1. 1
Mali 2016 Humanitarian Response Strategy
1. Summary
Type of document Response Strategy MALI 2016
Response name Northern Mali Complex Crisis
Response code MLI-cx-14
Timeframe 1st January 2016 – 31st December 2016(12 months)
Target Funding (USD) $12,663,000 (secured: $4,380,876)
2016 Target
beneficiaries
1,285,083 individuals, including 738,200 children.
Supporting
documentation
 CO sitreps
 SCI Mali Emergency Preparedness Plan 2016
 OCHA Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2016
 OCHA Mali HNO 2016
 Master budget
Key Contacts Raphael Sindaye, Country Director, Mali
Raphael.sindaye@savethechildren.org
DoutiPiake, Operations Director, Mali
Douti.piake@savethechildren.org
Daniel Lamadokou, NorthAreaManager
Daniel.lamadokou@savethechildren.org
Fenke Elskamp, Humanitarian PDQ Coordinator, Mali
fenke.elskamp@savethechildren.org
Antonio D’Agnanno, Humanitarian Program Advisor
antonio.dagnanno@savethechildren.org
Date 2/5/2016

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2. Executive Summary
Goal:To outline the CO approach to responding to the emergency in Northern Mali in order to
save lives and reduce suffering amongst children and their families, returnees, vulnerable households,
and persons affected by conflict, natural disasters and infectious diseases throughout 2016.
Target beneficiary numbers: Save the Children Mali intends to reach 1,285,083 people in 2016
(of whom 738,200 children).
Top priority needs by sector:
 Nutrition: Prevent malnutrition, promote optimal IYCF and strengthen management of
MAM and SAM children at community as well as health facility level.
 Health: Increase access to free of charge health services.
 FSL: Increase access to food (especially during the lean season), and establish resilient
systems, in order to make children and families more resilient to seasonal shocks.
 Child Protection: Rebuild child protection systems through families and local communities.
 Education: Access to education for children and Returnees, and acceleration of learning
program for more than 40,000 children.
 NFIs: Access to adequate NFI support to families displaced by conflict and/or flooding.
 WASH: Increase access to a minimum WASH Package (infrastructures & services) at
community, education, health, nutrition and FSL levels.
Proposed sectors of Save the Children response: Child Protection; Education; Health;
Nutrition; FSL and resilience; WASH, and NFIs.
Please see more detail on proposed intervention in sections 4 and 5.

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3. Overview of Background and Content
 Type of crisis: complex. Annual floods, civil conflict displacement, insecurity, disease outbreak,
recurrent drought, malnutrition, food insecurity. A set of critical elements present integrated with
significant seasonal and cyclical risks lead the Malian region to have a protracted humanitarian crisis,
which goes from medium to acute when multiple causes contribute at the same time.
 Categorization. It is a SCI Category 2 response for the Humanitarian crisis in Northern Mali,
and is intended to improve capacity to respond and to guide the response to conflict in the regions of
Gao, Tombouctou and Mopti. Mali has been continuously classified Category 2 from 2012.
 Location. Central and Northern Mali.
 Affected people. Total estimate of people affected (overall and severely affected) and number of
affected children: 2.5 M on 18 M1. 57 % of children: 1,425,000. (HRP 2016)
 Demography and associated physiographical factors. The South, which is a third of the country
area, has about 90% of the total population, or 16 million people. The three northern regions (Gao,
Kidal and Timbuktu) have a population of about 1.5 million inhabitants.
Mali, one of the poorest countries in the world (Mali is ranked 176 of 187 countries, according to the
last HDI), has one of the highest fertility rates in the world (3.6 %), with an average of more
than six children per woman (2013).
More than 50% of the population in Mali are children (48% are 0-14), and the average age is 16
years old (CIA World Factbook).
A widespread lack of employment, social services, livelihood and educational opportunities
have recently left Mali’s youth vulnerable to the adoption of negative coping strategies such as sexual
exploitation and recruitment into armed groups. There is a history of population migration across the
country, for aforementioned reasons but also due to harsh weather conditions such as drought, which is
likely to happen again in the future.
 The majority of the population is Muslim, 9% are indigenous animists, and Christians make
up 1% of the population. Bambara is the most widely spoken language, although there are
another 13 national languages.
The Literacy Rate is at only 33.4% (2012). The percentage of young people able to read a short sentence
is only 48% (for men), and it is worth noting that 56% of all children are involved in work (MICS INSTAT
January 2016 and OCHA, Dec 2015).One in two girls are married before the age of 18, and one in six
girls are married before age 16.
Eight out of ten girls are affected by genital mutilation and there is a wide acceptance for this practice
among the population. More than one third of all women give birth before the age of 18.
1
Define exactly the number of total population in Mali is quite difficult having regard to its impressive speed of annual growth.

