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(Excerpt from “Total Information Awareness: A Legal and Ethical Analysis.” Bezich,
2004.)
II. THE MANAGERIAL STATE
This chapter provides a general description of the federal government as a
managerial state responsible for the welfare and safety of citizens. Government is
described as a decision-making organization which is dependent on information.
Characteristics and limitations of the managerial state are described. This discussion
provides an organizational and operational context for government’s use of information
and its impact on privacy.
The Managerial State
Robert Higgs (1987, 4) notes that, in 1900, the federal “government still
approximated the minimal state” envisioned and established by the Founders. During
the twentieth century, the United States government expanded in response to war and
crisis, increased demands for social services and security, and a popular mandate to
regulate business and the economy (Higgs, 1987; Twight, 2003).
Progressive politicians and intellectuals provided political and philosophical
justifications for this new role, which did not fit the model of limited government
envisioned by the Founders. Woodrow Wilson (1912/1961) championed the federal
government as the guarantor and facilitator of Jefferson’s yeoman republic, under threat
by the new industrial order. Philosopher and educator John Dewey (1916, 1934) sought
to manage society like a classroom. Government, he wrote, should study social
conditions and continuously reconstruct society with the goal of promoting democracy,
reducing social barriers, and bringing individuals “together in more fruitful
arrangements” (Dewey, 1916).
The philosophical basis of government and its relationship to the citizen changed.
“Democratic citizenship,” Paul Gottfried (1999, ix) claims, “has come to mean eligibility
for social services and welfare benefits.” Government necessarily treats citizens as
customers and clients, or, as Gottfried implies, wards of the state.
In order to administer a complex web of regulation and services, the federal
government expanded and modernized its bureaucracy. To improve administration,
government borrowed organizational principles and practices, including scientific
management, from private industry.
Scientific management, developed by engineer Frederick W. Taylor (1910),
improved manufacturing efficiency, raised output levels, and increased profits for
industry. It offered a rational basis for industrial operations. Scientific management
prescribed uniform tasks for workers on the assembly line. This eliminated or reduced
the need for workers and supervisors to make individual decisions (Taylor, 1910).
Efficiency experts were responsible for quantitatively evaluating industrial processes
and determining the most efficient methods (Taylor, 1910).
The theory of scientific management, or at least its assumption that human
actions could be rationally directed by experts, was widely embraced by government
policy makers and administrators.
Characteristics and Limitations of the Managerial State
Ralph Hummel (1987) argues that, in order to serve society, government
bureaucracy ultimately transforms society. Bureaucracy must transform relationships
within society, not for the benefit of society as Dewey (1919, 1934) proposed, but for the
purpose of improving the efficiency of government. Society itself must be
bureaucratized. Human activities are transformed into rational processes. Human
relationships become guided transactions (Hummel, 1987).
Herbert Kaufman (1991) observes that agencies “abhor” uncertainty. They try to
reduce uncertainty “within their boundaries or in the segments of their environment
touching their own activities” (Kaufman, 1991, 42-44). There are three strategies for
managing uncertainty: centralization, expansion (expanding boundaries to include and
control the source of uncertainty), or creating barriers or withdrawing from the source of
uncertainty (Kaufman, 1991).
Harold Seidman (1970), who served twenty-five years with the Bureau of the
Budget, argues that administrative structure and functions have given rise to a “fourth
branch” of government made up of competing administrative “guilds.” This fourth
branch is increasingly unresponsive to executive direction, legislative oversight, and
national and local interests. Although reorganization might sound like a good solution,
he observes that reorganization gives rise to new dynamics and politics without
necessarily enhancing accountability or control (Seidman, 1970).
Although (in the author’s opinion) bureaucrats are generally well-intentioned,
their agencies tend to be self-serving. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) note
that agencies may create agendas and policies which affirm or justify their identity and
purpose. According to Hummel (1987), bureaucracy is not concerned with effectively
solving problems, but with handling them in accordance with internal goals.
"So-called efficiency," claims Richard Scase, professor of organizational behavior
at the University of Kent at Canterbury, "takes the place of effectiveness, quantity of
quality. The means become an end in themselves" (cited by Boyle, 2002, ¶ 9). David
Boyle (2002, ¶ 1 ) describes this “obsessive preoccupation with numbers” as autistic.
He criticizes the belief “that everything can be controlled from the centre, every job
broken down into measurable parts— a Taylorist fantasy of time and motion–with every
decision taken in full view of the auditors and the public” (Boyle, 2002, ¶ 19).
