This is a print-quality PDF of the 2016 edition of the Safecast Report

1. 1
VOLUME 2 - MARCH, 2016
THE SAFECAST
REPORT
www.safecast.org

2. All text and images in this
publication are made available
under a Creative Commons
CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license
with attribution to SAFECAST,
except as noted.
www.safecast.org
2
Foreword
So, what is The Safecast Report?
This is the second edition of the Safecast Report, released in March, 2016. Five years
have passed since the start of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Powerplant Accident, and
also since the start of Safecast. A fifth anniversary is a good time for taking stock. As we
said last year, when we started Safecast in March, 2011, amidst the chaotic aftermath
of the unfolding nuclear disaster, our primary questions were, “What are the radiation
levels?” and, “Is it safe?” These concerns became the major drivers for the Safecast
project. They are still very important today.
But as time has gone on we have found ourselves motivat-
ed as much by the larger questions which enfold our soci-
ety’s relationship with the environment, with information, with
openness, and with risk. Though we started by measuring
radiation levels in the streets of Fukushima, our mission has
expanded to the wider quest for more open data about the
environment everywhere, and to promote policies which en-
courage openness. We’ve reached out to people from all
corners of society, and many have reached out to us: cit-
izens young and old, companies, educational institutions,
experts, and local governments
As we’ve collected and shared more data, Safecast has
been building an information and action-based ecosystem
that includes a lot of innovative hardware and software, new
visualizations, unique measurement methodologies, human
relationships, and a communication and design “style.”
We’re all about participation and inclusiveness. We often
find ourselves in agreement with people who are concerned
about environmental and nuclear issues, but rather than
voicing anger and trying to smash things, our response is
to try to build better alternatives which can be easily and
widely shared and built upon by others. We’ve deployed a
lot of sensors worldwide and have amassed the largest open
data set of radiation measurements to date. We’re develop-
ing new equipment and forming new teams. But we don’t
pretend to have any real answers. On the other hand, we
can’t help but notice that the main result of our efforts has
been that we’ve developed a better appreciation for how
challenging the questions are.
A lot has happened in the past 5 years. As the The Fukushi-
ma Daiichi nuclear disaster is far from over. Five years may
seem like a long time, but as we and others have pointed
out, the half-life of Cs-137 is many times longer than this,
and it will take generations before the radiation levels can re-
ally be considered back to normal. It will be a long haul, and
Safecast intends to be in it for the duration. As we’ve collect-
ed and shared more data, we’ve been better able to gauge
the true scale of the problems we’ve tackled, have gotten a
better idea of what else is out there, seen what is working,
and more importantly, areas where we could do better. In
this report, we want to share what Safecast is doing today, in
Japan and globally. We also want to acknowledge and share
what we have learned from projects, studies, and initiatives
done by others. But we don’t shy away from objective criti-
cism of governments and other institutions, and make a point
of noting where governments, universities, companies, and
others could improve their contribution to the public good by
embracing openness and public participation more fully. We
call on all of them to recognize the importance of third party
verification by open, citizen-powered projects like Safecast.
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is far from over. Four
years may seem like a long time, but the half-life of Cs-137
is many times longer than this, and it will take generations
before the radiation levels are really back to normal. Over
the past few years, The Internet of Things has become a
major buzzword, and despite the hype, the technology and
applications that are making it possible are helping usher in
the age of open data and citizen empowerment. With the
Safecast Report we want to show what we’re doing now
and what others are doing that we feel are worth sharing,
and hopefully will inspire others to participate in this exciting
project, to learn, and to take action.
We wanted this second edition of the Safecast Report to be
a “stand alone” document which would not require readers
to refer back to Vol. 1 for basic background information. As
a result much of that material is repeated, and information
updated where relevant. Over 40 pages of new material has
been added, however. Then as now the report is split into
two sections: an update about the Safecast project itself,
and an in-depth examination of the status of measurement
and monitoring at the Fukushima Daiichi plant and in the
wider environment, as well what we know about radiation
in food and in people’s bodies, and the consequences for
the health of individuals and communities. We intend to is-
sue updates to the Safecast Report as often as possible,
and plan to add information about air and water pollution
in future installments. We also welcome your feedback and
suggestions, as well as your questions.
None of this would have been possible without the support
of our many passionate and generous volunteers!
THANKS!!!
THE SAFECAST REPORT TEAM:
Azby Brown, Pieter Franken, Sean Bonner - March 2016

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With a disaster the size of Fukushima Daiichi,
there is no way a single report could adequate-
ly reflect all viewpoints or answer all questions.
The best we can do is to present a bird’s eye
view and point out where the landmarks seem
to be. Concerned individuals must be prepared
to inform themselves and seek their own an-
swers. This report is intended to help people
around the world to do that more effectively.

4. 4
The limited-edition Fifth-anniversary bGeigie Nano
(front plate design by Jurgen Westerhoff)

5. 5
2..........Foreword
6 .........EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
6..............Part 1: SAFECAST PROJECT
7..............Part 2: SITUATION REPORT
11........PART 1: THE SAFECAST PROJECT UPDATE MARCH
2016
12............1.1 Safecast Code
13............1.2 DRIVECAST - Mobile Radiation Measurement
15............1.3 POINTCAST - Stationary Radiation Measurement
16............1.4 POINTCAST - Air Pollution Measurement
17............1.5 Open Data (aka The Safecast API)
18............1.6 Data Visualization
19............1.7 Outreach Activities
19............1.8 Press & Publicity
20............1.10 Funding & Support
21............1.11 Always Improving
23........Part 2: SITUATION REPORT
23............Prefatory note
27............2.1- ISSUES AT FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR
POWERPLANT (FDNPP)
27................2.1.1—Decommissioning roadmap
29................2.1.2—Spent fuel pools
30................2.1.3—Water problems
31...................2.1.3.a—Radionuclide removal systems
33...................2.1.3.b—Groundwater problems
37................2.1.4— Melted fuel debris removal
38...................2.1.4a— Muon imaging
39...................2.1.4b— Other investigations
42...................2.1.4c— Robot technology
43................2.1.5— Worker Issues
44............2.2- EVACUEES AND RETURNEES
44................2.2.1—Number of evacuees
46................2.2.2—Compensation
49................2.2.3—Evacuee housing
52............2.3- ENVIRONMENT and DECONTAMINATION
52................2.3.1—Overview
54................2.3.2—The land environment
56...................2.3.2.a—Forests
57...................2.3.2.b — Biota studies
58...................2.3.2.c—Decontamination progress, plans,
effectiveness
65...................2.3.2d—Travel in the area
66................2.3.3—The Ocean
66...................2.3.3.a—Measurement overview
68...................2.3.3.b—Within 100km
71...................2.3.3.c—The wider Pacific:
75............2.4- FOOD
76................2.4.1—Basic findings
76...................2.4.1a - Rice
76...................2.4.1b - Food products in general
77...................2.4.1c - Seafood
77...................2.4.1d - Greatest risks
78...................2.4.1e - Consumer sentiment
78................2.4.2— Food: In-depth
78...................2.4.2a— Overview of Japanese
government food monitoring
79...................2.4.2b— Food in general
80...................2.4.2c— Rice
83...................2.4.2d— Fish
83...................2.4.2e— Independent testing
overview
88............2.5- HEALTH
88................Introduction
89................2.5.1—Thyroid disease findings
90...................2.5.1a—Results and interpretation
93...................2.5.1b— Independent thyroid tests
94................2.5.2— Internal contamination
screening (WBC)
94...................2.5.2a—Fukushima prefecture
WBC program
95...................2.5.2b— WBC Screening programs
administered by local governments
96...................2.5.2c—Independent programs
97...................2.5.2d— WBC Scams
97...................2.5.2e— Comparison to Chernobyl
98................2.5.3—External Exposures
98...................2.5.3a—Personal dosimetry results
100.................2.5.3b—International comparisons
100.................2.5.3c—Iitate
101.................2.5.3d—Overall trends, public health
screening
102..............2.5.4— Worker doses
104..............2.5.5— Mental health
Table of Contents

6. 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Part 1: SAFECAST PROJECT
1.1 Safecast Code
In 2014 we published the Safecast Code 1.0, which attempts
to describe the Safecast ethos through a list of 10 attitudes
that guide our efforts. It can be considered our code of con-
duct, something we use to remind ourselves of our goals
and to help us focus our efforts. We try to measure up to
the values and attitudes embodied in this list and encourage
others to do the same. The Safecast Code is unchanged
since last year.
In addition, then as now:
— We strongly feel that data about our environment should
be open, easy to access and easy to understand.
— A second opinion about environmental data has to be
available. In the age of the Internet of Things, that voice can
come directly from citizens.
— Official groups such as governments, universities, and
companies should publish data about the environment un-
der Creative Commons Zero (CC0) public domain designa-
tion and acknowledge the importance of a third parties to
validate their own data against.
1.2 DRIVECAST - Mobile Radiation Mea-
surement
Since April 2011, Safecast volunteers have been collecting
radiation data using bGeigie mobile radiation sensors. As of
March 2016, the size of the Safecast data set has grown
beyond 43,000,000 measurements, adding 16 million mea-
surements over the past year alone. Over 5 million of these
measurements have come from fixed sensors, while the re-
mainder is from bGeigies. There are over 900 registered us-
ers, over 50 of whom have logged over 100,000 data points
each, 6 of whom have logged over one million each. The
number of Safecast detectors deployed (fixed and mobile)
is approximately 1000, including over 500 bGeigie Nanos.
Development of Drivecast-related hardware continues, with
new models in prototype stage and due for initial deploy-
ment during 2016. We are also looking at ways to better
utilize the bGeigies that are already out in the world.
1.3 POINTCAST - Stationary Radiation
Measurement
iIn March, 2015, pointcast.safecast.org launched. This initia-
tive is focused on deploying stationary radiation sensors in
Japan and globally. These sensors send real-time updates
about radiation levels and publish it without interceptions;
this data is also open through CC-0. Currently over 30 real-
time sensors have been deployed, and our goal is to deploy
30 to 40 more inside Fukushima over the coming months.
The sensors deployed in Japan will increasingly focus on ar-
eas around the Fukushima Daiichi plant, including the exclu-
sion (“difficult to return”) zone. We’re working with volunteers
who are in contact with evacuees who have expressed the
desire to be able to check the radiation levels at their evac-
uated houses in realtime. For people living outside of the
zone, we will work with volunteers to house the sensors. In
the meantime work is under way to develop the next gener-
ation Pointcast devices and visualizations.
1.4 POINTCAST - Air Pollution Measure-
ment
While the primary focus of Safecast to date has been ra-
diation measurements, we’ve always intended for the proj-
ect to grow to include other environmental data. Air quality
testing emerged as the prime candidate. At SCC2015 we
announced a modular Safecast Air Quality prototype pro-
duced in conjunction with Pasadena based IO Rodeo. This
device is based on the bGeigie form factor, and eventually
can be fused with other sensors. Since that announcement
we’ve designed and deployed a number of prototype Air
Quality devices, with different sensor configurations to test
out viability. These devices looked at gases such as meth-
ane, ozone, nitrogen monoxide and others. We also looked
at particulate in PM10, PM2.5 and PM1.0 sizes. The natural
gas leak in the Porter Ranch area outside Los Angeles pro-
vided valuable opportunity to field test these devices and
helped us decide to use a single sensor per unit direction
rather than trying to fit many different sensors into a single
housing.
1.5 Open Data (aka The Safecast API)
SAFECAST tries to set an example of openness in how we
gather and present our data, and to demonstrate what the
wider benefits of easy access to open data are for society
as a whole. It’s not just a matter of principle, but also one of
pragmatism and practicality: we’re convinced that the more
open data is, the more useful it becomes. “Openness” is
not something that can be easily added later, but needs to
be integrated into the data collection system from the start,
including insuring that there’s a consensus among all the
participants that it’s a major priority. An open system doesn’t
have to cost more than one that’s not, but it does require
careful consideration and planning.
Our detailed FAQ about our openness and data access fea-
tures remains valid:
http://blog.safecast.org/faq/openness-and-data-access/
1.6 Data Visualization
When creating maps, our goal is to provide visualizations
of the data we collect that are accessible and easily under-
stood without compromising detail or accuracy. Perhaps our
most accessible visualization endpoint is the Safecast web
map. In 2015, many improvements were made to it, both to
the data backend and new usability features. The primary
backend software for the web map -- our own OS X pro-
duction app and Retile -- also saw improvements to better
support it. Steady improvements have been made to the
iOS and OS X apps as well.

