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1. Overview of Army Manpower –
September 2001 to March 2005
In-process Report Based on An Ongoing
Analysis to Answer the Question: Is A
Return To Conscription In Our Future?
Dave McGinnis
Updated on May 10, 2005

2. Summary
• The Army Has Us in a Manpower Pickle
• The Current Army Vision is at Risk and National
Objectives are in Jeopardy.
• We Have Been Placed on a Slippery Slope and
Gravity Has Been Gaining Since 9/11.
• Creating Disproportional Demand on Guard/ and
Reserve
• Congress Raises Armies – Not Presidents – and
Has to Act.
5/10/05 An American Analyst 2

3. Our Active Army of 2001
• Organized to fight and win one Major
Theater War in about 180 days – not Two.
• Was Short ~ 40,000 Junior Enlisted:
– Authorized Strength was about 482,000.
– Required Strength was about 520,000.
• The Force was Unbalanced.
5/10/05 An American Analyst 3

4. Personnel Trends Since 9/11
• Army has Grown in Raw Numbers
• Rate of Growth Appears Positive.
• Indicators Tell a Different Tale:
– Officer Growth Disproportional to Need.
– Enlisted Growth from STOPLOSS
– Recruit Declining – Despite Rhetoric
• Army has Highest Officer to Enlisted Ratio in History --
15,000 Excess Field Grades.
• Officers Contributed 30% of Recent Growth.
• Field Grade Officers Grew 3.6% -- Larger than Jr.
Enlisted.
5/10/05 An American Analyst 4

5. Recent Army Strength History
• Army Supporters Called for More People.
• Congress Considered Increases But
Administration Resisted.
• Need is for Junior Enlisted Soldiers.
• Administration Bends Allowing
“Temporary” Increase for Modularity – of
30,000.
5/10/05 An American Analyst 5

6. Reality Check 20,000
Decline
Since 9/11
• Enlisted Strength -- 140000
against Total Army 120000
Strength -- declined one-
100000
half percent since 9/11!
80000
• Junior Enlisted Personnel
60000
Grew by 3% -- less than
40000
Field Grade Growth.
20000
• E-1 thru E-3 -- Seed Corn
0
– Dropped By Over 13%!
ar
98
00
01
02
03
1- 4
0
M
19
20
20
20
20
20
By 20,000 + or 53 Battalion equivalent
5/10/05 An American Analyst 6

7. Numbers – Just Don’t Add Up
Comparison of Army Accessions Claims and Monthly End Strength Trends
80000 30000
79000
25000
Paid Recruit End Strength
78000
Number of Recruits
77000
20000
76000
Reported
Claimed
75000 15000
74000
10000
73000
72000
5000
71000
70000 0
Sep-01 Sep-02 Sep-03 Aug-04
Date of Source
Accessions Paid Rct ES
5/10/05 An American Analyst 7

8. Expectations and Reality
Junior Enlisted E-1 thru E-5
315000
310000
305000
300000 Army Program
295000 Actual
290000 w/o StopLoss
285000 Log. (Army Program)
280000 Log. (w/o StopLoss)
275000
270000
265000
2001 2002 2003 2004 Mar-
05
5/10/05 An American Analyst 8

9. Recruits on the Payroll
Se
p-
5/10/05
9
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
0
Ja 6
n-
9
M 7
ay
-9
23472
Se 7
p-
9
Ja 7
n-
9
M 8
ay
-9
Se 8
p-
9
Ja 8
n-
9
M 9
ay
-9
26823
Se 9
p-
9
Ja 9
n-
0
M 0
ay
-0
Se 0
p-
0
Ja 0
n-
0
M 1
ay
-0
27642
Se 1
Reporting Months
An American Analyst
p-
0
Ja 1
n-
0
M 2
ay
-0
25527
Se 2
p-
0
Ja 2
n-
0
M 3
ay
-0
21054
Se 3
p-
0
Ja 3
n-
0
M 4
19660
Army Recruit Payroll Trends
ay
-0
18426 18702
Se 4
p-
Buy Time
04
9
19191
Burning DEP to
Series1

10. From Anemic to Hemorrhage
Baseline
25000 Need
20000
Recruits on the PayRoll
15000
Series1
10000
5000
0
Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar-
03 03 03 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 05 05 05
Months
5/10/05 An American Analyst 10

11. How Did We Get Here
• Ignoring the Changing Demographic and
Target Expectations.
• Believing “Money Can Fix Everything”.
• Not Demanding Truth and Accountability.
• Impact of “Basically No Unemployment”
• Perceived Value of Iraqi Freedom
• Making Guard and Reserve the Competition
5/10/05 An American Analyst 11

12. Conclusion
• We Didn’t Recruiting What We Said We
Did -- The “Game” is Over.
• 2004 and 2005 Net Loss and 2006 Follows.
• End Strength Growth is a Figment.
• Objective of 48 Modular Units of Action is
Well Out of Reach.
5/10/05 An American Analyst 12

13. Conclusion (Continued)
• 43 Modular Units of Action Questionable
• To Grow 10k/Year We Need to Recruit
– 78,400 High Quality People per Year
– With a monthly trainee population over 28,000
• Until Recruiting Aligns to Demographic and
Expectations This is Unlikely.
• The All-Volunteer Army is Doomed Unless
Congress Reasserts its Power to Raise Armies.
5/10/05 An American Analyst 13

14. Options for the Congress
• Hold the Army Accountable and Changes in
Personnel Acquisition and Management to Meet
Demand
• Size the Army More Compatible with the Current
Demographic – Less Than 400K -- and Move
Remaining Structure to the Guard and Reserve
• Return to National Service
• Do Nothing and Hope – like 1920’s and 30’s
5/10/05 An American Analyst 14

15. Dave McGinnis
757-564-9790
DaveMcGinnis1@Cox.Net
5/10/05 An American Analyst 15