The Role of "The Times" and "The Irish Times" in the Anglo-Irish Settlement, 1921 (without annexes)

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Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3
Institut du Monde Anglophone
Spécialité : Études internationales / études anglophones
The Role of The Times and The Irish Times in the Anglo-Irish Settlement, 1921
Mémoire de Master 1 Études internationales
Présenté par Marguerite Gallorini
Directeur de recherches Mr Wesley Hutchinson
Mai 2014

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Introduction
In the 20th century, Anglo-Irish relations were more strained than ever, Ireland’s centuries-old wish for autonomy becoming more and more pressing. Great Britain became faced with two conflicts: in the middle of the First World War, a domestic rising triggered by the more republican factions of Irish nationalists took place in 1916 in Dublin, known as the 1916 Easter Rising. Éamon de Valera and Michael Collins participated to it; they would become the face of Irish republicanism for the years to come. This rebellion and its bloody repression spurred a significant rise of republican partisanship, the outcome of the 1918 general elections resulting in an unprecedented Irish electoral takeover by Sinn Féin.
In historic researches and analyses, while newspapers are sources to first-hand information, their role in the development of events is often overlooked.1 However their subjectivity in processing information is very interesting: how different views disagreed and responded to one another; how certain facts are highlighted in some papers and silenced or undermined in others. It is in this comparative light that we will look at Anglo-Irish relations up to the Treaty; more particularly – and because of the restricted scope of this paper – through the eyes of The Times and The Irish Times. National newspapers’ role in influencing public opinion – if not of the whole country, at least of their readership – was not negligible, especially at that time when the written press was still one of the only and major medium of information.
The Times, one of the oldest British daily national newspapers in Britain, was a serious and high quality newspaper, very influential in high political English spheres.2 The First World War had changed geopolitics radically, and public opinion adopted a more pro-small nations stance: this was also the case of this newspaper. Of a moderate conservative stance, it had been opposed to Irish self-government for years; but it quickly grasped the importance of the stake of events in Ireland, fearing for Great Britain’s international reputation, she who claimed to be the advocate for small nations3; the newspaper even proposed detailed options for an Irish settlement; and became increasingly critical of the British Government’s policy and exactions in Ireland.
1 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921, 2008, p. 1
2 Kenneally, Ian. The Paper Wall, op. cit., p. 147
3 Francis J. Costello, “The Role of Propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921”, op. cit., p. 5

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The Irish Times, for its part, was the voice of Southern unionism, becoming increasingly lonely over the years within a nationalist country – it had even called for the execution of the 1916 Easter Rising’s leaders.4 Whereas it never had a bad word for the British Government, it nevertheless reluctantly changed its opinion at the end of 1920 (seeing nationalism not fading), to become in favour of a form of autonomy for Ireland while retaining ties to the Empire.
It is interesting that the London-based The Times should be critical of British politics, while the London-based The Irish Times was critical of the Irish republicans. Therefore these two newspapers, while not having the same views concerning Anglo-Irish policies, ended up converging in favour of Irish autonomy within the Empire, and their influence would ultimately lead – in part – to a Truce, and then a Treaty.
Therefore the problem of rising Irish nationalism in the 20th century was met by the British government with confused approaches and policies, leading to a large-scale civil war never officially recognised by Great-Britain; the truce of 11 October 1921 put a stop to warfare, and then the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 6 December 1921 settled Anglo-Irish relations, to the greatest relief of all or almost. How did the two major newspapers The Times and The Irish Times interpret these two major events, and did they have an influence on contemporaneous Anglo- Irish politics?
4 Along with the Irish Independent