7. 7
1.7 Outreach Activities
From the start, we’ve considered events and outreach activ-
ities to be an important part of communicating what we are
doing, building our community, and training our volunteers.
We frequently hold workshops, run hackathons, give talks,
and participate in public symposia. We also have ongoing
relationships with MIT Media Lab, Keio University, Aoyama
Gakuin University, Kanazawa Institute of Technology, and
San Diego State University. Our outreach activities increased
in number and intensity during 2015. A few highlights in-
clude:
— The Safecast Conference 2015 - SCC2015 - attracted
over 500 participants in Tokyo and Koriyama (Fukushima)
— Academic presentations and participation in several ex-
pert symposia and in Japan, Europe, South America, and
India.— Workshops in Japan and abroad on an almost
monthly basis.
— Ambitious educational initiatives in Japan, Europe, and
the United States.
— Participation in art exhibitions in the UK, Europe, Singa-
pore, and Taiwan.
.1. 8 Press & Publicity
The Safecast project emerged from the possibilities of the in-
ternet age and “runs” on a fabric of social media, the cloud,
chat rooms, Slack, etc. Safecast does not spend any re-
sources on advertising, relying instead on word of mouth.
However we do get coverage from various types of media
regularly, and we see these as endorsements that what we
do remains relevant. Over the past years we have been
featured, mentioned, or covered in over 150 media publi-
cations—printed press, books, TV, blogs, online, etc. (ap-
proximately 30 newspaper articles in Japan and abroad, 6
features by major broadcast media, at least 50 mentions in
online media, etc.) . Though we have historically gotten more
media coverage outside of Japan than inside, over the past
year Safecast has been well-covered by mainstream media
in Japan.
1.19 Funding & Support
We continue to benefit from the generosity of donors such
as the Shuttleworth Foundation, which is sponsoring key ar-
eas of our activity this year, as well as past support from the
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. Many companies
continue to provide contributions in kind as well. We express
our sincere gratitude to all for this invaluable support.
1.10 Always Improving
If you see anything you think could be done better, needs
fixing, or can be complemented, or if you simply want to help
out or to contribute, let us know at info@safecast.org.
And if you want to learn how to make your data open and
more useable (as a citizen, company, university, or govern-
ment body), we’re here to help.
Part 2: SITUATION REPORT
2.1- Issues at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Powerplant (FDNPP)
As we noted last year, the Fukushima crisis has been evolving
slowly in most respects compared to the situation in 2011.
It is less dynamic in terms of new developments which de-
mand emergency action, but it is a continuing situation with
continuing hazards. Regardless, it is difficult to keep up with
changing circumstances and new information. We’ve gath-
ered a large store of data on issues such as the condition of
the Fukushima Daiichi plant itself, the situation for evacuees,
environmental consequences of the accident, food risks,
and health issues, which we share among ourselves and
which help us focus our efforts. Every aspect of this disaster
is accompanied by controversy, and we strive to be as open
and inclusive as possible. To this end we make a point of
listening to experts on all sides.
2.1- Issues at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Powerplant (FDNPP)
There are many continuing issues of concern at the Fukushi-
ma Daiichi site itself, and how quickly and well they are re-
solved will greatly influence the ultimate severity of the effects
to the environment and to people’s health. The following
sections summarize the current status of decommissioning,
removal of spent fuel rods, water problems, and other is-
sues, noting that the information comes almost entirely from
TEPCO and for the most part cannot be independently con-
firmed.
2.1.1—Decommissioning roadmap
Briefly put, everything that is being done now and which will
be done on site until the year 2020 is merely preparation
for the really hard work of removing the melted fuel debris
from the bottom of the reactor buildings. TEPCO’s roadmap
has slipped more than once, though the company seems
to be basically on schedule so far, but but the work gets
much harder from this point forward. Muh of the needed
technology is either untried or does not yet exist. Regulatory
oversight is in place, but we don’t think it’s intrusive enough.
Slow progress was made in 2015 on the most challenging
issues.
2.1.2— Spent fuel pools
TEPCO quieted some critics by safely removing all of the
spent fuel from Unit 4 in late 2014. This unit had the most
fuel to remove, but the remaining three units will almost cer-
tainly be harder. Over a year has passed, and the schedule
for removing the remainder has been pushed back. The last
fuel pools are now due to start being emptied by 2020. This
fuel needs more secure long-term storage than in the com-
mon pool onsite, though no progress seems to have been
made on preparing a place to put it.

8. 8
2.1.3—Water problems
about at the Daiichi site have gotten better overall since our
last report. They remain serious and are an obstacle to start-
ing the other work which needs to be done, and continue to
pose potential consequences for the environment and ma-
rine life. The influx of groundwater into the site is what poses
the greatest problems, and because it has been impossi-
ble to map its underground flow, every effort to control it
has had unpredictable consequences. The water problems
have forced TEPCO to think ambitiously and innovatively,
and though none of the ideas have worked out quickly or
perfectly, they appear to be advancing technology in some
areas. Other leaks which have low-tech, easily preventable
causes continue to make the news, mainly because they
can be easily detected.
2.1.3a—Radionuclide removal systems
TEPCO has spliced together several different systems for
removing radionuclides from water onsite. These started as
an unreliable hack, but have gradually grown and become
more reliable, and a modular approach has made it pos-
sible to scale up and add new capabilities, and to initiate
new technological developments. While breakdowns and
poor performance were frequently noted in earlier years,
the technology seems to be one of the few major elements
of the overall water strategy that is working well now. The
inability of these systems to remove tritium, however, means
that more tanks will continually be needed to store the treat-
ed water, unless new, expensive, and relatively untried sep-
aration technologies are put in place, or a difficult political
decision is made to release it into the ocean.
2.1.3b— Groundwater problems
Unless the flow of groundwater int the reactor building
basements is stopped, it won’t be possible to carry out the
next steps to prepare for removing the melted fuel debris.
The planned solution is an ambitious series of underground
dams made of frozen soil, and dozens of pumps. All of the
work is complicated by the radioactivity of the water and the
site itself. The frozen wall is about to be activated, and if it
doesn’t work, there does not seem to be a plan “B.” Since
our last report, several elements of TEPCO’s groundwater
strategy have been put in place, but have generally been
less effective than hoped.
2.1.4— Melted fuel removal
The process will require decades and the most optimistic
scenarios have it starting in 2022. The last time something
similar was attempted was over 25 years ago, at Three Mile
Island, where melted core removal was completed in 1990
(it has not yet been attempted at Chernobyl). Consequently
there are not many people with relevant experience to call
on for assistance. A new, well-funded research institute has
been established to incubate the kinds of technologies that
will be necessary. Meanwhile many systematic attempts
at surveying conditions inside the reactor pressure vessels
remotely have been made, some which deserve credit for
ingenuity.
2.2- Evacuees and Returnees
Evacuees’ lives are uprooted, and their grievances are se-
rious and deep-seated. Much of their plight is rooted in
hastily made decisions about where to draw lines between
the evacuated and those who were allowed to remain — as-
suming they wanted to, or would be financially able to leave
if they didn’t. At the moment, not many evacuees want to
return to their abandoned home towns despite enticements
from all levels of government, but quite a few who lived out-
side the evacuation zones have returned. Meanwhile, a large
disparity in compensation has continued to drive communi-
ties even further apart. Since last year another evacuated
town has been reopened and the schedule for the reopening
of others has been accelerated, while lawsuits by evacuees
against TEPCO and the government have proliferated.
2.3- Environment and Decontamination
The radioactive releases to the environment from Fukushi-
ma Daiichi are unprecedented in many respects, but also
comparable to releases from other accidents and from nu-
clear weapons testing. Radionuclides are both persistent in
the environment and mobile, and it’s of paramount impor-
tance to locate and track them as they disperse through the
ocean and migrate into the soil and through watersheds,
to know where to expect food species to be contaminated
and by how much, and where the places where people live
will require remediation, or even abandonment. Since our
last report, radiation levels have continued to decline overall,
while an increasing number of studies have helped clarify the
overall movement of radionuclides within the environment
and the effects on plants and animals.
2.3.1—Overview
The levels of radiation in the post-accident environment do
not remain constant, but change over time due to physical
decay of nuclides, as well as their mobility within ecosys-
tems due to migration into the soil and through watersheds,
their dispersion through the oceans, uptake and dispersion
by plants and animals, and other processes known collec-
tively as “weathering.” In this section we will deal briefly with
the most relevant impacts of Fukushima radiation on the en-
vironment.
2.3.2 The land environment
Odd though it may seem to say it, it was fortunate that only
about 20% of the radioactive releases from Daiichi ended up
on land. Even that much has caused the displacement of
over 100,000 people, and necessitated very costly remedi-
ation of farmland and living areas. Fortunately as well, most
kinds of environmental radiation is not very difficult to detect
and map. This is why SAFECAST exists.
2.3.2a Forests
About 70% of the fallout that fell over land in Japan ended
up in forests. The possibility of decontaminating these vast
areas continues to be discussed, but government agencies
and other researchers who have conducted experimental
forest decontamination concluded that it would be relatively
ineffective even with a great expenditure of money and ef-
fort. Consequently, radionuclides in the forest environment

