Was The Rebellion Inevitable The rebellion was not inevitable but was the result of a series of administrative and policy decisions made in a period of two decades. Dalhousie’s basic policy was sound. He was administratively annexing regions which had been politically and militarily conquered and defeated long ago. But Dalhousie’s pace of annexation was fast. His modus operandi of routine administration and dealing with the Indian native princes as well as the British officials was rash. His treatment of the CinC Charles Napier was unjust. His perceptions regarding Oudh were by and large correct but the manner in which he dealt with Oudh was not correct. Being the man on the spot he should have actively decided that immediate annexation was not the answer. But he suggested to the Directors of EEIC a number of options including annexation which they selected. Thus he made the Directors take a decision about which they had little first hand knowledge. Sleeman had prophetically warned Dalhousie that annexation of Oudh would have a very negative effect on the sepoys who were almost 50 to 60% part of the Bengal Infantry. Despite all this we must not forget that the foundation of an educated and aware Indian middle class was laid essentially by Macaulay and Dalhousie rather than by any Indian Hindu or Muslim. The three universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were foundations of an Indian educated middle class. The British had resolved to introduce western education in India before 1857 and both Hindus and Muslims were to acquire if, even if Sayyid Ahmad Khan had died fighting for the rebel cause at Bijnor!

1. Myths and Misconceptions of Indo Pak Military History-Part SIX-
British exaggerations and inevitability and the Sepoy Rebellion
Major Agha H Amin (retired)
About the Author
About the Author Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major who served in five tank regiments
and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in various staff , instructional and
research assignments. In his Pakistan Army tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on
Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support group , and RFS Concept.
His writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals , Pakistan Army Journal and
Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta. His recommendations regarding
bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff cadre advanced in 1998 were later
accepted. In addition his recommendation of grouping various corps into army commands
advanced in an article published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote
The Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998 , Pakistan Army till
1965 in 1999 ,Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban
War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence Journal ,Executive Editor of
globe and Founder Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies . An associate of the think tanks
ORBAT and Alexandrian Defense group. Carried out various oil and gas and power
transmission line surveys in West Asia. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and
monthly Military and Security Review. Heads the think tank Centre for study of Intelligence
Operations established in early 2010.

4. Was The Rebellion Inevitable
The rebellion was not inevitable but was the result of a series of
administrative and policy decisions made in a period of two
decades.
Dalhousie’s basic policy was sound. He was administratively
annexing regions which had been politically and militarily
conquered and defeated long ago.

5. But Dalhousie’s pace of annexation was fast. His modus operandi
of routine administration and dealing with the Indian native
princes as well as the British officials was rash. His treatment of
the CinC Charles Napier was unjust. His perceptions regarding
Oudh were by and large correct but the manner in which he dealt
with Oudh was not correct.
Being the man on the spot he should have actively decided that
immediate annexation was not the answer. But he suggested to the
Directors of EEIC a number of options including annexation
which they selected.
Thus he made the Directors take a decision about which they had
little first hand knowledge. Sleeman had prophetically warned
Dalhousie that annexation of Oudh would have a very negative
effect on the sepoys who were almost 50 to 60% part of the
Bengal Infantry.
Despite all this we must not forget that the foundation of an
educated and aware Indian middle class was laid essentially by
Macaulay and Dalhousie rather than by any Indian Hindu or
Muslim.
The three universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were
foundations of an Indian educated middle class. The British had
resolved to introduce western education in India before 1857 and
both Hindus and Muslims were to acquire if, even if Sayyid
Ahmad Khan had died fighting for the rebel cause at Bijnor!

6. The greased cartridges case was an administrative lapse. Here the
main fault lay with the Directors of EEIC who did not co-ordinate
with the civil and military authorities in India about the religious
implications of the cartridges.
The conduct of 3rd Light cavalry troopers was the most decisive
factor of the whole affair. Their seizure of Delhi was the most
tangible and concrete part of the whole affair.
By occupying a militarily and politically crucial city they
effectively transformed what was only a military mutiny caused
due to an inadvertent lapse on part of the EEIC authorities in
introducing a weapon system which was correctly perceived by
the soldiers as an attack on their religion. The Oudh factor was
important but was overplayed later on. Oudh took two more
months after the Delhi affair for going into full rebellion.
The crucial factor was the seizure of Delhi. Casualty wise and in
number of concentration of rebel regiments; three fourth of 1857
was decided at Delhi in September 1857. If there is any event
which may have turned the scales, it was a British defeat at Delhi.
The British came very close to it, but perhaps men like Nicholson
saved the day; just like Kemal at Gallipoli!
Equally crucial and decisive was the indecisiveness of General
Hewitt and Brigadier Archdale Wilson at Meerut.

