Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war

Funeral of the Patiala Pathan
who stopped Indian tank
division with two squadrons and

the unjust controversy to usurp
his role since 1965 war
 July 2020
 DOI:
 10.13140/RG.2.2.32238.43849
 Project:
 Military History
 Agha H Amin

THE REAL HERO OF 1965 WAR
AGHA H AMIN

In March 2001 my book
Pakistan Army till 1965's
chapter on Battle of Chawinda

was published in Defence
Journal Karachi.This started a
controversy about the Real hero
of Battle of Chawinda as far as
the most decisive day 8th
September was concerned.Below
are the series of letters then
exhanged.The controversy has
raged on from March 2001 till
September 2008.
Agha H Amin

EX MAJOR FAROUK ADAMS
LETTER TO DEFENCE
JOURNAL AND MY
REBUTTAL OF 2001:---
Farouk Adams Letter to Editor
Defence Journal and A.H Amin's
Reply Defence Journal August
2001
The Battle of Chawinda
I refer to Agha Humayun Amin’s
article on the Battle of Chawinda,
and also being “direct participant,
would like to share with your
readers, some of my knowledge on

the subject. Since I am writing
from memory, I will touch only
upon those incidents and aspects of
the battle, of which I am certain.
About a week before the war
started, an A. K officer from the
Gibraltar Force, exfiltrated, and
brought to HQ 24 Brigade, certain
Indian Army documents. These
purported to show the presence of
the 1st Indian Armoured Division
opposite us. Brig Abdul Ali Malik
accordingly informed the higher
HQ, and GHQ detailed Maj.
Mahmud of the Army Aviation to
physically carry these documents

to GHQ for evaluation. GHQ’s
assessment was that these
documents were part of an Indian
deception plan. Brig Malik
disagreed with this assessment. So
it is incorrect to say that he had no
idea what he had against him,
though it is correct that when the
attack came, he had no way of
knowing that this was the main
effort of the enemy. But neither
did anyone else.
When the Jassar fiasco took place,
Brig Malik advised 15 Div. not to
move him, because he expected a

strong attack against his positions.
HQ 15 Div. did not agree.
HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to
clear the imaginary enemy
bridgehead at Jassar. Brig Malik
tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my
unit) to do the needful. The
Commanding Officer, Lt Col
Jamshed MC Bar, SJ, suggested an
attack at first light, instead of a
night attack, because we had no
idea about the enemy location,
terrain etc etc. But 15 Div. orders
were clear and inflexible, and so
Col Jamshed, decided to lead the
attack in person. But before this

could be done, the actual situation
in Jassar became clear, and the
attack was called off.
At about first light on 08
September, an NCO of the
Engineers came into our positions.
He told of a heavy Indian attack
that had severely mauled 3 F.F
Regiment which was deployed as
screen. He was immediately taken
to the Brigade HQ, where Brig
Malik questioned him in the
presence of Col Jamshed and
Major Aslam Shah, who was the
B.M.

If Brig Malik had any doubt about
a serious enemy thrust in his
sector, that was now removed. It
took him about a minute to take,
what many consider, the most
important decision of the war i.e.
to advance on a broad front and
engage the attacking enemy forces.
This decision was entirely Brig
Malik’s, and it saved Pakistan.
Had it gone wrong, he would have
been court martialled. Since he
suspected that HQ 15 Div. was
prone to panic, he ordered Maj.
Aslam Shah to break wireless
contact with the Div. HQ (which
was re-established when the enemy

had been engaged, and Tikka Khan
had taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik
then gave the operation orders to
his unit commanders, including Lt
Col Nisar, CO 25 Cavalry. It is,
therefore, absolutely incorrect to
say that Brig Malik “abdicated” his
command to a unit commander.
Indeed, after that first day, 25
Cavalry was not involved in
operations as regiment, because
the situation warranted squadron
actions in support of infantry. And
this support these squadrons
unstintingly and heroically
provided. But this by no stretch of
the imagination can be taken to

mean the de facto command of the
Chawinda Battle was at any time
exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This
remained firmly in Brig Malik’s
hands who remained unswerving
and steadfast and central to the
battle, right till the very end.
After the first three days of almost
continuous battle we had suffered
serious depletion in numbers, and
had suffered extreme exhaustion
both physically and mentally. And
so we were withdrawn from the
FDLs to recover, but that same
evening the situation at the front
became so alarming that we were

thrust right back into the battle. It
is a fair comment on the morale of
24 Brigade group that despite our
bedraggled state and the mauling
we had received, there was no
hesitation on the part of anyone to
rejoin battle. From then, to the end
of the war, 24 Brigade held its
position and survived — but
barely. It is difficult to explain
what extreme weariness really is.
There is mention in the article
under reference, of Brig Malik’s
request to be moved to the “rear”,
which was refused by Gen Abrar.
If a Brigade Commander is to

make such a suggestion, he cannot
just say “rear”. He has to give an
alternate plan of operations which
he must work out with his staff.
Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M)
denies that any such suggestion
was ever made, and this fits into
the experience of people like me,
who were quite clearly told that for
24 Brigade, this was to be a “last
man last round battle”. Therefore,
if such a suggestion is recorded,
either its context is missing, or it is
the result of a misunderstanding.
When we were suddenly pulled out
of recuperation and sent back into
battle (refer sub-para above) we

were told that we will be pulled
back for refitment at the first
possible opportunity. Perhaps this
could be the context.
2. And now I would like to make
few general comments as under:-
Anyone reading the article under
reference is bound to come away
with the impression that the Battle
of Chawinda was fought
exclusively by Brig Amjad
Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj.
Muhammad Ahmed, and the
“direct participant” Maj.
Shamshad. The infantry, it seems

was just not there. As authentic
history, therefore, this article will
be seen as trifle lop-sided. The
truth is that by sheer coincidence
some very brave and steadfast men
got thrown into what was 24
Brigade. With the courage of these
men, came a good deal of luck by
providence — and the combination
made for quite a number of gallant
actions by all arms, and all ranks.
Brig Muhammad Ahmed was
heroic, and so was Lt Col Nisar,
but how can the rest of 25 Cavalry
be put into the dustbin of
anonymity? Indeed I can’t think of

one officer or tank commander
who did not perform.
Yes, General Abrar was a good
commander. He was calm and
poised and did not foist needless
interference on 24 Brigade. Brig
Amjad Chaudhry too had a
reputation of a good artillery
officer, though I would have to be
a very brave man to declare him
the best gunner officer in the sub-
continent. These officers held their
nerve, and did not panic. And nor
did they need to. They were never
within the sights of the enemy. But
people like Lt Col Shinwari, Lt

Col Jamshed and Maj. Aslam Shah
constantly were, and yet they kept
their calm. And last but not the
least the composure of Brig Abdul
Ali Malik deserves to be saluted.
Throughout the battle his HQ was
either in the FDLs or not more
than 400 yds in the rear. He kept
his cool in the face of direct enemy
fire for days at end — comparison
between him and the others is like
comparing a fighter in the ring
with the audience. When Lt Gen
(Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV
two years ago on the occasion of
Defence Day, he talked of his
experiences of the Battle of

Chawinda. He was generous in his
praise of many gallant actions. But
he singled out Brig Malik beyond
all the rest as the man whose battle
it really was, while all the rest of
us revolved around him. Having
seen him at close quarters, I cannot
disagree with this assessment.
3. Lastly, to call a respected senior
officer “a VCO type” General, was
not in very good taste.
Farouk Adam Khan S. J
27 June 001

REPLY OF A.H AMIN TO EX
MAJOUR FAROUK ADAM
PUBLISHED ALONG SIDE
FAROUK ADAMS LETTER IN
DEFENCE JOURNAL :---
I refer to Ex Major Farouk Adam
Khan’s S.J letter on my article “
Battle of Chawinda” .
I have only touched “incidents and
aspects” of the battle about which
“I could be certain” based on the
“authority of tangible concrete and
precise” records in the form of “
official sources of the Pakistan
Army” like Major General Shaukat

Riza’s “The Pakistan Army-War
1965” sponsored and published by
the Pakistan Army and printed by
the Pakistan Army Press in 1984 ,
The Pakistan Army Green Book-
1992 the official yearbook of the
Pakistan Army published by the
Pakistan Army’s General
Headquarters and accounts of
direct participants like Major
Shamshad. I had the opportunity of
meeting other participants like
Brigadier Ahmad in 1982 ,
Lieutenant Colonel Raza in 1993
and Major Shamshad in 2000. In
addition, I met a large number of
participants while serving in 11

Cavalry from 27th March 1983 till
9th April 1985.
l Firstly the assertion by the
worthy critic that the Indian
mailbag was captured by an
exfiltrating element of Gibraltar
Force. The Gibraltar Force was a
fiasco of magnanimous
proportions and very few
exfiltrated in good shape what to
talk of capturing a mail bag. The
mail bag was captured by a
deliberate ambush launched under
the direction of Headquarter 15
Division under direction of Col
S.G Mehdi. The official account

on this episode is clear. Thus
Shaukat Riza states “Lt Col Sher
Zaman (MI Directorate) ordered
Col S.G Mehdi (15 Division) to
lay an ambush on the road (Samba-
Kathua), and get some prisoners.
At 0100 hours night 3rd/4th
September, Zaman had a call from
an excited Mehdi. An Indian
despatch rider had been captured.
His message bag contained mail
for HQ Squadron 1 Indian
Armoured Division. The bag was
immediately flown to Rawalpindi.”
(Refers-Pages-133 & 134-The
Pakistan Army-War 1965-Shaukat
Riza-Army Education Press-1984).

l What happened after this at least
on paper was a mystery till Gen
N.U.K Babar cleared this point on
paper in an interview conducted by
this scribe and published in DJ
April 2000 issue by stating that the
mail box was dismissed as an
Indian deception by the then DMI
Brigadier Irshad.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic
states about Brigadier Malik i.e “It
took him about a minute to take
the most important decision of the
war i.e to advance on a broad front
and engage the attacking enemy

forces”. Now this is a figment of
the worthy critics imagination. In
“Summer 1997“ issue of “Pakistan
Army Journal“ Brigadier Nisar the
Commanding Officer of 25
Cavalry gave his version of the
Battle of Gadgor-Chawinda.
Nowhere in the article did Nisar
state that Brigadier Malik gave
him any order on the decisive 8th
of September “to advance on a
broad front and engage the
enemy”. On the other hand this
point has been treated very clearly
by Shaukat Riza in the Pakistani
GHQ’s officially sponsored
account. Shaukat describes the

initial situation on the crucial
morning of 8th September 1965 in
the following words “At about
0600 hours 24 Brigade received
the news that 3 FF had been
overrun. Brigadier Ali Malik got
on to Col Nisar and ordered 25
Cavalry to do something”. (Refers
Page - 148-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit)
That was the only order Malik
gave. All the subsequent
deployment was done by Nisar and
the brunt of the Indian attack was
borne by “Bravo Squadron” of 25
Cavalry commanded by Major
Ahmad. It was Col Nisar and Nisar
alone who did the broad front

deployment without any orders to
resort to any broad front
deployment from Brigadier Malik.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic
states that Brigadier Malik never
made a request for a withdrawal on
16th September. My source for
stating that Brigadier Malik made
a request for withdrawing from
Chawinda position is none other
than a major direct participant staff
officer of the battle i.e Major K.M
Arif the then GSO-2 (Operations)
6th Armoured Division at
Chawinda. It was 6th Armoured
Division Headquarters which

controlled the battle after 9th
September. It is very strange that
the critic finds my narration odd
rather than contesting the authority
which I quoted to support my
assertion. In an article published in
Pakistan Army Green Book-1992-
Year of the Senior Field
Commanders, General K.M Arif
(Retired) made the following
assertion i.e “The battle raged with
considerable intensity on
September 16. After its failure to
capture Chawinda the enemy failed
to envelop it by a two pronged
attack. In the process the villages
of Sodreke fell and Buttur