9. 9
are likely to remain bioavailable to plants and wildlife
for decades. Radionuclides have essentially hijacked
the watershed, turning it into a cesium delivery system
(while delivering smaller amounts of other nuclides as
well). Fortunately researchers have a lot of experience
tracking them in these environments.
2.3.2b Decontamination progress, plans,
effectiveness
The area needing to be decontaminated is vast. When
we investigated the results of the techniques being
used in 2013, we concluded that decontamination was
only partly effective, and that in many situations it made
more sense to wait for natural radioactive decay to take
its course. But much of the time it can make a big
difference in radioactive exposures and doses, though
it rarely eliminates them. The decontamination process
has produced vast quantities of waste that needs to be
disposed of somehow.
2.3.3 The Ocean
The radioactive releases from Fukushima Daiichi to the
ocean were huge, but when the radioactive contami-
nation that entered the ocean as fallout during the cold
war is considered, the overall amount is not necessarily
unprecedented. Many teams of oceanographers have
been tracking and sampling the nuclides as they make
their way across the Pacific, and predictions they made
as early as 2012 about how long it would take the
ocean “plume” to reach the coast of North America,
and how much cesium would be in it when it got there,
have proven to be very accurate. As predicted, the
levels throughout the Pacific in general are lower now
than they were in the 1970’s. But Fukushima Daiichi is
still leaking and major releases of contaminated water
cannot be entirely ruled out. Meanwhile, the radioactive
contamination on the seabed off the Fukushima coast
has been mapped. Experts agree that while contami-
nation in marine species has declined significantly since
2011, only time will reduce the ongoing impact there
to truly negligible levels. Close monitoring of the ocean
environment is extremely important and will continue to
be for years to come.
2.4- Food
Keeping contaminated food off the market is essential
for minimizing internal exposures to radiation. This risk
is chronic because cesium and other radionuclides re-
main in the environment for years -- decades in many
cases -- usually migrating deeper into the soil, and even
if the problem appear to be controlled at some point,
it is still present. The Japanese government quickly in-
stituted a food monitoring program in March 2011, and
in scale and comprehensiveness it has been unprec-
edented. Not everything is checked, however, which
is why the appearance of dozens of independent, cit-
izens-run food testing labs all over the country is ex-
tremely welcome. Also welcome are independent tests
of actual meals being eaten by residents of Fukushima
and elsewhere. While the relative paucity of tests for strontium
remains a matter of concern, the independent tests tend to
support official findings, that less that 1% of the food being
produced in Fukushima has above-limit concentrations of cesi-
um, and virtually none of this is finding its way onto the market.
Farmers themselves deserve almost all the credit for this. The
biggest food risks -- wild mushrooms and vegetables, and wild
boar and other game -- are well known, and will continue to
pose problems for years to come..
2.5- Health
The concern about health damage from radiation exposure,
and particularly the vulnerability of children, has made it the
single most contentious issue surrounding the Fukushima di-
saster. Health concerns are the reason people were evacuated,
and prompted many families to mistrust official assurances and
move away on their own. The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the most likely radiation-related diseases, such as can-
cer and leukemia, will not appear for years after the exposures,
and will only be detected by large-scale, long-term monitoring.
The government quickly established such programs, and the
results so far give cause for cautions optimism. Nevertheless
inadequate transparency and poor communication have left
many citizens suspicious. The finding of many cases of thyroid
cancer in adolescents in Fukushima through mass screening
has caused alarm, and a contentious debate between those
who claim it is due to radiation exposure and experts who dis-
agree.

10. 10
Top: Reception following the Safecast Conference
in Koriyama, Fukushima Prefecture, in March
2015..
Left: Joe Moross installs a Pointcast realtime
radiation sensor at Odaka Worker’s Base in
Odaka, Fukushima Prefecture, 7 km from
Fukushima Daiichi.
Below: Completed Pointcast units ready to be
deployed.

11. 11
PART 1: THE SAFECAST PROJECT UPDATE
MARCH 2016
Compiled by Pieter Franken (Japan ops), Sean Bonner (Global ops), and Nick Dolezal (visualizations)
The Safecast Project now spans numerous aspects of environmental measurement.
The key areas where we’re active today are:
• Mobile Radiation Measurement
• Stationary Radiation Monitoring
• Air Quality Measurement & Monitoring
• Sensor R&D
• Data Visualization: maps and apps!
• Activities: workshops, hackathons, talks
• Outreach: sharing, helping, and learning
In addition, we will discuss Safecast principles and other developments:
• Open Data (The Safecast API)
• Safecast Code—what we stand for and how we (think) we do it
• Press & Publicity—highlights and coverage
• Volunteers—Safecasters and where you can help
• NPO, Funding & Contributions
• Always Improving

12. 12
1.1 Safecast Code
The Safecast Code
In 2014 we published the Safecast Code 1.0, which at-
tempts to describe the Safecast ethos through a list of 10 at-
titudes that guide our efforts. It can be considered our code
of conduct, something we use to remind ourselves of our
goals and to help us focus our efforts. We try to measure up
to the values and attitudes embodied in this list and encour-
age others to do the same:
• ALWAYS OPEN – We strive to make everything we
do transparent, public and accessible.
• ALWAYS IMPROVING -We can always do better so
use agile, iterative design to ensure we’re always re-
fining our work.
• ALWAYS ENCOURAGING – We aim to be welcom-
ing and inclusive, and push each other to keep try-
ing.
• ALWAYS PUBLISHING - Results are useless behind
closed doors, we try to put everything we’re doing
out to the world regularly.
• ALWAYS QUESTIONING – We don’t have all the an-
swers, and encourage continued learning and criti-
cal thinking.
• ALWAYS UNCOMPROMISING – Our commitment
to our goals keeps us moving closer towards them.
• ALWAYS ON – Safecast doesn’t sleep. We’re aware
and working somewhere around the world 24/7
• ALWAYS CREATING – Our mission doesn’t have a
completion date, we can always do more tomorrow.
• ALWAYS OBJECTIVE – Politics skews perception,
we focus on the data and the questions it presents.
• ALWAYS INDEPENDENT - This speaks for itself.
These principles incorporate some of the guiding principles
of Safecast co-founder Joi Ito <http://www.media.mit.edu/
about/principles>. “Deploy or Die” and “The power of Pull”
are two that resonate a lot with us.
We’re on a mission
We’re not saying that “We’re on a mission from God,” but
we do have something to say about openness:
• We strongly feel that environmental data should be
open, easy to access, and easy to understand for
everyone
• Independent opinions about environmental data
have to be available. In the age of the Internet of
Things, that voice can come directly from citizens
• Official groups such as governments, universities,
and companies should publish data about the en-
vironment into the public domain via the Creative
Commons (CC0) designation and acknowledge the
importance of third parties in validating their own
data.
The Safecast Report
You are currently reading the 2nd edition of The Safecast
Report, which was published in March, 2016, as part of the
Safecast Conference 2016 (#SCC2016). The original report
was published in March 2015 and opened to public feed-
back. The 2016 edition integrates much of that feed- back,
and adds a significant number of new insights in the situa-
tion report (Part 2).
With the 2016 edition, we also are publishing the report for
the first time in Japanese and we expect the Japanese ver-
sion to be available during spring 2016. We plan to publish
updates on an annual basis
The Safecast Measurement Method
One of our goals is to document the Safecast measurement
method and answer many of the questions (and challeng-
es) we have received concerning that method. Recently
Safecast’s first, peer-reviewed, scientific paper has been
accepted for publication in a scientific journal. The paper
describes the Safecast methodology and includes a com-
parisons with similar initiatives to highlight what makes the
Safecast approach unique and effective. The article, which
should appear later this year, will mark a major milestone for
Safecast as a “citizen science” project gaining recognition in
the academic world.
In 2016 we will continue the work to document the Safecast
Method and disseminate it in the most effective way possi-
ble.
Meet the new Family:
Drivecast, Pointcast and Pocketcast!
Surprised?
Last year, during the SAFECAST Conference 2015, Safe-
cast Advisor and original volunteer Ray Ozzie encouraged
us to focus on how to best categorize our various projects
and devices. The idea was to be agnostic to the type of
measurement (e.g. radiation, air quality, water, etc) and
group along the measurement format. This resulted into
three clusters into which the collection of projects, devices
and apps fit:
Drivecast - Mobile environmental measurements using a
dedicated, stand alone, rugged device. This includes the
wide range of bGeigie devices for radiation measurements,
and will be expanded to include air quality capable devices.
To clarify, Drivecast does not replace the popular bGeigie
Nano, rather Drivecast is a classification and bGeigie Nano
is one of many devices that falls under that classification.
Other Safecast mobile devices are also Drivecast devices.

