1. To: Maureen Meyer March 1st, 2016
From: Andres Sellitto
Subject: Current Status of Police Reform Development in Mexico
Executive Summary
The implementation of a number of measures to deal with criminal activity in Mexico, as well
as corruption inside police forces at all levels has been unfolding slowly and in an uneven fashion. The
Peña Nieto administration has pushed for the reform and continuation of a litmus test for police officers
called control de confianza, as well as the establishment of internal affairs units and discipline councils
called consejos de honor y justicia in most states police forces. This measures would be complemented
by the establishment of a measure to unify and federalize law enforcement called mando único.
However, the reform and implementation of these measures has been affected by a number of
reasons, including a lack of national standards, the lack of political will from decision-takers and the
mishandling of resources destined for these purposes, as well as the prevalence of corruption and
criminal infilitration in police forces at all levels. This has been taking place as the political and
academic debate on the effectiveness of these measures keeps unfolding.
On The Evolution Of The “Control De Confianza” And Its Current Status
The Mexican government has been making some efforts to revamp its so-called control de
confianza measure for a considerable amount of time now. The control de confianza, according to the
Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP), is a five-step evaluation
of police officers that is meant to verify that these officers are doing their jobs inside the institutional
framework of the state and the police. It is meant to make sure that police officers are not corrupt, and
that they hold to a certain level of professional standards in their behavior and actions as police
officers. It consists in a series of psychological, physical and toxicological tests that are meant to
determine the abilities of the officer to perform correctly.
Its implementation is the responsibility of the Centro de Evaluación y Control de Confianza
(CECC), a detached subdivision of Mexico's Attorney General Office (Procuraduría General de la
República, PGR).1
The process has been steady but ongoing, and has followed the guidelines of its
regulatory law, the Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (LGSNSP), according to
the SESNSP. A November 2014 report from this office laid down the advancement in the
implementation of this measure. It stated that by October 30, 2014, all public security institutions of the
country had evaluated its entire staff under the guidelines of this measure. It claimed to have had
trained 3,133 specialized workers that carried out over 800,000 interviews between 2009 and 2014.2
More importantly, the organism reports the firing (or “purge”) of 42,214 officers that failed the
evaluation and did not comply with the standards set by the test. This figure combines the firing of
38,698 officers at the state and municipal levels, and the firing of 3,516 federal officers. These figures
represent 12% of state and municipal forces and 6% of federal forces respectively.3
The SESNSP has
also certified and re-certified most evaluation and “control de confianza” centers in each state.4
1 http://www.pgr.gob.mx/Transparencia/Paginas/Evalucion-y-Control-de-Confianza.aspx
2 http://www.secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/work/models/SecretariadoEjecutivo/Resource/1052/1/images/BOLETIN_NO
V_7_2014.pdf
3 http://www.secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/work/models/SecretariadoEjecutivo/Resource/1052/1/images/PRESENTACIO
N_07112014.pdf
4 http://www.secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/work/models/SecretariadoEjecutivo/Resource/1052/1/images/ESTATUSDECC
CAL301014.pdf

2. However, many experts have provided reasons to doubt that this complete rollout has been
completely efficient or effective, or in certain cases more than an empty measure passing as reform.
First, the October 2014 SESNSP report breaks down the results of the “control de confianza” by state.
