Palestine’s closet ally) mutually accepted
Israel earlier in the 1940s. Fundamentally Palestinian statehood was undermined by
the passive or even complicit acceptance of Zionist advancement throughout
Palestine.
Most significant to my argument, the Palestinians were subject to a campaign of
mass terrorism by the Zionist militias in the 1940s, and were directly disadvantaged
as a fragile and divided community. Whose hope of statehood left tarnished by the
failures of the Arab armies in defending the Palestinians moral right to self-
determination. The Zionist militias being the prevalent force which led to the ultimate
dispossession of land from the Palestinians, the mass exodus and suppression of
Palestinians to exercise any political unity was diminished by the actions of these
Zionist militias hence the failure of Palestinian statehood and establishment of the
state of Israel.
Bibliography:
Bar-Joseph, U. 2013. The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the war of
1948. New York: Routledge.
Ben-Eliezer, U. 1998. The Making of Israeli Militarism. U.S, Indiana: Indiana
University Press.
Davis, U. 2003. Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within. London: Zed
Books Ltd.
Dowty, A. 2005. Israel/Palestine. UK, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Khalidi, R. 2007. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood.
GB, Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
Lucas, N. 1975. The Modern History of Israel. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd.
Smith, C.D. 2007. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A History with Documents.
New York: Bedford/St. Martins.
Tessler, M. 1994. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Indiana: Indiana
University Press.