Cap Stone Paper Final

Running Head: CRISIS RESPONSE VIA SOCIAL MEDIA
Crisis response via social media:
Response time during communication crisis effects on outcomes
Alan Piñon
Wayne State University
Comm 7220
March 21, 2016

CRISIS RESPONSE VIA SOCIAL MEDIA 2
The speed at which communication can occur between large segments of the population
has drastically changed the way in which organizations need to respond during a communication
crisis. Even as little as 10 years ago, when Twitter was just a fledgling company and Facebook
was only two years old, the speed of communication was considerably slower than it is today.
The slower speed of communication, even if it was only a few hours, meant that organizations
had time to consider messaging and tactics in the face of crisis, as it was less likely other parties
were putting any messaging out regarding the situation. If the organization had a crisis
communication team in place and a well thought-out crisis communication plan, then the few
hours before the media got wind of a problem and started inquiring would have been enough
time for the organization to conduct some fact finding, assess damages, decide on key messages,
and select and debrief the proper spokesperson. There could have even been time to craft proper
messages for internal stakeholders and communicate to some of them so that the entire
organization was on message and ready for the onslaught of questions.
Things are vastly different in today’s world. Communication is instantaneous. It happens
across multiple platforms, and the messages come from a multitude of places. To add to the
problem, many of those weighing in with opinions and information about the crisis at hand do so
without any authority or special insight (Dotey, 2011). In the past, that lack of credibility would
have meant no one paid attention, but today, the seemingly flat landscape for who counts as
credible allows for any voice that speaks “loud” enough and often enough to become an
important influencer during a crisis. Often, the person who is in first with messages becomes an
influencer on the subject. The problem is that first often means wrong, or at the very least,
incomplete. First hand observations that are put out with no fact finding or reliable sourcing of
information can never really be accurate. But, the public is not interested in precise information.

When a crisis happens, the public just wants information (Aggergaard, 2015). This presents both
an opportunity and a challenge for an organization attempting to handle a crisis.
The opportunity comes as an organization can identify itself or its avatar as the authority
in the crisis, as long as it gets into the social media conversation quickly. This can be a great
benefit to an organization, and we know from the literature on crisis that being in early with key
messages, especially if those messages are of a nature that indicates remorse and acceptance of
blame, then the organization has a better chance of surviving the crisis (Coombs, 2007).
However, being in first is a challenge. When you weigh-in and start communicating in a crisis
before any fact-finding has been conducted or a key message drafted, then an organization can
create a problem for itself if its early messages have to be changed and back-tracked on as new
information is brought to light (Aherton, 2009). When the public sees an organization constantly
shifting its messages or recanting what it previously said, it brings up more questions about the
integrity of the organization and the ability of its leadership to do the right thing and handle the
problem. Even with a highly trained crisis team and a well-thought out plan to get messages out
during a crisis, there will always be some lag time between the onset of an event and the
organization’s first message hitting social media.
In order to gain a better understanding of how the element of time impacts an
organization’s ability to control messaging during a crisis event, I will examine a number of case
studies in which social media played a role in a crisis event. Specifically, I will focus on events
in which it can be found that an organization’s response on social media had an impact, either
positively or negatively, on an organization’s ability to manage the crisis situation to better
understand how response time and frequency of messaging impacted public perception of the
organization. By examining multiple case studies that had varying outcomes, it will be possible

to explore how long it took an organization to respond to a crisis event on social media and how
that may have affected the effectiveness of the messaging. In addition, the role of cadence or
frequency of messaging in social media will be looked at in order to understand how it impacts
the overall ability for an organization to handle a crisis. This is important for crisis
communicators to understand, since a better understanding of how much time is actually
available before messaging needs to be put forth in social media can help crisis communicators
better plan for and execute a crisis communication plan.
For this study, Coombs’ situational crisis communication theory will be used in order to
understand the type of crisis events the case studies represent, as each will fall into one of the
clusters as identified in situational crisis communication theory. This literature lends a
framework for understanding if the messaging itself would be successful outside of social media,
and allows for certain assumptions to then be made about how time and frequency may have
helped or hindered that messaging’s effectiveness in social media. An organizational
communication crisis is generally defined as a threat to the organization’s high priority goals.
These events are generally unexpected and non-routine. (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998). A
crisis damages the organization’s reputation, and threatens its future ability to function. With
situational crisis communication theory as the framework, Information Cascade Theory will be
used in order to understand how the flow of information in social media played a role in the
efficacy of social media mediated crisis communication. An Information Cascade is described as
the documented phenomena where decisions are made by “observing the actions of other
individuals, and then reproducing the same choices, independently of their own judgment”
(Kobayashi, 2015).