The report shows great disparities in the relative number of officers that approved or failed the tests
depending on each state. For instance, for the 2010-2014 period, states such as Jalisco or San Luis
Potosi fired over 1,000 officers, making some significant changes to their police forces. In contrast,
states such as Colima or Campeche fired 1 and 0 officers respectively over the same period of time,
even if their police forces are not far from the size of the ones from the states mentioned above.5
This
has led many experts to doubt the existence of solid, national standards and guidelines for the
application of the control, as well as of the existing national oversight provided by the SESNSP. The
establishment of these would prevent the alteration or intentionally bad application of the test to police
officers in order to skew data. A variation of these manipulations has appeared in states such as
Veracruz, already heavily troubled with police matters, where up to 47% of police officers who failed
the test are still active in the force, as reported by Diario Eyipantla earlier on February 11.6
Experts have also pointed out that high-profile scandals related to police behavior keep
happening in a scale similar to the time before the implementation of the control. Two of the highest
profile cases include the disapperance of the 43 normalistas in Ayotzinapa in 2014 and the escape of
“El Chapo” Guzmán in 2015, as well as other massacres in Veracruz and Morelos.7
The main changes that the government has done to the control process over its existence have
merely been to render toxicological tests random and without previous notice to officers, as well as
more targeted psychological tests. However, the control keeps being applied according to the originally
established guidelines, and remains a complement to the other measures to increase efficiency and
reduce corruption in Mexican police forces.8
On The Current Status Of Internal Affairs Units And Honor And Justice Comissions
The current state of established internal affairs units in each Mexican state police forces is well
described by the report on police reform development Semáforo de Desarrollo Policial, published in
January 2016 and produced by Causa en Común. The report established that 30 out of 32 Mexican state
police forces currently have an internal affairs unit, Sonora and Zacatecas being the two states where
this unit has still not been established. Causa en Común set forth 4 main criteria to judge the status of
each internal affairs unit. They were evaluated according to the availability of a set of norms that
described the unit's role and powers, the existence of enough personal to effectively carry out the unit's
duties, the existence of a system to process claims and the existence of oversight carried out by the unit
on the police force's activities.
Under these criteria, only 6 states (Baja California, Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Hidalgo,
Jalisco and Nuevo León) comply with the requirements for internal affairs units to function optimally.
In contrast, 4 states' units (Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Quintana Roo and Tlaxcala) are severely
deficient, as they mostly do not comply with any of the aforementioned criteria. The units in the rest of
Secretarías de Seguridad present deficiencies in some areas, diferring according to weach particular
case, but do not work at an optimal level altogether. In the case of the Federal Police, its unit was one
of the first to be put in place, and has formulated over 380 cases of corruption under the current
administration.
In general, Causa en Común found the reason for this lack of effectiveness to pivot around two
5 See n.3 above
6 http://www.diarioeyipantla.com/bermudez-mantiene-trabajando-a-47-de-policias-reprobados-en-control-de-confianza/
7 http://www.reforma.com/libre/acceso/acceso.htm?urlredirect=/aplicaciones/editoriales/editorial.aspx?id=67171
8 http://www.secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/docs/pdfs/certifiacion_acreditacion/5%20NUEVO%20ESQUEMA%20DE
%20EVALUACION%20FOCALIZADO/1%20DOCUMENTO_EJECUTIVO.pdf

3. main reasons. On one hand, most units do not possess enough staff, be it in quantity or quality, to
perform its tasks correctly. The organization set a ratio of 1 investigator per 150 police officers to be
the standard at which the unit has enough capacity for oversight. However, only 11 units out of 30
comply with this, exposing a severe lack of staffing. On the other hand, the staff that work in most units
is mainly geared towards administrative duties, and is generally composed by unskilled employees or
lawyers who handle the cases. The report higlighted the need for police officers to also integrate
internal affairs units in order to bring experience, impartiality and capacity for dialogue with other
fellow officers.
General reports of the status of internal affairs units at the municipal level are non-existent,
given the fact that the existence of these unites is not widespread in all of these forces. However, cases
of actions, both postive and negative, taken by active municipal police internal actions units can be
highlighted. Such is the case of the unit of the municipality of Hermosillo, who presented cases against
68 of its own officers to the police's consejo de honor y justicia between Spetember 2014 and July
2015, and recommended the firing of 18 of them for severe offenses.9
On the negative side for the
credibility of municipal internal affairs units is the case of Silvestre Medina Gasga aka “El Chocolate
abuelita”, police officer and member of the band “Los Chilangos” who managed to become to director
of internal affairs of the police force of Tierra Blanca, Veracruz after escaping the state of Oaxaca.
Tierra Blanca was the site of the disappearance and murder of 5 teens this past February.10
The case of the consejos de honor y justicia is different from the internal affairs units'. The
report set forth 3 criteria for judgment of the commissions: adequate normativity, the existence of a
technical office for the commission and that the commission is regularly in session. It found that 11
secretarías possess commissions that comply well with these standards. However, in 5 entities (Baja
California Sur, Coahuila, Michoacán, Nayarit and Zacatecas), the commissions exist on the charters of
each secretaría, but they still had not had their first session at the time of the report, which means they
effectively still do not exist. In the case of the Federal Police, the commission has been established
since 2007, being the first in the country.