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PART ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE TRUCE AND TREATY: 1918 – 1921
I) Situation of the Irish Society
1) Sinn Féin and Dáil Éireann
In the aftermath of the First World War, the world's empires were going into social chaos and internal political divisions. As for Ireland, the country was torn between a “southern Catholic and separatist Ireland on the one hand and a northern Protestant and unionist Ireland on the other […]. The Irish Times itself was now a symptom of these anomalies – a unionist paper in an increasingly nationalist city.”5
The crushed 1916 Easter Rising represented a shift from constitutionalism to republicanism in Ireland. The Sinn Féin party (“We Ourselves”), created by Arthur Griffith in 1905 with the aim of taking back independence peacefully, was rather marginal beforehand: up to 1912, its very name “generated ridicule rather than admiration or fear”.6 However it came out of the Rising as the main political beneficiary7 and “reformulated the rhetoric of liberation [of a] republic both Gaelic and free”8, along a more revolutionary approach under its charismatic and controversial leader Éamon de Valera, president of the party from October 1917 – whose “doctrines of revolution and unrest” were condemned by The Irish Times.9 Therefore the election of Sinn Féin during the 1918 general election in the United-Kingdom was one of the most important events in the years preceding the Anglo-Irish Treaty, insofar as it was the first political victory and expression of popular support for Irish republicanism, and above all a clear disapproval of the British Government’s policy in Ireland.
Polarisation grew in Ireland between nationalists and unionists because of the protracting of the implementation of Home Rule in Ireland and the harsh treatment of Sinn Féin members by the British Government10; and also because of the 1916 Rising’s unionist perception as a ‘stab in the back’ by nationalists.11 Therefore the general election on 14 December 1918 took place at a time
5 Fintan O'Toole, The Irish Times Book of the Century, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1999, pp. 92-93
6 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands 1912-1939, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 16
7 Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912-1985; Politics and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 38
8 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, op. cit., p. 28
9The Irish Times, 5 July 1917, editorial: ‘The State of Ireland’
10 Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912-198, op. cit., p. 39
11 Fintan O’Toole, The Irish Times Book of the Century, op. cit., p. 91

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of great social unrest; what is more all women12 and men (so Catholics as well) had the right to vote. The results saw a heavy defeat of the moderate Irish Parliamentary Party, in favour of Sinn Féin.
Once elected and according to the party's doctrine, the members of Sinn Féin refused to take their seats at Westminster – where they would have constituted the third party in the House of Commons, with 73 seats – setting up their own Parliament, “Dáil Éireann” (“Assembly of Ireland”) in Dublin with 27 Sinn Féiners present. It was not recognized by the British Government, and was scorned by The Irish Times which called the assembly “a body of young men who [had] not the slightest notion of [the] Empire’s power and resources and not a particle of experience in the conduct of public affairs.”13 Nevertheless, ignoring British rule and unionist opinion, the Dáil opened on 21 January 1919 and adopted its own constitution; on the same day two Royal Irish Constabulary men were killed in the Soloheadbeg Ambush by Irish Volunteers14: this very day Irish nationalism entered the “era of revolutionary action”15; in other words the Irish Independence War broke out.
2) Home Rule for Ireland
Since the Act of Union with Ireland in 1800, Ireland was an integral part of Great Britain: the centre of politics was based in London, and it was connected to the Irish Administration based in Dublin. Home Rule proposed devolution: to keep the link with Great Britain while granting some self-governing powers to Ireland, with an Irish Parliament that would deal with her domestic affairs. Home Rule thus was at the centre of public debate and press coverage from the late 19th century until the Truce of July 1921. The first two drafts were successively rejected in 1886 and 1893, and the third one in 1912-14 never came into force, since the World War and 1916 Easter Rising changed the political landscape in Ireland, not permitting to implement it in such conditions.
Ulster unionists, for their part, sought to keep the 1800 Act of Union for two main reasons: so that the Empire would keep on protecting their Protestant minority16; and to keep their free trade with the Empire, the North-East region of Ireland being especially industrialized compared to the
12 Suffrage was extended to most women over 30 on 6 February 1918 (Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, p. 266)
13 The Irish Times, 22 January 1919, editorial: ‘The State of Ireland’
14 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall; Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921, Cork: The Collins Press, 2008, p. x
15 Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question; The Anglo-Irish Settlement and Its Undoing 1912-72, New Haven and London: Yale University, 1991, p. 118
16 They feared that the granting of Home Rule to Ireland would lead to a Catholic general takeover of power and, eventually, to a complete break with Britain.

