All In One

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ABBREVIATIONS
IMB International Maritime Bureau
PRC piracy reporting centre
WFP world food programme
UNSC united nation security council
UNCLOS United Nation Convention on Law of the Sea
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

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Chapter one
Backgroundof the study
1.1 Introduction
Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a threat to international commerce and shipping since the
political collapse of 1991 which led to the complete breakdown of security institutions in
Somalia, including the coastal defense. Beyond the immediate threat that maritime piracy poses
to crews, property, and ships, it endangers sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom
of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermines regional stability by providing
funds that feed the vicious war in Somalia.1
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) piracy reporting centre indicated that
piracy attacks was increasing for years. But one of their latest reports in 2008 stated that
maritime piracy reached its highest level since they began tracking piracy incidents in 1992 and
this shows how pirate attacks endangers the smooth follow of the commercial shipping, global
trade as well as humanitarian aid deliveries.
In addition to that, the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) of the international maritime bureau
reported that, the first nine months of the same year; 27 pirate attacks were successfully carried
out and 33 attempted in the Gulf of Aden and east coast of Somalia. The consequences of Somali
piracy touched itself for the fact that World Food Programme (WFP) intermittently suspended
delivering 185,000 tons of aid food to the Somali people. As result, the United Nation Security
Council (UNSC) passed the following resolutions- 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851 in an attempt to
control the piracy issues off the Somali coast. These Resolutions encouraged States to develop a
cooperative framework to counter piracy in the region as well as granting specific authority to
“cooperating States” to enter Somalia’s territorial sea with the consent of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to repress piracy in a manner consistent with the
international law applicable on the high seas. UN Resolution 1851 authorizes “cooperating
States” to go further and engage in counter-piracy action on Somali soil.2

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For the last two decades, State failure of Somalia to defend its coastal areas and violations of
Somali waters by foreign trawlers expectedly triggered a reaction of armed resistance by Somali
fisherman, whose livelihoods was disrupted by the illegal fishing fleets can be stated as one a
major causes for the rise of Somali piracy and in view of that, piracy is becoming unmanageable
event which forces the shipping companies prefer to take long route for their ships other than the
Gulf of Aden in order to avoid the possibility of being hijacked and these have had spillover
effects for the maritime transaction in a sense, it increases maritime transportation and insurance.
Piracy in Somalia is now considered one of the dangerous threats on maritime trade and freedom
of navigation. However, piracy in Somalia is a multifaceted problem that the warships of the
international community alone cannot solve the problem, but solving the problem will require to
address the various facets of piracy, namely; geopolitical, regional, legal and operational as well
as the legal gap of the international law on combating piracy.3
One of the legal gaps which pave the way for pirates is that International law on piracy does not
apply to incidents within a coastal state’s adjacent waters and most of the Somali pirate attacks
occur in their territory. The effect of this is that pirate attacks of territorial waters is left to the
territory of that state to utilize its own criminal justice system to police and patrol their waters
and ultimately enforce their criminal law through prosecution. However not all states have an
equal capacity to ensure maritime security, the typical example is Somali state which fails for the
last two decades to regulate its waters. And in such scenarios international law of the sea fails to
address such issue.
Having this as a background of the study, this thesis tries to emphasize the problem of Somali
piracy under international law and its root causes as well as its impacts
1. Elizabeth Daheza “The Danger of Piracy in Somalia” “No 24/2009”.
2. Summary on United Nation Security Council Resolution 1851.
3. Joana Ama Osei-Tutu “The Root Causes of Somali Piracy.

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1.2 Statement of the Problem
Piracy has been defined in a different ways. According to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 4 defines piracy as follows:
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
A. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
a. On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft;
b. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State;
B. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
C. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)
or (b).
This definition contains five elements. First, piracy must include criminal acts of violence,
detention or depredation. Secondly, the act must be committed for solely private ends and
obviously this excludes attacks on ships for public or political motives. Thirdly, pirates must
commit their acts by using private ships and not state warships, but there is an exception in
article 102 which states the following:
“The acts of piracy, as defined in Article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or
government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are
assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft”. The fourth one is the “two ship
requirement” which means pirates need to use a ship to attack another ship. An act committed by
a crew member or passenger on board and not against another ship is not piracy because it lacks
the fourth element, which requires at least two ships one attacks the other. The fifth and the last
element of the definition is that the act must be committed in the high seas or in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any state.

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High seas are defined in article 86 of the UNCLOS as “all the parts of the sea that are not
included in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in the territorial sea or the internal waters of a
state, or in the archipelagic water of an archipelagic state.
According to the above definition, piracy is a crime that can only be committed on international
waters. This includes High Seas and presumably exclusive economic zone and other places
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state. By this implication, therefore this entails the same
acts which occurs in the territorial waters of Somalia cannot be counted as piracy.5
Under the UNCLOS, only a state in whose territorial waters the attack occurred has the right to
prosecute the offenders, but its common knowledge that Somalia is unable to prosecute the
offenders and carry out its obligations under international law as its dysfunctional.
Furthermore, the definition of piracy under Article 101 of the UNCLOS puts two restrictions on
the crime of piracy; one which is the act must be committed for private vessels. In view of this,
acts of piracy cannot be committed by ships owned by others nations. However, one may
observe that this restriction must be waived in a situation where pirates take over a state owned
ship and use for piratical purpose. The other restriction imposed by Article 101 provides that
maritime offence can be considered an act of piracy only when it’s committed for private ends.
This obviously excludes crimes motivated by political consideration and this show you the legal
gap of the international law on piracy.
Due to that legal gap which I have mentioned above and the state failure of Somalia to police and
patrol its territorial waters affects the escalation of Somali piracy.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered into force 14
November 1994) Article 101
5. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as follows: ‘an act of boarding (or attempted boarding)
with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that
act’. This definition is all encompassing in comparison with that provided by UNCLOS.

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1.3 Research Questions
Recently, the issue of Somali piracy under international law has become a very sophisticated
dilemma which demands, more attention for the international community for its prevention and
eventual elimination. However the study will try to answer following interrelated questions.
1. Explore and elaborate the root causes of Somali piracy?
2. Determine in which extent lack of central Somali government contributed the emergence
of piracy in the Somali coast?
3. What are the repercussions of piracy in Somalia and Gulf of Aden?
4. What are the initiatives of the Somali government and the international community in
combating piracy?
1.4 Hypothesis
The international crime of piracy is a constant headache and unmanageable event for the
international community. Therefore, piracy issue deserves to be eradicated.
1.5 Objective of the Research
1.5.1 General objective
This research aims to accomplish the following major objectives:
 To ascertain and analyze the existing legal gap of UNCLOS on combating piracy and
the contribution of such gap towards the exacerbation of piracy issue.

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1.5.2 Specific objectives
More specifically this study tries:
 To analyze the link between lack of Somali central government and the emergence
of piracy.
 To elaborate some of the challenges on Somali piracy.
 To assess the measures taken against Somali piratical attacks
 To explore the impacts of Somali piracy on the global economy.
1.6 Significance of the Research
It is not the first time that a researcher makes a research on the problem of the Somali piracy in
the Gulf of Aden. This thesis is significant in such a way that:
 This research will help the reader to understand the existing legal gap which aggravates
the issue of piracy.
 It is significant in a way that the reader will come to know that State failure of Somalia
contributed a lot for the rise of Somali piracy.
 The other importance of this thesis is that it will provide recommendations to overcome
and reduce the challenges of Somali piracy.
 Finally, this paper will be an input for other researchers who want to conduct further
research in this area.