As a technical officer in the Army, the author observed this autistic mentality
among some civilian research scientists and military officers with scientific and technical
backgrounds. (One of these individuals probably had Asperger’s Syndrome, a mild
form of autism often accompanied by enhanced technical ability.) In their relationships
with other people, many of these individuals exhibited poor social skills and failed to
take into account how their actions and directives might affect others. Focusing on
process over results, they measured success in terms of efficiency, complexity, or
novelty rather than effectiveness.
When an entire agency focuses on process and measures effectiveness in terms
of efficiency, the results can be catastrophic. In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara brought in the business philosophy and operational management
techniques he had successfully used as CEO and President of Ford Motor Company
(Kaplan, 1983). He staffed the Pentagon with his “whiz kids,” technical and business
specialists from Ford (Kaplan, 1983).
The progress of the Vietnam War was measured in terms of “body counts” of
enemy dead and other quantitative measures. This data analysis suggested that the
United States was winning the war (Boyle, 2004). Well-versed in operational research,
defense official Daniel Ellsberg went to Vietnam to compare Pentagon analysis to the
reality on the battlefield (Cooper, 2004; Kaplan, 1983). After interviewing military
personnel of all ranks and participating in combat patrols, he concluded that the war
was unwinnable (Cooper, 2004). Long after McNamara himself came to the same
conclusion, quantitative analysis was still generated and cited to justify White House
and Pentagon claims that the United States was winning the war.
The Managerial State and Information
Organizations are decision-making bodies guided by rationalism (Simon, 1968).
Rational decision-making requires information. Information is gathered internally and
externally to ensure regulatory compliance, formulate policy, measure policy
effectiveness, and improve administration and operations.
Personal information about individual citizens is necessarily gathered for internal
and external administration. Personal information is required for personnel records for
federal employees, background investigations for security purposes, and verifying the
eligibility of individuals for social services. Personal information may also be collected
and compiled for statistical purposes, in order to evaluate policies, programs, or
regulatory compliance.
Charlotte Twight (2002) notes that the federal government compels the collection
of data on nearly every American by private and public agencies in labor, medical,
education, and financial services. Businesses and non-profit agencies are directed to
collect certain information for regulatory or reporting purposes. Most of this information,
whether paper records or databases, private or public, can generally be accessed by
government agencies without a warrant, if the information is deemed necessary (in the
agency’s opinion) for the agency carry out their missions. Federal statute laws (see
Chapter V) regulate government’s use of information, but, as Twight (2002) observes,
the requirements are extremely flexible. Exemptions are very broad for national security
and law enforcement agencies (Privacy Act, 1974).
Federal law enforcement agencies gather data on crime and individual criminals.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, 2004) maintains the Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS) Division. CJIS includes the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), Uniform Crime Reporting program which compiles national data on
crime, and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (FBI, 2004).
Government’s automation of data gathering began with Herman Hollerith’s punch
card system for collecting and tabulating census data in 1890 (Bray, 2002). Working in
tandem with the business sector, the federal government played the key role in the early
development of computer technology (Bourne 1999; Bray, 2002). During the past twenty
years, the combination of personal computers, storage hardware, new software, and
telecommunications networks have made it is easier to collect, store, share, and
analyze data (Bourne 1999; Bray, 2002). The databases of government agencies can
be cross-linked. Private databases, such as credit information, can be accessed.
“These databases, linked by individuals’ Social Security numbers,” observes
Twight (2002, 237-8), “now empower the federal government to obtain an astonishingly
detailed portrait of any person in America, including the checks he writes, the types of
causes he supports, and even what he says ‘privately’ to his doctor.”
Discussion
The federal government is a managerial state, the child of social liberalism
(progressivism) and scientific management. It is a decision-making organization that
requires large amounts of information. Because of its expanded role in social welfare
and other programs that assist or support citizens, government necessarily collects a
great deal of private information. It also compels the private sector to collect private
information. As a result, the federal government maintains or has access to a wide
range of data on nearly every American citizen (Twight, 2002).
A review of the literature and personal experience lead the author to make the
following conclusions about the tendencies and limitations of government. The author
takes for granted that most government officials and employees are sincere in carrying
out their duties whether in national security or social welfare. Agencies, however, tend
to elevate their own goals above national policy, even though they may justify their
goals in terms of the national policy. Faced with uncertainty, agencies tend to expand
the scope of their activities while attempting to insulate themselves from oversight,
accountability, and criticism. Agencies tend to measure success in terms of internal
efficiency and focus on process rather than results. Some compare this organizational
orientation and practices to autism (Boyle, 2002; Smith, 2004).