13. 13
Pointcast - Stationary environmental measurements us-
ing a dedicated device installed in a fixed location. This in-
cludes devices for radiation measurement and air quality.
The original nGeigies are 1st Generation Pointcast devices,
and 2nd generation devices are currently in the works.
Pocketcast - Mobile measurements using a highly porta-
ble device that piggybacks onto mobile device such as a
smartphone for processing, geo-positioning and commu-
nication. This is currently our least developed classification,
as only a few concept prototypes have been built. We rec-
ognize the value of these paired devices, however, and hope
to see further development of the Pocketcast line in use in
2016.
1.2 DRIVECAST - Mobile
Radiation
Measurement
The Safecast radiation measurement dataset contains over 40 million
measurements as of March 2016.
Since April 2011, Safecast volunteers have been collecting
radiation data using bGeigie mobile radiation sensors. As
of March 2016, the size of the Safecast data set has grown
beyond 43,000,000 measurements, adding 16 million mea-
surements over the past year alone. Over 5 million of these
measurements have come from fixed sensors, while the re-
mainder is from bGeigies. There are over 900 registered us-
ers, over 50 of whom have logged over 100,000 data points
each, 6 of whom have logged over one million each. The
number of Safecast detectors deployed (fixed and mobile)
is approximately 1000, including over 500 bGeigie Nanos.
Almost all major Japanese roads have been measured, with
many areas repeatedly measured over time which provides
clear evidence of radiation level changes. Additionally, data
has been collected from every continent and more than 70
countries, including most of Europe and North America. The
Safecast dataset includes data from far corners including
Sudan, Iraq, and Antarctica, as well as sites of interest such
as Chernobyl, Semipalatinsk, and the Marshall Islands.
A significant percentage of the growth of the data set has
been from areas outside of Japan. Specifically noteworthy is
the growth in Europe where Safecast has gained significant
popularity and we have now a growing network of dedicat-
ed volunteers. In Asia volunteers in Taiwan and Hong Kong
have added significant data covering cities and countryside.
Unique locations on our map now include the Bikini Atoll,
and an expedition to the North Pole. We have not seen as
much activity in Africa, Russia, China, or Latin America yet,
and we hope to see volunteers cover these over time.
Devices
The bGeigie Nano is the current workhorse of Safecast’s radiation mea-
surement efforts.
Since it was released it in mid-2013, more than 500 bGe-
igie Nano kits have been deployed. Previous incarnations
of the bGeigie included the original suitcase size bGeigie,
bGeigie Mini, bGeigie Plus, bGeigie Stealth, and the a one-
of-a-kind special deploy- ment xGeigie. We also designed,
prototyped, but ultimately abandoned a bGeigie 3. Models
prior to the bGeigie Nano were much more labor intensive to
build and had a higher individual cost per unit. Creating the
scaled-down (in both price and size) bGeigie Nano solved
Safecast’s device availability problem almost overnight, ef-
fectively allowing people from all over the world in any loca-
tion to become Safecast volunteers, regardless of whether
or not they had met other Safecasters in person.
bGeigie Bluetooth interface
In 2015 the bGeigie Nano was extended with an optional
Bluetooth interface that allows iOS and Android devices to
connect and facilitate measurement and upload while on the
go. The BLE interface is expected to be available through
kithub.cc later this spring. With the release of BLE module
for the bGeigie, volunteers have released apps for iOS and
Android that allow users to collect and upload measure-
ments directly with their mobile phones. This eliminates the
need to upload data from the SD card into a PC, and makes
it easier for our volunteers to get data out. The iOS and An-
droid apps can be found in the Apple App store and Google
play stores by searching for “Safecast”. Though the iOS and
Android Safecast Drive apps have different interfaces, they
provide similar functionality.

14. 14
Pocketcast
Pocketcast prototype
The first prototype of the Pocketcast was put together
during the Safecast Conference 2015 Hackathon. The goal
is to make a compact device that connects seamlessly with
mobile devices and can run for extended periods without
the need for recharging. This project is expected to gain
renewed focus in 2016.
Fukushima Wheel
Fukushima Wheel (credit: Eyes Japan)
This ongoing project is being developed by Eyes Japan in
conjunction with the University of Aizu, in Aizu Wakamat-
su, Fukushima, under the guidance of CEO Jun Yamade-
ra. A custom-designed rental bicycle is fitted with sensors
and wireless, and can show location-based advertisement
on the wheel through a LED display system mounted on
the wheels; this combines environmental measurement
with a local business model. The second generation of the
Fukushima Wheel uses modified bGeigieNano that includes
CO, NOX and NH3, temperature, and humidity sensors. A
third generation prototype which included PM2.5 and UV
sensors was made as a demo for the Japanese web sales
corporation Rakuten.
Local Government Measurement
Program
In 2012 we started a program to work with municipalities
in Fukushima to measure entire cities, street by street, to
discover hotspots and establish values for the entire town.
Though many radiation surveys were and are being done in
the evacuation zone by the central government (see sec-
tion 2.3 on Environment and Decontamination below), sur-
veys have been inconsistently done in many other parts of
Fukushima. Through this program we have measured four
BLEbee interface module
Safecast Drive on iOS:
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/safecast-drive/
id996229604?mt=8
Safecast:Drive on GooglePlay:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.wizkers.
safecast.drive&hl=en
Safecast Drive apps-- Left: iOS, Right: Android
bGeigie Nano solderless version
Work is underway to develop a version if the bGeigie Nano
for younger volunteers or those uncomfortable with solder-
ing, that can be assembled in a few minutes by snapping
a few pre-built parts together. We expect this to become a
popular model for those that want to just grab a Nano and
measure. The first version is due later in 2016.
Fixed sensor transform kit
While the vast majority of our data comes from mobile de-
vices, we have had a strong interest in having a fixed sen-
sor network as well, especially from volunteers who own a
bGeigie Nano. Many would like to be able to convert this
device into a static sensor so it can collect data at home or
the office when it’s not being used to collect mobile data.
We’re currently developing an additional board that can be
plugged into the XBEE header on existing bGeigie Nanos
that will allow them to collect continuous data from a static
location and automatically upload the readings. For these
purposes we’re developing both hardwired (ethernet) and
wireless (wifi and Bluetooth) options.

15. 15
cities in Fukushima. We were able to remeasure them in
2015, but are planning to remeasure these cities this year.
bGeigie Sharing Program
To get better milage from the fleet of existing bGeigies, we
are developing a sharing program for bGeigie owners to
make their bGeigies available to other volunteers in their
communities. Preparations for doing the first trial run in Ja-
pan are underway and launch is expected in spring 2016.
1.3 POINTCAST -
Stationary Radiation
Measurement
Safecast is deploying a new network of fixed realtime sensors.
In March, 2015, pointcast.safecast.org was launched. This
new initiative is focused on deploying stationary radiation
sensors in Japan and globally. These sensors send real-time
updates about radiation levels and publish it without inter-
ceptions; this data is also open through CC-0. The web in-
terface shows current and past levels, a time versus radia-
tion level plot, the location of each sensor, and photos of the
sensor itself. In addition comments can be posted for each
sensor, encouraging feedback. Sensors that have been off-
line for more than 24 hours are listed as offline.
http://pointcast.safecast.org
The sensors in Japan will increasingly focus on areas around
the Fukushima Daiichi plant, including the exclusion (“difficult
to return”) zone. We’re working with volunteers who are in
contact with evacuees who have expressed the desire to be
able to check the radiation levels at their evacuated hous-
es in realtime. For people living outside of the zone, we will
work with volunteers to house the sensors. This will be a
“pull” model, where we’re dependent on volunteers who are
willing to support the initiative.
Initially we will deploy dual sensors that house two Gei-
ger-muller tubes—one that measures the dose rate equiv-
alent (in uSv/h) and one “pancake” tube to measure the
combined alpha, beta, and gamma activity in counts per
minute (CPM). The sensor unit is manufactured by Medcom
International and has been in production for the past 25 years.
Sensors will installed outdoors, while the electronics (the Point-
cast) will be be located indoors.
Currently over 30 realtime sensors have been deployed, and
our goal is to deploy 30 to 40 more inside Fukushima over the
coming months. This deployment is financially made possible
by the Shuttleworth foundation.
Pointcast hardware elements: Top: Medcom Hawk detector; Bottom: Point-
cast control and communication unit.
Devices
Pointcast is the hardware platform driving pointcast. safecast.
org. The system currently consists of a radiation sensor (Med-
com Radius or Hawk) that is connected to a communications
box (Pointcast) that relays radiation data realtime to the Safe-
cast API. The initial deployment will focus on getting dense cov-
erage across Fukushima, with some sensors also located in
Tokyo and prefectures north of Tokyo.
In 2015 we deployed the first batch of 2nd Generation Point-
casts in Japan and US. These were mostly equipped with fixed
ethernet connection. Though functional, we found that install-
ing sensors outside poses challenges when connecting power
and fixed internet access. In Japan particularly, more and more
people have abandoned fixed internet access together with
their fixed phone lines, and only use a mobile phone for internet
access. Also, most locations in the exclusion zone do not have
fixed internet access. To make deployment less dependent on
the infrastructure at a site, we decided to put more focus on 3G
capable Pointcast devices. Though 3G subscriptions used to
be expensive, last year saw the rise of data-only 3G SIM cards,

16. 16
Dummycast module
developed. This is an Arduino-based simulator of a dual sen-
sor Medcom Radius that outputs two random streams of
pulses which mimick a LND pancake and LND 712 sensor.
resectively The Dummycast can generate a high CPM count
enabling us to ensure the system under test can handle
those levels appropriately.
Safecast 6D
One limitation of using Geiger tubes is that they tell us how
much radiation is present, but nothing much about the iso-
topes emitting the radiation. This is specifically important
when measuring food, but this knowledge can also help us
understand the main contributors to the levels measured in
the environment and to help correctly compute the derived
dose rate. In 2014 Safecast volunteers started to work on
an new design and sensor selection to augment the bGeigie
and nGeigie, which will be able to “see” more dimensions
than in the data we currently collect. At present the project
remains in the concept stage.
ScanningTheEarth
In collaboration with Keio university, Safecast helped deploy
approximately 300 radiation sensors across Japan as part
of the Scanning the Earth project. The data was broadcast
in realtime to a dedicated server hosted at Keio Universi-
ty. Softbank/Yahoo, which sponsored the project, shared
the data for each location on Yahoo Japan on a dedicated
webpage (“Radiation Forecast”). This page was regrettably
discontinued in 2014, although the network itself remains up
and running. One of the limitations of this network is that the
sensors are located non-uniformly inside Softbank stores,
often in a back room or a closet, and not outdoors, where
they would have been more relevant from Safecast’s point
of view. The realtime.safecast.org project is building on the
experience from this project, and is focused on outdoor sen-
sors and broader community to support the sensors.
1.4 POINTCAST - Air
Pollution Measurement
While the primary focus of Safecast has been radiation mea-
surements, we’ve always intended for the project to grow to
include other environmental data. At first glance, air quality
has many similarities to the concerns that attracted us to
radiation. It’s generally invisible, and except in extreme cases
one usually can’t just look outside and see it. Most impor-
which lowered the costs over 90%. One start-up, Soracom.
com, has been very supportive of the Safecast project and
is working together with us to further reduce the costs of the
3G hardware and worldwide coverage. The next batch of
largely 3G-enabled Pointcasts is expected to be deployed in
Fukushima in spring 2016, and should double the number
of sensors available.
In the meanwhile work is under way to develop the next
generation Pointcast. Focus is on a low power solution that
can either connect through BLE to a base station inside a
house, or use experimental networks such as LoRaWan
that have been optimized to consume very low energy. If
power consumption can be kept low enough, the system
will not require cabling, which will simplify deployment in the
field (“drop and forget”). In February 2016, the first LoraWan
Pointcast was successfully connected the The Things Net-
work (TTN - http://thethingsnetwork.org) an international
non-profit group building a LoraWan based network. Safe-
cast and TTN are discussing a partnership to leverage Safe-
cast sensors and the TTN community.
In addition, an iOS app is under development to provide
easy acess to the Pointcast system data. that will show all
Pointcast radiation sensors, either as a list or map. Users
can select “favourite” point cast sensors and monitor these
through a separate list and set alarm levels for those sen-
sors. This will allow citizens to set alarms at levels they want
to be notified at. The Pointcast app is currently in testing and
we hope to see it in the iOS app store by summer 2016.
The Pointcast app on iOS
NRDC partnership (US)
In a collaboration with the NRDC (Natural Resources De-
fence Council, Washington DC), Pointcast sensors have
been deployed on a trial basis in the Washington DC area. In
2016 the goal is to deploy more devices at locations in the
US and expand the reach of the network.
Dummycast
We needed a way to test Pointcast sensors withoutconect-
ing a Medcom Radius or other sensor, and also needed to
be able to generate high CPM without using dangerous ra-
diation sources. A device we’ve dubbed “Dummycast” was