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1.7 ResearchMethodology
My duty as a researcher is to attest the reader different arguments and prepositions in his/her
reading. Although it is the dynamic nature of the research not to asphalt every side of the coin;
then, I have tried my best to bring the reality in front of and I have employed secondary methods
which include Laws, Books, Articles, Journal articles and websites.
1.8 scope of the study
Piracy is a broad concept and multifaceted in nature; accordingly it is difficult to address the
basic factors related to piracy. Therefore, this thesis focuses to analyze the problem of Somali
piracy under international law. Moreover, the study tries to focus on dealing with the root causes
of Somali piracy and its repercussions on global trade and economy.
1.9 Organization of the paper
The thesis has five chapters, the introductory chapter deals with the background of the study,
statement of the problem, research questions, hypothesis, objective of the study, Significance of
the Research, research methodology, scope of the study and organization of the paper. The
second chapter covers the concepts and conceptualization of the study.
Chapter three focuses on challenges of Somali piracy. Chapter four determines generally the
impacts of Somali piracy on global economic development and Somali economic development
particularly. Finally chapter five summarizes the findings of the study and provides conclusions
and recommendations of the thesis.

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CHAPTER TWO
2.1 Concept and Conceptualization
2.2.1. Meaning of piracy
Maritime piracy is war- like act committed by pirates for private ends (not connected with any
government) that engage in acts of robbery and criminal violence at sea. Piracy is as old as the
history of navigation and one of the earliest of recorded human activities. The references to it
coincide with the earliest references to travel and trade; it may be assumed that very shortly after
men began the transport of goods from one point to another various enterprising individual who
saw profit in intercepting these goods on the way.6
There is no consensus about the definition of the term piracy and according to this, many
definitions of the term is given. The United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty, is the
international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place from 1973 through 1982).7
The convention defines the term piracy as the following acts:
D. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
a. On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft;
b. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State;
E. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
F. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)
or (b).
In short the above definition states that piracy is an act of violence against ships, persons or
property on board. And, the act of violence must be committed by the crew or passengers of
another vessel; illegal and serve for private ends and it must be committed on the high seas.

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Accordingly, any acts which take place within territorial water of state are not considered as an
act of piracy.
The international Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as “the act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the apparent intent of capability to use force in the furtherance act” 8
This definition provides that piracy is nothing but an act of boarding any vessel with intent to
commit theft, robe or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance
of that act.
The UNCLOS definition of piracy confines only to the high seas leaving incidents of piracy in
territorial waters within jurisdiction of a given state. The IMB definition includes as piracy
attacks against ships in the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a state and this definition is
broader than that of UNCLOS because it includes piracy acts within the 12 nautical mile of
states’ territorial waters.
Moreover, many authors use the words “piracy and armed robbery” simultaneously. However
both are two different crimes and their difference can be best understood in the definition of
armed robbery given by IMB, “Armed robbery against Ships means any unlawful act of violence
or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, directed
against a ship or against person or property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over
such offences”. Clearly, this definition differentiates crime of piracy with crime of armed
robbery, it indicates that, crimes committed within territorial waters of a state can be considered
as an act of armed robbery, while, when similar acts occurs outside territorial waters falls the
category of piracy. : 9
6. Philip Gosse 2007 “The History of Piracy”, New York: Dover publication
7. United nations Convention on the law of the sea in 1982, Article 101.
8. International Maritime Bureau (IMB) “definition of piracy”
9. International Maritime Organization, Draft Code of Practice for the investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships.

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Some Experts define piracy as an act of terrorism by providing two areas where piracy and
terrorism overlaps. The first one is legal, both are non state actors according to the Law of the
Sea, piracy must occur on the high seas (outside territorial boundaries), and outside the
jurisdiction of any state. Second is financial, there are speculations that Somali pirates are
funding the Islamic terrorist organizations.10
Modern definitions of piracy include the following acts:11
 Boarding
 Extortion
 Hostage taking
 Kidnapping of people for ransom
 Murder
 Robbery
 Sabotage resulting in the ship subsequently sinking
 Seizure of items or the ship
 Shipwrecking done intentionally to a ship
Finally, black’s law dictionary also defines the term piracy as act of robbery or forcible
depredation or detention and violation against ships, properties or crews as well as endangering
the global economy and trade without having lawful authority.12
10 Iris Patricia et al “Modern Pirates as a threat to Sea level”
11. Ibid.
12. Black’s law dictionary “definition of piracy”.

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2.2 Piracy under international law
Maritime Piracy has been considered one of the international crimes under international law and
United Nations conventions including; the convention on the high seas, the convention on the
law of the sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and the convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against safety of maritime navigation (SUA).
Piracy under international law is commonly held to represent an act which is an enemy to the
mankind (Hostis Humani generis), and as of this piracy were placed under the concept of
universal jurisdiction which entitles every state to capture pirates and try through its own laws.
The stability of the international trade depends upon the security given to the merchants in the
high seas since the most part of the international commercial transportation is made by sea. To
this end, the crime of piracy is a big threat on it. However, the unique international community’s
attempts to repress it do not seem to work because of the constraint and the weakness of the
international law to address the issue in a broader manner.
According to Robert Beckman, “the weakness of the UNCLOS provisions dealing with piracy
outgrows the issue of piracy. He states that weakness by referring the articles on piracy under the
convention”.13
Article 101 of the convention provides a definition of piracy, but it fails to impose obligation on
States parties to enact national legislation making piracy as defined in UNCLOS a criminal
offence with appropriate penalties. In addition to that, this article does not impose obligation on
states to make acts of piracy outside the territorial sovereignty of any state.
Article 105 of the convention gives every state the right in areas outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any state to seize pirate ships and the properties on board and to arrest pirates, but
it fails to impose obligation to exercise such right.14
Furthermore, the Convention on the one hand does not expressly authorize States to establish
universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy by foreign nationals against foreign ships when their
only link to the act is the presence of the offender in their territory and on the other imposes no
specific obligations on States to cooperate to suppress piracy, such as a duty to prosecute or
extradite pirates in their custody, duty to provide mutual legal assistance in prosecutions, etc.

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The SUA convention aims to suppress the unlawful acts of pirates and maintain the safety of
maritime navigation. Unlike the UNCLOS, the SUA convention makes obligatory for state
members to either prosecute or extradite the offenders and this shows how this convention fills
the gap that UNCLOS failed to fill.15
Currently, International law of the sea is an outdated law with regard to the modern piracy in a
sense that it fails to cope all the elements of modern piracy and with regard to that, it requires an
update which will not leave any gap for combating piratical activities. With regard to the legal
gap many pirates escape punishment and prosecution and this serves as an incentive for pirates to
go forth. in order to effectively deal with the problem of piracy. It is necessary to temporarily
amend the ‘high seas’ element of the definition of piracy so as to allow other states to take action
in Somalia – both on its mainland and in its territorial waters – which would otherwise not be
possible under the jurisdictional rules governing piracy which normally apply.16
13. Robert Beckman, “The Piracy Regime under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”: problems and
prospects for cooperation.
14. Ibid.
15. The convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against safety of maritime navigation (SUA).
16. Omer F. Direk et al, “Somalia and the problem of piracy in international law”.