These organizational tendencies and limitations present practical and ethical
risks, as evidenced by the Vietnam War (Boyle, 2002). Despite the best intentions of
policy makers and administrators, policy goals may not be achieved, risks overlooked,
and resources misused.

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bezich_excerpt_managerial_state

  • 1. (Excerpt from “Total Information Awareness: A Legal and Ethical Analysis.” Bezich, 2004.) II. THE MANAGERIAL STATE This chapter provides a general description of the federal government as a managerial state responsible for the welfare and safety of citizens. Government is described as a decision-making organization which is dependent on information. Characteristics and limitations of the managerial state are described. This discussion provides an organizational and operational context for government’s use of information and its impact on privacy. The Managerial State Robert Higgs (1987, 4) notes that, in 1900, the federal “government still approximated the minimal state” envisioned and established by the Founders. During the twentieth century, the United States government expanded in response to war and crisis, increased demands for social services and security, and a popular mandate to regulate business and the economy (Higgs, 1987; Twight, 2003). Progressive politicians and intellectuals provided political and philosophical justifications for this new role, which did not fit the model of limited government envisioned by the Founders. Woodrow Wilson (1912/1961) championed the federal government as the guarantor and facilitator of Jefferson’s yeoman republic, under threat by the new industrial order. Philosopher and educator John Dewey (1916, 1934) sought to manage society like a classroom. Government, he wrote, should study social conditions and continuously reconstruct society with the goal of promoting democracy, reducing social barriers, and bringing individuals “together in more fruitful arrangements” (Dewey, 1916). The philosophical basis of government and its relationship to the citizen changed. “Democratic citizenship,” Paul Gottfried (1999, ix) claims, “has come to mean eligibility for social services and welfare benefits.” Government necessarily treats citizens as customers and clients, or, as Gottfried implies, wards of the state. In order to administer a complex web of regulation and services, the federal government expanded and modernized its bureaucracy. To improve administration, government borrowed organizational principles and practices, including scientific management, from private industry. Scientific management, developed by engineer Frederick W. Taylor (1910), improved manufacturing efficiency, raised output levels, and increased profits for industry. It offered a rational basis for industrial operations. Scientific management prescribed uniform tasks for workers on the assembly line. This eliminated or reduced the need for workers and supervisors to make individual decisions (Taylor, 1910).
  • 2. Efficiency experts were responsible for quantitatively evaluating industrial processes and determining the most efficient methods (Taylor, 1910). The theory of scientific management, or at least its assumption that human actions could be rationally directed by experts, was widely embraced by government policy makers and administrators. Characteristics and Limitations of the Managerial State Ralph Hummel (1987) argues that, in order to serve society, government bureaucracy ultimately transforms society. Bureaucracy must transform relationships within society, not for the benefit of society as Dewey (1919, 1934) proposed, but for the purpose of improving the efficiency of government. Society itself must be bureaucratized. Human activities are transformed into rational processes. Human relationships become guided transactions (Hummel, 1987). Herbert Kaufman (1991) observes that agencies “abhor” uncertainty. They try to reduce uncertainty “within their boundaries or in the segments of their environment touching their own activities” (Kaufman, 1991, 42-44). There are three strategies for managing uncertainty: centralization, expansion (expanding boundaries to include and control the source of uncertainty), or creating barriers or withdrawing from the source of uncertainty (Kaufman, 1991). Harold Seidman (1970), who served twenty-five years with the Bureau of the Budget, argues that administrative structure and functions have given rise to a “fourth branch” of government made up of competing administrative “guilds.” This fourth branch is increasingly unresponsive to executive direction, legislative oversight, and national and local interests. Although reorganization might sound like a good solution, he observes that reorganization gives rise to new dynamics and politics without necessarily enhancing accountability or control (Seidman, 1970). Although (in the author’s opinion) bureaucrats are generally well-intentioned, their agencies tend to be self-serving. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) note that agencies may create agendas and policies which affirm or justify their identity and purpose. According to Hummel (1987), bureaucracy is not concerned with effectively solving problems, but with handling them in accordance with internal goals. "So-called efficiency," claims Richard Scase, professor of organizational behavior at the University of Kent at Canterbury, "takes the place of effectiveness, quantity of quality. The means become an end in themselves" (cited by Boyle, 2002, ¶ 9). David Boyle (2002, ¶ 1 ) describes this “obsessive preoccupation with numbers” as autistic. He criticizes the belief “that everything can be controlled from the centre, every job broken down into measurable parts— a Taylorist fantasy of time and motion–with every decision taken in full view of the auditors and the public” (Boyle, 2002, ¶ 19).