Literature Review
It is becoming more commonly accepted by corporations and communicators that blogs
and social media are better than traditional news mediums for communicating during a crisis,
specifically when it comes to repairing reputation (Schultz, Utz, & Göritz,2011). Schultz et. al.
examined how social media has had an increasing role in crisis and how the medium can
influence the public’s perception of the organization following a crisis. This work is of particular
note because it showed how Twitter, more so than blogs, was far more influential when used as a
means to sway public perception during a crisis. Furthermore, this research showed that the
medium crisis communicators chose to use to communicate during the crisis event often
outweighed the actual messaging put forth. Researchers have labeled blogs and Twitter as two-
way, dialogic, authentic, and credible ways to communicate (Schultz, Utz, & Göritz,2011).
Twitter and blogs allow for messaging to reach large segments of the population and allow for
the public to respond to what they read.
The research has found that crisis communication over Twitter resulted in better
reputation management than blogs, but both Twitter and blogs allowed for better reputation
management than traditional newspapers. This is despite the high perceived credibility of
traditional news outlets. Shultz, Utz, and Goritz examined three independent measures:
reputation, secondary crisis communication, and reactions. It was found that the most successful
messaging in all of these areas was a strategy of information and not one of apology or
sympathy. In addition, crisis communication through Twitter was found to lead to less negative
crisis reactions than the other two mediums measured. In essence, in terms of reputation,
organizations that scored the best with respondents in the study that were exposed to crisis
messaging via Twitter scored the reputation of the organization higher than those who read a

news article in a traditional news medium or a blog. This showed that people were less likely to
talk badly about the organization when the messaging was received through Twitter rather than a
blog or newspaper.
Communicating in social media during a crisis is shown to be an important part of a
modern-day crisis communication plan. One of the main reasons to communicate in the social
media space is that many of an organization’s stakeholders are already using that mode of
communication, making it ideal for messaging to get across (Veil, Buehner, & Micheal
Palenchar, 2011). Despite the amount of literature that has been put forth attempting to show the
importance and place of social media in crisis, there does not seem to be a cohesive examination
of the practical application of using social media in regards to how fast that information needs to
flow and how frequency aids in achieving desirable outcomes.
Communication Cascade Theory (Kobayashi, 2015) is important in understanding how
important the element of timely communication is on the effectiveness of social media
messaging during a communication crisis. Cascade Theory provides for a pivotal point in social
media at which messaging around an event becomes extremely hard to change as a particular
message get “shared” at a great rate and great volume without being independently checked or
verified by each individual user. This has serious impacts in social media because of the very
nature of the platforms. The rate at which information can be shared and pushed on to larger and
larger segments of the population means that an information cascade can occur rather quickly. In
social media, this would be the sharing of information without a user independently vetting or
judging the accuracy of the content. This poses a very really problem for crisis communicators,
as bad or even unwanted information can be spread at great speed and to a great segment of
stakeholders very quickly and there are few ways to halt or slow down information cascades

once they begin.
The ubiquity of social media and the access to the public pose both a challenge and an
opportunity for the digital-age crisis communicator. The opportunity exists in that
communicators in a crisis have direct access to platforms that can quickly and widely spread the
messages they want, without the need to go to third party reporting outlets, which often slow
down the process and convolute or change the desired message (Aherton, 2009 . The challenge
is the necessity of speed and the amount of competing voices. One of the key strengths being
identified for using social media during a crisis is its ability to increase dialogue during a crisis,
which, if used correctly, can help mitigate impacts on organizational reputation by providing a
good, honest, flow of information to the public (Brengarth,& Mujkic, 2016). Using social media
to educate the public during an event and to listen and respond to the concerns of the public has
proven in many cases to be key in successfully managing crisis. Another reason social media is
so vital in crisis communication is its ability to work even when other, more traditional mediums
of communication fail (Brengarth &, Mujkic 2016).
The most compelling reason for crisis communicators to use social media is the presence
of their stakeholders in this space. A large majority of those who most organizations will want to
communicate with during a crisis are already on social media (Argenti, 2006). If an organization
is not present in these platforms during a crisis, not only will they be missing an opportunity to
get their messages out, but they will be leaving the door wide open for other, possibly negative
and inaccurate messages to spread and shape perceptions of their organizations. It is here that
the information cascade can be a determinate factor in the way social media shapes the outcome
of crisis communication. One of the key conditions researchers have found to be present for
information cascades to happen is the existence of a social bond of social link. This has become