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2.3 Root causes of Somali piracy
Piracy in Somalia poses threat to the international peace and security and the smooth maritime
navigation and piracy has never truly been eliminated or eradicated in the world.
A number of authors argue, the root causes of Somalia is numerous, however the major causes
for the surge of piracy in the Somalia are the following:
 State failure ( lack of viable government)
 Poverty
 Unemployment
 Violations of Somali waters by foreign trawlers.
2.3.1 Statelessness or(State failure)
The notion of state is widely held as an ultimate authority in international system and directly
linked to the principle of state sovereignty.17 However, the inability of state to maintain effective
control and provide security to its inhabitants creates serious dilemma for the international peace
and security to sustain.
From legal point of view, failed state means a state which retains legal capacity but for all
practical purposes loses to exercise it or in other words it lacks a body that functions
governmental authority due to different reasons such endogenous problems and clan favoritism
problems which Somali state is the typical example.18
According to Sarah Neal, failed state occurs “when a Nations government becomes unable to
provide law and order to its territory”. The breakdown of the Somali government in 1990s and
removing the regime of Mohamed Siad Bare by the warlords and gangs which takeoff the
stability of the country and as result of, Somali state was experiencing for the last two decades
incapacity to provide law and order and this can be seen as a connection for the surge of Somali
piracy.19

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Somali state fails to secure and control its territorial waters because of the disintegration of
Somali government in the early 1990s. Somalia has not had a stable government, and its fragile
government is currently combating to warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the
country. The country does not have a functional economy, and its official law enforcement
operations are slim, with regard to the gangs of paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling
the streets of Mogadishu and other towns. Piracy has thrived in these pirate gangs of by taking
advantage for the failure government, and violence occurs in everyday life. A functional Somali
government is so absent despite many efforts for stabilizing it. As a consequence, some Somali
coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where piracy not only enjoys local
support, but local governments rely on it.20
There is a growing acceptance that failed states will be marked to face violent, terror and
unwelcomed events such as terrorism, piracy and robbery etc, which are detrimental to the
international peace. As Roger Middleton of the UK- based Chatham house institute observes:
“Somali piracy has been a constant dilemma for the last 10 years because of having no functional
government or little government function; and he further stated that Somalia is perfect place for
piracy to thrive.21
The link between state collapse and piracy is complex and controversial, state collapse is defined
as the failure of “National institutions of enforcement, execution and decision making which in
other words means that the basic functions of the state are no longer secured”. A certain state
gains the status of a failed or collapsed state as a result of three key dynamics: firstly a state
earns the status of a failed state due to the absence of effective national government with judicial
capability. Secondly, the absence of a state monopoly of force and lastly the wide scale lack of
access to service delivery.22
Some people argue that state collapse is neither necessary nor sufficient to be the real cause for
the outbreak of maritime piracy, failure of a state facilitates the emergence of the phenomena by
creating the condition under which factors which have historically favored. It would accumulate
so as to produce the perfect storm like in the case of Somalia. And further argue that piracy is
sustainable in areas that offer combination of rewarding hunting grounds, acceptable levels of
risk and proximate safe havens.23 and accordingly conclude, that piracy not only requires
physical geography what is often is overlooked is the need for a social and political geography

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that likewise encourages the marauders. The fact the there is lack of government is not sufficient
for the emergence of piracy since piracy not only requires governmental control but also it needs
societal support to operate.24
The contrary argument states that there is a positive correlation between state collapse and
piracy. Often state collapse results in economic crisis with high rate of unemployment therefore
individuals in order to survive will engage in piracy to earn a living because the possibility of
being caught is minimal since there is no body to look after the seas or if it exist its weak.
Furthermore, without sovereign government in place, individuals involved in such activities will
have virtual free- run of sea, enjoying widespread latitude to enforce rules that further and
protect.
In other view, relationship between state failure and its tendencies for piracy are considered as
cyclical. This is due to the susceptibility for state failure to contribute the condition to the
existence and facilitation of such kind of activities. 25
Obviously, the major cause for the rise of Somali piracy can be related to the failed state which
contributed so many civil wars, coups and the emergence of terror attacks and these conditions
make Somalia territory the breeding grounds for the rise of piracy.
17. The principle of state sovereignty were first adopted in the treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the legal implication
of this principle was marked in the UN charter (1945)
18.
19. Sarah Neal, “piracy in Somalia”: targeting the source.
20. Millena Sterio, “the Somali piracy problem”, piracy and the failed Somali state: a threat to global peace.
21. Roger Middleton, “piracy in Somalia” threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Briefing paper. London
Chatham house.
22. Salifu Uyo, “state failure in Somalia as a harbinger of pirates and terrorists” 2010.
23. Murphy Martin, “Small boats,weak states,dirty money” piracy and maritime terrorism in the modern world,
2009
24. Pham J. “Putting Somalia piracy in context”, 2010.
25. Ibid.

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2.3.2 Poverty
The political breakdown of Somali government leaded the massive destruction of the economical
development of the country and this brought the rise of high level of poverty and this made the
life difficult to survive. And due to this economic destruction, many young generations generally
and fisher men particularly faced many challenges to improve their life style such as
unemployment, insufficient domestic resources and this has forced them to join piracy activities
because the potential gains from piracy is higher than the other costs.
For Murphy point of view, the rise of Somalia piracy is the result of the spread of poverty and
the economic dislocation of the country. He further states that the underlying causes for the rise
of piracy in Somalia is poverty, the current economic situation of the country which makes one
of the poorest countries in the world and the country depends on the foreign aid.
Although poverty is not the only factor which plays a role for the surge of piracy but also the
ransom payment of huge amount of money also encourages those sea hijackers to increase their
attacks on ships which passes the Gulf of Aden as well as Somali territorial waters. In addition to
that piracy in Somalia is now becoming a lucrative business in recent years, financial gain is now
the primarily the motive for Somali and, as a result, pirates activities are not only restricted to
illegal fishing rather are now inclusive of passing naval and commercial ships. 26
2.3.3 Unemployment
The failure of Somali government to build the stability in the country for the last twenty years
leads the destruction of the economic and social infrastructure. As a consequence, extreme
economic and employment deprivation was found. Due to that many young generations failed to
obtain job opportunities and this forced the youth to join pirate activities.
According Annemarie Middleburg, “the rise of piracy is the result of the spread of poverty and
lack of employment in Somalia”. For him, piracy in Somalia is a threat to global trade and
commercial shipping and its surge is the result of the poorness of the country and the lack of job
opportunities for the Somali generation.27

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Currently, the pirate industry gives wealth, luxuries and ability to gain more money and due to
this they are attracting numerous young men to join and take their role for hijacking ships, taking
the crews as a hostage and demanding huge sum of money for ransom payment. In addition to
that, the ready willingness of the ship owners to pay a large sum of money for taking back their
ships and cargoes.
According to Pham “paying a huge ransom for those sea hijackers also creates an incentive for
those who do not have job opportunities in their country”. In January 2010, over $7 million
ransom was paid to secure the release of the Greek supertanker MV Maran cerntaurus carrying
two million barrels of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to the United States. 28 and this shows how
lack of employment and paying a large sum of ransom may encourage the jobless generation in
Somalia to engage maritime.
Others argue that paying ransom does not qualify as root causes of piracy in the strict sense, but
they can conveniently be discussed here. One illustration is whether paying ransom to pirates
encourages more acts of piracy. The preponderant majority in the maritime commercial industry
believe that an occasional ransom payment of US$5 million in order to secure the release of a
ship, its cargo and crew is cost effective and may encourage the sea hijackers.29
According to Murphy “the wide spread of unemployment and poverty situation in Somalia is one
the factors which attributes the surge of piracy” piracy provides a way to earn a living in a
country where there is lack of employment, poverty and the like. Similarly economic dislocation
plays a role. Significant changes in trade flows have driven piracy in the past and even today
changes in circumstances have encouraged some to try their hand.30
26. Ibid.
27. Annemarie Middelburg, “piracy in legal contexts”, prosecutions ofSomali pirates operating off the Somali coast.
Published by Wolf Legal Publishers Cited from W. Minter and D. Volman, “piracy and Washington”:the Somali
cross roads toward freedom.
28. Ibid.
29. Ploch et al, “Counter-Piracy Policy”, delivering judicial consequences, 2010
30. Ibid.