Dograndi came under attack. The
severe fighting resulted in many
casualties. The situation was
confused and the outcome
uncertain .So fluid the situation
became that at 1630 hours 24
Brigade Commander requested
permission to take up a position in
the rear.Abrar told the brigade
commander on telephone, “You
know what is there in the kitty.
There is no question of falling
back.We shall fight till the bitter
end from our present positions.”
His words proved a timely tonic.
24 Brigade fought gallantly. Soon
the danger subsided.” (Refers -

Page -6-” Abrar’s Battlefield
Decisions”-Pakistan Army Green
Book-Year of Senior
Commanders-Pakistan Army-
General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-
1992). This assertion was made by
one of the principal staff officers
of the 6th Armoured Division who
was present on the scene and not a
figment of my imagination.
l Even 6th Armoured Division’s
War Diary contains a record of the
above mentioned telephone call.
l As to the worthy critic’s assertion
in paragraph 1 about de facto

command of Chawinda Battle
remaining in Brigadier Malik till
the end. All that I stated was that
during the most decisive encounter
of the whole battle at Gadgor on
8th September it was Nisar and
Nisar alone who exercised coup d
oeil deploying his regiment
entirely on his own without any
orders from 24 Brigade about “any
broad front deployment” or any
“specific orders to deploy in any
particular disposition”. After this
decisive encounter at Gadgor the
Indians did not do anything till
11th September. From 10th
September 6th Armoured Division

entered the scene and controlled
the Chawinda battle, 24 Brigade
being one of the many brigades
that it commanded.
l Refers the criticism in paragraph
2 that “the battle was fought
exclusively by Amjad Chaudhry,
Lt Col Nisar, Major Mohammad
Ahmad and the direct participant
Major Shamshad” all I can say is
that the critic did not read my
article but only scanned through
it.On map opposite Page-40 it is
written that C squadron i.e
Shamshad’s squadron arrived

opposite Gadgor area at 1130
hours after the situation had been
stabilised. On various pages I have
stated eg “ 25 Cavalry was to
Pakistan Army’s good luck, a
newly raised but extremely fine
tank regiment” (Refers-Page-43).
The same point is repeated on
various pages.
l About Abdul Ali Malik’s
command qualities Gen Fazal
Muqeem notes in his “Pakistan’s
Crisis in Leadership” “The few
counterattacks which 8 Division
tried during the war were most
noticeable by their lack of

planning.The units were hurled
into battle without having been
given enough time for planning
and preparations .The worst
example of this attack was on
December 17 when against all
protestations of its very gallant
commanding officer , 35 FF was
sent into battle for almost certain
massacre” (Refers-Page-215 and
216-Pakistan’s Crisis in
Leadership-Major General Fazal
Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National
Book Foundation-Lahore-1973).
l Chawinda was an armour battle
and this is proved by casualties

suffered by tank and infantry units.
How many infantry units except 3
FF could match the casualties of
11 Cavalry in 1965 i.e 34 killed.
As a matter of fact the direct
participant Major Shamshad has
referred to one counter attack in
which an infantry company of 2
Punjab had Nil killed and two
officers got the SJ. Even in Chamb
during Grand Slam 11 Cavalry lost
19 killed on 1st September 1965
alone while 14 Punjab lost a total
of 3 killed in the entire Grand
Slam. (Refers-Page-108 1 & 109-
Pak Bharat Jang-Colonel Mukhtar
Gillani -Rawalpindi-April -1998).

As a matter of fact 11 Cavalry
suffered more casualties in Grand
Slam than all ten infantry units
except one i.e 13 Punjab which
had lost 24 killed as against 11
Cavalry’s 19 killed.But then the
strength of an armoured regiment
is around 400 vis-a-vis 800 of
infantry.
l Lastly the reference to VCO. This
was purely symbolic and had
nothing to do with rank or status in
the literal sense. Sher Bahadur’s
efforts to divide and distribute the
4 Corps Artillery Headquarter
before the 1965 War have been

discussed by an authority no less
eminent than Pakistan Army’s last
C in C, Gul Hassan.This if done
would have seriously
compromised chances of Pakistani
success in Grand Slam and
Chawinda.Without concentrated
artillery at Grand Slam or in
Chawinda none including Abrar or
Malik could have defeated the
Indians.
Kind Regards
A.H Amin
(pavocavalry@hotmail.com)

------------------------------------------
-------------------
BRIGADIER KAMAL ALAMS
AND COLONEL ANWARS
LETTERS TO DEFENCE
JOURNAL AND MY
REBUTTAL AS ASSISTANT
EDITOR DEFENCE JOURNAL
OF JANUARY 2002:---
Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel
Anwars Criticism of Chawinda and
A.H Amin's Reply Defence
Journal January 2002
Dear Major Sehgal,

In his letter in Defence Journal of
Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in
the Pak Army Journal (Summer
97) Brig Nisar does not mention
any order coming his way from his
Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I
am no historian but some questions
immediately come to mind viz.
Does Col Nisar also mention that
the Brigade Commander told him
to “do something”? If not who is to
be believed, Brig Nisar or Gen
Riza. And if he was not told to “do
something“, what major event
galvanized him into taking this
unilateral action against the enemy

advance? Did he get information
about the enemy advance himself,
or did someone give it to him, and
if so who? When he got his
information, was he in the
presence of the Brigade
Commander , or was in wireless
contact with him? And when he
decided to strike out on his own,
did he at least inform the Brigade?
And if so what transpired; or did
the rest of the Brigade merely
follow 25 Cav through guess-
work?
The point I want to make is that in
order to be classified as “history“

we have to first establish whether
25 Cav was a part of a larger
formation, or was acting in a
vacuum. And if it was subordinate
to
24 Brigade, did it take itself out of
the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or
did if take the Brigade under its
own command. This relationship
can only be settled by the
communication between the two.
So far it has been considered a
settled fact beyond any
controversy, that this Brigade and
all its components fought an
outstanding action. After all there

have been M Ds and presentation
on the subject for the last 36 years
and most officers have had a
chance to take part in one or
another of these. And no adverse
comment has come to tarnish the
reputation of any officer of the
brigade.
It is only recently that through one
sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza
‘s Book almost all infantry actions
of this battle seem to have been
nullified, and the brave conduct of
the Bridge Commander has been
found fit to be relegated to those
who functioned below par.

I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book
is primarily the amalgam of
various war diaries, with very little
original research , “officially
sponsored” to give the “official
view“. A very good insight into its
historical value and credibility lies
in what it has to say regarding the
change of command in Chamb,
which is a scandal that has refused
to be hushed up despite the best
official efforts. On page 121 of the
book Gen Riza blatantly states that
change of Command in Chamb
was pre-planned. And then he goes
on to brazenly assert that this was

confirmed by most officers in
GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that
this was a deliberate, set-piece
attack, the operation orders for
which per force would have to be
attended by GOC 7 Div, if the
command was to change, and all
the lower formations would have
known about it, and at least some
shred of documentary evidence of
this effect would have survived, at
least in GHQ. But there is not a
word extant to corroborate this
cover-up. And what is worst is that
immediately after the war in Staff
College under, Gen Riza was
serving “a 12 Div officer” who

was the GOC of this Division. He
was Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time
when even subalterns like me
could question Gen Malik on this
subject and get a candid reply, it is
impossible to believe that Gen
Riza did not know all details of
this change from the horse’s
mouth. And knowing this and then
wilfully distorting history is
deserving of the strongest
opprobrium. And then DJ takes
one line of this “history” and
knocks out all infantry actions, and
goes further to malign the
commander of Chawinda Brigade!

And now this is to pass for
history?
Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ
14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,
I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk
Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle
of Chawinda (Defence Journal
Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of
some regimental at officers I met
Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The
question of 3 F F came up. He said

the heaviest attacks seemed to
come wherever this unit was
deployed. As such at one point he
had to ask the Div HQ if there was
any possibility for this unit to be
relieved and rested. The Div HQ
said this was not possible. War
diaries are often not written
immediately . There are often
inaccuracies in them. Is it possible
that this event is being referred to
by both writers? At any rate 24
Brigade War Diary should also be
consulted.
Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book
i.e. Brig Malik got on to ...............”

From this it is obvious that it
means the communication was by
wireless or telephone. But I have
attended an M D on this battle and
also heard its narration from Brig
Shinwari. Both were nearer to
Farouk Adam’s explanation of
events of
8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has
referred to “official sources” and
“officially sponsored” GHQ
account of this Battle. This is its
weak point. Our “officially
sponsored accounts” unfortunately
have been cover-ups. Gen Riza
wrote about such an important

battle without interviewing any
infantry CO, or any officer of the
Brigade HQ, when they were all
alivel! What sort of history is this?
I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S.
J to which Farouk Adam has
referred. I have also heard him on
the subject in person. He said that
all units gave their very best but
also that the Brigade Commander’s
conduct, whose HQ was often in
line of direct fire, was most
inspiring.
After reading the original article
one gets the impression that the

whole battle was fought by Col
Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably
supported by Brig Amjad
Chowdhry’s guns. It seems
infantry was non-existant! Granted
it was a tank battle and very well
done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall
any DEFENSIVE tank battle over
two weeks duration without an
infantry firm base. And if
Chawinda base did not hold, that
would be the end of the tank battle
also. But the infantry did hold,
better than any infantry brigade on
either side. And the Brigade
Commander showed more pluck
than any officer of his rank, also

on either side. I am willing to stand
corrected on this. And if not
corrected, will not this make these
units and Brig Malik deserving of
credit?
Lt Col Mohammad Anwar
5 Dec 2001
REPLY TO CRITICISM OF
BRIG ALAM AND COL
ANWAR ON ARTICLE
“BATTLE OF CHAWINDA”
AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS
PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH
2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST

AND SEPTEMBER 2001
ISSUES
It is amusing as well as
encouraging to note that this
scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle
of 1965 published in Defence
Journal March 2001 issue
continues to attract flak from
critics!
The latest in the series are two
letters , both written by retired
officers . First of all I must clarify
that my sole motivation in all
writing has been to endeavour to
write “what men did” rather than

what “they ought ideally to have
done” or what “someone later with
the benefit of hindsight tried to
portray , what they had done”.
Thus the analysis of Chawinda
Battle done with pure loyalty to
service without any inter arm
rivalry or nationalistic motivation.
Pure and unadulterated military
history filtered dispassionately
separating fact from fiction and
myth from reality. How far I
succeeded is for readers to judge.
History as Frederick the Great
once said can be well written only
in a free country and ours has been

continuously under civil or
military dictators since 1958.
Enters Defence Journal which in
its resurrected form from 1997
picked up the gauntlet of serving
as a medium of intellectual
honesty and forthright criticism
and published facts which were
unpalatable for some and
welcomed by the vast multitude. A
breath of fresh air in a country
reduced to intellectual stagnation
because of years of censorship and
intellectual persecution! I had
written for the Pakistan Army
Journal and Citadel but had left
military history writing when in

1998 through a dear friend I
discovered that there is a new
Defence Journal in Karachi which
is open to some critical writing!
I maintain as one great master of
English prose said that “all history
so far as it is not supported by
contemporary evidence is
romance”! Battle of Chawinda
published in DJ March 2001 was
thus not romance! What many in
this country wrote and was
outwardly military history was
essentially “Romance”! Inspiring,
superhuman but a myth
promiscuously mixed with reality!