very relevant in the age of social media, as the very nature of the platform is to create
connections and build bonds between individuals. In regards to crisis communication, the
appearance of information cascades means that messages first into the space can be picked up
and spread fast within the community, regardless of its accuracy, because the information is not
vetted by each individual on its own merits, but is instead judged by the merits of the person
from whom it has been shared. This means that speed of messaging is crucial in controlling a
communication crisis.
Case Study Analysis
New Zealand Earthquake
In September of 2010, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake hit New Zealand. The response from
the University of Canterbury, which was near the epicenter of the quake, was fast and included
communication on their website and social media. When the earthquake hit, the university
sustained substantial damage since it was only 80 miles from the epicenter of the earthquake.
The resulting damage was so bad, the university would be forced to close for two weeks
(Dabner, 2012). Even though there was substantial damage, university officials felt it necessary
to communicate with its stakeholders, as the university was one of the largest government
institutions in the area.
Crisis Response Analysis
Despite the large structural damage, crisis communicators congregated, and information
for students was quickly and regularly made available through the university’s website and
Facebook page. This allowed for a dialogue to occur in real-time between staff, students, family,

and emergency responders. Facebook analytics revealed more than 5,000 new followers were
added to the University’s page over the course of a week, and although the university used their
website as the official home for information regarding the quake, Facebook was the medium
through which most of the stakeholders received that information (Dabner, 2012). Since this
crisis falls into the victim cluster (Coombs, 2007), there was only a mild threat to the
organization’s reputation, however, there have been numerous situations that have occurred on
university campuses where the mishandling of an event in this cluster has caused long-lasting
damage to the organization’s reputation. The shootings on Virginia Tech’s campus in 2006 is a
prime example of this. With this is mind, Canterbury’s decision and ability to push forth
messaging on social media quickly and repeatedly can be viewed as a successful tactic to ensure
the institution’s positive reputation.
Social Media Response
Forty-eight minutes after the quake, crisis communicators had gathered and started
working on messaging that would be pushed out by university. By 7:40, over two hours after the
quake, the team had issued the first set of messaging via email, on their website, and on social
media. It’s important to note that in this case, which is a natural disaster that triggered a crisis
communication event, the gap of almost two hours was viewed as acceptable. A study conducted
after the earthquake showed that students either maintained a positive sentiment toward the
university or reported increased positive feelings toward the university (Dabner, 2012). Students,
faculty and staff reported that the university’s handling of the event was good, and most pointed
to the presence of constant updates by the university in regards to what was happening on the
ground as the main reason for the positive view of its performance. Several important takeaways
are observed in this case. First, the university had a crisis communication plan in place that

specifically addressed the need and allowed for the use of social media. The university
responded quickly and issued repeated and frequent information updates that kept any one
message from gaining the momentum needed for an information cascade to occur.
Anti-French Demonstrations in China
In April of 2008, groups of Chinese people rallied against French supermarkets over
issues related to products that were said to have killed young children because of contamination
caused by additives in food. Sixteen babies who were fed on milk made from powder produced
by Hebei Province-based Sanlu Group in northwest China's Gansu Province were found to have
developed kidney stones and died due to the addition of melamine. One of the corporations that
manufactured the milk, Carrefour, a French run company, was the focal point for huge
demonstrations because of the deaths, an almost unheard of event in China. The boycott got legs
online in social media almost immediately and the request for participants in the protest quickly
spread, resulting in numerous protests of stores in multiple locations around China. It took
Carrefour two days to make any response on social media. This lag in response is attributed to
having a crisis communication plan that did not specifically address the issuing of messaging in
social media. So, while Carrefour was responding to press inquires with messaging, it took some
time before that messaging was put out in social media. By the time Carrefour started pushing
messaging in social media, the number of protesters grew from 80 at a single location to 16,000
throughout the entire country (Mclaughlin,2008).