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rest of the island.17 Therefore mental polarisation went further between an increasingly nationalist South and unionist North, well before the later effective partition of Ireland: from then on, the basis for a settlement would “no longer to be unity, but division”18 between Northern and Southern Ireland.
Prior to 1914, The Times had criticised the principle of Home Rule for Ireland; after the war though, there was a general “sense that substantial changes were necessary in the political map of Europe”19, and thus the paper started advocating a settlement for Ireland. What is more, in 1919 the newspaper's owner, Lord Northcliffe, recently developed a hatred of Lloyd George20; and the newspaper also feared for Great Britain’s international reputation – and especially for Anglo-American relations21; indeed her cling on Ireland, at a time when she claimed to be the advocate for small nations, attracted bad press. Therefore, while up to then The Times had been an ally of the British Government, by 1919 the editorial line criticised it harshly.
The Times even came up with its own detailed plan for an Irish settlement (see Annex 1). It was designed by Henry Wickham Steed, editor of the paper since February 1919, and R.J. Herbert Shaw, who had “quite a depth of experience in Irish current affairs”.22 They devised a nine- county Ulster, with two state legislatures and an “all-Ireland Parliament with equal representation for each jurisdiction”.23 Although The Irish Times liked this idea, it remained sceptical that such a system would work since it would “be managed by the party which hates England”24, Sinn Féin: they would never win the confidence of the Northern part, so resulting in a permanent partition. But The Irish Times was strongly opposed to partition: first because it left Southern unionists to themselves within a nationalist Ireland; and also because it was one of the few commentators to foresee this partition as not being only temporary.25
When the fourth attempt at a Home Rule Bill was being introduced before the House of Commons in February 1920, the editor of The Times was told by the Chairman of the Committee
17 John M. Lynch, “The Anglo-Irish Problem”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4, July 1972, p. 605
18 Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, op. cit., p. 123
19 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit., p. 147
20 Northcliffe and the Prime Minister disagreed over the issue of the handling of the defeated German enemy, which Northcliffe deemed too soft (Kenneally, The Paper Wall, p. 148)
21 In the past, the many migrations from Ireland to other countries, such as the United-States, contributed greatly to the internationalisation of the Irish cause; what is more the United-States appeared in favour of the Irish emancipation.
23 Ibid., p. 151, with reference to The Times, 24 July 1919, editorial: ‘An Irish Settlement’
24 The Irish Times, 26 July 1919, editorial: ‘Proposals for Ireland’
25 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit, p. 146

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framing the Bill, Walter Long, that the Bill would resemble the newspaper’s proposal. However it would differ in that this Bill proposed a six-county Ulster, and the Council of Ireland was much weaker than the all-Ireland Parliament proposed by the newspaper – something which deeply upset The Times. In its view, this Bill aimed only at adjusting to Ulster’s “susceptibilities”26, and wrote: “We can do no more save to assure the Irish people that a great body of public opinion in this country shares their anxiety, and regards the cause of it with deep regret and no small measure of shame.”27
Indeed, Ulster’s well-being was always regarded – especially since the three successive Coalition Cabinets that were to negotiate an Irish settlement presented a great unionist and low liberal membership.28 And as Lord Arthur Balfour wrote himself: “A parliament has been promised to Ulster […]. Whether the promise was originally wise or unwise is quite immaterial; it cannot be withdrawn”29 – a view shared by the Prime Minister himself, adamant that “the minority in Ulster” should not be coerced.30
The Irish Times was also very much concerned by this Bill being passed, even more than the nationalist newspapers the Freeman's Journal and the Irish Independent31 were at first. The Times underlined this general ignorance on the same day as the Bill’s enactment, writing that it was “treated with an indifference wholly out of keeping with its great and far-reaching importance.”32 According to The Irish Times, once the Bill would be enforced, “Sinn Féin [would transform] the 26 counties into an independent republican state. The prospect of being divorced from the Empire was horrifying”.33 Therefore, it advocated for the Union as it existed as well.34
At first, The Irish Times faithfully saw Ulster unionism as a means of defeating Home Rule; “but it began to suspect from early on that Ulster was primarily concerned with its own position”.35 Thus, as the Fourth Home Rule Bill became more and more likely to pass, the Southern
26 Ibid., p. 155, with reference to The Times, 11 March 1920, editorial: ‘The Decision of Ulster’
27 The Times, 30August 1920, editorial: ‘The Lord Mayor of Cork’
29 The Future of the Home Rule Bill: Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, 24 July 1920, TNA: PRO CAB 24/109, CP 1683
31 “[The forecasted outline of the Bill] has not received from the Irish press and Public the attention which might have been expected”, nicely put civil servant Sir David Harrel in a memorandum (CAB. 27/69 C.I.54, 6 January 1920)
32 The Times, 23 December 1920
33 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit., p. 134, with reference to The Irish Times, 9 March 1920, editorial: ‘The Southern Unionists’: “We refuse to believe that the nation which fought for Belgium will deliver a loyal community into the hands of England’s enemies.”
35 Fintan O'Toole, The Irish Times Book of the Century, op. cit., p. 96