Chance plays a key role in battle
and at Chawinda chance played a
very important role! Nisar, when
he deployed 25 Cavalry did not
know what was in front of him !
KK Singh Commander 1st Indian
Brigade also did not know what
was in front of him! This mutual
ignorance saved Pakistan on that
crucial day ! Later heroes were
created! I repeat “Heroes were
created” ! This was what the article
was all about !
What were the key facts? Most
important tangible fact was

“casualties” ! These were
deliberately hidden since these
would have let the cat out of the
bag! Everyone would have
discovered who really fought and
who got gallantry awards on
parochial,regimental or old boy
links !How many were killed in the
biggest military blunder
“Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top
Secret ! How many infantry men
died at Chawinda? Again no
mention of any figures! The real
motivation here is not national
interest but to preserve or more
important to “guard reputations”

Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter
a. I stick to the assertion that the
“broad front deployment” was
done by Nisar and Nisar alone and
Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no
role in it. It is another matter that
Nisar also did not know what was
in front of him. It was like Jutland
when both contending fleets were
running towards each other at
express train speed. Why Nisar
behaved as he did and what
actually happened even today is
hard to understand, whatever
anyone may claim now with the
benefit of hindsight! Brigadier

Alam offers no tangible proof that
the actions of 25 Cavalry had
anything to do with what Brig A.A
Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to
“do something” and Nisar did
something without the least clue of
what was in front of him. The
important thing is that Nisar did
something rather than getting
paralysed into inertia and inaction!
I may add a personal note here. I
understand that Alam’s elder
brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS
31 Corps while this scribe was
commanding 5 Independent
Armoured Squadron was a fine
soldier.

b. Alam raises the question about
the controversial “Do Something”
order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col
Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same
words were repeated by Nisar in
his article published in Pakistan
Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam
raises the question about 25
Cavalry functioning in a vacuum.
24 Brigade had two infantry units,
one which had been overrun and
dispersed on 8th September i.e 3
FF and 2 Punjab which was at
Chawinda. The crucial action took
place at Gadgor few miles north of
Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry

faced the entire Indian 1st
Armoured Division. This was an
extraordinary situation and Nisar
acted on his own best judgement
since Malik had abdicated to Nisar
by stating that he should do
something. It is another thing that
Nisar also did not know what was
in front of him and acted boldly
and unconventionally. Had he
known what was in front of him he
may have been paralysed by inertia
and inaction! But this is
speculation and some part of
history always remains
unfathomed and hidden! Nisar
acted through sheer reflex and

deployed his unit in an impromptu
manner. The fire fight which took
place at Gadgor between 0900
hours and 1200 hours was a pure
tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry
versus two leading tank regiments
of Indian 1st Armoured Division!
Thus the Indian Armoured Corps
historian stated “The Armoured
Brigade had been blocked by two
squadrons of Pattons and in the
first encounter had lost more tanks
than the enemy had...the worst
consequence of the days battle was
its paralysing effect on the minds
of the higher commanders. It took
them another 48 hours to

contemplate the next move. This
interval gave Pakistanis time to
deploy their 6th Armoured
Division...in fact the golden
opportunity that fate had offered to
the 1st Armoured Division to make
worthwhile gains had been
irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-
393 & 394-History of Indian
Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh
Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-
1990). Thus the Indians
acknowledged “This regiment’s
(25 Cavalry) performance was
certainly creditable because it
alone stood between the 1st Indian

Armoured division and its
objective, the MRL canal”.
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).
c. At Gadgor on 8th September it
was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry
alone which saved the day. Major
Shamshad a direct participant has
already stated on record that SJs
were awarded to some officers for
an attack in which not a single man
was killed on both sides!
d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24
Brigade but all that Nisar its CO
did on the crucial 8th September at

Gadgor was based on his own
judgement. On 9th and 10th
September no fighting took place
as Indians had withdrawn their
armoured division to the
crossroads. On 10th September, 6
Armoured Division took over and
24 Brigade was a part of 6
Armoured Division. On 8th
September there was a vacuum and
Nisar acted in a sitaution which
can be classified as one
characterised by “absence of clear
and precise orders”!
e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically
a compilation of existing facts. It

has historical value since Riza was
allowed access to official records.
f. The change of command aspect
about which Alam asserts is
correct and was officially hushed
up but why should Shaukat Riza
have any sympathy for the
armoured corps of 1960s which
was arrogant and looked down on
artillery as I personally witnessed
right till 1980s as a young officer
in Kharian and Multan? Artillery
officers were never welcomed in
armoured corps unit messes unless
real exceptions based on personal

ties and armour officers rarely
visited artillery messes.
g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus
armour suffered more casualties.
On the other hand Lahore was an
infantry battle where the
indomitable 1st Baluch lost
something like around 30 killed in
battle , more casualties than most
infantry units in the much
trumpeted Grand Slam.
h. Now I offer some figures for the
readers to form their own
conclusions.

KILLED-CASUALTIES GRAND
SLAM
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3
15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11 CAVALRY 19
13 LANCERS 14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN
BHARAT JANG-1965-COL
MUKHTAR GILLANI-
RAWALPINDI-JULY 1998 AND

UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS
AND 11 CAVALRY
The above casualties prove that
Grand Slam was both an infantry
and armour battle yet armour
suffered proportionately more
casualties since the effective battle
strength of a tank unit is half that
of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost
just 3 killed while 10 Guides
Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed
in officers alone apart from 12
OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost
more in killed casualties in 1965
War than any of the above units of
the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No

fault of infantry since Chawinda
was an essentially a tank battle.
i. Brigadier Alam does not give
any figures which prove that
infantry suffered more casualties at
Chawinda. I have already admitted
in my letter that the only infantry
unit which bore the brunt of Indian
assault was 3 FF on the 8th
September. 3 FF aside the brunt of
the attack at Chawinda was borne
by armour units since Chawinda
was a tank battle. At Lahore, the
brunt of the attack was faced by
infantry since Lahore i.e 10
Division battle was an essentially

infantry battle. Thus, there were
units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab
which suffered tremendous
casualties.1st Baloch suffering
casualties of 31 killed in 10
Division Area (Refers-Page-139-
Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16 Punjab
suffering casualties of 106 killed
and 70 missing most of whom
were killed (more than total of all
regular infantry units in Grand
Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col
Gillani). On the other hand there
were formations which in words of
Colonel Mukhtar Gillani
exaggerated the fighting and
suffered nominal casualties like the

103 Brigade in 10 Division area
(Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).
j. Even at formation level
Chawinda was not a big battle in
terms of casualties since the Indian
1 Corps suffered less casualties
than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej
Corridor.
k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter
arm rivalry with operational
leadership and personalities.
Infantry had a role in Chawinda.
Every arm and service had a role.
If I have not discussed infantry
actions in detail it is not because

infantry did nothing at Chawinda
but simply because Chawinda was
a tank dominated battle with
artillery playing a crucial role. Had
I been biased I would not have
stated in various articles that the
greatest tank commander of
Pakistan Army at operational level
was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an
infantry man. Similarly Ibrar
whose conduct I pointed out as
most decisive was again an
infantry man .
l. If Brigadier Alam wants to
highlight the infantry side of the
battle he is free to write an article

on the “Role of Infantry at
Chawinda”.
m. I have also compiled some
casualty figures of armour units in
1965 which will give the reader a
fair idea of who did what and who
suffered more or less:—
UNIT Killed casualties Battle area
Remarks
4 CAVALRY 17 KHEM KARAN
5 HORSE 5 KHEM KARAN
6 LANCERS 20 KHEM KARAN
GUIDES 15 CHAWINDA
Including 3 Officers
11 CAVALRY 34 CHAMB

CHAWINDA Including 1 Officer
12 CAVALRY 8 KHEM KARAN
Did Traffic Control / Flank
Protection etc. being Recce
Regiment
13 LANCERS 14 CHAMB
JAURIAN
AKHNUR Including 3 Officers
15 LANCERS 8 KHEM KARAN
19 LANCERS 18 CHAWINDA
20 LANCERS Nil SIALKOT
22 CAVALRY 1 CHAWINDA
23 CAVALRY 18 10 DIVISION
24 CAVALRY 14 KHEM
KARAN Including 2 Officers

25 CAVALRY 16 CHAWINDA
30 TDU 3 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
31 TDU 7 SIALKOT
32 TDU 7 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
33 TDU 9 JASSAR
Note:—These casualties were
compiled personally and may not
be wholly or totally accurate.
n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ
is distorting history. A bit naive
since articles published in journals
are opinions of individual writers
and not of the management. This is

true for all journals whether it is
Pakistan Army Journal or
Command and Staff College
Citadel.
o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter
was crude and lacked common
courtesy that one would associate
or expect from one holding the
rank of a brigadier.
Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—
a. I was not referring to 3 FF when
I discussed Brig A.A Malik’s
withdrawal request of 16
September. Hence, Col Anwar has

misunderstood the point. Brig A.A
Malik had requested permission to
withdraw when Indian tanks had
crossed the railway line on 16th
September and occupied Buttur
Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact
was brought to light not by the
much criticised Shaukat Riza but
by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured
Division Major (later General K.M
Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan
Army Green Book-1993 and again
a little tactfully in his recently
published book Khaki Shadows.
Thus no connection with 3 FF, an
infantry unit which as far as I
know suffered more casualties than

any other infantry unit at
Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably
but was launched thoughtlessly as
brought out by Major Shamshad in
his letter published in Sept 2001
DJ and consequently suffered
enormous casualties at Sodreke-
Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad
was the tank troop leader in
support of 3 FF when it
disastrously attacked Buttur
Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad,
the attack had failed not due to any
fault of 3 FF but because of poor
planning by Commander 24
Brigade.

b. About the assertion of Col
Anwar that official sources are
cover ups, all that one can state is
that if these are cover ups why
don’t experts like Brigadier Alam
and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or
Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to
writing serious military history.
c. In my writings I have relied on
official, unofficial and personal as
well as Indian accounts. If
someone has better knowledge of
facts he is most welcome to apply
his intellect and come out with a
better account.

d. Anwar has a point that infantry
was holding a firm base. I have not
denied this anywhere. My
emphasis, however, was on the
real battle, the armour battle which
was fought at Chawinda. It is up to
a reader to form subjective
conclusions.
e. Anwar states that infantry has
been ignored, I contend that the
real fact which has not been
favourably received by some is
that Brig A.A Malik has not been
projected as much in my article as
he had been before. Infantry, is an
arm and I have great respect for it ,

A.A Malik was an individual who
did well and rose to three star rank
despite launching poorly planned
counter attacks as brought out by
Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War
as a GOC .
Lastly I want to quote a great
captain of war :—
“ I am not publishing my memoirs,
not theirs and we all know that no
three honest witnesses of a brawl
can agree on all the details. How
much more likely will be the
differences in a great battle

covering a vast space of broken
ground, when each division,
brigade, regiment and even
company naturally and honestly
believes that it was the focus of the
whole affair! Each of them won
the battle. None ever lost. That was
the fate of the old man who
unhappily commanded”.
“Memoirs of General Sherman”
Lastly my humble submission;
Chawinda was about operational
leadership, not small unit actions
or projecting individuals or
maligning them. If someone feels

otherwise it is his subjective
opinion.
Kind regards
A.H Amin
--------------------
MAJOR SHAMSADS
SEPTEMBER 2001 LETTER
PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE
JOURNAL REBUTTING
FAROUK ADAM AND
KAMAL ALAM AND
COLONEL ANWAR:---