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 Context:
Since the overthrow of the former president Amadou Toumani Toure in March 2012, incidents involving
violence have been increasing in the country, and the current authorities are struggling to assert their
control and restore law and order, particularly in Bamako, parts of Mopti (central Mali) and in the north
(Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, Menaka and Taoudeni).
The armed insurgency emerged in 2012 when Tuareg separatists groups backed by jihadist groups
launched an offensive against the government of Mali in the north of the country.
In late 2012, radical groups had taken control of the three northern regions and marched on Bamako,
with Mali on the verge of collapse. The French intervention in January 2013, jointly undertaken with
FAMA and other international troops, gradually recaptured major northern towns. The conflict has
caused the displacement of more than half a million people in Mali and to neighbouring countries, thus
extending the scope of the crisis. Indeed, the consequences of the conflict and of the pre-existing food
security and nutritional crisis continue to have an impact on the vulnerability of the population. After
three years of a socio-political crisis in the North of Mali, the government of Mali signed an accord in
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in March 2015 with most armed separatist groups who had maintained
control over the region of Kidal since April 2012. Moreover, on June 20th, 2015 a peace accord between
the government of Mali and the last refractory armed separatist group ‘Coordination des Mouvements de
l’Azawad’ (CMA) was signed in Bamako, and the Algiers Agreement in July 2015.
With FAMA struggling to regain influence over large territories of the north and French troop presence
decreasing, the UN force (MINUSMA) has taken on a gradually larger responsibility for providing
security. The strength authorized by the UN Security Council is 12,640 uniformed personnel. MINUSMA
has become a primary target for many armed and radical groups in the region, observed in the number of
attacks carried out as well as the nature of threats explicitly directed against its presence. These trends
combined with increasing sophistication of methods used by radical groups severely impacts the mission’s
mobility and security; the mission is largely concentrated in urban centres and lacks sufficient intelligence
as well as manpower to curb the insecurity threats in the regions.
The Northern region remains a geopolitical strategic area and favorable to the emergence and
development of armed groups, because the military leaders of groups are taking advantage of traffic
networks of all kinds of illegal items (even drugs), and to the local proliferation of weapons smuggling.
 Population movements. Key findings from government and other agencies’ assessments:
 143,050 refugees as of 31 January 2016 which is an increase of 3,550 people compared with
November 2015. (OCHA January 2016)
 49,880 IDPs as of 31 January 2016. 52% (25,930) are children, 25% (12,470) are women.
 494,000 returnees of whom 453,000 returned and 41,000 repatriated, between July 2013 and January
2016.

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(from OCHA, November 20152
)
 Estimated number of returnees by location:
 Timbuktu, 237,000 returnees; (123,000 children)
 Gao, 175,000 returnees; (91,000 children)
- Mopti, 39,000 returnees; (20,000 children).
 Conflict in the area, background and main stakeholders:
 Rejection of the central government by the people of Kidal;
 Inter-ethnic and community tensions aggravated by economic problems and fights for territory
control, mainly in the regions of Gao and Menaka.
 Distrust between people, in connection with the conflict in the north.
 The lack of jobs and of adequate health and education services, making criminal activities such as
carjacking, drugs smuggles and armed robbery more attractive to young people.
 The four main radical Jihadist groups are AQIM, al-Mourabitoun-MUJAO, Al Ansar Dine, and the
Macina Liberation Front–FILM, excluded from the peace process. Their objectives are different
from the movements of the CMA. Ansar Dine has even denounced the signing of the peace
agreement by the CMA. The threat of jihadist groups’ remains, but their ability to move freely
2
In December 2015, there was an improvement of refugees towards Niger (more than 54,000).