17. 17
In the 12 months since that announcement we’ve designed
and deployed a number of prototype Air Quality devic-
es, with different sensor configurations to test out viability.
These devices looked at gases such as methane, ozone,
nitrogen monoxide and others. We also looked at particulate
in PM10, PM2.5 and PM1.0 sizes. The natural gas leak in
the Porter Ranch area outside Los Angeles provided valu-
able opportunity to field test these devices and helped us
decide to use a single sensor per unit direction rather than
trying to fit many different sensors into a single housing.
We expect to have several versions of tested prototypes that
we’re confident of shortly and will soon begin a larger de-
ployment of these sensors. SCAQMD has graciously offered
to collocate our sensors with their governmental spec sen-
sors which will provide excellent comparison data.
1.5 Open Data (aka The
Safecast API)
The ability to load specific drives to be visualized is a very useful API
feature.
SAFECAST tries to set an example of openness in how we
gather and present our data, and to demonstrate what the
wider benefits of easy access to open data are for society
as a whole. It’s not just a matter of principle, but also one of
pragmatism and practicality: we’re convinced that the more
open data is, the more useful it becomes.
Making everything openly available makes it easy for techni-
cally knowledgeable people to investigate our data and test
its trustworthiness, and encourages many people to partic-
ipate. We designed our system and our openness policies
with demanding people and skeptics in mind. We wish this
were the case for everyone publishing independent radiation
data (or any data, for that matter), but it’s not. There’s no
reason for the public to consider “independent” data more
trustworthy than “official” data unless the people publishing
it can demonstrate that it’s technically comparable and also
more transparent and free of possible bias. We encourage
others to start with the assumption that their data cannot be
tantly, no clear, universally accessible, reliable source of data
is available, and the data that can be found is often opaque
and vague. With radiation we are essentially measuring just
one quantity, but air quality in a much broader and more
loosely defined concept. A realistic concern in one city might
not be so in another, and this has led to much discussion
and the constant question of what aspects of air quality and
which gases are most important to measure, and for what
purposes.
Safecast’s most recent prototype air quality sensor.
Unlike radiation where there is a clear consensus about
which sensors are reliable for specific applications, air sen-
sors are much more diverse and tend to be much less reli-
able in general. We’ve spent a significant amount of time
and money trying to find and calibrate sensors that produce
consistent measurements. At SCC2015 we announced a
modular Safecast Air Quality prototype produced in con-
junction with Pasadena based IO Rodeo. This device is
based on the bGeigie form factor, and eventually can be
fused with other sensors. Additionally, we’ve been collabo-
rating with the SCAQMD, EDF, NRDC, MIT Media Lab, and
Google on air sensors. Particulate pollution, specifically
PM2.5, is of global interest and methane, a core greenhouse
gas, is an important gas to quantify when considering cli-
mate issues.
Safecast Air sensor unit for methane.

18. 18
• Client-side zoom of web map tiles, allowing for the user
to continue viewing a visualization beyond the practical
logistical limit of its original resolution.
• Cloud storage of web map tiles via AWS S3 with region-
al endpoints in the US and Japan, significantly improv-
ing performance for non-US based users while adding
redun- dancy and scalability.
• The primary backend software for the web map -- our
own OS X app and Retile -- also saw improvements to
better support it, including:
• Further optimizations to output PNG tile filesize.
• Various performance improvements, with a focus on
reducing server resource usage.
• Code rewrites to support maintainability and unification
of the iOS and OS X app codebases.
• Change detection, which reduces daily runtimes by
hours and allows for continued future dataset growth.
• Automated cross-region synchronization with AWS S3
cloud storage.
Snapshots of the Fukushima region for 3/11/2011 through 9/10/2011,
above, and 3/11/2013-9/10/2013, below.
In addition, we’re happy to announce that we have imple-
mented a long-awaited time-based “snapshot” feature which
allows users to see how radiation levels have changed over
time by using a simple slider set to 6-month increments.
considered trustworthy unless it can be easily and anony-
mously accessed by others and put to demanding analytical
tests.
“Openness” is not something that can be easily added later,
but needs to be integrated into the data collection system
from the start, including insuring that there’s a consensus
among all the participants that it’s a major priority. An open
system doesn’t have to cost more than one that’s not, but it
does require careful consideration and planning.
The detailed FAQ about our openness and data access
features remains relevant:
http://blog.safecast.org/faq/openness-and-data-access/
1.6 Data Visualization
1.6.1 Maps
Safecast’s dataset now has over 43,000,000 data points from over 70
countries
When creating maps, our goal is to provide visualizations
of the data we collect that are accessible and easily under-
stood without compromising detail or accuracy. Perhaps our
most accessible visualization endpoint is the Safecast web
map. In 2015, some of the improvements we made to it
were:
• Responsive design to better support mobile devices and
HDPI displays.
• Real-time sensor symbology that dynamically displays
their current measurement.
• Custom query support, including aircraft-collected data,
via scalability improvements to the bGeigie log viewer.
• Additional content: aggregate historical layers for 2012
• A query tool to quickly display measurement values from
the map.
• A transition to 512x512 web map tiles for improved
transfer speed, particularly for users with high-latency
connections.

19. 19
NPO IFF-ORME, with support from IRSN
• American School in Japan (ASIJ), including new educa-
tional units based on the bGeigie
• Aoyama Gakuin - a new 1-semester course
• Other presentations at schools in Tokyo area: Seisen HS,
British School
• Mori Building Kids Workshop
• KitHub, now bringing the educational initiatives together
and making open source course material
Exhibitions etc 2015:
Partial view of Safecast exhibit at the Taipei Digital Art Festival
• Big Bang Data (Barcelona, London, Buenos Aires, Sin-
gapore)
• Taipei Digital Art Festival
1.8 Press & Publicity
The Safecast project emerged from the possibilities of the
internet age and “runs” on a fabric of social media, the
cloud, chat rooms, Slack, etc. Safecast does not spend any
resources on advertising, relying instead on word of mouth.
However we do get coverage from various types of media
regularly, and we see these as endorsements that what we
do remains relevant. Over the past years we have been
featured, mentioned, or covered in over 150 media publi-
cations—printed press, books, TV, blogs, online, etc. (ap-
proximately 30 newspaper articles in Japan and abroad, 6
features by major broadcast media, at least 50 mentions in
online media, etc.)
Contributing to media is a significant activity for Safecast, as
it allows our message to be propagated to a larger audience
and also helps us to connect to new volunteers. Not only do
we appear in articles, we also have become a go-to source
for journalists who want to learn about radia- tion and scien-
tific findings relate to the Fukushima disaster, and we have
spent countless hours with reporters to share what we know
and connect them with relevant people and organizations.
1.7 Outreach Activities
From the start, we’ve considered events and outreach activ-
ities to be an important part of communicating what we are
doing, building our community, and training our volunteers.
We frequently hold workshops, run hackathons, give talks,
and participate in public symposia. We also have ongoing
relationships with MIT Media Lab, Keio University, Aoyama
Gakuin University, Kanazawa Institute of Technology, and
San Diego State University.
A few highlights from the past year have been:
• The Safecast Conference 2015 - SCC2015 - attracted
over 500 participants in Tokyo and Koriyama (Fukushi-
ma)
Expert symposia, academic presenta-
tions, etc:
• Ricomet (Ljubljana, Slovenia)
• IRSN, Paris
• Univ Science Po, Paris
• Univ Paris Sud
• Nuclear News Conference, New Delhi
• Risk Communication - United Nations Univ, Tokyo
• Temple Univ Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies
(ICAS)(with Ken Buesseler of WHOI)
• Gathering for Open Science Hardware at CERN, Gene-
va, Switzerland
Workshops & Collaborations in 2015:
• Tokyo: about workshops at the Safecast office, one at
ASIJ (American School in Japan)
• Fukushima (Koriyama), twice. -- Fukushima (Aizu)
• France: three times altogether -- Taipei: twice
• Hong Kong: once (31 participants, 3 days, biggest ever)
• Limited edition run of green bGeigies for the Shuttle-
worth Foundation
• 10 devices acquired by OpenOil for use at uranium
mines
• Limited edition run of pink bGeigies for Kithub, girls in
technology event
Educational initiatives begun in 2015:
• France, for high schools, sponsored by environmental