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2.3.4 Violation of Somali water by foreign trawlers
Violation of Somali waters by foreign vessels can be considered as one of the root causes of
Somali piracy. According to Waldo, piracy in Somali coast began not for monetary purpose but
it begun with fishermen who considered themselves as a coast guard since the disintegration of
the government there is no coastal defense body. Due to the fact of the instability of the country
many foreign fleets were illegally fishing Somali waters and this endangered the livelihood of
many Somali fishermen who depend upon fishing. In response to such acts the fishermen take
arms and tend to protect its resources and then this turned into what we now called Somali
pirates.31
Most of the researchers on the rise of Somali piracy argue that, it’s an act of self defense by local
fishermen and those who are fishing communities. They also argue that piracy rise in Somalia
was initially begun as a defensive response to increased illegal fishing and dumping of toxic
waste along the Somali coastlines.32
According to Rodger Middleton, the problem of illegal fishing in Somali waters by foreign
trawlers is very serious one and does affect the livelihood of many Somali people. He further
stated that illegal fishing violates international law particularly Article 56 of the United Nation
Convention on the law of the Sea. This Article provides the principle of Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ). The principle outlines that the coastal state has a jurisdiction as provided in the
provision. Moreover, Rodger says that “it can be argued that the origin of piracy has nothing to
do with the illegal fishing but it can be one of the contributing factors for the rise of piracy.33
31. Waldo, M.A, “The two Piracies in Somalia”: why the World ignores the other? See also
http:// wardheer news.com/articles -09.
32. Aaron Arky, “Trading Nets for guns”,the impact illegal fishing on piracy in Somalia, p2.
33. Http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/112/article3481.asp

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2.4 International Response on Somali Piracy
The issue of Somali piracy becomes a major issue which interrupts the global trade and maritime
transportation. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has continued to increase despite many international
efforts which tried to curb the problem in the region.
Pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast were reported rising that in 2007 to
2009, 51 to 217 attacks were occurred. In addition to that, International Maritime Bureau
reported that, in 2010, over 1,016 crew members were kidnapped and taken as a hostage by the
Somali pirates and after long ransom negotiations they have been released. 34 The problem of
Somali is not an only a threat to maritime transportation it endangers the property and the life of
crews as well and this dilemma poses a substantial danger towards peaceful maritime navigation.
Taking in to account the above state facts and the potential danger the piracy holds many
international responses has been made such as United Nations Security council Resolutions
(UNSCR), Contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia(CGPCS), Naval forces and private
sector and shipping industry responses.35
UN response to Somali piracy
The international coordination of anti-piracy efforts was made by the consensus of the members
of the United Nation (UN). The United Nation Security Council passed resolution 1964 for the
purpose of extending the mission of AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia) to keep
peace and security in the country and raising up the troops up to the 12,000 for also helping the
government to curb the piracy. The United States provided training and logistic support and
assistance which is worth of $365 million.36
International effort to respond the threat of Somali piracy was established when UNSC passed a
series of resolutions to facilitate curbing the piracy in the Somali coast. Resolutions 1816 was
passed on June 2008, this resolution authorizes states to cooperate each other and to enter Somali
territorial waters with the consent of transitional federal government (TFG) for the purpose of
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in a manner consistent with the permitted
action on the high seas and the international law on piracy. Furthermore, the resolution permits
taking all the necessary means for repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery.

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Another resolution was adopted in October, 2008(Resolution 1838), the Resolution calls on
states which have military capacity in the region to contribute to anti-piracy efforts and making
clear the position of the Resolution 1816 with regard to the international law.
At the request of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the mandate which establishes
the Resolution 1816 was extended for one year in December 2008 by the Resolution 1846. After
that, resolution 1851 expanded the mandate and authorized the states and regional organizations
that are acting at the TFG’s request to “undertake all necessary measures that are suitable in
Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of Somali piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of
Aden. Moreover, the resolution 1846 authorized the provision of technical assistance to TFG to
enhance the capacity of these states to ensure coastal and maritime security.37
Regarding international response to Somali piracy, the UNSC adopted another resolution to
facilitate or simplify the prosecution of Somali pirates. Resolution 1897 was adopted in
December, 2009 and this resolution encourages states to undertake agreements that would enable
governments to simply investigate, detain and prosecuting pirates.38
All the above mentioned resolutions were adopted by the UNSC for the purpose of suppressing
act of piracy in the one hand and facilitating the free flow of maritime navigation on the other.
34. Statistical information on annual pirate attacks found in this report from reports by the IMB, a division of the
international commerce in Lauren Ploch et al, “ Piracy off the Horn of Africa”, Congressional Research Service,
2011
35. Ibid.
36. Figures are projected totals of obligation for AMIZOM support provided by U.S. state department cited in
L.Ploch et al, “Piracy of f the Horn of Africa” Congressional Research Service, 2011
37. L. Ploch et al, “Piracy of f the Horn of Africa” CongressionalResearch Service, 2011 p.19
38. Ibid.

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Contact Group on Piracy off the Somali coast (CGPCS)
According to the resolution 1851, 39 Bush administration has led to establish a contact group on
piracy. Initially 24 governments and five regional organizations take part the establishment of the
CGPCS, and its first meeting was held on January 2009, the contact group agreed to undertake
the following six tasks:
 Improving operational and information support to counter-piracy,
 Establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism,
 Strengthening judicial framework for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates,
 Strengthening commercial shipping, self awareness and other capabilities,
 Pursuing improved diplomatic and public information efforts, and
 Tracking financial flows related to piracy.
Overall the purpose of these goals is to improve the operational coordination, information
sharing and effectively enforcing the legal activities of all actors combating piracy off the Somali
coast.
The second meeting held on 2010, the group agreed to update its strategies for accomplishing the
above stated tasks by providing suggestions and appeals, including calling for more donations to
counter piracy trust funds that will effectively enhance the capacity of the region and also
requesting additional maritime patrol aircraft and oil tankers.
The Contact Group on Piracy off the Somali coast aims to outline strategies, plans and play its
role for curbing generally the problem of piracy and Somali piracy particularly.
Naval Responses
Naval responses began in 2008 when the secretary general Banki-Moon called for assisting the
Aid shipment of WFP to Somalia. As a result of responding that call, the following three
international operations aimed to counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden was established40:
1. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) operation ocean shield
2. EU ( European Union) Atlanta Operation,
3. Combined Task Force (CTF-151).

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1. NATO operation ocean shield
This was launched in August 2009; its aim was to protect the shipments of WFP to Somalia or in
other words the main focus of the operation was to undertake the counter-piracy operations at sea
in order to facilitate the maritime navigation of the WFP shipments to Somalia. However, the
operation also extended its mission with assisting the capacity building efforts of the regional
states, upon their request to develop their capacity to combat pirate activities.
2. EU( Atlanta Operation)
The Atlanta operation was launched after few months of launching the NATO operation and this
was ever first EU naval operation of countering piracy after a lot of week planning.
Similarly, its objective was to protect the Aid delivery shipments of the WFP and further
extended its mission by undertaking more general anti-piracy role.
The mandate of the Atlanta operation was one year. However this was extended from 2009 to
2010 until the end of 2012 and it may be extended further in the future.
3. Combined Task Force (CTF-151)
The CTF-151 is US (United States) multinational task force and it was established in January
2009 and this task force replaced the previous task force (CTF-150) which continues to perform
other marine security operations.
The whole purpose of the CTF-151 is to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect
global maritime security and maintain the freedom of navigation for the sake of the international
interest.41
39. Resolution 1851 ” encourages all states and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia to establish international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact… on all
aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea.
40. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “ piracy off the coast of Somalia”, (Tenth Report Session
2010-2012).
41. Ibid.