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and to conquer other territories is very limited currently, because of the presence of the
MINUSMA, FAMA and Barkhane.
 The failure or lack of demobilization programs could cause the collapse of the armed groups into
several factions and create security dilemmas in the north.
The most evident trend today among armed groups is simply fragmentation.
SEE ALSO ANNEXES N and U.
 Government/local response capacity: The delivery of government services continues to be weak to
non-existent in many areas of northern Mali, especially in the areas of health, nutrition, WASH, education
and protection and particularly in areas of return. This limitation of access is mainly due to insecurity,
absence of state employees in some areas, lack of resources and human and financial capacity, as well as
to public infrastructure being damaged or not yet functional. This lack of access to basic social services
increases the vulnerability of populations especially in terms of malnutrition, health, schooling and
epidemic risks (Mali HNO 2016). That, combined with the ongoing internal displacement crisis and
chronic food insecurity means that enormous needs exist across all humanitarian sectors.
 Save the Children presence:
 Save the Children has been active and operational in the North since 2001 (Gao since 2001,
Mopti since 2011, and Timbuktu and Niafunké since 2013) and has reached approximately
218,772 persons (including over 135,753 children) with a multi-sector response focusing
on child protection, education, health and nutrition, and food security/livelihoods.
 Save the Children in Mali works with more than 300 staff in Timbuktu– Niafunké, Gao,
MoptiKoulikoro, Sikasso, and Kayes.
 In order to maintain access to volatile areas, Save the Children International has been forced to
adopt a low profile and acceptance approaches to deliver aid and transport staff and goods.
 About SCI Humanitarian activities, see the table below.
SCI 2016
Humanitarian
presence
Tombouctou
Cercle of Niafunké
Gao
Cercles of Ansongo,
Bourem, Gao
Mopti
Cercles of Mopti,
Bandiagara, Koro, Djenné
et Douentza
Total :
9 Cercles
Sectors Health, Nutrition Education and Protection,
Child Protection
Nutrition (WASH),
Education
5 Sectors
Donors ECHO –basic and
secondary health care
and SAM treatment
WFP – MAM
(moderate) treatment
Danida Humanitarian
SIDA HUM
UNICEF
ECHO – SAM treatment
CAIXA & SPAIN – SAM
treatment
6 Donors
Number of
Staff 2016
31, 4 more in
recruitment (ongoing),
Total 35
19 52 106 field staff
Budget 2016 $ 1,426,500 $ 1,380,000 $1, 161,000 $ 3,967,500
Humanitarian
Field Budget

7. 7
Other
agencies
present
Care International Mali (FSL); Stop Sahel (WASH); Ardil (national
NGO, FSL); WoyoKondé (national NGO, Protection), etc. Please also
see Problem analysis section.
Critical issues related to the crisis, operational context and implications for response programs
and operations:
 Operating context: Armed clashes, risks related to the presence of Explosive Remnants of War
(ERW) and social tensions in the northern regions of the country continue to have an impact on
humanitarian access. Main threats:
 political instability, corruption, and social unrest
 terrorism
 kidnapping
 carjacking
 criminal activities
 ethnic tension
 natural hazards (floods, drought)
 road accidents
 Health issues.
Central
Mali
Threat
level
Northern
Mali
Threat
level
Mopti High: 4 Kidal Very
High:5
Segou Medium: 3 Gao and
Menaka
High:4
Timbuktu
and
Taoudeni
High:4
 Obstacles to the involvement of international NGOs and issues related to access to
beneficiaries: insecurity persists in all northern regions with severe humanitarian, social and
political implications, and its increasing complexity is becoming difficult to navigate. The number of
security incidents involving NGOs more than tripled over the course of 2015 (see OCHA, Overview of
humanitarian access constraints 2015, 31/01/2016), mostly in the regions of Gao (50%) and Timbuktu
(40%).
Several humanitarian organizations, including SCI, have had to suspend their activities temporarily due
to insecurity; some have had to relocate and others have even decided to withdraw from certain areas
(i.e. from Kidal, area with difficult access) even if with high humanitarian need. Aerial access to Kidal was
a major challenge in 2015. The airstrip, reopened in January 2016, was not operational in 2015. No
humanitarian flights were able to service Kidal in 2015.
Negative sentiments among the population have occasionally flared in response to the presence of the
French military and UN Mission (MINUSMA), underscoring the need for humanitarian actors to
maintain their neutral identities in the north.
Generalized insecurity and attacks on humanitarian actors have made it increasingly difficult to
ensure the population has access to assistance. In order to maintain access to volatile and hard to
reach areas, INGOs have been forced to adopt new, more creative, and often more costly
approaches to delivering aid and transporting staff and goods.
 Sensitivities and risks:
The operational environment remains extremely volatile across the regions in the centre and the north.
Although there was a significant increase in security incidents affecting NGOs in 2015, this has not
necessarily resulted in access constraints. With the signing of the peace agreement in June 2015, access