20. 20
cast received the Good Design Award for the Safecast
Project as a whole. The Good Design Award is Japan’s
most prestigious award for what is deemed the leading
edge in industrial design.
1.10 Funding & Support
NPO Status & Advisory Board
Safecast is a registered, US-based non profit organization.
Over the last year we have begun to set up an advisory
board.
In addition to the US organization, there are plans to regis-
ter Safecast as an NPO in Japan and The Netherlands over
the coming year to increase scope and outreach.
Shuttleworth Foundation
Safecast co-founder Sean Bonner was awarded a Shuttle-
worth Foundation Fellowship for the year 2014–2015 which,
in addition to being a wonderful braintrust and support
group, has provided funds to allow us to do the following:
• Daily operation costs, servers, and office rent provided.
• Stationary Sensors Project (nGeigie)—25 sensors to be
deployed in Fukushima
• Visualization—continuation of development of the Safe-
cast maps and apps
• We now have new Makerbot Replicators and an Other
Machine Other Mills in both Tokyo and Los Angeles,
allow- ing us to speed up prototyping and share designs
globally. We can have an idea in Tokyo, design a circuit
board and case for it, and then simultaneously make
exact copies in Tokyo and Los Angeles for testing pur-
poses. This ability trims days and weeks from our design
runway.
• The Safecast Conference 2015 was also made possible
by Shuttleworth, and enabled us to bring many collabo-
rators to Tokyo from overseas.
• Air Quality R&D
The Knight Foundation
• Between 2011 and 2013, the John S. and James L.
Knight Foundation was the primary funder for Safecast,
awarding us several grants to aid with many different
aspects of the Safecast mission.
Contributions in kind
We would like to thank the following companies for offering
us help with our office, discounted equipment and services:
• Loftwork
• Medcom International -- Slack
We often accompany reporters into the field. We rarely seek
coverage, however, and generally wait to be approached.
When we feel information could be more accurately and in-
formatively represented, though, we’re not shy about reach-
ing out to journalists with more reliable information as well.
Though we have historically gotten more media coverage
outside of Japan than inside, over the past year Safecast
has been well-covered by mainstream media in Japan.
There are too many to mention, but we would like to high-
light a few recent media appearances, mentions, awards
and exhibitions:
Press Highlights 2015:
• Nikkei Shimbun (printed edition) 2x
• Asahi Shimbun 20-part series
• NHK documentary (directed by Michael Goldberg) -- The
Gardian (series on openness and security) -- Channel
News Asia “Danger Zone”
• Al Jazeera (Arduino documentary)
• Nova TV, Bulgaria
• Wissenshaftmagazin (Swiss radio)
• National Geographic - http://voices.national- geograph-
ic.com/2016/02/13/how-citizen-sci- ence-changed-the-
way-fukushima-radiation-is-reported/
• Makery - http://www.makery.info/en/2016/03/01/cinq-
ans-apres-fukushima-safecast-attaque-la-pollution-de-
lair/
• Forbes Online
• Die Zeit (Germany)
• The Engineer (Denmark)
• NRC Handelsblad (The Netherlands)
• Open Data Institute online article
Reports and Mentions 2015:
• IAEA Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report (They con- si-
dered us a noteworthy independent effort and devoted
ample space to describing our project)
• Peer-reviewed paper “Radiation Monitoring for the Mass-
es”
• Many mentions in academic papers dealing with infor-
mation and communication, citizen initiatives, etc. after
Fukushima
Recent Awards Won:
• 2013 - GOOD DESIGN AWARD, Japan - In 2013 Safe-

21. 21
• Fundraising - help fund a devices in your area.
Especially funding of point cast devices in Japan and else-
where is needed.
• Safecast Air - experts in air monitoring who are
interested in analysing and visualising data coming of our
sensors.
• Safecast Water - new initiative in need of project
lead, experts, funding, etc
• Events - help organize events
• SCC2017 - help out organising our annual confer-
ence
• Safecast Report - researchers and writers to ex-
pand the breath and depth of the report. A new chapter on
Air is on our shortlist for the next edition
If you want to help, please contact us and indicate in which
area you want to help out and what relevant skills/experi-
ence and time commitment you can bring to the project.
Get in touch: info@safecast.org and @safecast on twitter
(and if we don’t get back to you quickly enough, please
read the previous sections to understand why!)
Stephen Dimmock of Cambridge University was our very productive intern
in the summer of 2015.
• Adafruit
• Sparkfun
• Pelican Case
• MediaTemple
• Cloud66
• Kromek (Safecast 6D)
1.11 Always Improving
Safecast is the work of volunteers, and is by no means fin-
ished. We don’t expect we will ever get to a point where “the
final word” has been spoken. This applies to the Safecast
Report as well. The information provided here represents the
best data we have found, and the best of our understanding
and knowledge, but we encourage readers and volunteers
to check the data and information themselves and form their
own opinions about the environment we’re living in. Ques-
tions regarding what is or is not “safe” question can’t be
answered the same way for different individuals. However,
being aware will hopefully allow us to make better decisions,
and to focus our individual actions to better improve our en-
vironment and our lives.
If you see anything you think could be done better, needs
fixing, or can be complemented, or if you simply want to help
out or to contribute, let us know.
And if you want to learn how to make your data open and
more useable (as a citizen, company, university, or govern-
ment body), we’re here to help.
Want to help?
Safecast is a volunteer project and is in constant need of
help. Areas where we need you are:
• Measuring (of course!)- measure radiation in your
area. Team up with others to share a device for greater
reach. Find locations for fixed sensors. Help share devices.
• API - Ruby programmers, Google Go program-
mers, SQL programmers (Postgress)
• Devices - embedded system developers, low ener-
gy hardware designers
• Pointcast - web developers with experience in
WordPress and basic scripting
• Apps - iOS and Android developers
• Translators - J/E, E/J, Chinese
• Community managers - manage a community in
your locale
• SNS gurus - keep Facebook, Google, LinkedIn,
Twitter, Vimeo, Slideshare and other social media channels
alive in multiple languages
• Blog - write feature articles about what’s happen-
ing in and around Safecast

22. 22
Top: The Safecast Shinnenkai New Year’s Party in Tokyo,
Jan. 2016.
Left: Participants at our workshop at Aizu University, Oct.
2015
Below: Panel discussion at the Safecast Conference 2015 in
Tokyo, March 2015. From left: Safecast co-founder Joi
Ito (MIT Media Lab), Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa (NAIIC Re-
port Chairman), Joe Paradiso (MIT Media Lab), Karien
Bezuidenhout (Shuttleworth Foundation), Matthew
McKinzie (NRDC).

23. 23
Part 2: SITUATION REPORT
Information compiled and summarized by Azby Brown, with contributions as noted.
Prefatory note:
As we noted last year, the Fukushima crisis has been evolving slowly in most respects compared to the situation in 2011. It is
less dynamic in terms of new developments which demand emergency action, but it is a continuing situation with continuing
hazards. Regardless, it is difficult to keep up with changing circumstances and new information.
While the core of SAFECAST’s work is making crowdsourced
environmental monitoring data freely available online, we’ve
also gathered a large store of data on issues such as the
condition of the Fukushima Daiichi plant itself, the situation
for evacuees, environmental consequences of the accident,
food risks, and health issues, which we share among our-
selves and which help us focus our efforts. From the start
we have made a point of talking to researchers regardless of
their ideological stance on nuclear power, and over the past
several years have fielded countless questions and requests
for data, which we’ve always tried to respond to positively.
The robustness of this dialogue has also made it possible
for us to seek expert advice and opinion on many related
subjects, and to pass this knowledge on to our community
as well.
From time to time we have published in-depth blog posts on
specific subjects, and made technical backgrounders avail-
able online, and have often pointed researchers, journalists,
and others towards these to help them get up to speed.
Quite a lot of technical information and many scientific re-
ports are discussed, sometimes heatedly, on the Safecast
Radiation Discussion Google Group. Volume 1 of the Safe-
cast Report, <http://blog.safecast.org/the-safecast-report/>
released online in March 2015, was an attempt to make this
kind of information more accessible. You are now reading
Volume 2, released in March 2016. The following Situation
Report is an attempt to compile and summarize the most
relevant, current, and accurate information we are aware of
on the major aspects of the Fukushima disaster and make
it available as a reference for anyone who is interested or
has a need to know. In the following sections we describe
the current situation at the Daiichi site itself, for the environ-
ment in general, for food, and for people’s health, and cite
our sources of information in each case. Not surprisingly, we
have been forced to leave out as much as we’ve included,
and some issues may not be as well addressed as others,
but we have taken pains to make it readable, and provide
links to more in-depth documents wherever possible. Like
Volume 1, Volume 2 of the Safecast Report is intended to be
a stand-alone document which avoids as much as possible
requiring readers to refer to Volume 1 for important informa-
tion. Relevant changes and new developments are noted,
while some basic background and other information remains
largely unchanged.
Every aspect of this disaster is accompanied by controver-
sy, and we try to guard against our own biases and strive
to be as open and inclusive as possible. Some people will
undoubtedly find that our information in some places con-
tradicts what they’ve read elsewhere. Others will feel we do
not give sufficient weight to one opinion or another. We have
concentrated on finding the best-documented sources, and
have attempted to evaluate the evidence dispassionately.
We welcome criticism, and urge anyone who would like to
point out contradictory data not to hesitate to do so, be-
cause that is input we particularly welcome. As mentioned
above, we intend to update this report on a regular basis,
and would be pleased with any feedback which will help us
improve it.
About information sources
The reliability of information has always been a major issue
affecting public understanding of the Fukushima Disaster,
and in fact the lack of reliable information during the ear-
ly stages of the disaster was the reason SAFECAST was
founded. Official statements concerning ambient radiation
levels in the environment, and to a lesser degree soil con-
tamination, can be crosschecked against citizen science
and academic research in most cases. Radiation levels and
impacts in the ocean, with the exception of the immediate
vicinity of Daiichi, have been very well documented by re-
searchers, in a way which provides a useful cross-check
against official claims concerning releases of contaminated
water to the ocean, etc.. Food testing data from many inde-
pendent groups is available as well as that from the govern-
ment. There has been little or no third-party verification of the
decontamination process itself, but radiation levels can be
easily confirmed for most locations if desired. Verifying the
health monitoring done by the national and Fukushima Pre-
fecture governments presents a higher technical hurdle, but
several well-done health screening programs run by local
governments as well as by community groups and founda-
tions allow many useful comparisons to be made.
But for understanding what’s happening onsite at the Daiichi
plant itself, we are forced to depend on data provided by
TEPCO almost exclusively, much of it presented with an ob-
vious PR spin. Because there is almost no independent veri-
fication of measurements and work onsite, TEPCO data has
an inherent unverifiability which in some cases can be sig-
nificant. SAFECAST has consistently pushed for third-par-
ty verification of radiation monitoring at the Daiichi site and
elsewhere, and while some TEPCO staff and gov’t agency
employees have privately agreed that it would be beneficial
for everyone, including for TEPCO itself, to adopt this kind
of policy, none of our proposals have been accepted so far.
Other qualified groups and researchers we know have made
similar proposals and have also been rebuffed. We will con-
tinue to press for the inclusion of third-party monitoring as a
matter of course.