7. These two individuals were the only two Britishers who could
have prevented the Meerut Sepoys from capturing Delhi, keeping
in view the means at their disposal and the time and space factors
as on 10 and 11 May 1857. If this could have been successfully
done and 3rd Light Cavalry effectively annihilated by the Meerut
European units the Delhi garrison could have been disarmed and
Delhi secured by the British. Without Delhi in rebel hands more
sepoy units may still have mutinied but would have had no safe
haven to withdraw to. Thus the EEIC could have effectively
contained the sepoy units within four or five months.
The loss of Delhi was the green signal for the Bengal Army to be
bold, audacious and to perform the heroic act of rebellion, armed
insurrection etc.!
There is nothing inevitable in history. There is by and large no
good or bad luck or fate or destiny but consequences. The fall of
Delhi was not an act of historic destiny but a simple result of a
spinster like behaviour on part of two senior and responsible
British senior military commanders! It is not the office but the
man who holds it that matters ! Or, conversely it was an act made
possible by the supreme elan and audacity of the sowars of 3rd
Bengal Native Light Cavalry!
Rebellion or Mutiny
Pedantic historians have debated for long and devoted a
considerable amount of energy to prove that the rebellion of 1857
was a mutiny of soldiers.

8. We understand the British point of view in calling it a mutiny just
like the Turks called the Greek war of independence the Greek
revolt. But we are surprised that many Indo Pak historians are
convinced that the rebellion of 1857 was a mutiny or an event of
limited significance. Some historians don’t like it because the
Bengalis did not participate in it, some are rabidly condemning it
because the Punjabis played no part in it. The Britishers were the
most disturbed because the rebellion proved that the Indians were
not as docile as the British wanted them to be.
The Indian historians who are against the rebellion and who
dismiss it as an insignificant act forget that had it succeeded whole
of India may have benefited. Even in its failure the rebellion
influenced British perceptions in such a way that the process of
introducing local self government etc. was speeded up. Just
because all the nationalities of India did not join the rebellion still
does not reduce its significance.
For that matter even the subsequent elections in 1935 were an
illusion since only 10% of the population of India was eligible to
vote and out of these less than half did not vote549! The sepoy of
1857 was more politically aware and less docile than the Indian
Army soldier who fought in the First or Second world war!
Religion was used to galvanize the people in 1857 but against the
white colonial ruler, not against each other as in the holocaust of
1947 massacres.

9. The so called resistance campaigns of 1919 or 1920-21 or 1930-
31 or 1942 were pin pricks compared with the great battles fought
at Delhi, Lucknow or in rural Oudh. Today the official historians
and commercial historians who write for their livelihood are
trying very hard to portray the achievement of acquiring
independence as the outcome of a physical struggle against the
British! The Indians should instead thank Kaiser Willhelm II and
Hilter for starting the two world wars and the British liberal
traditions of parliamentary democracy!
The simple fact is that when the Sepoys seized Delhi and set up
Bahadur Shah Zafar as their head; a mutiny had been transformed
into a war aimed at making Indo Pak sub continent an independent
country. The fact that the rebellion was confined to certain areas
still does not reduce its magnitude to that of a mutiny or a local
outbreak.
If this is the yardstick then how should historians define the
French revolution of 1789 which was initially only an affair
confined to the Paris mob! The Russian revolution of 1917
succeeded because the mutiny of the Imperial Russian army
succeeded and it took four years of civil war before the
Bolsheviks succeeded in controlling whole of Russia. ‘Failure is
an orphan but success has many fathers!’
The Independence that both India and Pakistan gained in the year
1947 had many fathers including Kaiser Willhelm II, Adolf HItler
and British war exhaustion !! But official propaganda in both the
countries wants people to believe that there were only three
fathers, and all three of these were from the Indian Sub
Continent!!