Major Shamshads Rebuttal of
Farouk Adams Account of
Chawinda-Defence Journal
September 2001
The Editor
Defence Journal
Karachi.
Dear Sir,
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed
The May 2001 edition of your
esteemed magazine carries a letter
by Brig (Retd) Mohammed Ahmed
which mentions as under,
“Major Shamshad is right, in a
way, when he says only Charlie

Squadron went up to Pasrur. The
little difference being that only
Charlie Squadron went up to
Pasrur the others were turned back
half way when the Jassar fiasco
was discovered.
I would like to correct the record
here.
The entire action of night 7/8 and
08 Sept has been covered in a
single article appeared in Oct 1997
edition of DJ. I have nowhere
stated or recorded what Brig
Ahmed has ascribed to me. An
editing error has appeared in the

March 2001 edition of DJ which
the Brig should have corrected
rather than confirming it.
The fact is that entire regiment
moved to Pasrur on its way to
Jassar. The regiment was detained
at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron
was despatched to Jassar which
reached Narowal at 0300 hours
and turned about to reach Pasrur at
0500 hours.
BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
The August issue of DJ carries a
letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the

subject and another by Mr A H
Amin who is on the panel of D J.
Both the gentlemen have made
reference to me. I, therefore, feel
obliged to put in my word to keep
the record straight.
Farooq Adam, as a direct
participant appears to have
reservations about the description
of the battle by A H Amin who
was not a participant. He has
merely conducted research and has
adequately defended his point of
view by quoting his source of
knowledge. A H Amin has quoted
Gen Fazle Moqeem who has

reflected upon command quality of
Brig Ali and how 35 FF was
massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971.
To support the opinion of Gen
Fazle Moqeem I can quote one out
of several ill planned attacks which
fizzled out in initial stages, ordered
by Brig Ali in 1965. On the
morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were
ordered to attack Jassora with a
company. A detailed discription
has been published in May 1998
issue of DJ. For those who could
not reach that edition and also to
prove inanity of command I shall
describe the attack precisely. The
company was commanded by Capt

Raheem Shah and was supported
by my troop of three tanks.
I submitted to CO 3FF that before
attacking Jassoran, which was
2000 yards away from Railway
line, we had to clear
Buttardograndi half way between
Railway line and Jassoran. I also
informed him that area Jassoran-
Buttardograndi is occupied by a
tank regiment supported by an
infantry battalion which I faced on
16 Sept and eventually my troop
was shot up by that force. It was
impossible to dislodge an
armoured brigade by attacking

with a company and three tanks.
My plea was brushed aside with
remark that Butterdograndi had
been cleared during the night. As
we formed up behind railway line
heavy artillery fire was dropped on
us causing casualties to our
infantry. In the FUP we located a
centurian in Battalion one which
was destroyed. Finally we attacked
without artillery. Capt Raheem
Shah and his company displayed
tremendous courage.
8 Gharwal was entered in the
middle of 5 feet high maze crop.
As our men reached the trenches

they were fired at from point blank
range. Many of them fell other
turned and went to ground. They
were surprised: I saw this massacre
standing in cupola from a distance
of 50 yards. I moved the tank up
and mounted the trenches. By this
time I had reached the killing
range of enemy tanks deployed in
Jassoran. My tank was shot up and
went into flames. My second tank
was also hit and damaged. The
third tank turret # 1, tank
commanded by LD Kamal
prudently did come up and was
saved. In this swift action two

enemy tanks were also destroyed.
Here the attack fizzled out.
It is now for the reader to assess
the competence of higher
command. In my opinion it was
callous act to launch a company
and three tank against an armoured
brigade. To further illustrate my
point of view, a quotation from a
book (Guns of August by Barbara
Tuchman) will be in place.
Quote “When the moment of live
ammunition approaches, the
moment to which his professional
training is directed, the issue of the

combat, even the fate of the
campaign may depend on his
decision. What is happening in the
heart and vitals of a commander.
Some are made bold by the
moment, some irresolute, some
carefully judicious, some
paralyzed and powerless to act”
Unquote. I place ours higher in the
last category.
After having gone through the
letter of Farooq Adam and his two
earlier scripts, on the subject
(“Hero of Chawinda” published in
daily The News in April/ May
1992 and “THE ALI OF

CHAWINDA”published in
UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can
say that his writing is more of
fiction than honest description of
the events on the battlefield. On
reading his script of 1992, I
expressed my views which have
been published in daily THE
NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce
below the opening paragraph of
the article which delivers goods to
those who are interested to know
the facts.
Quote”On the outset I shall
mention here that I have never
served in the direct command of

Brig Ali. Hence there is no
possibility of having ill will or
malice towards him. However, I
feel that both the writers have tried
to aggrandize the revered general
out of proportion. I hold this
opinion as I have first hand
knowledge about the Battle of
Chawinda. I was a troop leader and
squadron commander in 25 cavalry
which was a part of Brig Ali’s
brigade. Mr Agha Babar should
show Adam’s article to his literary
friends in Newyork to be
appreciated as a good piece of
literature. Anyone with little
knowledge about army matters and

warfare will confront him with
awkward questions such as, Why
should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to
how many tanks did he have? Was
he ignorant of the organisation and
deployment of his only tank
regiment?. Why did Farooq Adam
leave his defensive position when
enemy tanks were still more than a
mile away? Why did he not wait
for the tanks to destroy once they
reached the killing zone of his ante
tank weapons? Why was Chobara
captured and abandoned time and
again?. Was a pitched battle fought
at Chobara? If so what was the

score of casualties? And many
more such questions.’Unquote.
The knowledge which Farooq
Adam wants to share with the
readers is of no consequence
unless he first fixes his position in
a fighting unit. Was he a platoon
/company commander or a staff
officer. I have gone through his
three scripts mentioned above.
Only at one place (UNIFORM
Sept 1994) he said that he was
attached to Major Mohammad
Hussain whose company was to
follow 25 cavalry tanks on the
morning of 8 Sept. Was he

attached to Major Mohammad
Hussain to advise him.
I will not go in details here, which
of course I have, to prove that
whatever Farooq has written is all
truth. Only one example is enough
to prove what I state.
On page 59 of the periodical
UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes
while describing the dialogue
between Brig Ali and Col Nisar.
“How many tanks do you have?
One squadron of tanks right here,
another dismounting from
transporters nearby”. He claims

that these words were exchanged
at Chawinda in the morning at
Chawinda on 8 Sept. This is totally
untrue. The whole regiment was
concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar
was called by Brig and told
“enemy had come think about it”.
He must have also told him that
enemy tanks were advancing on
Charwa-Cawinda track. What
happened thereafter has been
recorded by me in the form of 8
articles in D J starting from Oct
1997 to May 1998. 9th and
concluding article will appear in
near future. My suggestion to
Farooq is to write an account of 17

days as he saw the battle moving
day by day, mere eulogy is not
welcomed.
Passing orders is a simple
affair.The quality of effort a
commander makes to insure the
implementation of the order is
what that matters. The extent of
personal involvement, his control
and direction of the events, his
presence at the place and time
where the fate of the battle is being
decided are the factors which go in
to assess the competence of a
commander. In this light I found
our leader wanting.

Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan
-----------------------
BRIGADIER SIMONS
LETTER OF 2008 BASED ON
HIS DISCUSSION WITH
VARIOUS DIRECT
PARTICIPTANTS:---
AGHA AMIN AND BATTLE OF
SIALKOT-1965
JUL 24, 2008 THU 12:07 PM

I KNOW THE URGENCY AGHA
AMIN HAD IN CONTACTING
ME REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS
ILOG ON CHOWINDA, BUT I
WANTED CERTAIN
CONFIRMATIONS BEFORE
PUTTING MY VIEWS. IN THE
COURSE, I TRACED AND
TALKED TO SOME OF THE
PARTICIPANTS OF THIS
BATTLE AND AGREE THAT
AGHA AMIN’S ACCOUNT IS
MOST ACCURATE.
FIRST, HATS OFF AND A
TRIBUTE TO THOSE

SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT
BRAVELY IN THE BATTLE OF
CHOWINDA DESPITE THE
CONFUSION GENERATED BY
THE PAPER TIGER
COMMANDERS LIKE GEN.
ISMAIL, SAHIBZADA
YAKOOB ALI KHAN AND
MANY MORE WHO EARNED
LAURELS OVER THE DEAD
BODIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS.
1. INDIAN PLANS. YES IT WAS
AN FIU OPERATION
SUPPORTED BY AN
INFANTRY AMBUSH PARTY
THAT CAPTURED AN INDIAN

DESPATCH RIDER. THOUGH
THE INDIAN OPERATIONAL
INSTRUCTIONS COINCIDED
WITH GEN. YAHYA’S
LEADING HYPOTHESES OF
AN INDIAN MAIN OFFENSIVE
IN THIS SECTOR, THESE
DESPATCHES WERE
RUBBISHED AS DECEPTION
BY THE MASTER PAKISTANI
THINK TANK. THE ORIGINAL
HYPOTHESIS WAS
DOWNGRADED BY THE NEW
GOC 15 DIVISION MAJOR
GENERAL ISMAIL, DEPUTY
DIVISION COMMANDER
BRIGADIER RIAZ UL KARIM,

CORPS COMMANDER LT. GEN
BAKHTIAR RANA, AND
DEPUTY CORPS
COMMANDER DESIGNATE
SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI
KHAN ONCE INDIAN’S
ATTACKED JASSAR.
“HOWA KE PEHLEY HE
JHONKEY PE HAAR MAN GAI
WOHI CHIRAGH JO HUM NE
JALA KE RAKHAY THAY”
2. JASSAR ENCLAVE. IT IS AN
ENCLAVE WHERE MAJOR
OPERATIONS FROM NEITHER

SIDE WERE POSSIBLE AS THE
TERRAIN IS DIVIDED BY
RIVER RAVI. YET WHEN AN
INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS
DESPATCHED IN HASTE TO
DEFEND THE BRIDGE ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER,
THE LEADING UNIT HAD
VERY LITTLE DEFENSIVE
POWER IN TERMS OF
PREPARATION AND DEFENCE
STORES. CONSEQUENTLY,
SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS
WERE OVER RUN IN DOUBLE
QUICK TIME BY A
DIVERSIONARY ATTACK OF
AN INDIAN INFANTRY

BRIGADE PRIOR TO THE
MAIN ATTACK ON LINE
CHARWA- CHOBARA-
PHILORA. BRIGADIER
MUZAFFAR MADE A VERY
BIG BLUNDER OF
JUDGEMENT IN HIS
ASSESSMENT AND
REPORTED IN PANIC THAT
AN INDIAN MAIN HAD BEEN
LAUNCHED.. AS A RESULT
THE ENTIRE DEFENCE OF
SIALKOT SECTOR WAS
UNHINGED IN PANIC AND 24
BRIGADE MINUS 3FF IN
SCREENS AND 25 CAVALRY
WERE MOVED IN HASTE