The biggest issue with both the establishment and the correct functioning of these commissions
hinges upon an optimal structuring of the technical office of the commission. Most of the time, this
office finds itself colluded with the judicial office in many secretarías, and is overwhelmed with
justice-related issues. Thus, and in the cases when the office possesses employees specialized in the
duties of the commission, these workers are prevented from focusing on their originally intended tasks
of deliberating on disciplinary issues. The report stresses a need for these commissions to be separated
from the judicial offices of each secretaría.11
On The Evolution Of The Debate On Mando Único
Mando Único (MU) has proven to be a divisive issue in current Mexican politics. This initiative,
already existing in Felipe Calderón's administration, is one of the most important measures the Peña
Nieto's administration is attempting to take on the issue of crime, corruption and infiltration by criminal
cartels of Mexican police forces. This measure focuses on municipal police, estimating these to be the
most vulnerable to infiltration. It can be summed up in a few main points.
The federal government wants to reform article 21 of the Mexican constitution in order to make
public safety an issue handled only by the federal government and the 32 state entities. In practice, this
would mean that municipal authorities would no longer have control over their police forces, and
instead policing would be undertaken by state police in all counties. This also means that public safety
9 http://www.elimparcial.com/EdicionEnlinea/Notas/Noticias/12082015/997892-Asuntos-Internos--recomienda-destituir-
a-18-agentes-policiacos.html
10 http://imparcialoaxaca.mx/opinion/8A1/el-callao
11 http://causaencomun.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/160215-Semáforo-Nacional.pdf

4. policies would also be drawn up and funded at the state and federal level, with municipal authorities
having to contribute a certain amount of money and weaponry for this purpose. In addition to this, a
national set of standards and criteria for recruitment, formation, accountability and salary would be
imposed, as well as a reform on common criminal law.12
The reform has steadily been implemented in half of the states of the Mexican union. It is
currently operating in some level in 16 states, even if 26 states have started considering the measure in
some degree. However, out of these 16 states where actual implementation has begun, 8 (Nuevo León,
Sinaloa, Zacatecas, Tlaxcala, DF, Aguascalientes, Campeche and Coahuila) have implemented this
measure in at least half of their municipalities. Out of these 8, only Aguascalientes and Campeche have
effectively modified state law in order to reflect the change to mando único, whereas Nuevo León's
legislature is currently in the process of debating this modification. In the other 8 states (Durango,
Morelos, Sonora, Hidalgo, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Veracruz and Guanajuato), the measure has only
been implemented in less than half of the counties, or only in a few counties. Other states have opted to
undertake a hybrid strategy. Such is the case of Jalisco where a Fuerza Única combining local and state
elements has been put in place. Up to September 2015, the measure had been signed upon by 1762
counties through Mexico. However, the measure is currently operational in only 360 of those 1762
counties.13
A different arrangement has been agreed upon in the Laguna area, where state governors of
Coahuila and Durango allowed the military to control their region's public safety, creating the Mando
Único de La Laguna. This case has been praised by the attorney general of Durango Yadira De la Garza
Fragoso, who has claimed a 50% decrease in murders and kidnappings in the region after its
implementation, and columnists such as Luis Walter Juárez of Milenio as an example of an effective
public safety measure. Other similar measures have also been implemented in Tamaulipas and Sinaloa,
under the supervision of the Secretaría Nacional de Defensa (Sedena).1415
The measure has suscited a considerable amount of political debate and space in media
coverage. It is mainly backed by the official Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); this is at the
federal level by the President, and at the state level by its governors. The party has drawn a lot of
political criticism for backing the measure, especially since PRI's opposition to the measure was the
reason its development was halted during Calderón's PAN administration.