24. 24
Partly in response to this kind of criticism, in March 2015
TEPCO announced a new “disclosure” policy under which
all onsite measurement data would quickly be made public-
ly available. As will be noted below, while this data can be
helpful, it is relatively hard to locate at first (see links below).
TEPCO Announces New Disclosure Policy And Inde-
pendent Audit Of Drainage Water Issue; Says Findings
Will Be Public By End Of March March 6, 2015
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/
release/2015/1248564_6844.html
TEPCO to make all data on radiation at Fukushima plant
public Mar. 31, 2015
http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/tepco-
says-it-will-make-all-data-on-radiation-at-fukushima-plant-
public?utm_campaign=jt_newsletter&utm_medium=e-
mail&utm_source=jt_newsletter_2015-03-31_PM
TEPCO to come clean on radiation levels, allow checks
by outside experts March 31, 2015
https://web.archive.org/web/20150411035133/http://ajw.asahi.
com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201503310040
Most announcements and news articles about this disclo-
sure policy note that TEPCO says it will allow regular checks
by third parties. We can only confirm that this is happening
for tests of water intended to be released into the ocean
after purification. The only third parties that have been ap-
proved for this testing to date are JAEA and the Japan
Chemical Analysis Center. JAEA is a government agency,
and the Japan Chemical Analysis Center, while independent,
has close government ties. Both entities have the requisite
technical capabilities and experience to do accurate testing
of this sort, and we have seen no evidence that would sug-
gest that their measurements are inaccurate. Nevertheless,
as we said above, we think it is important to allow testing by
more fully independent organizations and researchers.
Since implementing the policy in March 2015, TEPCO has
gradually expanded the data it has made available, and
claims that all of its measurement data has been available
online since August 2015; it estimates that 70,000 items will
be made available annually. Much of this takes the form of
handwritten ledger notes which have been scanned, and it
is very time consuming to review them; almost all of it is in
Japanese. Nevertheless, it will be very useful to research-
ers and others to have this information available. Up to date
measurement data appears to be available for the follow-
ing categories: Water treatment facilities; Tanks, Discharged
water /Sprinkled water; Accumulated water/Contaminated
water in the buildings; Units1-4 facilities/Common facilities;
Units 5,6 facilities; General facilities/Whole site facilities /Oth-
ers; Waste fluid/ Water used for Decontamination; Drainage/
River; Groundwater; Soil /Gravel /Gravel inside the Power
Station; Hazardous materials; Outside Power Station:
TEPCO Disclosure page (Japanese):
http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/disclo-
sure/2015/01/index-j.html
English index:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/disclo-
sure/2015/04/images/english_form.pdf
In addition, since our last report, TEPCO has improved the
accessibility of its overall monitoring results, and has made
it possible to choose reports in various categories using a
calendar interface:
TEPCO Monitoring results page (English)
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/in-
dex-e.html
Quite a lot of information related to the disaster is made avail-
able by various Japanese Government agencies in down-
loadable form, much of it in English. These efforts are poor-
ly coordinated at best, and the content is often repetitive,
with nearly identical information being published by different
agencies, though often with minor differences which require
vigilance to spot. The original sources for the information are
usually cited somewhere, and while several agencies have
the official power to conduct their own inspections, in prac-
tice information regarding Fukushima Daiichi itself almost
invariably comes from TEPCO. In the absence of adequate
independent sources, we are forced to rely on official doc-
uments like these for much of the information we include in
Section 2.1, about the Daiichi site, and we attempt to high-
light relevant caveats and uncertainties. While we also make
use of official data in the sections on evacuees, environment,
food, and health as well, much more independent informa-
tion and research data is generally available for these.
Official Reports
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a ma-
jor role in the global governance of nuclear weapons and
nuclear energy, and its actions (and inaction) have been key
factors in the response to the Fukushima disaster. IAEA in-
vestigation teams are given access to the Daiichi site regu-
larly, and also evaluate TEPCO and government data, issu-
ing periodic reports on their findings. One of the most recent
reports is from Nov. 2015. Approximately 23 pages of sum-
maries and links provided by the government are followed
by 2 1/2 pages of commentary and critique from the IAEA:
Events and highlights on the progress related to recov-
ery operations at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Sta-
tion, November, 2015
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/highlights-ja-
pan1115.pdf
This is actually a useful list of reports and findings from TEP-
CO and government sources, and includes recent informa-
tion about the ocean, decontamination, food, etc. It’s im-
portant to keep in mind that participation in IAEA programs
is voluntary on the part of national governments, and though
there are consequences for non-participation and non-com-
pliance, the IAEA is given access at the behest of the gov-
ernment and only with its cooperation. The IAEA can request
access to specific sites or to specific information, but there
are occasional signs that it doesn’t always get what it has
requested. All of this must be kept in mind when reading and
parsing IAEA reports, whose language is always extremely
formal and diplomatic. More reports related to the Fukushi-
ma accident are available on the IAEA’s website :
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima

25. 25
The IAEA issued its comprehensive report on the Fukushima
Disaster in August, 2015:
IAEA Releases Director General’s Report on Fukushima
Daiichi Accident
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-releases-di-
rector-general%E2%80%99s-report-fukushima-daiichi-ac-
cident
It includes the Report by the Director General (about 220
pages), as well as five technical volumes, each with several
electronic annexes. The Director General’s Report is divided
into several sections:
— The accident and its assessment (how the ac-
cident progressed, how and where safety functions failed,
contributing human factors, etc)
— Emergency preparedness and response (initial
official responses in Japan, protective measures taken for
emergency workers and the public, international response,
etc)
— Radiological consequences (environmental con-
sequences, public exposure, health effects, etc)
— Post-accident recovery (remediation and decon-
tamination, on-site preparations for decommissioning, com-
munity issues, etc)
— The IAEA response to the accident (Initial activ-
ities, action plans developed, cooperation, meetings and
conferences, etc)
The technical volumes follow a similar breakdown:
— Technical Volume 1/5 - Description and Context
of the Accident
— Technical Volume 2/5 - Safety Assessment
— Technical Volume 3/5 - Emergency Prepared-
ness and Response
— Technical Volume 4/5 - Radiological Conse-
quences
— Technical Volume 5/5 - Post-accident Recovery.
There are 40 downloadable files in all, and a printed version,
with CD-ROM annexes, is also available. The Director Gen-
eral’s report section is also available in several languages,
including Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish and
Japanese.
The report is massive, in short, and we suspect that very few
people have read more than a portion of it. We will refer to
some of its relevant findings in Section 2.5: Health and else-
where, but won’t attempt to summarize the entire report.
We will note that though it couched it in characteristically
diplomatic language, the IAEA’s criticism of TEPCO and the
Japanese government in this report is as scathing as we are
ever likely to read from a UN agency. It is reasonable to ask
why, of course, if the regulatory failures and lack of prepa-
ration for accidents were so extreme, the IAEA had not de-
tected this prior to the accident and insisted that Fukushima
Daiichi and other TEPCO nuclear powerplants be shut down
until safety modifications had been made. I think the only
answer for this is that the IAEA cannot enforce safety, can
only recommend what it considers best practices, and that
it is only given access to what the government wants it to
see. We think the recognition of the huge consequences of
this in case of Fukushima should by now be leading to calls
for more effective and binding governance of nuclear energy
worldwide. Such calls may be being made, but do not yet
appear to have had much impact.
The IAEA report includes discussion of volunteer efforts after
Fukushima, and Safecast is mentioned very positively in that
context (see Technical Volume 4, Annex III, p.23):
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Addi-
tionalVolumes/P1710/Pub1710-TV4-Web.pdf
While the full IAEA report was issued in August 2015, a draft
of the Report by the Director General section was leaked
online by Greenpeace in late May:
IAEA report draft download page (Japanese):
http://www.greenpeace.org/japan/ja/news/blog/dblog/
iaeaweb/blog/53006/
Greenpeace also issued a critique of the report based on the
leaked draft:
http://www.greenpeace.org/japan/Global/japan/pdf/IAEA
analysis by GP 20150528.pdf
Interestingly, TEPCO, in its first major progress report issued
since the release of the IAEA report, agrees with IAEA criti-
cism on all of the main points regarding inadequate prepa-
ration, complacency, underplaying tsunami risk, faulty safety
analyses, etc.. (see p. 71 of the text linked below). TEPCO
enumerates the measures it has put in place to address
these shortcomings, but while it may be possible to evaluate
some of of the technical aspects, we may never know which
of those those which are rooted in corporate and political
culture are actually being remedied.
TEPCO: Nuclear Safety Reform Plan - Progress Report
(Including Progress on Safety Measures at Power Sta-
tions) (2nd Quarter, FY2015) November 20, 2015
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/
betu15_e/images/151120e0102.pdf
The IAEA report follows on others from UN agencies:
WHO Preliminary dose estimation from the nuclear ac-
cident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami, 2012
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/fukushi-
ma_dose_assessment/en/

26. 26
WHO Health risk assessment from the nuclear accident
after the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsuna-
mi, based on a preliminary dose estimation, 2013
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/fukushi-
ma_risk_assessment_2013/en/
UNSCEAR 2013 Report to the General Assembly, Vol-
ume I: Report to the General Assembly, Scientific Annex
A: Levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the
nuclear accident after the 2011 great east-Japan earth-
quake and tsunami, 2014
http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2013_1.
html
(A draft of the UNSCEAR report on Fukushima was also
leaked in 2013 several months prior to release.)
Safecast made a summary critique of the UNSCEAR
Fukushima report:
http://www.slideshare.net/safecast/unscear-2013-fukushi-
ma-final-report-commentary-v02
The German branch of the International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) issued a critique of the
UNSCEAR report as well:
http://www.fukushima-disaster.de/fileadmin/user_upload/
pdf/english/Akzente_Unscear2014.pdf
Dr. Keith Baverstock also published a strong critique of the
UNSCEAR report, through the Japanese magazine Kaga-
ku, focusing on structural issues within the organization and
their implications:
https://www.iwanami.co.jp/kagaku/Kagaku_201410_Bav-
erstock.pdf
After it’s 2013 report was issued, UNSCEAR experts con-
tinued to collect data on the Fukushima accident, reviewing
more than 80 publications issued between October 2012
and December 2014 (the 2013 report considered informa-
tion available up to October 2012). UNSCEAR issued an
update in late 2015 in the form of a white paper. In it they
address the critiques from Baverstock and IPPNW, among
others:
Developments Since The 2013 UNSCEAR Report On
The Levels And Effects Of Radiation Exposure Due To
The Nuclear Accident Following The Great East-Japan
Earthquake And Tsunami, 2015
http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/Fukushi-
ma_WP2015.html
In the following sections, we begin with a general summary
of each topic, followed by more in-depth discussion.
Acknowledgements:
Many thanks to Andrew Pothecary, designer of many of the infographics which appear on throughout the Situation Report section. Many of these previ-
ously appeared in the Number 1 Shimbun, the magazine of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ) and are credited as such, while others were
made specifically for the 2015 version of this report and have been updated. We would also like to thank the many researchers and specialists who have
given us valuable feedback on our drafts. Of course any errors are our own.