TOWARDS JASSAR. THE
DEFENCE HAD TAKEN A 90
DEGREE TURN. IN THIS
VACUUM WHAT REMAINED
BETWEEN INDIA AND
SIALKOT WERE THE SCREEN
POSITIONS OF 3FF. ON THE
EVENING OF 7TH
SEPTEMBER, GOC 15
DIVISION ORDERED 24
BRIGADE AND 25 CAVALRY
TO LAUNCH A COUNTER
ATTACK ON JASSAR. THE
RESERVES WERE NEAR
NAROWAL AND THE
DIVISION HEADQUARTER
PREPARING FOR A WHITE

LINEN DINNER, WHEN
INDIAN DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY BEGAN
POUNDING 3FF POSITIONS.
MAJOR MEHMOOD OF
AVIATION THEN TOOK THE
RISK OF FLYING OVER
JASSAR ONLY TO REPORT
THAT THE BRIDGE OVER
RIVER RAVI WAS IN TACT
AND IN PAKISTANI
OCCUPATION. A SQUADRON
OF 25 CAVALRY UNDER
MAJOR SHAMSHAD HAD
ALREADY REACHED THE
JASSAR SECTOR WHILE THE
TWO REMAINING WERE ON

THE MOVE. 15 DIVISION HAD
BEEN CAUGHT WITH ITS
PANTS DOWN.
3. PHILORI-CHARWA-
CHOBARA SECTOR. INDIAN
ADVANCING COLUMNS
ENGAGED THE SCREENS OF
3FF ON THE NIGHT OF 7
SEPTEMBER. BY FIRST LIGHT
8 SEPTEMBER THESE
SCREENS AFTER SUFFERING
CASUALTIES AND OVER RUN
FELL BACK TO LINE PHILORI-
CHARWA-CHOBARA AND
ALONG WITH A COMPANY OF
2 PUNJAB TOOK HASTY

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE
SAME MORNING INDIAN
ARMOUR COLUMNS
OVERRAN CHARWA-
CHOBARA, BYPASSED
PHILORI AND REACHED 3-4
KMS FROM CHOWINDA. AT
8:30 AM 18 SQUADRON OF
PAF COMMANDED BY
SQUADRON LEADER
SALAUDDIN SHAHEED CAME
INTO ACTION WITH THREE F-
86 FIGHTERS WHO ENGAGED
THE INDIAN ARMOUR AND
IMPOSED A DELAY OF ONE
HOUR ON INDIAN ADVANCE.
THIS ONE HOUR WAS VERY

CRUCIAL AS IT PROVIDED
TWO SQUADRONS OF 25
CAVALRY THAT ARRIVED
FROM NAROWAL ENOUGH
TIME TO REGROUP AND
MOVE INTO BATTLE
FORMATION FOR
ENCOUNTER BATTLE. IT WAS
A VERY BOLD MOVE ON
PART OF THE COMMANDING
OFFICER TO TAKE ON THE
INDIAN ADVANCING
ARMOUR HEAD ON. PAF
PROVIDED CRUCIAL
SUPPORT. THE NEXT TWO
SORTIES WERE LED BY
FLIGHT LIEUTENANT CECIL

CHAUDARY WITH WHOM I
TALKED TODAY TO GET THE
RECORDS STRAIGHT.
IN THE COURSE OF WRITING
THIS, I TRACED OUT SOME OF
THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS
ACTION AND AM
CONVINCED THAT ALL
ACTIONS OF 8 SEPTEMBER
WERE TAKEN SOLELY BY LT.
COL NISAR THE
COMMANDING OFFICER OF
25 CAVALRY AT HIS OWN
INITIATIVE AND NO ONE
ELSE. THROUGHOUT THIS
BATTLE BRIGADIER A A

MALIK REMAINED IN A
SCHOOL AT PHILORA AND
LET NISAR HANDLE THE
SITUATION. AGAIN ON 9/10
SEPTEMBER, IT WERE 25
CAVALRY AND 3FF THAT
REPULSED INDIAN ATTACKS.
4. RELIEF IN LINE. AS IF THE
COMEDY OF ERRORS WAS
NOT ENOUGH, THE PAPER
TIGER THINK TANK NOW LED
BY SAHIBZADA YAKOOB
DECIDED TO CARRY OUT
RELIEF OF TROOPS ENGAGED
IN BATTLE FOR THREE DAYS.
25 CAVALRY AND 3FF WERE

REPLACED BY 11 CAVALRY
AND 9 FF (MOTORISED) ON
NIGHT 10/11. IN FACT THERE
WAS NO RELIEF AND THE
ENTIRE MOVEMENT WAS A
FIASCO. INDIANS EXPLOITED
THE SITUATION AND
LAUNCHED A FIERCE
OFFENSIVE ON THE 11TH
MORNING. THE ADVANCING
INDIANS WERE FIRST
SPOTTED BY MAJOR
MUZZAFAR MALIK OF 11
CAVALRY WHO THEN
ALERTED EVERYONE ELSE.
IT WAS A TOUGH TASK FOR
THE NEW UNITS BECAUSE

THEY HAD MOVED AT NIGHT
AND WERE NOT FAMILIAR
WITH THE TERRAIN.
BRIGADIER AA MALIK WAS
TO REPEAT HISTORY WHEN
AS GOC IN 1971, HE
LAUNCHED A JUST ARRIVE
355FF INTO ACTION AT BERA
PIND AND HAD IT
MASSACRED.
THE BIGGEST LESSON OF
THIS BATTLE WAS THAT
BOTH ARMIES WERE IN
EFFICIENT IN HANDLING
OPERATIONS AT A LARGE
SCALE. INDIAN CAUTION

AND RELUCTANCE TO
PURSUE AND EXPLOIT
SITUATIONS RESULTED IN
FAILURE OF THEIR PLAN
AND HEAVY LOSSES. IN
TERMS OF CLAUSEWITZ’
FRICTION, IT WAS MOSTLY
THE MENTAL BLOCKAGE ON
PART OF COMMANDERS ON
BOTH SIDES THAT RESULTED
IN MISTAKES. YET THE
CONDUCT OF SMALL UNITS
ON BOTH SIDES WAS
OUTSTANDING.
1965 WAS ALSO TO USHER A
SPIRIT OF CAMARADERIE

AMONGST THE PAPER
TIGERS THAT SURVIVES
EVEN TODAY. THEY FORM A
MUTUAL PRAISE GROUP
WHILE THE MOST HARDY
AND TRUE ONES LIE
AROUND TO ROT IN
ANONYMITY
THANKS ARE DUE TO AGHA
AMIN, BRIGADIER MEHMOOD
(EX-SERVICEMEN FAME),
GROUP CAPTAIN CECIL AND
MAJOR SHAMSHAD.

------------------------------------------
-----------------------
MAJOR SHAMSHADS
SUMMING UP LETTER OF
AUGUST 2008
MEN OF STEEL by Major
Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani
(Retired),majshamshad@hotmail.c
om,25 Cavalry
MEN OF STEEL
By
Major Shamshad Ali Khan
Kaimkhani (Retired)

majshamshad@hotmail.com
25 Cavalry
This was first sent to daily DAWN
but they did not have the guts to
publish it on grounds that it
involved the president and the
army.
The other day I came across a
book entitled ,’ MEM OF
STEEL,’. President General

Mushrraf has graced the book with
Foreword while the preface has
been written by General Khalid
Mahmud Arif (Retired). The book
is based on war diaries supposed to
had been maintained by the units
and the staff or the general (late )
Abrar Hussain who commanded 6
Armoured Division in 1965 on
Chawinda sector. I cannot reason
out as to why the book has been
published now when the event is
forty years behind at this point of
time. As there is nothing in the
book that would have jeopardized
the security of the country, it
should have come out immediately

after the war. That was the time
when it could provided opportunity
to higher command( there is
nothing for junior leaders in the
book) to learn from the experience
of the one who had fought the
greatest tank battle after world
war- II. That would have saved us
of many debacles in 1971 and
especially the ones committed in
Sialkot sector on western front The
book has five parts. Part three
(25% of the book) is the
description of the events on the
battlefield that is of interest to
students of military history. 75 %
of the book comprises of

background and statistics
regarding composition of units
/formations, casualties in men and
material on both sides, names of
commanders, list of recipients of
gallantry awards, photographs and
such like details.
I feel that late general Abrar
Hussain has not authored the book
because he was known to be of the
type who would never indulge in
such a travesty. General K.M Arif
appears to be the ghost author of
the book.

I was a participant in the events on
battlefield mentioned in part 3 of
the book and have a different
version.
To give authenticity to my
narration, which will be
diametrically opposed to the one
given in the book, it is necessary to
state that I was directly involved in
the events as a troop leader in C
squadron of 25 cavalry and
squadron commander twice on
extreme critical moments on the
battle field. I was face to face with
enemy every day throughout the

war. My location from day one had
been at Gadgor, Phillorah,
Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi
where the battle was fought. It is
regretted that I did not have the
good luck to see a red tab or even a
staff officer on front line during
entire war.
From the text of part three it is
clear that the general left his
Headquarter, at Bhollowal ten
miles behind the front line, for the
first and last time in a helicopter
on 11 September in the evening,
By that time our two regiments ,
Guides and 11 Cavalry, had been

badly mauled.. The right time for
the general to leave his HQ was in
the morning when he got the news
that 11 cavalry was under pressure.
Had he been at Chawinda at 1100
hours he could have directed and
controlled the efforts of the three
regiments and saved the day. By
the evening, while sitting in the
caravan, he had launched two more
regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry.
Guides was launched at a time(
about 1100 hours) when 11 cavalry
had retreated and Indians had
taken up defensives position to
shoot up Guides who attacked with
high spirits on their first day in

action. Some fine men and officers
were lost in this action due to the
apathy of commanding officer who
launched the regiment in haste,
without artillery and infantry
support contrary to the dictates of
terrain.. Lethargy and
incompetence of HQ 6 armoured
division resulted in our defeat at
Phillorah which was the greatest
tragedy on this front.
As if that was not enough, 25
cavalry was launched at 1600
hours with a mission to occupy
Phillorah track crossing which was
reported not occupied by the

enemy. Thanks to our stars and
battle experience of preceding
three days that we got away with
loss of only one tank when we hit
against enemy defenses at
Phillorah at 1700 hours. This is a
classic example how to destroy
one’s forces piecemeal.

Now a word about the title of the
book.
General Musharraf in the
introduction of the book has
mentioned that he was proud to be
apart of the force called MEN OF
STEEL by its commander. It
implies that late general Abrar had
ascribed the title of MEN OF
STEEL to his own formation. This

never happens, it amounts to
praising oneself. Such an absurdity
was not expected of general Abrar
who, I am told , was a different
breed.
Titles or honors are always
awarded by higher authorities .It
was 25 cavalry alone which was
referred to as men of steel by
General Ayub Khan during the
course of his talk on the eve of his
visit to the regiment immediately
after ceasefire, in
acknowledgement of our
performance. This had happened
on Pasrur airstrip where we were

camping .Army, Naval and Air
Chiefs were also present. Since the
president was not to visit any other
unit or formation head quarter, all
officers in the area were called at
the airstrip.
There are tangible, discernable and
universally accepted actions of 25
cavalry on the battlefield that
justify the suffix ‘ men of Steel’
with its’ title. The actions precisely
and in short are;
1-It was 25 cavalry alone which
clashed headlong with an armored
division , north of Fhillorah

crossing at 0800 and pushed it
back to Gudgor (2.5miles) by 1200
hours.
2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at
1700 hours and pushed the enemy
further back by three miles to
Chobara.,
3- we kept the enemy at bay for
another two day with no additional
force in our support. Air support
was of course there.
4- On night 10/11 September we
were sent to Pasrur for rest and
refit On this point of time we were

placed under command 6 armoured
division which had taken over
Chawinda sector.
5- At about 1100 hours on 11
September C squadron 25 cavalry
found itself deployed behind
Chawinda with a mission to stop
the enemy at all cost that was
believed to be advancing behind
our force that had retreated from
Gudgor-Phillorah area in the
morning. In fact Div HQ had
accepted the loss of Chawinda and
therefore we were deployed behind
that town to stop the enemy
advance towards Pasror.