This event falls into the accidental cluster of crisis communication theory. Researchers
have noted that in this type of case, two types of actions are necessary in order to a mange a
crisis with high propagation speed and high volume: The implantation of plans and information
monitoring (Viel, 2011). By consistently monitoring the flow of information in social media, an
organization can predict an information cascade before it happens and attempt to intervene with
proper messaging (Beeline Labs, 2009). Crisis plans must be in place that allow for crisis
communicators to react in real-time, when a cascade is seen to be eminent (Denis-Remis,
Lebraty, & Philippe, 2013). Carrefour failed in its crisis response because they were very late in
responding to the conversations happening in social media. By the time any messaging was put
forth by Carrefour, the messages being shared online had already reached what could be
classified as a cascade, since information that was being shared on social media was being
propagated without commentary by individuals and it was happening a great speed (Mclaughlin,
2008).
The protest was eventually ended both by the government and an earthquake in the area
that took the attention away from this topic. Despite the sudden end, Carrefour’s reputation was
severely damaged because it was never able to get ahead of the information cascade that
motivated the protestors. Even though the information that was being spread about Careefour
was eventually shown to be inaccurate, Carrefour’s lack of ability to get in on the conversation
before the messaging spread en mass meant that information was allowed to speed un-
interrupted. Carrefour responded so poorly because they were working from a crisis

communication plan that did not accommodate for the speed and volume of messaging in social
media.
The Love Parade Tragedy
Mass panic and the resulting stampede at the Love Parade music festival in Germany
killed 21 young people and injured 500 more in 2010. The event was put on by Rainer Schaller,
chief executive officer of one Germany’s largest gym chains. Before the incident at Love Parade,
Schaller had notably made comments about his willingness to take risks. Connecting the
statement to the event, media went after Schaller with accusations of risky cost cutting measures,
resulting in insufficient security at the event, allowing for the stampede. Schaller denied the
charges and accused the police of being the problem, which triggered a round-robin of finger
pointing between local government, event organizers, and the police. Message boards and social
media tools were a primary way stakeholders responded to and shared information about the
event. Researchers used the Love Parade tragedy to highlight failures to test SCCT and to
understand the extent the public used social media to address issues of blame as well as to
understand how social media shaped their attitudes toward the event and those who were accused
of causing the situation (Pretorius, Gwynne & Galea, 2015).
Love Parade started in 1989 as a small party with about 150 attendees. By 1999, the
festival grew to a peak capacity of 1.5 million. Despite its popularity, the event was not
generating a lot of revenue. That, combined with changes in regulation to laws in Germany about
events, led the organizers to look for cost cutting measures, but they were unsuccessful and were
forced the festival to shut down for two years. In 2006, Schaller purchased the rights to the
parade, but the parade could not find a venue, as the city of Berlin officials felt the parade was

too large for the city to handle, and other alternative areas refused to accept liability for the
event. Parade organizers, in an effort to appease town officials, found a site in which they said
they could control capacity because there was only one entrance to the festival grounds, which
was a ramp that led to two tunnels that opened up into a railroad depot. This, of course, meant
the only entrance was also the only exit.
Chronology of Events on the Ground:
• 4:20 p.m. Police stopped venue goers from entering the depot as it was clear peak
capacity had been reached, and early attendees attempting to leave were running into
traffic of new festival goers coming in, causing a log jam at the entrance/exit.
• 5:20 p.m. Festival goers begin to breach barriers to either get into the festival or to leave
the festival. As pressure around the exit/entrance mounts, a slow moving stampede event
occurs, crushing participants. At this point, people start to attempt to climb scaffolding
and other facades to escape, but fail and fall, resulting in multiple injuries.
• 7 p.m. The crisis management team for city authorities gathered.
• 7:45 p.m. A press conference is held updating the public on the injuries at the public.
All of the participants that died during the event died from crushed rib cages as other
festival goers trampled them. Three organizations were held responsible for the event: Schaller
as the event organizer, the town officials who licensed the event and approved all plans and
logistics, and the town police who were in charge of ensuring security plans for the event were
proper and who agreed to a support roll for hired event security.