More importantly, there is heavy criticism coming from scholars and experts on the subject of
the viability and premise of the plan. Security expert Alejandro Hope notes that state police is not
necessarily more trustworthy or better prepared, as they are generally small in size and about 55% of
the officers that failed the control de confianza for 2014 were part of state forces. He also recalls the
fact that local police also has a role of controlling traffic, keep public order and solve daily disputes on
the street, skills that require some closeness between the officers and the people they protect, something
a state officer foreign to the community cannot easily manage.16
Advocacy group members and scholars such as Javier Oliva of the National Autonomous
University of México (UNAM), María Elena Morera of Causa en Común and Armando Rodríguez of
the Colectivo de Análisis para la Seguridad y la Democracia (CASEDE) have also criticized the plan
for its uneven implementation and its political undertones. Oliva has stated that after many years of
developments, centralization and standardization have not shown consistent advances, and the irregular
unfolding of the measure has prevented experts from measuring its actual success. Morera has stated
12 http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/12/03/mando-unico-policial-y-otras-10-claves-del-nuevo-plan-de-seguridad-de-
pena
13 http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2016/01/8/seis-anos-mando-unico-opera-en-175-de-
municipios
14 http://www.milenio.com/firmas/luis_walter_juarez/clave_18_686511424.html
15 See n.13 above
16 http://m.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/articulistas/2014/12/73615.html

5. that the MU does not comply with the system of police development at the municipal level that has also
been undertaken, with measures such as the implementation of professional career services. Finally,
Rodríguez expressed his concern with the fact both the federation and the states were trying to take
power, resources and enforcing capabilities from local mayors who were not willing to relinquish it,
because of either wanting to keep these faculties or because local organized crime was pressuring them
to refuse mando único. He also highlighted that the clear majority of states who were pushing for MU
are PRI-ruled, thus believing that it was a partisan action to get hold of more public resources.17
Security experts such as Salvador Mejía have praised some aspects of the plan, such as the fact
that its unifying features allow for more efficient coordination and intelligence-gathering capabilities
for federal police.18
However, fellow security expert Georgina Bujanda Ríos has refuted claims of
success by showing that success in reducing crime has no correlation with the implementation of MU.
Perception of safety by the general population, as reported by the Encuesta Nacional de Victimización
y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública 2015 carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Geografía y
Estadística (INEGI), showed that the top states in which the population felt safer were all ruled by
different policing strategies, including cases of coordinated police mando- or mando mixto-(Colima and
Yucatán), no MU (Querétaro and Baja California) and MU (Aguascalientes). The same situation was
replicated in the bottom tier, with MU states (Morelos) sharing the worst rankings with non-MU states
(Guerrero) or coordinated police mando states (México, Tabasco). Bujanda blames this situation on the
uneven implementation of the measure, that does not allow for correct evaluations, but especially on
the lack of political will and institutionalism, that imply the mishandling and embezzling of the
numerous resources that have been allocated for the measure to be succesful.19
María Elena Morera (Causa en Común), in accordance with this analysis, has noted that
Querétaro, widely seen as one of the most succesful cases of police reform and development, achieved
such success because there was political will from the state policy-makers in order to implement a
system of normativity that actually works, complemented with a great development in the coordination
in-between public safety institutions and the involvement of civil society.20
In the political arena, the parties have split at the national level, but have agreed upon regional
alliances at the state level. National leaders of both PAN and PRD have claimed that MU should only
be used in emergency situations, when organized crime has deeply infilitrated municipal police. PAN,
through one of his national leaders Ricardo Anaya Cortés, has expressed its support for regional MU,
accompanied with some degree of subsidiarity so as to not eliminate local police forces. It has also
pressed for the creation of an external institution that would decide on federal and state police
intervention for certain cases based on technical criteria. Anaya has stressed the need to strengthen
municipal forces, highlighting the succesful cases of the local agencies of Querétaro and León,
Guanajuato, which work significantly better than many state police forces, such as the one from
Veracruz.21
An example of regional cooperation has already taken place in the shape of a 3-party alliance
between the governors of Guanajuato, Michoacán and Jalisco in early February, in order to establish a
regional MU. This is similar to the case of Tamaulipas and Sinaloa in that elements of the Mexican
army, as well as from the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) will provide support in
policing and law enforcement.22
This foreshadows the continuation of the implementation of MU in a
progressive but uneven way under the Peña Nieto administration.