10. Impact on Future Indo-Pak History
The rebellion failed but it decisively convinced the British about
the need for reform and of bringing the Indians as junior partners
in the higher decision making process.
A carefully conceived policy regarding respect for the various
religions followed in India was adopted. Non interference in
religious matters and careful consideration in not interfering with
the religious rituals were enforced as a strict policy. In the short
term the Indians suffered immediately in the first decade
following 1857 but in the long term their position improved.
All inspiration was provided to all future movements directed
towards independence and the British also became conscious
about the Indian aspirations about political freedom and equal
rights.
Chances of Success
There is a school of thought who is convinced that the Sepoys
were bound to fail. But again there is nothing that is inevitable in
history.
Before 11 May 1857 no one could have believed that one
regiment composed of Ranghars and Hindustani Pathan troopers
could seize Delhi and wind up the EEIC hold on India for good!
No one before 10 May 1857 would have believed that “2028”
European soldiers at Meerut could not effectively disarm “2057”

11. Native Sepoys. The layman reader should not underestimate what
“2028” Europeans meant in India in 1857.
the EEIC forces consisting of some 2300 native sepoys and just
about 500 European troops from HM 22 Foot captured Sind in
1843550! In September 1842 General Nott using just about two
European infantry battalions and some seven Bengal and Bombay
Army native units captured Kabul the capital of Afghanistan.
Those who understand Indo Pak military history of 19th Century
were thus naturally surprised the way the British at Meerut
behaved. Even the 3rd Light Cavalry troopers were surprised to
witness such masterly inaction on part of the European troops at
Meerut.
It was only when they were convinced that the Europeans had
sunk into absolute inertia and inactivity that they regained enough
resolution to move towards Delhi. The sepoys had a fair chance of
success till September 1857.
Had they destroyed the British force at Delhi they would have
gained moral ascendancy and the British position may have
become more critical. We have already seen that the British
position at Delhi was never comfortable till the city was finally
captured.
The fact that the rebellion was confined to certain areas still does
not dismiss it as a mutiny, revolutions never breakout
simultaneously to cover whole of a country.

12. The French Revolution of 1789, 1830 and 1848 was largely the
work of the Paris mob but were called the French Revolution. The
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was initially confined to Petersburg
but ultimately by 1921 the Bolsheviks were controlling whole of
Russia.
The only real hope for the sepoys lay in simultaneous uprising all
over India.
But this was too ambitious a possibility and since no deliberate
conspiracy seems to have been at work this was a very utopian
and nearly impossible possibility.
Intervention by Afghanistan and Nepal may have seriously tilted
the balance against the EEIC. In NWFP at least there would have
been a general uprising in case Afghans had decided to invade
India. But Nott and Ochterlony had taught such a lesson to
Afghanistan in 1842 and Nepal in 1816 that both the countries
rulers were too keen to please the EEIC to the best of their
ability!.
India was not a country and it was this on ground reality which
made the British task very simple. The rebellion remained
regionalised and the people of the sub continent as a whole lost a
very good opportunity to become independent.
Sepoy Strength Exaggerated by the British writers
Since there was no military account written by the “Rebels” of
1857, all we are left with are the British accounts.

13. These too are again based on military records despatches and
reports written by participants who were mostly very keen to win
the newly introduced “Victoria Cross”!
In this exercise these participants indulged in an effort to inflate
sepoy strength in each and every action.
We have earlier discussed how Michael Edwards, an otherwise
respectable historian tried to fit 30,000 Rebels in a space which
was not more than 600 or 700 yards wide as per the British Survey
Map of the battle in case of the Battle of Badli Ki Serai!
The sepoys were essentially plain soldiers led by the Subedars and
Risaldar Native Officers, and were without any officer cadre or
the shackles of military discipline. Two factors played an
important part in reducing the strength of every sepoy unit.
The first was that many soldiers after a successful mutiny and the
initial looting spree deserted their regiments and retired to their
villages. This happened immediately after every outbreak.
The most glaring out of all these was the case of the 10th Native
Infantry at Fatehgarh which after rebelling and looting simply
dispersed to their villages; with the exception of very few
individuals who went to the Nawab of Farkhabad.