27. 27
Organizational acronyms:
JAEA: Japan Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
NIRS: National Institute of Radiological Sciences
NRA: (Japan) Nuclear Regulatory Authority
METI: Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology
IRID: International Research Institute for Nuclear Decom-
missioning Recent site guide to the Fukushima Daiichi
2.1.1—Decommissioning
roadmap
Briefly put, everything that is being done now and which will
be done on site until the year 2020 is merely preparation for
the really hard work of removing the melted fuel debris from
the bottom of the reactor buildings. TEPCO’s roadmap has
slipped more than once, though the company seems to be
basically on schedule so far, but but the work gets much
harder from this point forward. Much of the needed technol-
ogy is either untried or does not yet exist. Regulatory over-
sight is in place, but we don’t think it has enough teeth. Slow
progress was made in 2015 on the most challenging issues.
TEPCO released it’s first decommissioning roadmap — a
timeline describing the expected schedule of work on the
cleanup of the Daiichi site — in Dec. 2011, and has issued
periodic updates, most recently in February, 2016. The orig-
inal 2011 plan is a complicated document that points to the
ultimate removal of melted fuel from the reactor contain-
ments at some as yet unknown date in the future, demolition
of the buildings themselves, and remediation of the site.
Much of the actual planning for later stages of the work can-
not be done until success has been assured on earlier stag-
es, particularly in solving the many water-related problems
on the site. In fact, some of the technologies expected to be
required for actually extracting the melted fuel do not exist
yet..
Long-term decommissioning diagram (Credit: TEPCO, annotations by
SAFECAST)
TEPCO: Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap towards the
Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station Units 1-4, Dec. 21, 2011
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/
betu11_e/images/111221e14.pdf
2.1- Issues at
Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Powerplant
(FDNPP)
There are many continuing issues of concern at the Fukushi-
ma Daiichi site itself, and how quickly and well they are re-
solved will greatly influence the ultimate severity of the ef-
fects to the environment and to people’s health. We quickly
summarize the current status of decommissioning, removal
of spent fuel rods, water problems, and other issues.
Notable changes since last year’s report: Updates on the
overall decommissioning timeline; updates on preparations
for removing remaining spent fuel from the spent fuel pools;
progress on water treatment and remediation; discussion of
the tritiated water problem; update on progress with the by-
pass, subdrains, and the frozen underground wall; discussion
of the effectiveness of the seaside impermeable wall; update
on preparations for melted fuel debris removal; updated Muon
imaging results; description of progress of investigations inside
the reactors; discussion of onsite worker issues.
Recent site guide to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FD-
NPP).(Credit: TEPCO)

28. 28
TEPCO does not make its plans in isolation, but receives
guidance and instructions from Japanese government
agencies such as METI, NRA, JAEA, NIRS, and IRID, and is
required to demonstrate to the IAEA that progress is being
made onsite. As noted above, NRA and IAEA conduct pe-
riodic reviews and onsite inspections, but we feel they lack
the manpower, if not the mandate, to conduct the kind of
unannounced inspections that seem to be warranted. The
government seems to rely too heavily on what TEPCO tells
it, and the IAEA seems to depend primarily on information
provided by the Japanese government. We’re left to con-
clude that the only entity which really knows what’s hap-
pening onsite is TEPCO itself, and that despite its new dis-
closure policy it is able to be selective about what data it
releases, how, and when. The IAEA issued a (preliminary)
inspection report on Feb 17, 2015, and its major Fukushi-
ma report in August 2015, as described above. Documents
released by UN agencies invariably adhere to a thick dip-
lomatic language which requires a fair amount of parsing
and reading between the lines. Not surprisingly, however,
the IAEA reserved its strongest criticism for TEPCO’s failures
of management and oversight. Partly because of continued
problems in these areas, we suspect, new corporate enti-
ties, the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination and Decom-
missioning Engineering Company and the Nuclear Damage
Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corpo-
ration, were established, intended to improve oversight of
these critical long-term projects
IAEA International Peer Review Mission On Mid-And-
Long-Term Roadmap Towards The Decommissioning
Of Tepco’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Units 1-4 (Third Mission) -- Preliminary Summary Re-
port To The Government Of Japan, 9 – 17 February 2015
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/missionre-
port170215.pdf
METI website:
Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommis-
sioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station Units 1-4
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decom-
missioning/index.html
Summary of Decommissioning and Contaminated Wa-
ter Management January 28, 2016
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decom-
missioning/pdf/20160128_e.pdf
This site makes a lot of relevant information about the de-
commissioning process easily accessible:
Website of the Information Portal for the Fukushima
Daiichi Accident Analysis and Decommissioning Activ-
ities
https://fdada.info/
IRID website:
http://irid.or.jp/en/
(IRID seems to be developing many robots for use in the
decommissioning process, but has not issued much new
information in the past year regarding overall decommis-
sioning strategy)
Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommis-
sioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1–4,
index with updates
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decom-
missioning/index.html
This NRA document from Feb 2015 describes the overall
strategy:
Measures for Mid-term Risk Reduction at TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi NPS (as of February 2015)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000098679.pdf
This summary from Jan. 2016 describes the current sched-
ule:
Summary of Decommissioning and Contaminated Wa-
ter Management January 28, 2016
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decom-
missioning/pdf/20160128_e.pdf
The overall long-term timetable has changed little since
2011, and is divided into three phases:
—Phase 1 (2012-2013): This involved stabilization and
other work done prior to the start of removing spent fuel.
—Phase 2 (2014-2021): This is the current phase, and
includes the continuing removal of spent fuel, and prepara-
tion for removing melted fuel debris from the reactor contain-
ments, including solving many water-related issues onsite.
Unit 1: Fuel removal to start in FY2020 (previously sched-
uled to begin in FY2017)
Unit 2: Fuel removal to start in FY2020
Unit 3: Fuel removal to start in FY2017 (previously
scheduled to begin in FY2015)
Unit 4: Fuel removal completed in 2014
—Phase 3 (2022 -?): This is the melted fuel removal and
decommissioning process itself. The Jan. 2016 METI sum-
mary states, “The fuel debris removal method for each unit
will be decided two years after revising the Mid-andLong-
term road map (June 2015). The method for the first unit will
be confirmed in the first half of FY2018.”
Many kinds of work are carried on concurrently, and TEPCO
can be said to have met its primary goal for the end of Phase
1 and the start of Phase 2. The more detailed timelines are
frequently adjusted, as are actual work targets, and often
slip by months or longer. The 2014–2021 phase is very long,
and this reflects the fact that many technologies do not exist
for what needs to be done, and will require years of de-
velopment. The melted fuel removal and decommissioning
phase expected to start in 2022 currently has no estimated
end point, though TEPCO has previously stated it would be
30–40 years from now. Based on prior experience at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl (where melted fuel has not yet
started to be removed), we should assume it will require sev-
eral decades.

29. 29
Unit 3:
Rendering of planned cover for Unit 3 (credit: TEPCO)
Spent fuel removal plans are furthest along for Unit 3. Ac-
cording to the current roadmap, removal of spent fuel from
Unit 3 will begin in fiscal 2017 (likely early 2018). Although
the 566 assemblies that need to be removed (514 used, 52
unused) are far fewer than there were in Unit 4, Unit 3 is al-
most entirely inaccessible to workers because of high dose
rates. Work onsite is being done remotely for this reason,
and the removal of the spent fuel rods is expected to be
done primarily remotely as well. Removal of rubble from the
roof was completed in Oct. 2013. The spent fuel pool was
also full of structural debris which was carefully mapped and
modeled in 3D to help guide the remotely controlled removal
equipment.
TEPCO, 3d debris maps etc, Jan 2015. (in Japanese)
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/
pdf/150129/150129_01_3_5_07.pdf
3D debris map of Unit 3 spent fuel pool. (credit: TEPCO)
There were mishaps, such as equipment accidentally
dropped back into the pool while it was being removed, and
highly radioactive dust being released while a large gird-
er was being removed from the roof adjacent to the pool
(known as the Tobichitta jikken. See Sec 2.4: Food). One of
the most challenging tasks, the removal of the 20-ton fuel
handling machine, the largest piece of debris in the Unit 3
spent fuel pool, was safely concluded in August 2015. It re-
quired the development of special cutting and lifting appa-
ratus.
2.1.2— Spent fuel pools
TEPCO quieted some critics by safely removing all of the
spent fuel from Unit 4 in late 2014. This unit had the most
fuel to remove, but the remaining three units will almost cer-
tainly be harder. Over a year has passed, and the schedule
for removing the remainder has been pushed back. The last
fuel pools are now due to start being emptied by 2020. This
fuel needs more secure long-term storage than in the com-
mon pool onsite, though no progress seems to have been
made on preparing a place to put it.
Unit 1:
This spent fuel pool contains 392 fuel assemblies, and the
schedule for staring the removal of the spent fuel has been
pushed back from FY2017 to FY2020. The building is cur-
rently covered by a lightweight structure intended to contain
ongoing releases of radiation to the air. Remaining debris on
the top floor of the reactor building was cleared while using
dust suppression measures, and dismantling the roof pan-
els in preparation for installing a cover for removing the fuel
began in July and was completed in October.
Events and highlights on the progress related to re-
covery operations at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station, November, 2015
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/highlights-ja-
pan1115.pdf
CNIC- Current State of Post-Accident Operations at
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station July to De-
cember 2015 ~Nuke Info Tokyo No. 170, Feb 2 2016
http://www.cnic.jp/english/?p=3280
Unit 2:
This spent fuel pool contains 615 fuel assemblies, and re-
moval is currently expected to begin in 2020, although the
final plan is not expected to be decided until 2017. Because
this reactor did not suffer a devastating explosion like the
others, the erection of a large separate secure structure like
at units 3 and 4 will probably not be necessary. But because
of the high dose rates and the need for adequate access
for remotely-operated heavy machinery, as well as space
needed to install the fuel handling equipment and fuel re-
moval frame, it has been decided to completely dismantle
the building above the top floor. The area around Unit 2 is
also being cleared for heavy machinery access, which en-
tails dismantling small buildings nearby, which began in Sep-
tember 2015.
Events and highlights on the progress related to re-
covery operations at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station, November, 2015
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/highlights-ja-
pan1115.pdf
Asahi Shimbun: TEPCO to dismantle top part of Fukushi-
ma No. 2 reactor building by fiscal 2018, Nov 27, 2015
https://web.archive.org/web/20151212051450/
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/
AJ201511270048