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community came to feel “betrayed by unionists in the soon to exist six-county state”.36 On 11 March 1920, The Irish Times was resentful and “scathing”37 after the Ulster Unionist Council accepted the six-county exclusion (see Annex 2 for full editorial):
[The Council] has resolved to slam, bar and bolt the door of six counties against the other twenty-six […]. The Unionists of Cavan, Monaghan, and Donegal are thrown into outer darkness, unwilling victims to the perpetual segregation of the six-county area.
[Ulster unionists] accept the Bill, therefore, as “a preferable alternative” to the Act, and advise their party to press for such amendments as will promote the interests of the six counties and - a polite, but meaningless, addition - those of the Unionists of the South and West.
They have re-established the Tudor Pale – save that on this occasion some half-million of the King’s loyal subjects are outside of it.38
However by mid-1920, after a meeting between its editor, John Healy, that of the Freeman's Journal39, and representatives of the Dominion Home Rule Group, The Irish Times adopted a new attitude. Since the Government of Ireland Bill would pass indeed, they had to make the best out of it. Therefore the newspaper saw Dominion Home Rule (“full self-government within the Commonwealth, including a parliament with full control over its own taxation”40) as a fair option for Ireland; it announced its new support publicly in its editorial of 4 August 1920.41 Shortly before the Bill was to be passed, the newspaper produced a very hopeful editorial, speaking of the British Government as a generous hero and of republicans as ungrateful rebels:
The government not only is anxious for peace, but now makes an overture bolder and more generous than any other British cabinet has made in the course of history. It is willing to treat with men who for four years have insulted, defied, and injured the British Empire by every means in their power.42
The Bill passed, and was enacted on 23 December 192043 as the Government of Ireland Act. It proposed two separate parliaments in Dublin and Belfast, and “partitioned Ireland along the six- county border, though retaining provision for the unification of Ireland if the two parliaments agreed”.44 But it did not grant much power to Ireland to govern herself, and according to
37 Mark O'Brien, The Irish Times, A History, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008, p. 54
38 The Irish Times, 11 March 1920, editorial: ‘No Surrender’
39 By that time, the Bill was not ignored anymore, and even nationalist papers like The Freeman’s Journal advocated for Dominion Home Rule – not a Republic, this option perceived as being too unlikely to succeed (Kenneally, The Paper Wall, pp. 170-171).
40 Fintan O'Toole, The Irish Times Book of the Century, op. cit., p. 103
41 The Irish Times, 4 August 1920, editorial: ‘The Home Rule Bill’
42 The Irish Times, 11 December 1920, editorial: ‘The Twofold Policy’
43 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands 1912-1939, op. cit., p. 268

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Mansergh, “the Bill, with its economic and political reservations, […] was designed not to concede but to exclude the possibility of national self-government.”45 Therefore this gave nationalists “no incentive to negotiate a settlement at this stage, especially one governed by the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act.”46 If this Act completely overran nationalist aspirations, it consolidated Sinn Féin's grasp on Southern Ireland: in the 1921 general election, the party was elected anew, unopposed.47
3) British propaganda
Regarding propaganda, several attempts were made from the British side: for instance in early 1920, a 'daily report of outrages' started to be issued to the press by General Sir Nevil Macready48, aiming at supposedly “[placing] the real facts before the public”49, and boost the morale of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) members who kept on resigning because of the pressure they worked in.50 But, as ‘official news’, it was greatly distrusted by almost all newspapers but the unionist Irish Times, which published these reports immediately, arguing that “if it were possible to show that the [reports were] being “faked” at Dublin Castle, the nefarious design would have been exposed within twenty-four hours”.51
In July 1920, a new department of the Irish administration was created to “counter the increasing success of republican propaganda”52: the Public Information Branch, with Basil Clarke at its head, an Oxford graduate and experienced journalist. But the aim was not reached easily, since other factors undermined the PIB’s work: for instance one month later, the RIC issued the Weekly Summary, a weekly police journal “designed as a morale-boosting supplement for a force that was under social boycott and constant attack from the IRA”53, praising the work of the Black and Tans for instance. The paper came to be seen at encouraging reprisals, worsening further the Irish and English press’s distrust in ‘official news’; this stained the PIB as well by amalgamation, and in the end all Government-supplied information was looked at with suspicion.
46 Ibid., p. 120
47 Ibid., p. 159
48 Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland in 1920
50 John Ainsworth, “British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921: A Desperate Attempt by the Crown to Maintain Anglo-Irish Unity by Force”, School of Humanities & Social Science, Queensland University of Technology, 2000, p. 1
51 The Irish Times, 8 May 1920, editorial: ‘The Tyranny of Crime’
53 Ibid., p. 21