The initial response from all three of the organizations was one of denial or refusal to
accept blame and scapegoating the other responsible parties. As this crisis falls into what
Coombs would describe as a preventable event, this is not considered an effective crisis response
strategy. There was a lot of shifting of blame being done by the parties, who primarily
communicated through press conference, and press releases. However, their stakeholders, who
were primarily injured festival goers and their families, were having conversations online in
social media around who was responsible for the event. But, the organizations themselves did not
have a voice in this conversation. From a crisis perspective, all three organizations failed in their
response. The blame game led to more outrage and increased comments online, almost all of
which the parties involved were unaware because they were not monitoring or responding online
(Schwarz, 2010). The public essentiality refused to pick a side, blamed all sides equally, and
demanded retribution from all three. Since this was the early era of social media, none of the
responsible parties participated in any listening or engaging in the social boards where their
stakeholders were communicating. This meant that not only was the strategy of scapegoating a
poor crisis response, the lack of using social media to listen, engage, and respond was added to
the overall failure for the organizations to manage the crisis.
The tragedy at Love Parade falls into the preventable cluster. Research has shown that a
proper response here is acceptance of blame, apologia, and compensation. None of this was
done by any of the organizations involved. None of the organizations involved in the event

appeared online in order to put forth messaging. What occurred in social media was the public
took pieces from media coverage, reposted articles, and commented, often issuing blame, but
almost never defending one of the three organizations involved. Since the organizations never
responded in social, the messaging was completely dictated by the public, with outrage as the
end result across the board. This is an extreme example of how failing to have a presence at all in
social media can allow for stakeholders’ upset around an event to gain a fever pitch. The outrage
online eventually led to the then mayor of Duisburg, Adolf Sauerland, stepping down, and the
event was forbidden from ever operating again, causing huge financial losses for Schaller.
A very interesting component of the social media response was that there appeared to be
fewer mentions of the event organizer and his role in the event. This has been attributed to the
fact that much of the social chatter was in response to the police organization and town officials
repeatedly issuing statements of blame at each other. In this way, the event organizers, who
arguably were the most to blame, evaded some of the worst commentary online because they
were absent in a majority of the finger pointing that was being reported in the traditional media.
Conclusion
These cases highlight examples of social media directly impacting the outcomes of public
perception of an organization during and following a communication crisis. The main hypothesis
tested was that organizations need to be quick with messaging on social media in order for that
messaging to be effective and keep wrong or unwanted information from reaching a point at
which it can cascade to users. The Anti-French Demonstrations case shows how being slow to
respond with appropriate messaging can have devastating effects on an organization. Love
Parade shows how having a complete absence of messaging in social can harm many parties, but
a very interesting outcome was that the party that did the least amount of blame shifting was also

the party that escaped the most blame on social media. This should not be considered an
endorsement of not presenting messaging during a communication crisis, but it is an interesting
piece of information that deserves further exploration.
The earthquake and the university response highlight the importance quick messaging
can have in terms of managing a crisis. In terms of time, it’s hard to identify a specific timeframe
or hard and fast rule based on the information reviewed in this paper, but many guideposts can be
identified. Surprisingly, the most successful case reviewed here showed a lag time of almost an
hour before initial messaging from the organization was put out on social media. In the
Carrefour case, the social media response took two days. Other similar research supports the
idea that days is too long to respond, but that hours are still available before an organization
needs to be present with messaging on social media. Interestingly, much of what these cases
show and other research alludes to is that frequency of messaging is just as important as the
speed at which initial messaging is brought forth. Frequent and repeated messaging was the
determinant factor in the success of the university. The overall conclusion drawn from this brief
analysis is that there might be more time available during a crisis event for messaging to be
communicated than one might expect. To claim that organizations have an hour or even several
hours before messaging needs to be present is a safe assumption based on these cases. What
cannot happen is for days to pass before messaging is put forth.
Discussion
The cases featured here are a small example of times social media has either aided or
hindered the ability of an organization to effectively manage a crisis situation. Researchers who
study social media and communication are further ahead of crisis communication scholars in

their understanding of how social media is used to sway public opinion in areas such as
marketing or public policy. It is not uncommon for researchers in those areas to talk about time
and frequency or messaging and how those elements impact successful campaigns. It seems
there is ample evidence for a similar in-depth discussion to happen around how both time and
frequency impact crisis communication. This is important to understand because, as previously
mentioned, the stakeholders that any organization wishes to communicate with are already using
social media. This makes social media a critical tool for crisis communicators. In order for crisis
communicators to have success in that arena, there needs to be a plan in place that addresses the
use of the platform and has specifics on how and when messages must be produced in order for
there to be successful outcomes (Pohl, 2013). As noted, this paper suggests that an hour at least
is available for communicators so long as subsequent messages are frequent following the initial
response. This result is somewhat surprising when one considers the speed and volume at which
social media messages can occur around an event, which means further research is called for in
this area.

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