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constraints related to the conduct of war hostilities have virtually disappeared (cfr. Overview of
humanitarian access constraints, OCHA January 2016) whereas violence against humanitarian actors has
increased.
Crime, terrorist acts and the presence of radical armed groups remain major constraints for
humanitarian access in Mali. In Mali, there are areas where no humanitarian actor operates, internally to
the 3 northern Regions. In 2016, humanitarian access in Mali will still be hugely dependent on the
effective implementation of the peace agreement and the ability of military actors to secure the
operational environment in which humanitarian actors operate.
Kidal now is reachable by road as frequent humanitarian convoys do, and some NGOs operate even with
the opening of new airstrips. UNHAS Helicopters reach Kidal every week as well.
SEE ANNEX S.
See also MSR-SA and Area sensitivities in Annexes C and D.
4. Scenario 2016
The scenarios here outlined are the ‘most likely’ of the possible scenarios.
Working Assumptions:
- Assumption 1: The UN peacekeeping force (MINUSMA), the French army and the Malian
government armed forces will not be able to maintain security in all areas.
- Assumption 2:
(i) Pockets of low-intensity violence are likely to continue to flare up in northern Mali, as
inter-community and ethnic violence may continue regardless of political leadership; and
(ii) Radical groups will continue to exploit the vast areas of northern Mali and keep at least a
minimum presence and continue to carry out attacks in accordance with their regional
strategies.
- Assumption 3: In the north, Mali will be affected by a harsh dry season, exacerbating
chronic vulnerabilities and seasonal food insecurity levels.
Most likely scenario (middle case scenario):
It is expected there will be relative calm for at least the first 6 months; demobilization and
reintegration of armed groups will start; and the peace process will slowly continues.
SEE also ANNEX R.
There is hope that hostilities will not resume until the end of the year3, because:
•The government of Mali, Coordination of Azawad Movement (CMA, separatist group), and GATIA
pro-government armed militia group are committed to dialogue, reconciliation and implementation
of the peace agreement signed last year.
•The two rival armed groups (GATIA and CMA) have shown their willingness to resolve their
differences through negotiation rather than engaging in violence.
•The presence of UN peacekeepers and French soldiers will dissuade renewed violence between
warring parties.
3
For the end of the year, a review will be made to analyse the changes in the security situation in the country followed by a review of the Scenario
of the Strategy for the beginning of 2017.