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If the Irish Administration failed to deal with the press, it is because of “divisions that dominated the relationship between the military and the civil administration of Dublin Castle, and a lack of unity of command between the police and military”.54 While the Police was rather open and cooperative with the PIB and with journalists, military officers like General Macready followed the view that British propaganda would work better by avoiding all reports that could prejudice the military; however civil servants like Basil Clarke focused primarily on showing all information concerning the Irish administration but in a favourable light, especially the information provided to England and abroad. As a result, British propaganda was inconsistent, and rarely successful.
The resulting general distrust was all the more hard to oppose that some officials would wreck easily all the efforts made by the administration, like Chief Secretary Hamar Greenwood55 who would go as far as to deny the military reality of the Black and Tans and make all sorts of amalgams.56 Sir T. P. O’Connor even once said, in the House of Commons, that “the Chief Secretary had taken up the disastrous position of making himself Martin himself the strong, unquestioning, and blatant advocate and defender of every act of frightfulness in Ireland.”57 He was so badly perceived that by 1921, “the Irish papers and the English press critical of the Government refused to believe almost any statement by Greenwood”58, and The Times stated that it had long been wondering about the accuracy of Government information.59
II) Violence in Ireland
1) Reprisals on the population
The British tried to answer rising nationalist violence by recruiting 7000 ex-soldiers60 who joined the Royal Irish Constabulary without any uniform, known as the ‘Black and Tans’61; and
54 Ibid., p. 26
55 Chief Secretary for Ireland from 1920 to 1922
57 The Irish Times, 5 November 1920, ‘Chief Secretary and the Murder Campaign’
58 Idem
59 The Times, 29 December 1920, editorial: ‘The Government and Ireland’
61 “[T]he sobriquet, Black and Tans, was an Irish rather than an English invention, with the mixed uniform of these new police recruits – dark green RIC caps and tunics with khaki trousers – reminding Irish observers of a famous pack of hounds from Limerick of the same name. (Ainsworth, “British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921”, op. cit., p. 2)

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6000 officers62 who joined the Auxiliary Division of the RIC (ADRIC), also wearing “mixed uniforms”63, known as the Auxiliaries. They began arriving “in March and August 1920 respectively”.64 They were supposed to help the existing police force enforce the law – before needing to resort to official martial law, such as imposed in four southern counties on 10 December 1920 and then four adjacent ones on 4 January 1921.65 But much burning and looting was caused by them, reprisals upon the population in response to IRA attacks being common. Their mission was to suppress any opposition; and since Sinn Féin and the IRA were thought to have members everywhere, many farmers’ homes were attacked.
One of the most impressive reprisals was the burning of Cork city on 11 December 1920: an Auxiliary patrol had been attacked by the IRA, one of their grenades killing an Auxiliary. Retaliation from the Crown forces followed immediately, by burning and looting many key establishments of the city, as well as by abusing civilians. The Irish Times presented this episode as such:
We report [...] a bomb outrage in the city of Cork by which a servant of the Crown was killed and eleven others wounded. The crime was followed by a series of fires which destroyed the City Hall, the Carnegie Library, and a dozen of the leading business establishments.66
What was first underlined in this coverage was the death of the Auxiliaries, while the subsequent burning of the city was written at the passive form so as not to tell who its perpetrators were: the Auxiliaries. The newspaper also published the ‘official reports’ given by Dublin Castle (centre of the Irish Administration), which ended on: “It is officially stated that members of the Auxiliary Police Force have been fired at on several occasions recently in Cork”, as to excuse them for their exactions on the whole city.67
The Times’s editorial on this episode handled the matter in a whole other way. It laid down straight away that “the view [was] widely held that the burnings were reprisals, on the part of servants of the Crown […]”. It continued reproachingly:
A statement issued by Dublin Castle contains only a brief rehearsal of facts. Doubtless there will be a fuller explanation, which will be eagerly awaited. The country is entitled to a full
63 D.M. Leeson, The Black and Tans; British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 1
65 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands 1912-1939, op. cit., p. 269
66 The Irish Times, 13 December 1920, editorial: ‘The Greatest Need’
67 The Irish Times, 13 December 1920, ‘Shootings and Burnings in Cork – Official Reports’