After five hours of my insistence
that Chawinda was vacant, at 1700
hours we were ordered to advance
and occupy Phillorah, which
according to high command was
not held by the enemy. What
happened later is along story but it
should suffice to say that we hit
enemy defenses in Phillorah where
tank to tank battle ensued. In the
process our one tank with crew
was destroyed. The skirmish
proved to be a deterrent and the
enemy did not advance any further
that day.

6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September
C squadron along with 3FF was
defending area in the north and up
to Jassoran in the west of
Chawinda. It was through this area
that the enemy attempted, for four
days, to penetrate but could not
succeed.
7- On 16th the enemy launched an
armored Brigade to out flank
Chawinda and attacked Butter
Dograndi in the rear of that town.
They succeeded because the task
force commander (who later
retired as Major General Wajahat
Hussain), failed to coordinate with

24 Bde and left Jassoran
unoccupied providing a gap
through which the enemy
infiltrated and turned our flank.
We suffered heavy losses. Seven
tanks were destroyed including
two of 33 TDU. In the evening we
attacked Butter Dugrandi
supported by artillery. . Destroyed
two enemy tanks and some
infantry. Under very critical
circumstances we stopped the
enemy at Butter Dograndi that was
determined to reach Pasror that
day. Artillery played effective roll
but never fired on enemy tanks
with open sights on that day as

mentioned in the book. We never
allowed enemy tanks to reach that
close to our gun areas.
8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and
company of 3 FF who again
attacked (without artillery) Butter
Dograndi, midway to our main
objective Jassoran, on the morning
of 17th and mounted enemy
trenches north of the village.
Although we suffered heavy losses
and could not reach the objective,

our offensive action forced the
enemy to vacate Butter Dograndi
and withdraw to Jassonan in the
evening and eventually across the
railway line Chawinda –
Sialkot.(quoted from official
history of 17 Poona Horse that was
controlling the operation on Indian
side).
9-It was 25 cavalry again, along
with 3 Ff who repulsed an infantry
brigade attack on night19/20
September. Although some of their
troops had crossed over the
railway line and hit the track
behind Chawinda at milestone 5,

our tanks fired from behind
railway line and forced the enemy
to withdraw, leaving behind dead
and wounded.
Now where does the 6 armour
division appear in this scenario? It
has always been a troop or
squadron action through out war
accept 11 September that was a
fiasco .I can confront any one who
can prove me wrong.

Now the story as to how did 6
armored division became’Men Of
Steel’.
I served in 6 armored division, of
which 25 cavalry was a part , till
September 1971. No one called the
Division as men of steel it was
only 25 cavalry alone. I was
shocked when I visited HQ 6
armoured Div after Indian
captivity in 1974. I saw on the
name boards of staff officers
written ‘MEN OF STEEL’ on top.
No body could explain how it
happened. Knowing general
K.M.Arif I can say that he is

behind this happening supported
by general Wjahat Hossain(retd)
who was commanding 6 Armored
Division in 1973-74.
To face the enemy is the
professional obligation of a
soldier. To be killed in action, get
wounded and fall prisoner is very
much a normal happening in the
life of soldier and there is nothing
to be proud or ashamed about it.
This ancient and universal concept
of soldiering does not hold good in
Pakistan. Here a soldier sitting in
trench and killed by artillery fire
can be given gallantry award and

also proclaimed a national hero. A
gallantry award is justified only for
an act performed beyond call of
duty and in the face of enemy.
Major K.M. Arif never left the
Divisional HQ which was 10 miles
away from front line and the Div
Commander left only once in the
evening of 11 September, as
mentioned an the book, when
fighting had subsided. Obviously
both of them do not deserve the
gallantry award.
Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif (
Later general) was GSO-2

operation of 6 armored division in
1965.
.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and
held very powerful position in
GHQ.
To justify undeserved gallantry
awards that he and the Div
commander had received and also
to cover-up the blunders
committed by Div HQ, he floated
the word that general Mosa Khan
had called 6 armored division as
men of steel at Pasror airstrip.
Knowing his vindictive nature
nobody could dare oppose him.

On his signal this word was
continuously and systematically
given currency for 20 years. It is
possible that he provided
documentary support to this
misdeed while he was in power.
It is time that we stopped
fabricating and twisting history to
serve the vested interests and
record true fact for our posterity.
------------------------------------------
---------------------------

COLONEL SARDAR YAHYA
EFFENDIS SUMMING UP OF
2008 AFTER READING
BRIGADIER SIMON AND
MAJOR SHAMSHADS
LETTERS OF 2008

------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
THE GENERAL WHO FAILED
WHEN VICTOY WAS AT HIS
FEET

ONE OF THE MOST
PHENOMENAL FAILURES OF
1965 WAR--MAJOR GENERAL
RAJINDER SINGH SPARROW
COMMANDER FIRST INDIAN
ARMOURED DIVISION WHO
MISERABLY FAILED IN
WINNING THE 1965
WAR,WHEN ON 8TH
SEPTEMBER 1965 DESPITE A
PHENOMENAL SUPERIOROTY
OF 5 TO 1 IN TANKS AND 15
TO 1 IN INFANTRY HE FAILED
TO OUTFLANK A LONE TANK
REGIMENT 25 CAVALRY OF
PAKISTAN ARMY

THE TANK REGIMENT
COMMANDER WHO
EXHIBITED EXTREME COUP
D OEIL AND DEPLOYED HIS
REGIMENT TO STOP A
WHOLE TANK DIVISION,NOT
KNOWING WHT WAS IN
FRONT OF HIM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
NISAR AHMAD
COMMANDANT OF 25
CAVALRY WHO ENTIRELY
ON HIS OWN JUDGEMENT
DEPLOYED 25 CAVALRY ON

BROAD FRONT AND
BROUGHT THE INDIAN FIRST
TANK DIVISIION TO A HALT

Battle of Chawinda
Comedy of Higher Command
Errors
Major Shamshad’s excellent and
thought provoking articles
published in the Defence
Journal in 1997-98 on the Battle
of Chawinda, inspired this scribe
to redraft parts of his book “The
Pakistan Army till 1965” and
present them in form of an article
devoted exclusively to the
Chawinda Battles. The article is a
humble attempt to integrate the
picture incorporating viewpoints
of both sides and to analyse the

Battle of Chawinda in its larger
perspective.
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN
AMIN examines this crucial
battle objectively.
Introduction
The tank battles fought in the area
between Charwa and Chawinda
from 8th to 21 September 1965
were the most decisive battles of
the 1965 War . Initially the Indians
were very close to victory while in
the last stages the Pakistan Army
was in a relatively better position
to launch a counterstroke which
could have forced the Indians to
abandon all gains made inside the

Shakargarh Bulge from 7th
September.
The Chawinda Battles also gave
birth to many myths as far as the
Pakistan Army was concerned.
Many conflicting claims were
made about ‘Military
Effectiveness’ ‘Martial Fervour’
etc citing the ‘Battles of
Chawinda’ as an example. The
Indian commanders were also
criticised for phenomenal
incompetence, but somehow they
rationalised their failures as a case
of normal failure in face of
technically superior tanks.
Pakistani Dispositions

Pakistani dispositions in Ravi-
Chenab Corridor where the battle
of Chawinda was fought were as
following:-- (ONE) 8 Division
consisting of four infantry brigades
(24,101,104 and 115 Brigades)
four armoured regiments (20
Lancers,25 Cavalry, 31 & 33 TDU
1) defending Sialkot-Pasrur Sector
and Jassar. The total frontage that
this division had to defend was
approximately 180,000 yards.
2 But this was only a theoretically
awesome figure, because till 1965,
keeping in view the force to space
ratio in terms of divisions
available, the Indians were not in a

position to be effective as a threat
all along this frontage. (TWO) 6
Armoured Division in Chenab
Ravi Corridor3 to defend the area
from any Indian incursion. The 6
Armoured Division was not a full
strength division and consisted of
a divisional headquarter, three
armoured regiments (one of which
was in Chamb for Grand Slam)
two artillery regiments, two
motorised infantry regiments and
had no brigade headquarter.
Initially it was placed at
Gujranwala but later placed at
Pasrur4. This Division according
to Musa was placed at Pasrur with

the express intention of dealing
with enemy’s main attack which
was expected on the Jassar-Sialkot
approach.5
Indian War Plan
The Main Indian Attack was
aimed at decisively disrupting the
Pakistani defensive layout and
resultantly forcing Pakistan to
commit its main armoured reserves
for defence was to be launched by
the newly formed Indian 1 Corps
comprising the 1st Armoured
Division and three infantry
divisions (6 Mountain Division 14
Division and 26 Division) in the
Ravi-Chenab Corridor from Samba

area on the general axis Samba-
Chawinda-Phillora-MRL Link and
eventually secure line Daska-
Dhallewali-Mandhali6. In other
words the Indian aim as stated by
another Indian military writer was
to ‘cut off Sialkot from Lahore’.7
As per the wording of the
decisions taken at the planning
conference of the Indian Chief of
Army Staff held on 9th August the
object of the 1 Corps attack
aimed at Daska was ‘with a view
to relieving Jammu’.8 This meant
that the Indian Army Chief viewed
a Pakistani attack on Jammu with a
view to severe the Indian line of

communication as most likely.
This attack was rightly termed as
‘Riposte’ by some Indian
authors.Riposte has been defined
as ‘Striking a vulnerable point thus
forcing the enemy to abandon his
attack’.9
The Battle of Chawinda
The main Indian attack against
Pakistan was launched by the Ist
Indian Corps opposite Chawinda in
Sialkot Sector. The Sialkot Sector
was defended by the Pakistani 1
Corps comprising 15 Division and
6 Armoured Division. From 1956
onwards the 1 Corps was the only
corps of the Pakistan Army. Till

1965 its area of operational
responsibility extended from river
Chenab till Sulaimanke in the
north and it consisted of 1st
Armoured Division, 6 Armoured
Division,10,11 and 15 Divisions.
The 1 Corps since soon after its
creation in 1956 was commanded
by Lieutenant General Bakhtiar
Rana10 whose basic qualifications
were described as extreme loyalty
and limited intellect by many
contemporaries! In early
September the frontage of the
corps was reduced to the area
between Ravi and Chenab rivers or
simply the Ravi-Chenab Corridor,

and its under command formations
were reduced to the 6 Armoured
Division and 15 Division.
Pakistani Dispositions and
Plans:- 15 Division (four infantry
brigades, four tank regiments) was
designated to defend the area of
responsibility while the newly
formed 6 Armoured Division
(previously known as 100
Armoured Brigade) was the main
strategic reserve in the area. The
total frontage of 15 Division was
180,000 yards and the distribution
of forces/dispositions/tasks were as
following11:--