  • 3. As a technical officer in the Army, the author observed this autistic mentality among some civilian research scientists and military officers with scientific and technical backgrounds. (One of these individuals probably had Asperger’s Syndrome, a mild form of autism often accompanied by enhanced technical ability.) In their relationships with other people, many of these individuals exhibited poor social skills and failed to take into account how their actions and directives might affect others. Focusing on process over results, they measured success in terms of efficiency, complexity, or novelty rather than effectiveness. When an entire agency focuses on process and measures effectiveness in terms of efficiency, the results can be catastrophic. In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara brought in the business philosophy and operational management techniques he had successfully used as CEO and President of Ford Motor Company (Kaplan, 1983). He staffed the Pentagon with his “whiz kids,” technical and business specialists from Ford (Kaplan, 1983). The progress of the Vietnam War was measured in terms of “body counts” of enemy dead and other quantitative measures. This data analysis suggested that the United States was winning the war (Boyle, 2004). Well-versed in operational research, defense official Daniel Ellsberg went to Vietnam to compare Pentagon analysis to the reality on the battlefield (Cooper, 2004; Kaplan, 1983). After interviewing military personnel of all ranks and participating in combat patrols, he concluded that the war was unwinnable (Cooper, 2004). Long after McNamara himself came to the same conclusion, quantitative analysis was still generated and cited to justify White House and Pentagon claims that the United States was winning the war. The Managerial State and Information Organizations are decision-making bodies guided by rationalism (Simon, 1968). Rational decision-making requires information. Information is gathered internally and externally to ensure regulatory compliance, formulate policy, measure policy effectiveness, and improve administration and operations. Personal information about individual citizens is necessarily gathered for internal and external administration. Personal information is required for personnel records for federal employees, background investigations for security purposes, and verifying the eligibility of individuals for social services. Personal information may also be collected and compiled for statistical purposes, in order to evaluate policies, programs, or regulatory compliance. Charlotte Twight (2002) notes that the federal government compels the collection of data on nearly every American by private and public agencies in labor, medical, education, and financial services. Businesses and non-profit agencies are directed to collect certain information for regulatory or reporting purposes. Most of this information, whether paper records or databases, private or public, can generally be accessed by government agencies without a warrant, if the information is deemed necessary (in the
  • 4. agency’s opinion) for the agency carry out their missions. Federal statute laws (see Chapter V) regulate government’s use of information, but, as Twight (2002) observes, the requirements are extremely flexible. Exemptions are very broad for national security and law enforcement agencies (Privacy Act, 1974). Federal law enforcement agencies gather data on crime and individual criminals. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, 2004) maintains the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division. CJIS includes the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Uniform Crime Reporting program which compiles national data on crime, and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (FBI, 2004). Government’s automation of data gathering began with Herman Hollerith’s punch card system for collecting and tabulating census data in 1890 (Bray, 2002). Working in tandem with the business sector, the federal government played the key role in the early development of computer technology (Bourne 1999; Bray, 2002). During the past twenty years, the combination of personal computers, storage hardware, new software, and telecommunications networks have made it is easier to collect, store, share, and analyze data (Bourne 1999; Bray, 2002). The databases of government agencies can be cross-linked. Private databases, such as credit information, can be accessed. “These databases, linked by individuals’ Social Security numbers,” observes Twight (2002, 237-8), “now empower the federal government to obtain an astonishingly detailed portrait of any person in America, including the checks he writes, the types of causes he supports, and even what he says ‘privately’ to his doctor.” Discussion The federal government is a managerial state, the child of social liberalism (progressivism) and scientific management. It is a decision-making organization that requires large amounts of information. Because of its expanded role in social welfare and other programs that assist or support citizens, government necessarily collects a great deal of private information. It also compels the private sector to collect private information. As a result, the federal government maintains or has access to a wide range of data on nearly every American citizen (Twight, 2002). A review of the literature and personal experience lead the author to make the following conclusions about the tendencies and limitations of government. The author takes for granted that most government officials and employees are sincere in carrying out their duties whether in national security or social welfare. Agencies, however, tend to elevate their own goals above national policy, even though they may justify their goals in terms of the national policy. Faced with uncertainty, agencies tend to expand the scope of their activities while attempting to insulate themselves from oversight, accountability, and criticism. Agencies tend to measure success in terms of internal efficiency and focus on process rather than results. Some compare this organizational orientation and practices to autism (Boyle, 2002; Smith, 2004).
  • 5. These organizational tendencies and limitations present practical and ethical risks, as evidenced by the Vietnam War (Boyle, 2002). Despite the best intentions of policy makers and administrators, policy goals may not be achieved, risks overlooked, and resources misused.