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account of destruction so widespread, especially when it is attributed to the forces of the law and order.
[The] reckless and indiscriminate burning of public and private property requires some fuller justification than a plea that forces, which ought to be under the strictest discipline, have, as a result of provocation, got out of hand.68
Reprisals were vehemently denied by General Macready, who called them “untrue and exaggerated”.69 Macready and Greenwood were both known for defending the Auxiliaries. Macready had accepted the command of the army in Ireland even though he “[averred] privately that he loathed Ireland and its people ‘with a depth deeper than the sea and more violent than that which I feel against the Boche’.”70 By some he was seen as having good judgement71; but he was also keen on defending Crown forces’ raids by saying it was “only human that they should act on their own initiative”72 and that punishment for such reprisals was “a delicate matter”.73 Macready's stubborn attitude drew rebuke by Lloyd George and Churchill though for its negative impact on public opinion and the press. Indeed:
The Times attacked Macready personally for his ambivalence surrounding the punishment of Crown forces involved in reprisals. His use of the phrase ‘a delicate matter’ was condemned. The paper made two points in response to Macready's comments. The Government had to maintain ‘a responsible control over all their agents in Ireland’ and there should ‘be no secret adoption of the barbarous methods of vicarious punishment’.”74
The Irish Times never wrote about the Crown forces’ exactions as nationalist papers did – or The Times, for that matter. It rather blamed “terrorism in Ireland”75 and always welcomed new measures and curfews as an “effort to remedy a disgraceful set of affairs”76 – not as an attack against civil liberties. It defended the Administration and the police, like the RIC of which the paper said it had a “magnificent character and traditions”77; it termed the deaths of policemen and soldiers as ‘murder’ while civilians died from unknown causes, and headlines often presented the deaths of policemen before that of civilians (see Annex 3 for a few examples of headlines from The Irish Times); and finally, official reports (delivered by Dublin Castle) were
68 The Times, 13 December 1920, editorial: ‘The Burnings at Cork’
69 Hugh Martin, Ireland in Insurrection; an Englishman's record of fact, London: Daniel O'Connor, 1921, pp. 69-70
70 Keith Jeffery, “Macready, Sir (Cecil Frederick) Nevil, first baronet (1862–1946)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., Jan 2008 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/printable/34822, retrieved 10 February 2014
71 Idem.
72 Freeman’s Journal, 25 September 1920
73 Idem.
74 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit., pp. 22-23, with reference to The Times, 27 September 1920
75 The Irish Times, 28 January 1920
76 The Irish Times, 13 March 1920, editorial: ‘The Irish Executive’
77 The Irish Times, 19 April 1920, editorial: ‘The Irish Police’

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the newspaper's main source of information78 – it is fair to say it was one of the rare newspapers believing whatever British propaganda was saying (together with the Morning Post).
Of course it condemned Crown forces reprisals, that it deemed “wholly wrong”79; but it adopted the explanation General Macready often gave, that they were “the inevitable result of prolonged provocation”.80 Indeed the paper held the view that all this bloodshed could be stopped at once if the “forces of the crime”81 (republican forces) decided to stop attacking the Crown forces, who would “rejoice to go”.82 It went as far as fervently defending the Auxiliaries: “It is wicked and ridiculous to suggest that police work in Ireland has produced a sudden degeneration in men who fought bravely and honourably in every area of the Great War.”83 About those ‘brave men’ though, Hugh Martin, independent investigative British journalist who had made inquiries on the spot in 1920, writes in Ireland in Insurrection that the Black and Tans were:
good enough soldiers […] who are completely out of their element, and inspired by precisely the worst sort of spirit for their present job. They believe that the Irish 'let the British down’, and they are not averse from getting their own back in their own way.84
2) Reprisals on newspapers
As for being targets of reprisals themselves, The Times and The Irish Times were fairly out of reach. Indeed the former was based in London, having therefore more liberty for criticising – which was all the more problematic for the Government, especially coming from such an influential paper; by 1920, it criticised the Government and British actions in Ireland “with a directness that would have seen an Irish newspaper printing similar material suppressed or attacked by Crown forces.”85 As for The Irish Times, although based in Dublin, it was the “most famous and widely read unionist newspaper”86, always praising the Administration and the Crown forces’ work, therefore not representing a threat to public opinion in Britain or Ireland.
But other newspapers did not have the same luck: “attacks on newspapers offices and printing presses became more regular from the middle of 1920”87 – the time when Black and Tans and
78 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit., p. 140. Indeed, The Irish Times’s archives show many an article in which is written “according to official reports”.
79 The Irish Times, 3 November 1920, editorial: ‘The Campaign of Crime’
81 The Irish Times, 3 November 1920, editorial: ‘The Campaign of Crime’
82 Idem
83 The Irish Times, 5 November 1920
84 Hugh Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, op. cit., p. 59
86 Ibid., p. 2
87 Ibid., p. 16