15 Division:- This division was
commanded by Brigadier Sardar
Mohammad Ismail Khan from the
ASC. Its defences were organised
as following:-
115 Brigade:-- The main task of
this brigade was to defend the area
along the river Ravi with special
emphasis on Jassar bridge over
river Ravi. The brigade had two
infantry battalions, one tank
regiment (33 TDU), one R & S
company and two artillery batteries
(one field and one mortar).
24 Brigade:-- Defend area
Chobara-Phillaura and be prepared
to attack an enemy force which

seek to attack the Sialkot Sector
(i.e. 15 Division area of
responsibility). It was a sort of a
reserve/counterattack force. The
brigade had two infantry
battalions, one tank regiment (25
Cavalry), one R & S company, and
one field artillery regiment less a
battery in direct support.
101 Brigade:-- Defending Sialkot
city against enemy attack along
main Jammu-Sialkot road and also
to be prepared to go on the
offensive in case of an enemy
concentration in Phillaura area.
The brigade had two infantry
battalions,one R & S company,

one tank squadron (ex 31 TDU)
and one field regiment and a
mortar battery less troop in direct
support.
104 Brigade:-- This was a reserve
brigade but had just one infantry
battalion, one tank regiment (31
TDU) minus one squadron and a
field regiment less battery in direct
support.
One infantry battalion in an
independent role to defend the
crucial Marala Headworks.
Covering Troops/Advance
Positions:--
One tank regiment (20 Lancers)
less squadron deployed in front as

covering troops from Chaprar till
main Jammu-Sialkot road. 20
Lancers was the corps recce
regiment.
One tank squadron (20 Lancers)
with one infantry company, one R
& S company deployed as advance
position on main Sialkot Jammu
road in area Raspur-Kundanpur.
One R & S company as screen on
border to cover the front from
Bajra Garghi to Charwa.
One R & S platoon with R & S
Battalion Headquarter in
Shakargarh area.
Rangers (border police) to keep the
border between Chaprar and

Marala Headworks under
observation.
12 Mujahid Companies (Militia)
and rangers all along the border
subdivided into small posts for
observation/local defence.
NOTE:-- There were a total of 24
Rangers/Mujahid Companies in 15
Division area. These were of
limited military value and could
not face regular Indian Army.
6 Armoured Division:- 6
Armoured Division was not an
armoured division in the full sense
but did have a large number of the
organisational ingredients of an
armoured division. It was

commanded by Major General
Ibrar Hussain. It was the 1 Corps
reserve and was the main Pakistani
armoured reserve in the Ravi-
Chenab Corridor with the primary
role to take on an enemy strike
force attacking 1 Corps area of
responsibility. According to Musa
the most expected line of Indian
approach in 1 Corps defended area
was the Sialkot Jassar
Corridor12 and the 6th Armoured
Division was to be used in a
defensive role against an enemy
offensive in 1 Corps
area.According to Gul Hassan it
was also visualised that the 6

Armoured Division could be used
to attack the Jammu sector but
later on this idea was dropped13.
The 6 Armoured Division was a
curious division for it had no
brigade headquarters! On 6th
September 1965 it was in dispersal
in Gujranwala-Nandipur area. It
had the following units14:-
Guides Cavalry (10th Cavalry)
22 Cavalry
11 Cavalry (On loan to 12
Division/7 Division for Operation
Grand Slam since late August
1965 and in Chamb area on 6th
September 1965.

Two infantry battalions one of
which was in Kharian as defence
battalion with the 1 Corps
Headquarter.
One self-propelled field artillery
regiment and one medium battery.
Later on from 6th September
onwards the formidable and
extremely well organised 4 Corps
Artillery Brigade consisting of one
field, one medium, one heavy and
one locating regiment was
also affiliated with it.
One engineer and one signal
battalion.
Indian Dispositions and Plans:-
The Indian 1 Corps was deployed

opposite the Pakistani 1 Corps.
The 1 Corps consisted of one
armoured division (1st Armoured
Division) and three infantry
divisions (6 Mountain Division,14
Infantry Division and 26 Infantry
Division). The 1 Corps was the
principal Indian strike force and
was tasked to launch the main
Indian attack inside Pakistan.The
main task of this corps in words of
K.C Praval was to ‘cut off Sialkot
from Lahore’ and this was to be
done by attacking from general
area Samba east of Jammu
and advancing in a southwesternly
direction cutting the Sialkot-

Jammu road around Daska15 as
already discussed in the earlier part
of this chapter. Gurcharan Singh
described 1 Corps task as ‘secure a
bridgehead extending to line
Bhagowal-Phillora cross roads
junction south of Tharoah with a
view to advancing to the eastern
bank of the MRL canal’ with the
possibility of advancing further to
line Dhalewali-Wahulai-Daska-
Mandhali’16. The initial objectives
of this attack were
capturing Phillora Chawinda and
Pagowal areas.Distribution of
forces/dispositions and formation
tasks were as following17:--

1st Armoured Division:-- It was
the spearhead of the Indian
offensive. This formation was
much weaker in
numerical/organisational terms
from the 1st Pakistani Armoured
Division i.e. having only four tank
regiments and lorried infantry
battalions and two brigade
headquarters. 62 Tank regiment
was therefore taken from 26
Division and assigned to it as the
fifth tank regiment.It was
tasked to advance inside Pakistani
territory on general axis Ramgarh-
Phillora-Pagowal-Chawinda-MRL
from first light 8th September after

the 6 Mountain Division had
secured the bridgehead in
Maharajke-Charwa area.As per the
Divisional plan this advance was
to be conducted on two axis with
43 Lorried Brigade on the right
and 1st Armoured Brigade on the
left. The 1st Armoured Division
was organised as following:--
1st Armoured Brigade:- It
consisted of two tank regiments
(17 Poona Horse, 16 Light
Cavalry) one tank squadron (from
62 Cavalry), and one and a quarter
infantry battalion (lorry borne) etc
which was tasked to advance in the
first phase on axis Ramgarh-

Harbal-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora.
Tasks/Groupings for operations till
MRL canal after capture of
Phillora were to be given later.
43 Lorried Brigade:- Grouped as
one full tank regiment (2 Lancers),
one tank regiment less squadron
(62 Cavalry) and two lorried
infantry battalions tasked to
advance on axis Salehriyah-
Saidanwali-Cross roads-Mastpur-
Ahmad Pur-Pagowal.
Divisional Reserve:- One tank
regiment (4 Hodson’s Horse) and
one lorried infantry company.
6 Mountain Division:- This
division was the principal infantry

component of the 1 Corps
offensive battle and was tasked to
secure the bridgehead inside
Pakistani territory from where the
1st Armoured Division was to be
launched on the thrust towards
MRL canal.Its initial task was to
secure the bridgehead in area
Maharajke-Charwa and exploit till
line Ahmadpur-Nauni.It was
tasked to commence the attack at
2300 hours on 7th September
1965.18 It had the following troops
for the bridgehead operation:-
69 Mountain Brigade:- The right
forward assaulting brigade in the 6
MountainDivision bridgehead

operation. It had three battalions
and a tank squadron from 62
Cavalry and was tasked to capture
Maharajke area in the first phase of
the 1 Corps operation.
99 Mountain Brigade:- The left
forward assaulting brigade in the 6
Mountain Division bridgehead
operation.It consisted of three
infantry battalions and was tasked
to capture Charwa in the Corps
phase one.
35 Infantry Brigade:- Originally
from 14 Division, this brigade
consisted of three infantry
battalions and was placed under
command 6 Mountain Division

specifically for the bridgehead
operation. It was the reserve
brigade of the 6 Mountain Division
and was earmarked for unforeseen
tasks.
14 Infantry Division:- In the
initial Indian attack plan this
formation was supposed to take
full part in the I Indian Corps
offensive in Sialkot sector.
However the peculiar
developments of events in
September 1965 dictated otherwise
and this formation played a limited
role in the 1 Corps operation.
These reasons are explained in
detail in note 146.19 The

Division played no role in the
initial battles of 8 to 10 September
1965 as its 35 was under 6
Mountain and 1st Armoured
Division but was assigned a
limited role from 11/12th
September to attack Zafarwal. Its
116 Brigade reached Samba area
from Pathankot on 10th September
and became the first brigade to
function under command 14
Division opposite general area
Zafarwal.20
26 Infantry Division:- This
formation consisted of three
infantry brigades (19,162 & 168)
and one tank regiment (18th

Cavalry).19 Brigade had two
infantry battalions while 162 and
168 Brigades had three infantry
battalions each. It was assigned the
mission of containing Pakistani
forces at Sialkot so that these could
not create any problem on the
northern flank of the 1st Armoured
Division’s line of advance. To
achieve this aim 162 and 168
Brigade with a tank squadron
each,162 Brigade on the right and
168 Brigade on the left were to
carry out a limited advance into
astride Sialkot Jammu road in the
direction of Unche Wains-Niwe
Wains-Bajragrahi areas from 2330

Hours night of 7th September
onwards. The third brigade i.e. 19
Brigade was to be the reserve
brigade.21 It appears that this
brigade was brought particularly
against the Pakistani Marala
Salient which was called ‘ Dagger
Salient’ by the Indians. All the
Pakistanis had in this dagger
salient was one simple infantry
battalion! The main malady with
which the Indians suffered was
having too much infantry and not
knowing how to use it while the
Pakistani problem seems to have
been having too many tanks and
not knowing how to use them!

Battle of Chawinda-6th to 22nd
September 1965
Jassar Bridge Crisis:- At 0315
hours on the night of 6th/7th
September Indian artillery shelled
the Pakistani 115 Brigades
positions on both sides of the
Jassar Bridge.It was ironical that
both the 115 Pakistani Brigade
(two infantry battalions,one R & S
Company and one TDU tank
regiment) and the 29 Indian
Brigade(three infantry battalions
and one tank squadron) opposing
each other in Jassar area were
commanded by two extremely
timid and highly nervous

commanders. The task assigned to
29 Indian Brigade originally from
7 Division but now operating in an
independent role directly under 11
Corps Headquarter was to capture
the Pakistani enclave across river
Ravi which was a potential
Pakistani jump off point inside
Indian territory. The Indians
launched their attack at 0400 hours
6th September and by 0415 hours
reached the southern end of the
Jassar bridge which was a few
hundred yards from the Indian
border. 115 Brigade launched a
counter attack using tanks and
dislodged the Indians from the

southern end of the bridge by 0800
hours. The Pakistani GHQ,
influenced by nervousness at
Headquarter 1 corps, took the
situation opposite Jassar very
seriously and ordered the 6
Armoured Division in dispersal in
Gujranwala-Nandipur area to
move to Pasrur on night 6/7
September.22 The Indian brigade
commander sent exaggerated
reports about Pakistani success to
11 Corps Headquarter and
requested permission to withdraw.
11 Corps Headquarter instead
sent their Chief Engineer Officer
and another staff officer to revive

the morale of 29 Infantry Brigade
Commander. These two officers on
arrival were able to put some spirit
in the 29 Brigade and under their
supervision the 29 Indian Brigade
launched another attack on night
06/07 September 23. This attack
was successful and the Indians
recaptured the southern end of the
bridge by 0800 hours 7th
September 1965. In response to
this development the 115 Brigade
blew up a span of the Jassar bridge
which was already prepared for
demolition since 6th September at
0800 hours 07 September 1965. In
reality the situation had stabilised

now with river Ravi in between
and both the brigades positioned
north and south of the river.
Brigadier Muzaffar was
unfortunately for Pakistan Army of
a different stuff. At 1130 hours on
the same day i.e. 7th September
without reconfirming he sent a
report to Headquarter 15 Division
that an enemy infantry battalion
had crossed the ravi river and
established a foothold on the
northern side of the river 24. All
this was happening at a time when
Headquarter 11 Indian Corps had
ordered the 29 Brigade on 8th
September to leave a battalion and

revert to its parent formation 7
Infantry Division’s command in
area Bhikiwind on the night of
8/9th September25, in response to
the developments in 4 Mountain
Division sector as a result of the
1st Armoured division’s offensive
in Khem Karan. 115 Brigades
alarming report naturally caused
grave apprehensions in the
Pakistani High Command from 15
Division onwards till the GHQ.
Headquarter 15 Division
despatched 24 Brigade less one
battalion opposite Chobara-
Phillora alongwith one tank
regiment (25 Cavalry) to 115