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Preventing and disrupting pirate attacks
Private Sector and Shipping Industry Responses
In response to the threat of pricy, private sector and shipping industry uses difference mechanism
to avoid pirate attack on their shipping.
Some ships prefers to take along root of the cape of good hope rather than circumnavigating in
the gulf of Aden which the risk of being attacked is higher, while some others prefers to take
counters measures and best practices to resist and repel the pirate attacks by using fire hoses
,water cannons and passive sonic defenses and this mechanism is the more used one.
In addition to that, industry surveys suggested that using higher freeboard and ships that operate
at speed above 15 knots42 half proven less susceptible to pirate attack, however US official naval
intelligent warned the private sector and shipping industry stating that pirates also uses high
speed boats which has an ability to board any vessel regardless of high freeboard that ships use
to navigate43.
Moreover, IMO and other bodies such as international chamber of commerce and maritime
bureau have developed and provided a detailed guidance and recommendation known as “Best
Management Practices” including recommendations on speed, information on typical pirate
attacks, and ‘self protection measures’ including watch keeping, manoeuvring practice, water
spray and foam monitors and citadels—fortified safe rooms to which the crew can retreat and
await military assistance.44
42. One knot is unit of measurement which is equivalent to one Nautical mile per hour or 1.5 miles per hour.
43. L. Ploch et al, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa” Congressional Research Service, 2011, p.24.
44. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “ piracy off the coast of Somalia”, (Tenth Report Session
2010-2012). P.19

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Chapter three
3. Challenges ofSomali Piracy
3.1 Background
Somalia is a country located in the horn of Africa bordering with Gulf of Aden north, Indian
Ocean east, Ethiopia west, Djibouti North West and Kenya South West. It was under the Italian
colony and gained its independence in July 1960. After its independence, Somalia unified with
the Somali British (currently known as Somaliland) who also gained its independence from the
British government in late June 1960 and formed the Republic of Somalia. At the outset of their
unification Somali people enjoyed almost one decade of civil and democratic government but
unfortunately the military coup of General Mohammed Siad Bare intervened and took over the
power and established a military government by the late of 1960s.
After 22 years of military government, the Siad Bare regime collapsed and disintegrated with a
multifarious reason including clan favoritism, colonial legacy and Ogaden war.
Following the disintegration of Somalia, the police force and defense institutions ceased to exist
and taking in to account to these facts many unwelcomed activities and events exploded off such
as piracy, terrorism, killing of innocent people and theft and so on. In addition to that, the
collapse of the government leads the break of many civil wars which is currently between the
Islamic insurgent group known as AL Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
According to Najad Abdullahi, the disintegration of Somali state provided the absence of Somali
navy force and leaving Somali coastal waters undefended, foreign vessels and industries make
use of that fact by illegally fishing and dumping chemicals and nuclear wastes and this as a
matter of fact lead the erosion of Somali fish stock, local fisher men started to group themselves
and tend to protect their resources. Although most of the defensive involvement of Somali fisher
men went unreported, the first recorded incident of modern piracy off the Somali coast occurred
on May 10, 1991 near Mombasa port. 45
Moreover, the stand point of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report stated that, “the
increase of pirate attacks off the horn of Africa in directly linked to continuing insecurity and the
absence of the rule of law in war-torn Somalia. The absence of functional central government

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there provided freedom for pirates to engage piracy against the maritime shipping”. The report
further stated that the apparent motive of most pirate groups in Somalia is to gain profit and
piracy in Somalia proves that the lucrative business of piracy attracts many young who suffer
poverty and unemployment.46
Piracy off the Somali coast threatens the maritime ships in a sense that it seized 3 out of 18
attacked vessels in 2009 by the Somali pirates. In addition to that, the annual reports of
IMB(International Maritime Bureau) for 2009 also stated that there 196 incidents of pirate
attacks on shipping, 46 vessels were hijacked and 857 crew members have been taken as a
hostage in the Gulf of Aden Somalia.47
Piracy has been rampant in the Gulf of Aden, particularly in the Somali coast because of the lack
of governance in the littorals.48 but currently, piracy off the Somali coast is decreasing due to the
pressure of Multinational Naval and AMISOM forces which has been given the mandate of
countering pirate attacks.
45. Najad Abdullahi. ""'Toxic waste' behind Somali piracy", October 2008". English.aljazeera.net. Retrieved 2011-
03-27.
46. L. Ploch et al, “Piracy of f the Horn of Africa” CongressionalResearch Service
47. IMB Annualreport 2009.
48. Littorals is a region lying a long a shore or situated on the shore of the sea.

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3.1.1 Challenges of Somali Piracy on Maritime security
Maritime Piracy is not a new phenomenon in international system. Over the last two decades,
observers have consensual recognition that piracy, while certainly an existential threat to the
global economy system, can pose significant challenges to the international order and stability.49
More than 80 percent of the maritime transportation involves ocean transit. Accordingly, with
regard to the importance of the maritime transit Somali piracy poses potential threat to the
international trade and maritime navigation. Furthermore Somali piracy not only threatens the
freedom of maritime navigation but also the live and property of seafarers. In other words one of
the most visible cost of piracy is the human cost in terms of numbers killed and traumatized.
Many mariners are being killed, wounded, kidnapped or traumatized in some way every year due
to pirate activities.50 (Murphy, 2009:378). In year 2010 IMO’s report was indicated that two
crew members were killed and 30 crew members were reportedly injured, while 1,027 crew
members were reportedly taken as a hostage or kidnapped world wide.51( IMO report 2010).
Therefore the danger or threat of piracy and particularly Somali pirates presents to all seafarers
and the fear it provides especially on crews become serious concern to the international
community.52 (Murphy, 2009:378).
Somali piracy again threats international trade through raising numerous costs to the commercial
shipping industry including huge ransom payments, damage to the ships and cargoes, delays in
the cargo delivery, increasing maritime insurance rates and costs to harden merchant ships
against attack. This costs over burdens the commercial vessels and the global trade. However,
there are some vessels which in order to avoid pirate attacks takes a long route or divert their
way around the Cape of Good Hope. This would obviously add a numerous costs to the shipping
industry.53
49. See Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, "Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipping Lanes are Safe," Foreign
Affairs Vol. 86, No.3 (May/June 2007): 7–13
50. Murphy Martin, 2009 “Small boats,weak states,dirty money” piracy and maritime terrorism in the modern
world, p378
51. IMO report 2010.
52. Ibid
53. Middleton, Roger 2008 “ threatening global trade, feeding local wars”, p1.

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According to One Earth Future (OEF) foundation after a large scale of study to quantify the cost
of piracy as a part of its oceans beyond piracy project. The foundation calculated that maritime
piracy is costing in the international economy between $7to $12 billion per year.54
Furthermore, OEF foundation states that the main direct costs of piracy are: the cost of ransoms,
piracy insurance premiums, deterrent equipment, and the cost of rerouting vessel away from
piracy risk zones. The foundation will provide some facts relating to the above mentioned costs
which piracy causes to maritime vessels.
The cost of ransom
One of the spectacular increases in the cost of piracy in recent years has been the increase price
of ransoms paid to release hijacked ships. Ransoms are sought by the Somali pirates, while
pirates in other regions opts to stole the vessels, or cargo rather than demanding ransom payment
for the value of the seafarer live and their ships. In November 2010, the highest ransom paid on
record which is $9.5 million, was paid to Somali pirates to release Samho dream ( a South
Korean Oil Tanker).55
Similarly, in January of the same year $7 million ransom paid to release the Greek supertanker
MV Maran Centaurus, which has been carrying $162 million of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to
the United States. The total cost of ransom paid is estimated to be a round double the value
actually paid to pirates because of other factors which relates for the payment of ransom such as;
the cost of negotiation, psychological trauma counseling, repairing damaged ship and the
physical delivery of ransom money which often done by helicopter or private lane.56
The cost of insurance
Regarding the growing threat of Somali piracy, the insurance companies responded by increasing
its shipping rates and insurance premiums especially in the high risk piracy zones. In addition to
that the OEF provides that the two major forms of piracy-related insurance are war risk and
kidnap and ransom (K&R).
This insurance market has evolved throughout 2011 to reflect continued developments in piracy.
The war risk’ region was expanded to include the larger Indian Ocean at the beginning of the
year, and many shipping companies have received premium reductions for having private armed