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Auxiliaries began arriving – and nationalist newspapers like the Freeman's Journal and the Cork Examiner were the principal adversaries of the Irish Administration and of the Crown forces. These newspapers were often prey to violent raids, and most of all to censorship from the Administration: all newspapers were subjected to the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) since 8 August 1914, soon after Great Britain entered the First World War; but censorship in Ireland tightened further after the 1916 Rising and it went from censorship, to “suppression and prosecution: they constantly risked intimidation and violent attack.”88
One instance of this occurred in September 1919, when the Cork Examiner and its allies were suppressed for three days for having published a loan fund for Dáil Éireann; many other papers soon followed, and print machinery was then destroyed by the military. It attracted heavy criticism from The Times, the editorial expressing its anxiety at misuse of power:
A right of interference would be fully sustainable if the press were used as an instrument of crime – but not otherwise. We do not regard the advocacy of any political opinion as within this definition, and we consider that the Press has an indefeasible right to report faithfully the happening of all events, whether welcome to the Executive or not”.89
Violence not decreasing the following year, The Times warned that “British wrath [was], indeed growing, hot at the latest outrages in Ireland.”90
Again in 15 December 1919, The Freeman’s Journal was suppressed, this time for having printed “offensive articles about the military, the RIC and the proposed recruitment of a new auxiliary force”91; an immense press reaction followed from both English and Irish newspapers, leading 44 days later to the end of the suppression. Only two papers did not offer their support: the Irish Independent and The Irish Times.92 Another such repression happened to the newspaper a year later in October and November 1920 (under the then Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (ROIA)93, replacing the DORA), leading to the trial and imprisonment of its proprietors and directors; Prime Minister Lloyd George himself would decide their release on 6 January 1921, taking fright because of the “intense press reaction” to this story.94
88 Ibid., p.23
89 The Times, 22 September 1919, editorial ‘Freedom of the Press’
90 The Times, 30 November 1920
92 Ibid., p. 180
93 This was introduced by Sir Hamar Greenwood in the hope of securing more arrests and avoid declaring martial law in Ireland. It took effect on 13 August 1920. (Ainsworth, “British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921”, op. cit., p. 5)

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3) The Hugh Martin Case
Martin deemed “absurd”95 the excuses invented by Chief Secretary Greenwood when the latter said there was very little evidence blaming Crown servants; experienced threats from British forces for his unflattering and pragmatic account on what was going on in Ireland:
[…] I was fully aware of the fact that the police regarded my activities with the greatest disfavour. All through the month of October hints were reaching me from various quarters that it would be well either to cease telling the truth in print or to take special precautions for my own safety.96
T. P. O’Connor also brought Martin’s allegations in the House of Commons on 4 November 1920: he was indignant about “the case of Mr. Hugh Martin, an admirable and able British journalist, who had been warned that if he fell into the hands of soldiers and police he would be soon disposed of.”97 One particular episode of Martin’s journey was telling – and therefore contentious – in the way many Crown forces members operated: Martin, “[taking] a walk through the town to see the extent of the damage”98 at 9.30 p.m. with fellow journalist A. E. MacGregor, experienced a very delicate situation where he had to lie to RIC members about his own identity for fear that they would abuse him: indeed they plainly told the two journalists that they were after Hugh Martin, the “one enemy” of the police (see Annex 4 for the full account by Martin).
Sir Greenwood made himself some inquiries into the matter and was told by the County Inspector, who was not present at the scene, that he had “no knowledge of any threat to Mr. Martin”99; he added that if this person had been identified, “any policeman who had either flippantly or good-humouredly100, or in any other way, threatened a journalist, or any other person” would have been punished. On this basis, Sir Greenwood dismissed the accusations by saying he did not think Martin “had the slightest ground for complaint against the Government”101. Regardless of the visibly fruitless inquiry, in any case Martin had made plain the fact that he was not complaining about the Government: “I have never suggested that endeavours to limit my activities or threats against my life were made with the knowledge, consent, or even tacit approval of any section of the Government in Ireland.”102 Martin pointed
96 Ibid., p. 137
97 The Irish Times, 5 November 1920, ‘Chief Secretary and the Murder Campaign’
99 The Irish Times, 5 November 1920, ‘Irish Questions in Parliament’
100 As if there was such a thing as a “flippant” death threat
102 Ibid., p. 151