Brigade area (Jassar). 25 Cavalry
spearheading the fire brigade sent
to extinguish the exaggerated fire
at Jassar reached Jassar at 2200
hours on 7th September and found
out that the situation was not a
fraction as serious as reported by
115 Brigade and at 0200 hours on
night 7/8 September to return to
his original location Pasrur which
25 Cavalry reached at first light
8th September26. Meanwhile the 6
Armoured Division which had
started moving from Gujranwala to
Pasrur on 6th September evening
and whose leading elements had
reached Pasrur by 2345 hours was

ordered to return to Gujranwala by
0500 hours 7th September!27
Contrary to the porevalent thinking
in Pakistan Jassar was no Indian
deception but a sheer defensive
action aimed at eliminating a
dangerous enclave from which the
Pakistanis could threaten Amritsar.
It was the fog of war that made the
Pakistani GHQ and 1 Corps
imagine the shadow at Jassar as
that of a giant ! Interestingly the
Indian brigade commander at
Jassar was as much afraid of the
Pakistani troops opposite him as
the Pakistani 1 Corps and GHQ
were afraid of the Indian threat

opposite Jassar. If Major
Shamshad a direct participant who
went to Narowal (Jassar) is to be
believed then only one squadron of
25 Cavalry was sent to Jassar.28
The 26 Division Fixing
Manoeuvre against Sialkot from
7th to 8th September:-- The aim
of 26 Division attack against
Sialkot was not to capture Sialkot
but to contain the Pakistani forces
in Sialkot so that they could not
pose a threat to the northern flank
of the main Indian attack force
consisting of the 1st Armoured and
6 Mountain Division.Keeping in
view the Indian superiority in this

sector this was an easy to achieve
objective.The Pakistani 15
Division had relatively better
mobile forces in the shape of one
tank regiment, one TDU tank
regiment and one R & S Company
but just three infantry battalions
(two from 101 Brigade and one
being from the divisional reserve
i.e. 104 brigade) against one
Indian tank regiment and eight
infantry battalions. The Indian
attack commenced two brigade
up against the border villages of
Niwe Wains, Bajragarhi etc from
2330 hours night 7/8 September.
Both the brigades captured their

insignificant objectives.In any case
the troops opposite Sialkot were
too weak to interfere with the
advance of the main Indian attack.
The Indians however remained
obsessed with defence of Jammu
and later brought a fourth brigade
i.e. the 52 Mountain Brigade(three
battalions) on 11th September
1965.29
The Main Indian Attack and 25
Cavalry (24 Brigade) Counter
actions 0n 8th September 1965:--
We have already discussed that 25
Cavalry and 24 Brigade minus one
unit in defence opposite Charwa
was despatched to Jassar on 7th

September and that 25 Cavalry
returned to Pasrur at approximately
0500 hours on 8th September.
While 25 Cavalry and 24 Brigade
were moving to Jassar and moving
back to Pasrur the third battalion of
24 Brigade i.e. 3 FF which was
holding defences opposite
Maharajke-Chrawa extended as a
screen for over 10,000
yards30 was overrun by the
concerted attack of the 69 and 99
Mountain Brigades on the night of
7th/8th September. This news
about the overrunning of 3 FF was
received at 0600 hours at Pasrur by
the 24 Brigade headquarter

which had just reached Pasrur
from Jassar at 0500 hours on 8th
September. The news was
shocking! Brigadier Abdul Ali
Malik the 24 Brigade Commander
knew little about tank warfare and
had no idea of the quantum of
troops opposite him. However the
Commanding Officer of 25
Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Nisar,
was a capable armour officer. In
adition 25 Cavalry was,to Pakistan
Army’s good luck, a newly raised
but extremely fine tank regiment,
having on its strength some very
outstanding officers, not merely on
paper but in terms of bravery in

face of enemy and in extraordinary
situations. Malik who like Nisar
had no clue about the situation in
his front and asked Nisar to do
something.31 Thus Malik
abdicated the conduct of battle to
the commanding officer of a tank
regiment which was under his
command! The regiment was
refuelling at this time having
poofed up all the fuel going to
Jassar (Major Shamshad, a direct
participant and later referred to,
states that only Charlie Squadron
went to Pasrur) and coming back.
Nisar immediately ordered tank
squadron (B Squadron)

commanded by Major Ahmad
(originally from Guides Cavalry
and an extremely brave leader of
men) to advance in an extended
order towards Charwa the reported
point of enemy breakthrough!After
tasking one of the squadrons to
advance towards Charwa Nisar
alerted the remaining part of the
regiment to move towards
Chawinda. At 0730 hours Nisar
sent another squadron (A
Squadron) towards Tharoah on
receiving reports that Indian
armour was seen opposite Tharoh
area. At 1130 hours Nisar sent ‘A’
Squadron to area west of

Gadgor.In short by 1200 hours the
whole of 25 Cavalry was deployed
three squadrons in line abreast
opposite the Indian 1st Armoured
Brigade leading the advance of the
Indian 1st Armoured Division. ‘B’
squadron of 25 Cavalry came in
contact with the advancing tanks
of the Indian 1st Armoured
Division near Gadgor.The Indian
1st Armoured Division which had
commenced its advance from the
bridgehead secured by the 6
Mountain Division in Charwa-
Maharajke area after crossing the
international border at 0600 hours
on the morning of 8th September.It

was advancing two regiments
up;with an inter regiment gap of
approximately 3500 to 4000
metres in between,each regiment
one squadron up, 16 Light Cavalry
supported by a Gurkha infantry
battalion on the right,advancing
towards Phillora 17 Poona Horse
on the left advancing towards
Tharoah cross roads.Both the tank
regiments had a clean run during
the first 15 kilometres of their
advance inside Pakistan.According
to the Indian armoured corps
historian the Pakistan Airforce
aircrafts attacked the leading
Indian armour elements at about

8.40 Am. at Chobara but were
unable to hit any tank. The Indian
16 Light Cavalry advancing two
troops up came in contact with 25
Cavalry’s tanks advancing in
extended order towards Chobara
without a clue that the Indian 1st
Armoured Division was just a few
miles away. 25 Cavalry ‘s ‘Bravo
Squadron’ commanded by Major
Ahmad ,suddenly at
approximately 50 to 200 metres
ranges at about 0900 or 0945
hours came into contact with two
leading tank troops of 16 Light
Cavalry. Some of Ahmad’s tanks
had taken firepositions while some

were in the open .The Indians were
on the move. A confused firefight
followed in which both sides lost
tanks, Pattons burning on being hit
while Centurions getting shot
through both sides! Both the
Indian leading tank troop leaders
were killed, thus leaving the
leading squadron commander of
16 Light Cavalry clueless.32
Major Ahmad of 25 Cavalry
carried the day by fighting from
the front, thus inspiring his men to
fight till death, rather than
withdraw an inch. It was during
this firefight that Major Ahmad,
who had already changed his tank

once was also severely burnt after
having personally destroyed four
tanks.33 There is no doubt that it
was Major Ahmad who saved the
Pakistani position at Gadgor by
fighting from the front and
injecting in his men real steel. He
was the only squadron commander
in 25 Cavalry who led from the
front and was the only major who
proved himself equal to the crisis
in 25 Cavalry! Major Shamshad
one of the direct participant in that
battle gave the same verdict.34 16
Light Cavalry CO tried to bring up
another squadron, commanded by
an Indian Muslim officer Major

M.A.R Shiekh to outflank the
Pakistani position in front from the
the east. The space for manoeuvre
was however extremely limited
Poona Horse the left forward
Indian unit being just 4000 metres
away from the right forward unit.
In the process of manoeuvring this
second squdron exposed its
broadsides to 25 Cavalry tanks of ‘
Alpha Squadron’ losing many
tanks including that of Major
Shiekh who received a head
injury35 and died on the spot.
Finally this second squadron was
held up having lost its squadron
commander and unable to

manoeuvre due to limited visibility
and lack of space to manoeuvre.
As per General Gurcharan
Singh once the second squadron
was held up CO 16 Light Cavalry
passed ‘exaggerated’ reports to the
1 Armoured Brigade Commander
who in turn ordered 16 Light
Cavalry not to advance any
further36. We will not go in the
details of what 25 Cavalry or 16
Light Cavalry did since this in
itself would require a whole
book.In brief 16 Light Cavalry’s
advance was checked at Gadgor by
1000 hours 8th September. 17
Poona Horse which was advancing

on the left towards Tharoah
commenced its advance two
squadrons up but soon changed to
one squadron up because of the
limited fields of fire and
observation that made command
and control, extremely difficult.It
came in contact with 25 Cavalry at
0945 hours in Tharoh area and was
also checked like 16 Light
Cavalry. According to Gurcharan
Singh some firing took place in
between the tanks of 16 Light
Cavalry and 17 Poona Horse37.
This happened because the inter
regiment gap between both the
regiments was too less. ‘C’

Squadron 62 Cavalry which was
tasked to provide left flank
protection to the 1st Armoured
Division’s advance was delayed as
its tanks got bogged down while
inside Indian territory .When half
of this squadron did finally got
going and crossed the border at
1000 hours it went south towards
Zafarwal by some
misunderstanding after crossing
the Degh Nala instead of
advancing parallel and north of the
Degh Nala as originally
ordered!This squadron crossed the
Degh Nala and reached Zafarwal
in Pakistani territory absolutely

unopposed and later recrossed the
Degh Nala to go north once it
probably realised that it was
supposed to stay north of Degh
Nala!Once this squadron was
recrossing the Degh Nala it was
engaged by an Indian artillery
battery providing fire support to
the 1st Armoured brigade,which
naturally mistook it for Pakistani
tanks seeing it approach from
south of Degh Nala.In turn this
squadron also opened fire on the
Indian battery which they thought
to be a Pakistani battery destroying
several guns and vehicles!38 By
1300 hours Brigadier K.K Singh

Commander 1st Armoured Brigade
was a mentally defeated man.He
reached the conclusion that ‘He
was held up by at least two Patton
regiments and that there was no
possibility of advancing direct
towards Phillora without suffering
unacceptable losses’.He was
further unnerved by reports of a
‘raid by enemy tanks on guns and
soft vehicles’ (which in reality was
the firing between 62 Cavalry’s
tanks coming recrossing Degh
Nadi!)39 Commander 1 Armoured
Brigade concluded that ‘his line of
communication was not
secure’40 and ‘decided to adopt

Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war

Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war

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Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war