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security on board ships. The total cost of war risk and K&R insurance was approximately $635
million. Therefore this fact shows that Somali piracy has a major challenge to the international
trade and maritime shipping’s.57
The cost of rerouting
The cost of rerouting refers cost when a vessel opts to take the long route of the Cape of Good
Hope in order to prevent their ship being hijacked but this will cost those who opts this option
numerous costs because of the time and the long distance they will transit. Moreover in 2011,
some ships opted to avoid the piracy high risk area (HRA) by hugging the western Indian
coastline. This report assessed the cost of that re-routing for bulk carriers and tankers, and
Estimated the cost was around $486 - $680 million in 2011.58
The cost of deterrent security equipment
Ship owners may opt to equip their ships and crews in order to protect themselves and their
cargoes by the Somali pirates. In order to counter Somali pirate attack a lot of ship industries
prefer to equip their ships and its crew to deter the attacks and this will cost them. OEF
foundation stated that the total cost of equipping and arming the guards in 2011 was between
$1.06 and $1.16 million.59
54. Anna Bowden et al , December 2010, “the economic cost of maritime piracy”, one earth future working paper.
55. BBC news, November 2010, “Somali pirates receive record ransom for ships release” or also see
Http://www.bbc.co.UK /news/world-africa-11704306
56. BBC news, 2009. “Somali pirates’ free arms ship” or also you can see Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/78715/.
57. Anna Bowden et al , December 2011, “the economic cost of maritime piracy”, one earth future working paper.
58. Ibid
59. Ibid

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3.2 Challenges of Somali piracy on national security
Similarly, Somali piracy poses threat to the national security and exacerbates the peace building
process in the country. Somalia faces many maritime security threats and challenges. In the
absence of clear maritime authority and security policy, its waters remain in a state of
lawlessness. Piracy is of course the most well know maritime security threat emanating from
Somalia. Attacks against merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden region have increased
dramatically over the past three years and threaten one the globe’s busiest shipping lines and
exacerbates the peace building process in Somalia. Yet pirates also increasingly target Somali
dhows and fishing boats. 60
Also piracy obstacles the work of Somali Fishermen which are getting more reluctant to go out
fishing because they fear to be apprehended by naval forces mistaking them for pirate. In many
coastal villages insecurity, drug abuse and prostitution are increasing dramatically because of the
influx of pirates, ransom money and weapons (Somalia Report 2011).61
However, as indicated by Somalia Report, piracy is not the only maritime security challenge in
Somali waters. Also Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported fishing (IUU) and toxic waste dumping
have said to be that such acts are rampant and threatens the livelihood of coastal communities.
This is made worse by warlords, regional governments and businessmen issuing fishing licenses
to foreign trawlers. Given that fishing vessels are usually armed, the situation in Somali waters
often renders naval warfare. Moreover, Somalia’s waters have also become famous for many
other criminal activities, including smuggling, arms trafficking and human trafficking. Also
transnational criminal organizations and Somali Islamists groups have been involved in such
activities (e.g. UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011).62 Moreover, it’s recognized
that piracy in Somalia exacerbates the national security and peace building process of the
country.
60. Stockbruegger, “the Mogadishu Road Map: Towards a joint maritime security policy for Somalia” October
2011.
61.http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1648/_Vessels_Damage_Puntlands_FisheriesIndustry
62. Ibid

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3.2 Ways to Overcome the Challenges of Somali Piracy
3.2.1 Establishment of effective Somali government
As we previously seen that one of the major causes for the rise of Somali piracy is the
statelessness and lack of order. Therefore we can impliedly assert that one way to overcome the
challenges of Somali piracy is to establish an effective government which will patrol its waters.
In addition, many Authors and Politicians have concluded that because of statelessness of
Somalia piracy fosters, then the best approach to fight piracy is to fight statelessness; which in
other words indicates establishing Somali government effectively will be useful to eliminate
piracy which nowadays become business in Somalia.63
In the world policy journal 2009, James Kraska and Brian Wilson assert that the smart approach
to the piracy problem is to build state. Though they gave their acceptance to the military
responses, they argue that military response will never eliminate the problem of piracy which its
cause is the absence of central state. 64
Similarly Roger Middleton, a journalist for the BBC, stated in his briefing paper for the British
think tank Chatham house, though I support the presence of multinational naval forces in the
short term and suggest not paying ransoms could also deter piracy, but his main focus was that
piracy can be eliminated effectively on establishing Somali state who will control its waters and
counter the pirate activities. In short what Roger suggest to overcome the challenges of Somali
piracy is to build Somali state.65
After understanding the above stated points of Authors politicians and journalist, we can
conclude that building Somali state will play a great role for piracy elimination.
63. Jeff Geels, “Raiding the State: piracy and state building in Somalia.2009, p1
64. Ibid
65. Roger Middleton, “piracy in Somalia” threatening global trade, feeding local wars. Briefing paper. London
Chatham house.

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3.2.2 Direct Military Intervention
According to Jeff Geels, state building is unlikely to solve the piracy crisis in Somalia because
pirates attempt to interrupt any peace building process in one way or another. Again Jeff stated in
his article on “Raiding the State: Piracy and State-Building in Somalia” that pirates are in
relation with government officials in Puntland and Somaliland. This relationship works to the
advantage of both the officials and pirates in a sense that ransom payment of pirates will be
distributed among the two parties, therefore piracy benefits them and they are not willing for the
building of effective state which will control its water and counter pirate activities. Then for Jeff
new policy to combat piracy is required other than building effective government and he
suggests military intervention will be the solution. In addition to that, the head of the East
African seafarers’ Assistance program in Mombasa, Kenya noted, “capturing pirate ships in less
than 48 hours has not occurred before, therefore pirate are taking the opportunity to be more
aggressive and pushing more southeast as well as doing whatever they can” brought the attention
of the international community to consider the piracy in Somalia not as a regional problem but as
a global issue.66
Moreover, piracy in Somalia is a land based problem which multinational naval forces alone will
not eradicate the total issue and its challenges; the best solution is enabling direct military
intervention which will complement the complete role of the naval forces.
However, NATO disagrees this kind of approach by explicitly indicating its reservations on
military engagement in Somalia; NATO justifies its reluctant to intervene because it fears to
violate the human rights of pirates and fears to be condemned if it fails to accomplish the
purpose of military engagement. 67
66. Jeff Geels, “Raiding the State: piracy and state building in Somalia.2009
67. Ibid