14. This was a fairly documented fact; and thus when the 41th Native
Infantry reached Farkhabad in September 1857; the Nawab gave
them the colours of the old 10th Native Infantry to carry551.
The second major problem was that with the passage of time as it
became more and more clear that the British are winning;
particularly after the recapture of Delhi; many soldiers deserted
and simply went to their villages. Thus it is most likely that but
the time the British launched their assault on Delhi the sepoy
strength at Delhi may not have been greater than 6,000 or 7,000.
Many regiments came to Delhi from distances exceeding 200 to
300 miles; some came from as far as 500 miles. Many of these
regiments were pursued or obstructed on their way to Delhi by
British troops or loyal troops; specially those who came from
Ferozepur Jallandhar and Phillaur.
These we have the example of the 3 Nl, 36 NI, 61 Nl and 6th
Light Cavalry who crossed the Sutlej on their way to Delhi from
Jallandhar *36 Nl, 61 Nl, 6 LC) and Phillaur (3 Nl) in July 1857.
Keeping in view their total on paper, strength theoretically should
have consisted of some 3,500 men (3,000 infantry and 500
cavalry). As per the British account however; which is this case in
somehow factual the strength of these regiments was 1,600 552.
In any case no unit of a army has complete strength at all times;
since many men are on long leave (which in India as a policy was

15. compulsarily given for economy measures for a period of two to
three months annually).
Even Fortescue who was a very conservative and pro
establishment historian observed at many places in his History of
British Army that the Sepoy strength was exaggerated by many
British officers who fought against the sepoys in 1857.
Another aspect of the whole affair was the motivational aspect.
Every regiment had a hard core of men who stayed together till
the end; but similarly every regiment had a hard core of men who
stayed together till the end; but similarly every regiment had many
who simply preferred the safety of their village; after the initial
outbreak was over.
This is a very simple aspect in a rebellion in which the coercive
authority of a stable peacetime state to apprehend deserters has
lapsed.
Another very simple calculation of sepoy strength which may
have been initially available on the first day of each regiments
successful rebellion is as following:-
a. Total Bengal Army Native Troops Strength
-118,663 553
b. Sepoy Strength in Bengal -29,000 554
c. Sepoy Strength in Punjab
-65,478 out of which 37,257 were Hindustanis.

16. d. Total Remaining Sepoy Strength
excluding those in Bengal and Punjab
- 24, 185
Calculation of number of Rebels which may hypothetically
have fought against the British:—
a. Punjab:—
A total of 6 Infantry and 2 Cavalry units rebelled and successfully
reached Delhi to fight against the British. This comes to a figure
of a maximum of 4,100 men as per the following calculation:-
(1) Jullundhur Brigade and Phillor Rebels:—
These were four units i.e. 3 Nl 36 Nl, 61 Nl & 6 Light Cavalry ----
-------------- 1,600556
(2) Ferozepur Brigade:—
These were two units i.e. 45 Nl & 10 Light Cavalry And these
could not have been more than 1,500 if we being very liberal to
the British unrealistically agree that all posted strength rebelled
and all reached Delhi some 300 miles away!
(3) Ambala Brigade:-

17. 5 Nl and 60 Nl rebelled towards September but a large Number as
per the Gazetteer were killed or jailed557 and two companies of
the 5th Native Infantry never rebelled. If we are very liberal we
may state the figure of rebels which reached Delhi from Ambala
at 1,000 men!
b. Bengal:-
As per the Cambridge History, above quoted there were 29,000
Sepoys in Bengal. Out of these as per our calculation four infantry
and two cavalry units successfully reached Rebel Held areas. This
meant that a maximum of 4,800 men out of the total of 29,000
could have fought against the British at Lucknow, Banda or
Cawnpore.
c. Total Hypothetical Maximum Strength of Rebel Sepoys:—
24,185+ 4,100 + 4,800 = 33,085. A Total of 33,085 regular troops
could have possibly fought against the British in total, if we
believe the figures advanced by the Cambridge History and Lord
Roberts as true!
Summary of all units of Bengal Army and major state force
units behaviour in 1857