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Potential resistance from some armed groups could be a reason for creating tensions and occasional
clashes. The International Community as a whole, engaged in Mali, will be the buffer (not only
physically) for these kind of armed incidents, so, it is expected there will be no more open conflict or
open clashes in the North. However, the north will remain heavily militarized.
Negotiations are proceeding slowly. With a formal peace deal accomplished in 2015, a full
breakdown has been avoided through an ongoing political process engaging the key parties.
Ceasefires are generally upheld but with occasional violations. However, the lack of genuine political
decentralization progress from Bamako contributes to sustain the conflict in the North (mostly, in
Kidal).
Absent socio-political and administrative reforms, poverty, marginalization, socio-political alienation,
and the insecurity felt by communities become incentives for individuals to join jihadist militant
groups, or armed militias and pro-government armed groups. The fragile alliances are disbanded and
reformed under new structures with slightly different political goals.
There is a protracted state of crisis, low-intensity with sporadic clashes between parties and factions.
The overall status quo already observed remains largely in place; the international military presence
prevents further territorial gains by armed or radical groups, but the relatively weak FAMA and
limited MINUSMA are unable to regain already lost territory and drive back armed groups from rural
Gao and Timbuktu, and Kidal. While the military engagement ensures the status quo which reduces
the perceived urgency of resolving political issues this in turn increases the risk of new violent
uprisings.
Radical groups continue to prosper. Their tactics adapt further to their new strategies of small
guerrilla tactics, observed in more attacks, and other lethal attacks against international actors.
Civilians are affected both as collateral as well as part of radical groups’ way to deter denunciation
through terror. One consequence of these small guerrilla tactics is increasing rates of
children and youth being recruited into these groups. Child recruitment is similarly seen
to continue from all sides of the conflict throughout 2016. With the resumption of
government services delayed in most of Kidal and larger parts of rural Gao and Timbuktu, the impact
on communities in large areas is significant, with limited access to services. Many communities are
not assessed and needs and gaps in response are difficult to address.
The major disruption in education remains a primary concern throughout the outlook. The
protracted conflict suggest that schools will continue to suffer from damage, pillaging and sabotage, as
well as occupation by armed groups.
Returning IDPs and refugees add to the already complex situation of multi-layered conflict cleavages.
Assuming no major external shocks or above-normal climatic impacts (but a worsening of dry season
is the trend), food insecurity levels at the national level are the same as 2015 levels. Mali is indeed
able to produce a good quantity of food: this is because, even if in some areas of the North the
situation can became critical, the general level of food security in the country can be quite good, if
there is not a real regional drought. During the lean season from May through October 2016,
nevertheless, the number of food insecure will increase markedly.
In addition to the major drivers of food insecurity listed above, areas under high volatility and
insecurity are directly impacted, where food insecurity reportedly drives more people to look for
alternative livelihoods in illicit activities, or to join armed groups, and insecurity hampers farming and
cropping activities etcetera, in turn exacerbating the food insecurity situation.
Lacking substantial stabilization and decentralization, and thus no resumption of services or significant
return of government to Kidal and many areas of Gao and Timbuktu, access to health care remains
inadequate for large segments of the northern populations, and malnutrition rates show no reversing

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trend. Humanitarian access remains difficult, but overall stability in territorial control and groups’
presence render insecurity for civilians and humanitarians more predictable.
The pattern of rural areas being markedly less accessible than urban centers, due to insecurity,
continue in Gao and Timbuktu regions.
A normalization of the status quo renders Kidal gradually more operationally feasible for humanitarian
actors, notably through local partners and aerial access (the airstrip reopened in January 2016).
However, occasional incidents and collateral damage cyclically deters delivery of assistance in large
areas, and areas where no humanitarian actor operates will persist in 2016.
5. Problem Analysis
Synthesis of immediate needs and/or specific longer-term needs:
(See also: 2016 Timeline humanitarian emergencies in Mali, in annex E.)
 Approximately 2,550,000 people affected by food insecurity, the consequences of which are
exacerbated by the insecurity of health services, particularly in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and
Mopti.
 About 140,000 Malian refugees in neighboring countries (more than 54,000 in Niger, 50,000 in
Mauritania and 34,000 in Burkina Faso). Approximately 62,000 IDPs remain in the country.
 Forecasts of OCHA report that, in 2016, 709,000 children between 6 and 59 months will suffer
from malnutrition together with 60,000 pregnant and lactating women, mainly in the northern and
central regions of the country.
 Over 20% of health facilities of Kidal, Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti were destroyed and many others
are not working anymore.
 High rate of malnutrition (13.3% of children under the age of 5 years and 18% of the total
population).
 According to Mothers Index compiled by Save the Children, Mali is among the last places of a
world-scale about providing care and assistance to pregnant women and post pregnancy (176 out
of 179!).
 Three fifths of victims of explosive remnants of war are children.
 In the centre and north of the country 284 schools remain closed (January 2016).
 Measles outbreaks are reported in the region of Mopti, Menaka and Kidal.
Top priority needs by sector:
 Nutrition: Prevent malnutrition, promote optimal IYCF and strengthen management of MAM
and SAM children.
 Health: Increase access to health services.
 FSL: Increase access to food (especially during the lean season), and establish resilient systems, in
order to make children and families more resilient to seasonal shocks.
 Child Protection: Rebuild child protection systems through families and local communities.
 Education: Access to education for children and returnees, and acceleration of learning program
for more than 40,000 children.
 NFIs: Access to adequate NFI support to families displaced by conflict and/or flooding.
 WASH: Increase access to a minimum WASH Package (infrastructure and services) at
community, education, health, nutrition and FSL levels.