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3.2.3 New Legal Mechanisms
To combat piracy as an international crime which disrupts the interests of the international
community requires new legal mechanisms. Under the United Nation Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) which considers piracy an international crime and subjects international
jurisdiction for detaining, seizing pirate ships and prosecuting pirates. The convention officially
codifies the principles of original jurisdiction which dictates that every state has the right to
seize, detain and prosecute pirates according to their own laws. 68
However, Robert Beckman (director centre for international law) stated that the UNCLOS only
give states the right to enforce detaining, seizing and prosecuting Somali pirates rather than
obliging them to do so, since the crime is an international crime.69 In addition to that problem
some states legislation on piracy is an outdated law and only gives their court’s jurisdiction when
it fulfills the following two requirements:
(a) If the perpetrators ( pirates) are its nationals, or
(b) The victim ship was flying its flag.
Furthermore, as we have seen in previous parts the convention only considers an act of piracy
only when its committed in the high seas and those who occurs in the territorial water of a given
state that state will handle the issue but it fails to address if the state concerned is a failed state
what will the way out?, therefore new legal mechanisms which deals the modern piracy in each
side is required because effectively combating this issue depend on the filling the legal gaps and
obliging stated to update their laws regarding piracy in accordance with the UNCLOS.
Moreover, more must be done to empower nearby African countries to prosecute pirates. Most
trials over the past year have occurred in France and Denmark, and the United States agreed to
prosecute the surviving pirate from the assault on the Maersk Alabama. Though nations like
Ethiopia and Kenya are much closer, they do not have the institutional capability to try pirates
therefore material support should be given to enable them and this will deter Somali pirates after
seeing the enforcement of punishing pirates.70

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3.2.4 New rules of engagement for naval forces
The most important policy change that will help to reduce the maritime piracy is to change the
rules of naval engagement which deals pirates. First the UNCLOS limits for the naval forces to
pursue pirates only in the international waters; once pirates retreat into their territories the naval
force that was pursuing the pirates cannot follow the pirates into their territorial waters because
the laws of the sea enable the forces not to pursue pirates in their territorial waters otherwise the
principle of the 12 nautical mile will be violated. And this certainly undermines the ability of
naval forces to pursue pirates effectively.
Therefore new rule of naval engagement is required. As a result of that, the United Nation
Security Council (UNSC) lately passed resolution 1846 which enables the naval forces to pursue
pirates even in the territorial waters of Somalia by using all necessary means to repress piracy
and armed robbery at sea.
According to Jeff Geels this resolution is not sufficient because it’s for temporary purpose, he
suggests that this resolution should be extended until effective government of Somalia
established.71
Secondly, the convention restricts the range of military responses to piracy. Under Article110, a
“warship has first to send an officer-led party to board a suspected pirate ship to verify any
suspicions. The warship cannot just open fire. Any inspection has to be carried out with all
possible consideration.” The effect of these regulations is to completely hamstring the response
of the multinational naval force in the area. No pirate ship willingly submits itself to detainment
and interrogation, so they almost always avoid capture. Preventing the multinational force from
engaging with the pirates renders it nearly useless. These regulations must be made less strict to
allow the force in the area to engage when necessary.72
68. Jeff Geels, “Raiding the State: piracy and state building in Somalia.2009
70. Ibid
71. Ibid
72. Paul Reynolds, “Rules Frustrate Anti-Piracy Efforts,” BBC News, December 9, 2008

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Chapter Four
4. Impacts of Somali piracy
4.1 Impact of piracy on global economic development
As we have stated in the former unit the way Somali piracy impedes and poses a challenge to the
commercial ships by costing them a numerous cost. Similarly, in this unit we will see another
way in which Somali piracy provides an impact on the global economic development.
In addition, unit three scrutinized how piracy in Somalia costs to the commercial vessels a couple
of costs including cost of ransom payment, cost of rerouting, and cost of guarding the merchants
and so on. However, this unit provides the following costs and elaborates how it impacts the
development of the global economy.
A. The cost of prosecution and Imprisonment
B. The cost of military operation and
C. The cost of counter-piracy Organizations.
A. The cost of prosecution and Imprisonment
As we know that prosecuting and imprisonment is one method of deterrence and achieving
criminal justice system. Prosecuting and imprisoning pirates is a rule of law enshrined under the
United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The law grants every state the
universal jurisdiction of the piracy crime to seize and prosecute pirates as long as its penal law
criminalizes piracy. In addition to that, the convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of maritime navigation (SUA) also criminalizes piracy and makes subject of
universal jurisdiction.731
However, prosecuting and imprisoning pirates costs the international community. In 2011 the
total cost of prosecuting and imprisoning pirates in different regions such as Africa, Asia, Europe
and North America was $16.4 million. In Africa the total cost was estimated $461,470.74
73 Working paper, one Earth Future Foundation “ the economic cost of Somali Piracy” 2011, p22
74 Ibid.

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B. The cost of Military Operation
Counter piracy efforts based on military forces was made by over 30 countries in the Gulf of
Aden and Indian Ocean. The three military operations aimed at deterring, preventing and
repressing pirate attacks are: EUNAVFOR (Operation Atlanta), NATO operation (ocean shield)
and combined task force (CTF-151).
Though the military operations succeeded to disrupt many pirate attacks after their
establishment, however according to naval authorities stated they will decline in late this year
because of budgetary pressures which this naval force mission costs to the contributing countries
unless otherwise it is extended.
Moreover the total cost of these military operations can be calculated in to two forms. First
calculating the administrative budgets of these military missions and second calculating the
military assets contributed by each state. But our calculation is based on the former one. So the
administrative cost of EUNAVFOR was estimated in$10.9 million, while NATO and CTF-151
was measured $5.5 million each. Therefore the total of the administrative costs of the three
military operations is $21.9 million.
C. The Cost of Counter Piracy Organizations
Under the Counter Piracy Organizations, the following organizations detailed below are aimed to
perform different counter piracy tasks.
I. Trust fund (to support initiatives of states to counter piracy off the coast of
Somalia)
This organization was launched in 2010 by the UNSG (United Nation Secretary General) Banki
Moon. The objective of this organization was “to help defray the expenses associated with
prosecution of suspected pirates as well as other tasks related to implementing the contact
group’s objectives regarding combating piracy in all its aspects”.
The cost funded to this organization to perform its counter piracy task was $4.7 million.

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II. The United Nation office of Drugs and Crimes (UNDOC)
UNDOC CPP (counter piracy programme) was established in 2009 with a mandate of assisting
Kenya for prosecuting Somali pirates in light of international standard, rule of law and human
rights.
Moreover, this organization focuses three key areas for accomplishing its task:
 Establishing six prisons in the region to ensure the basic health of prisoners in line with
international human rights standard and training 600 staffs to make sure the best
practices of serving the prisoners. $1.5 million fund given to the UNDOC to develop
the Hargeisa prison in Somaliland and constructing a court room and its equipments for
the Bossasso prison in Puntland.
 Support police to gather evidences and prepare case work on piracy related cases.
 Support Kenyan officials on prisoner transfer and post trial for prosecution and
advocacy issues.
III. The Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia ( CGPCS)
This organization was launched in 2009 by the mandate of United Nation Security Council
Resolution 1851; its objective is to “facilitate the discussion and coordination of action among
states and organizations to suppress piracy off the Somali coast”. The total cost of the contact
group meeting was measured $1.218.
IV. The Djibouti Code of Conduct
It was launched in 2009; its objective is to develop regional cooperation and coordination to
deter piracy in the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. The following are the
pillars of the code:
 Training work
 Capacity building
 Rule of law and
 Information sharing.

38 | P a g e
The total financial contributions funded to this organization in order to perform its objective on
countering Somali piracy was estimated $1.25 million.
V. Save our Seafarers (SOS)
This organization was established in 2011, the aim of its establishment is creating awareness on
the human and economic cost of piracy. The total cost of this organization was $187,057. SOS
gets its fund from sixteen contributing countries.
VI. Maritime piracy humanitarian response programme ( MPHRP)
Organization of MPHRP was established in September 2011 for a purpose of implementing a
model for assisting seafarers and their families with humanitarian aspects for the trauma caused
by the pirate attacks and armed robbery as well as taking crew of the vessels as a hostage.
MPHRP is funded by the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) seafarers initiative,
the cost is $113,325.
VII. Ocean Beyond Piracy (OBP)
OBP was launched by the One Earth Future Foundation in 2010. Their aim is to “ develop global
response to maritime piracy that comprehensively deals with the deterrence , suppressing,
prosecution of pirates and its establishment is for long term solution. The total budget of this
organization was $1.02 million.752
The above stated costs have been funded to the various anti-piracy missions in order to deter and
prevent as well as reduce pirate attacks. This fact can easily be understood on how Somali piracy
poses an impact on the global economic development. In other words if piracy does not exist at
all, those costs were not been funded or given, therefore the existence of piracy threat or impacts
the development of the global economy.
75 Ibid.