17 See n.13 above
18 http://www.altonivel.com.mx/54928-el-mito-del-mando-unico-que-nos-puede-dar-realmente.html
19 http://themexicantimes.mx/el-mando-unico-ni-es-el-unico-pendiente-ni-la-unica-respuesta/
20 http://www.enfoquenoticias.com.mx/noticias/nacional/destaca-queretaro-por-mejor-policia-en-semaforo-del-desarrollo-
policial
21 http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2016/02/8/pan-contra-mando-unico-generalizado-en-el-pais
22 http://impacto.mx/nacional/marquez-aureoles-y-sandoval-van-por-mando-unico-regional

6. that the MU does not comply with the system of police development at the municipal level that has also
been undertaken, with measures such as the implementation of professional career services. Finally,
Rodríguez expressed his concern with the fact both the federation and the states were trying to take
power, resources and enforcing capabilities from local mayors who were not willing to relinquish it,
because of either wanting to keep these faculties or because local organized crime was pressuring them
to refuse mando único. He also highlighted that the clear majority of states who were pushing for MU
are PRI-ruled, thus believing that it was a partisan action to get hold of more public resources.17
Security experts such as Salvador Mejía have praised some aspects of the plan, such as the fact
that its unifying features allow for more efficient coordination and intelligence-gathering capabilities
for federal police.18
However, fellow security expert Georgina Bujanda Ríos has refuted claims of
success by showing that success in reducing crime has no correlation with the implementation of MU.
Perception of safety by the general population, as reported by the Encuesta Nacional de Victimización
y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública 2015 carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Geografía y
Estadística (INEGI), showed that the top states in which the population felt safer were all ruled by
different policing strategies, including cases of coordinated police mando- or mando mixto-(Colima and
Yucatán), no MU (Querétaro and Baja California) and MU (Aguascalientes). The same situation was
replicated in the bottom tier, with MU states (Morelos) sharing the worst rankings with non-MU states
(Guerrero) or coordinated police mando states (México, Tabasco). Bujanda blames this situation on the
uneven implementation of the measure, that does not allow for correct evaluations, but especially on
the lack of political will and institutionalism, that imply the mishandling and embezzling of the
numerous resources that have been allocated for the measure to be succesful.19
María Elena Morera (Causa en Común), in accordance with this analysis, has noted that
Querétaro, widely seen as one of the most succesful cases of police reform and development, achieved
such success because there was political will from the state policy-makers in order to implement a
system of normativity that actually works, complemented with a great development in the coordination
in-between public safety institutions and the involvement of civil society.20
In the political arena, the parties have split at the national level, but have agreed upon regional
alliances at the state level. National leaders of both PAN and PRD have claimed that MU should only
be used in emergency situations, when organized crime has deeply infilitrated municipal police. PAN,
through one of his national leaders Ricardo Anaya Cortés, has expressed its support for regional MU,
accompanied with some degree of subsidiarity so as to not eliminate local police forces. It has also
pressed for the creation of an external institution that would decide on federal and state police
intervention for certain cases based on technical criteria. Anaya has stressed the need to strengthen
municipal forces, highlighting the succesful cases of the local agencies of Querétaro and León,
Guanajuato, which work significantly better than many state police forces, such as the one from
Veracruz.21
An example of regional cooperation has already taken place in the shape of a 3-party alliance
between the governors of Guanajuato, Michoacán and Jalisco in early February, in order to establish a
regional MU. This is similar to the case of Tamaulipas and Sinaloa in that elements of the Mexican
army, as well as from the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) will provide support in
policing and law enforcement.22
This foreshadows the continuation of the implementation of MU in a
progressive but uneven way under the Peña Nieto administration.
17 See n.13 above
18 http://www.altonivel.com.mx/54928-el-mito-del-mando-unico-que-nos-puede-dar-realmente.html
19 http://themexicantimes.mx/el-mando-unico-ni-es-el-unico-pendiente-ni-la-unica-respuesta/
20 http://www.enfoquenoticias.com.mx/noticias/nacional/destaca-queretaro-por-mejor-policia-en-semaforo-del-desarrollo-
policial
21 http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2016/02/8/pan-contra-mando-unico-generalizado-en-el-pais
22 http://impacto.mx/nacional/marquez-aureoles-y-sandoval-van-por-mando-unico-regional