18. J.W Fortescue the author of the classic is “A History of the
British Army” and a very pro Establishment and conservative
historian admitted the fact that many British accounts about 1857
were highly exaggerated.
Fortescue thus said; “This impression, moreover, is heightened by
the accounts of the hundreds of engagements with various forces
of the rebels. Their numbers were always superior, they had
plenty of guns, they had the climate in their favour, and they
frequently fortified positions or buildings for a resolute defence.
Yet, a commander had only to attack them otherwise then as they
desired to be attacked (which was not very difficult), and they
invariably gave way without inflicting any great loss. We hear
frequently of their stubborn resistance, yet the lists of the British
casualties rarely, if ever, suggest any severe struggle”.558

19. Around 2,500 cavalry at Delhi, around 8,000 infantry and around
3,000 cavalry at Lucknow and around 3,000 infantry and 400
cavalry at Cawnpore.
The figure for Delhi is comparatively lower keeping the total
number of regiments in view; however this is so because the
rebels arrived at Delhi more slowly and from far off places and in
between a long period involving four months; figure at Lucknow
is comparatively more stable; because most of the regiments
which came to Lucknow came from a 100 mile radius around
Lucknow; stretching at the maximum to 200 miles with the
exception of the Dinapur brigade or the Segowlee cavalry.
The strength at Cawnpore is comparatively higher; since 3 out of
four regiments which fought at Cawnpore were part of the
Cawnpore garrison and did not march from anywhere outside
Cawnpore.
 It is human to exaggerate the odds against a unit in order to
magnify the battle performance of a unit or an individual
commands.
 In order to perpetrate the “White man’s superiority” myth.
They succeeded in doing so at least till the Russo Japanese
invasion of Malaya!
 To get the newly instituted Victoria Cross!

22. 546Page-30-The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb-Op Cit.
547Page-364-Concise Oxford History-Op Cit.
548Page-431-Ibid.
549Pages-221 & 222-Nehru-A Tryst with Destiny-Stanley
Wolpert-Oxford-New York-1996.
550Pages-196 & 197 -Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page-286-
J.W Fortescue-Volume XII-1839-1852-Op Cit. Out of the total
2800 available British-Indian Troops, only 1,800 actually
participated in the battle. The British Indian casualties were 62
Killed (including 6 British officers), and 194 wounded (including
13 British officers).
551Page-93-Indian Infantry Colours-Captain H. Bullock - The
Times of India Press - 1931.
552Page-265-Lieut F. G Cardew-Op Cit.
553Pages-344 and 345-Incidents in the Sepoy War-General Sir
Hope Grant-Op Cit.
554Page-35-Cambridge History-The Indian Empire-1858-1918-
Op Cit.
555 The Punjab Mutiny Reports earlier quoted gave the total
strength of Native Troops in Punjab as 59,656, out of which on
paper 35,900 were Hindustanis (including 2,000 who were
actually Punjabi) while 13,430 were Punjabi Irregulars out of
which as per the Mutiny reports “full one fourth” were
Hindustanis i.e. 3,357. Thus I have calculated Hindustanis as
33,900 Regulars, after having excluded 2,000 Punjabis added with
3,357 Hindustanis who were one fourth of the Irregular Troops.
Lord Roberts who was a more reliable authority than the Mutiny
Reports placed the Native Strength in Punjab at 65, 478 men
(Page-88-Forty One Years in India-Volume One-Op Cit) i.e.
5,822 more than the Mutiny Reports.

23. 556As calculated by Lieut F.G Cardew on Page-265-A Sketch of
the Services of the Bengal Native Army up to 1895-Op Cit.
557Pages-30 & 31-Ambala District Gazetteer-Punjab District
Gazetteers-Volume-VII-Part-A- Compiled and Published under
the Authority of the Punjab Government-Superintendent
Government Printing Press Punjab-Lahore-1925.
4b This is an absolutely original table. Compiled by the author
through study of a large number of books. It may not be wholly
accurate, but is basically an attempt to illustrate the general trend.
558Pages-389 & 390-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XIII-Op Cit.
558aAppendix-Incidents in the Sepoy War-Op Cit.
558bPage-307-Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny - Lieutenant
General Mc Leod Innes-London-1895
558cPage-836-Henry Beveridge-Volume-III-Op Cit.
558dPage-307-Mcleod Innes-Op Cit.
558ePages-391 & 392-J. W Fortescue-Vol-XIII-Op Cit.