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4.2 Impact of piracy on the Somali economic development
Most Somali economy was dependent on the sea and international shipping trade. Prior to the
political collapse, Somalia was a major exporter of agricultural products and livestock’s.
Unfortunately, the civil war in Somalia destroyed the economic infrastructure, however the
economic development still dependent on unimpeded access to the sea.763
Though there is no an economic development since 1991 which the political crises of the country
broke out and the economic infrastructure is destroyed by the civil war77. However there are
private owned industries such as telecommunication which Somali piracy impacts its economic
development. Also Somali piracy poses an impact on maritime fishing because many fisher men
are reluctant or refused to fish by stating that naval forces may mistakenly apprehend them for
pirates and this impact the fishing which is one important sector for the economic development
of the country.78
Similarly, Somali piracy imposes threat to the Somali business men whose cargoes transports
from the Gulf of Aden in to the Somali waters and as result of the fear of pirate attack, they
deploy armed security team to protect their ships and then this forces them to incur cost of
security guarding. In addition to that piracy makes the Somali coastal are a no-go area of
international shipping and due to this; reduction of port revenues and available funds for
investment in port and reduction of custom revenues will be incurred and the huge ransom
payment of the pirates contributes inflation as well.79
Moreover piracy causes delay and disruption to the maritime transportation and also forces the
owners of the ships to pay huge ransom. Therefore piracy in Somalia also plays a role for the
impact of the economic development of the country.80
76. Ahmedou Ould‐Abdallah, 2008“ piracy off the Somali coast” international expert group on
piracy off the Somali coast,p29
77. Ibid
78.http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1648/_Vessels_Damage_Puntlands_FisheriesIndusty
79. Ahmedou Ould‐Abdallah, 2008“ piracy off the Somali coast” international expert group on
piracy off the Somali coast,p29
80 I bid

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4.3 Impact of Somali piracy on Humanitarian Aid deliveries
Civil war has deprived millions of Somalis of their homes and livelihoods. At the same time,
recently Somalia is suffering a series of droughts considered to be the worst droughts the region
has experienced in decades. As a result, many Somali people flee in to the neighboring countries,
Kenya and Ethiopia and become refuge there.814
The WFP as one of the major food supplier in the country began to deliver humanitarian Aids to
the suffering population; pirate attacks targeted the WFP shipping cargoes which as a result
hampered the efforts of providing humanitarian aid deliveries.82
Recently, more than 3 million Somali people including children and mothers are dependent on
the food aid deliveries.83 In addition to that the on-going drought and famine in Somalia and the
Horn of Africa is worth noting within the context of piracy due to the impacts piracy has on the
delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as potential concerns over de-creased livelihoods in
crisis areas. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) notes in a special report
on Somalia that piracy impacts livelihoods by decreasing maritime trade and increasing the cost
of commodities as fewer vessels come to port. 84
Moreover pirate attacks hamper the humanitarian effort of the WFP. According to the African
Development Bank (AFDB) piracy has been a longstanding problem for aid efforts to Somalia as
In 2007, the World Food Programme (WFP), UN's food aid agency, reported that the number of
ships willing to carry food aid had been cut by half because of the increased dangers faced by
ships in Somali waters.85
81.I bid
82. Edeko “THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF MARITIME PIRACY IN SOMALIA” African Journals of
Social Sciences, Volume 1 Number 3 (2011),p36
83. Kennedy K. Mbekeani et al, “economic impact of maritime piracy”, Africa economic brief Volume 2 issue 10
2011,P5
84.Erin Foster, “Anti-piracy Review”, civil military fusion centre, 2011, p4
85.Mark Tran, 2011“ piracy hampers delivery of food aid to Somalia”, news global development.

41 | P a g e
The existence legal gap of the international law of the sea also contributes its role for the rise of
piracy and its impacts on the economic development. The reason is that the law fails to deal
comprehensively with the modern day of piracy in all its aspects. Because the law limits the act
of piracy only to those who occurs in the high seas while official statistics show that most
incidents of today’s piracy occur in territorial water of states.865
In addition to that, the law also considers an act to be pirate act if its motivation is for private
motivation leaving the public and political motivations aside.
The other gap is that few states have national legislation which criminalizes piracy so the
international law of the sea does not oblige its member states to enact a law on piracy in their
national laws and there are countries who are unable or unwilling to prosecute pirates they
caught, or in other words one of the main challenges in dealing with piracy off the Horn of
Africa is what to do with the pirates after they have been caught. A common practice of States
patrolling the area, coined as “catch and release”, is to release pirates which have been arrested
or are in custody, often because they are unable or unwilling to prosecute them or find another
State able or willing to prosecute them. The inability to prosecute is frequently due to the fact
that many States do not have adequate national piracy legislations to prosecute Somali pirates. It
was also noted that many States, even if they did have adequate piracy legislation, lacked the
political will to prosecute Somali pirates. 87
Moreover there is another gap under international law of the sea with regard to the detention and
prosecuting pirates. The detention of pirates when seized raises several issues; the first one is the
time to surrender the captured pirates to the authorities concerned after seizing them. Broadly
detention raises human right issues such as the time right to bring the pirate before court of law
and the issue is very complicated when pirates captured are juveniles. So the international law of
the sea did not clearly indicate such issues.88
86.2000 Annual Report, IMO Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,
MSC/Circ. 1991, March 31, 2001.
88. Cermalattin Karadas, “The Difficulties Modern International law faces when it is combating sea piracy: is
international cooperation enough?”

42 | P a g e
Besides detention, prosecuting pirates is an extremely complicated issue. According to the
international law of the sea, the flag state has the power to punish capture pirates according to its
law. Often time, states lack viable national criminal law incorporated the principles of the
international law, or they are reluctant to prosecute them because of the time and cost constraint.
For my point of view this can be considered as a legal gap, piracy under international law is an
international crime which is an enemy to humankind; there is no international court which deals
piracy cases. Similarly most international crimes are under the ICC (international criminal court)
while piracy lacks such judiciary system.896
Another point of legal gap which is worthy to mention is that western countries have made an
agreement with Kenya to prosecute Somali pirates captured by western anti-piracy forces.
However the problem lies that Kenyan penal law did not sufficiently defines the term piracy and
the substantive law relating to maritime industry in Kenya is outdated law which also did not
defined the term piracy and determine what constitutes piracy so how can this kind of law
prosecute pirates. Therefore we can say the above stated legal gaps paved a way for the ongoing
piracy in east Africa and its impact on the global economy because if the law sufficiently covers
all aspect of modern piracy without leaving any loophole piracy was not in a position to last.90
Another legal can be found under the article 100 of the UNCLOS which imposes on states to
cooperate their best to counter piracy but there is no any department who checks whether states
are cooperating or not.
The best mechanism to overcome the criminal acts of Somali pirates is to fill the loopholes of the
international law of the sea and obliging member countries of the convention to domesticate the
convention in to their national laws. For the neighboring countries they should come up under
their national laws a law which criminalizes piracy and leaves no gap for combating piracy in
general and Somali piracy in particular.
Secondly, the top root of the rise of piracy in Somalia is the statelessness and to build viable state
might be a good mechanism to deal with the elimination of piracy.
89. Ibid
90. Andrew Mwangure, 2011, “the legal challenges of prosecuting pirates: the case of Kenya”.

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