MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN DIRECT PARTICIPANT OF CHAWINDA BATTLES BUSTS THE MYTH THAT THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT IN KITTY ON 16TH SEPTEMBER AND LT GEN MAHMUDS CLAIM THAT SITUATION WAS PRECARIOUS

2. MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN DIRECT PARTICIPANT OF CHAWINDA BATTLES
BUSTS THE MYTH THAT THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT IN KITTY ON 16TH
SEPTEMBER AND LT GEN MAHMUDS CLAIM THAT SITUATION WAS
PRECARIOUS .
• December 2021
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.25024.05125
• Projects:
• How History Moves-Mans Role in History
• MILITARY HISTORY
• Agha H Amin
EXAGGERATED
PAKISTANI NARRATIVE
OF BATTLE OF
CHAWINDA THAT THERE

3. WAS NOTHING LEFT IN
THE KITTY , REFUTED
AND BUSTED BY DIRECT
PARTICIPANT MAJOR
SHAMSHAD
At this stage it is essential to comment on the events of
16 Sept as described by Gen Arif in "Abrar's Battle
Decisions". The narration is sketchy and incorrect which
for the benefit of the reader is reproduced below.
"The battle raged with considerable intensity on 16 Sept.
After its failure to capture Chawinda the enemy
attempted to envelop it by two-prong attack. In the
process, the village of Jassoran and Sodreke fell and
Buttar Dograndi came under attack. The severe fighting
resulted in heavy casualties.
The situation was confused and outcome uncertain. So
fluid became the battle that at 1630 hours 24 Brigade
requested permission to take up position in the rear.
Abrar told the Brigade Commander on telephone, "you
know what is there in the kitty.

4. There is no question of falling back we shall fight to the
bitter end from our present position." 24 Brigade fought
gallantly. Soon the danger subsided. Chawinda defences
remained impregnable and the attack was successfully
repulsed.
"The tank battle in this theatre of war was described by
some western analysts as the largest and most fierce
since the Second World War."
The narrative is entirely incorrect. However, I shall take
on the major points the Gen has tried to make. Indians
never attempted to capture Chawinda before 16 Sept nor
did they launch two prongs attack on the town on that
day. I say so because my troop, along with 3 FF,
remained deployed on Chawinda railway station,
throughout after 11Sept and nothing has escaped my
eye. A position falls to attacking troops only if defending
forces either withdraw or surrender.
In case of Jassoran, I can say with confidence that it was
not held by our troops. The enemy just walked in. I have
nothing to say about Sadreke because it was nearly two
thousand yards away from Jassoran in the west and thus
not under my observation.
It may be a news to the Gen after 35 years, although he
was GSO 2 of 6 Armoured Division and should have
known on 16 Sept that Buttar Dograndi did not merely
come under attack but was captured by Indians at 1200
hours and remained in their possession for two days.
The battle was not at all fluid.

5. In fact it was extremely sluggish affair. In support of my
viewpoint a short description of the battle is given below:
Indians started the manoeuvre from Wazirwali at first
light to outflank Chawinda with 17 Poona Horse
supported by infantry battalion plus.
The leading elements of this force reached Jassoran by
0900 hours. Minute to minute information was passed on
to higher echelon by me and N/Ris Khaliq who was
located on 15r on the outskirts of Chawinda in the north.
From Jassoran the enemy tried to push a troop of tanks
onto railway station which was made impossible by my
two tanks which were deployed there.
To the best of my knowledge, at no other place except
Chawinda, and that too from Jassoran side did the enemy
resolutely press in the face of opposition along entire
front of 6 Armoured Division. (For details see April 98
issue of DJ).
The enemy did not move beyond Jassoran till 1100 when
they started outflanking my position (Chawinda), after
bringing up another squadron and an infantry battalion,
and occupied Buttar Dograndi at about 1300 hours.
There was no fluidity and confusion on the front line. It
may have prevailed in Divisional HQ, as mentioned by
General K.M. Arif. This confusion was due to the fact that
neither the commander nor any of his staff officers ever

6. visited the front and mostly depended on the information
provided by front line troop, who always are inclined to
misreport and exaggerate the battle situation.
The enemy remained stuck up for three to four hours in
Jassoran before it reached Buttar Dograndi but our troops
at Mundeke Berian (if at all they were there) and south of
it did not react.
The tragedy was that armour battle was being conducted
through line communication from a bunker and not from
cupola of a tank through wireless.
Here it is what was in
the kitty in Sialkot
sector on 16 Sept.
1. 19 Lancers-location not known.
2. 22 Cavalry, somewhere between Badiana and
Chawinda.
3. Remnants of 11 Cavalry somewhere between Badiana
and Chawinda.

7. 4. Remnants of Guides Cavalry between Badiana and
Chawinda.
5. 20 Lancers -Jammu Sialkot Road.
6. 31 TDU location not known.
7. 33 TDU less squadron plus squadron 22 Cavalry area
Zafarwal.
8. 25 Cavalry plus squadron 33 TDU area Chawinda.
9. 5 Horse area Pasrur as strategic reserve.
Facing these nine regiments Indians had five regiments
1. 2 Lancers.
2. 4 Horse.
3. 16 light Cavalry.
4. 17 Poona Horse.
5. 62 Cavalry
About infantry, it was a ratio of 1:3. Since we were
defending, this ratio should not have caused anxiety to
us. In any case Indians never used infantry in isolation
except in a night on the last day of the war. An infantry
brigade was launched to capture Chawinda by reaching
MS 5 behind that town. The attack was repulsed.
The general has taken support from western analysts to
describe the tank battle in this theatre as the largest and
most fierce since the second world war. This again is not
correct. To compare the battle of Sialkot sector with
those of WW 2 is a cruel joke.
The western analysts had no first-hand information.
They had formed the opinion based on details provided to

8. them by the high command of both sides. Since there
was nothing much to talk about, they had given
descriptions of imaginary battles.
On no particular day throughout the war, except on 11th
Sept, more than a squadron was committed to battle
from either side. On 11th, Indian used Poona Horse as a
regiment and we employed three regiments ie, 11th
Cavalry, Guides Cavalry and 25 Cavalry.