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out that this did not involve high officials, who were on the contrary always sympathetic and educated; rather he accused the undisciplined Crown forces composed of bands of young policemen and military roaming the streets of Irish towns to terrorise at will, without any supervisor – he talked of a “rot of indiscipline”.103
On the other hand, it also appeared that Martin refused to take advantage of a Press pass that would have facilitated his work; “He was apparently determined to give only one side of the story”104. However this does not necessarily explain such a treatment of terror on the journalists that did not have this Press pass; unless indeed this pass was delivered to potentially friendly newspapers especially, and/or led them to be shown only the friendlier side of events, in which case the facilitation of their work by police forces was understandable.
Sir Greenwood then declared that, as to the question of the Press, “there never had been the slightest obstacle put in the way of Pressmen”105: this might have been true for most of the time, MacGregor himself stating that “he was emphatically of opinion that there was no organised official plan to obstruct English Pressmen in Ireland”106. Nevertheless, only one month later, after an ambush in County Cork (the first significant and successful attack by the IRA on the Auxiliaries), the military barred the Press from checking information on the spot107. Even the friendly Irish Times was barred from the nearest Auxiliary base in Macroom, its special correspondent writing to Dublin: “A visit to Macroom today was a strange experience. The Press representatives were “held-up” at various points and it was almost an impossibility to secure a narrative of the crime.”108 This technique therefore pushed newspapers to get to the only source of information they could get: official reports.
All this shows that the population as well as journalists were therefore targeted by Crown forces. The press thus became more and more critical of the Government – and so did The Irish Times in the end. By 1921, violence was at its utmost in Ireland, and public opinion was weary of all this daily bloodshed spread in newspapers. Following the Government in Ireland Act, in June 1921 Ulster was to have its own Parliament, that was to be opened by the King of Great Britain; his speech was about to represent the stepping stone for peace negotiations between the two countries.
103 Ibid., p. 149
104 The Irish Times, 5 November 1920, ‘Irish Reprisals’
105 The Irish Times, 5 November 1920, ‘Irish Reprisals’
106 Idem
107 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit., pp. 38-39
108 The Irish Times, 1 December 1920, ‘The Murdered Cadets’

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PART TWO: TOWARDS A TRUCE: JUNE 1921 – JULY 1921
I) King George V's speech: 22 June 1921
The period of the opening of the Belfast Parliament was one of great turn-around in British policy in Ireland: the King’s speech on 22 June 1921 acted as ice-breaker for following peace negotiations, leading eventually to the truce less than a month later.
At the same time as the King and the Queen were preparing to visit Belfast, the Cabinet was in deep discussions over which policy to adopt in Ireland: basically whether to keep on crushing nationalists or try negotiating with them. The matter became increasingly pressing with time: internationally, it was felt less and less as a “concentration of force required to destroy ‘a small nest of assassins’”109, and more as violence applied “to keep a small nationality in subjection, at a time when the cause of long suppressed peoples in Central and Eastern Europe was championed in the West”.110
Even though, the Cabinet remained divided, with a majority against a settlement: the Prime Minister especially “remained resolute against a truce”111 because he did not want to see happen its likely consequence: a dominion settlement. “To that he remained implacably opposed.”112 But dominion status was actually brought forward by South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts to the King and Lloyd George. He was one of the drafter of the King’s speech, and wanted to include the offer of dominion status into the speech. “No one, it was thought, was better fitted, or indeed more ready than he, to extol the virtues of dominion status”113 114; however he failed in selling its virtues to Lloyd George, who “was not by mid-June 1921 prepared to enter into such a commitment”.115 Thus the offer, initially at the heart of the speech, was removed.
Although The Times was disappointed in the Government’s policies – especially its editor, Wickham Steed – it used the opportunity of the King’s visit to Belfast to try and influence it. Before the King’s departure, Steed managed to meet with Sir Edward Grigg, the second drafter of the speech and one of Lloyd George’s private secretaries; and with Lord Stamfordham, the
110 Idem
111 Ibid., p. 159
112 Idem
113 Ibid., p. 161
114 At the time South Africa was a dominion of the Empire, since 1910.

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King’s private secretary. The King indeed recognised the “potential inherent in his speech and rejected the first draft proffered by the Cabinet”116 as well as several other drafts; “the final wording of the speech [was] prepared only hours before the King left to travel to Belfast.”117 A month later, “the king was reported as having told Lord Northcliffe with respect to the British government and the activities of British troops in Ireland: Lloyd George ‘must come to some agreement with them [the Irish]. This thing cannot go on. I cannot have my people killed in this manner’”.118 The King was indeed sincerely concerned about the Irish question, and this episode also stood as a blatant example of the English political elites’ esteem of The Times.
Two days before the day of the Parliament’s opening, the editorial of The Times contained both a little sting to the Government’s policy (writing about the “failure of the Government to do with the foresight and insight what they knew to be right and necessary”119); but it was especially hopeful about the coming opening of Parliament. The paper reminded that the King’s visit should not be seen “as a visit to Ulster alone”120; that “the King is, and feels himself to be, King of the whole of Ireland.”121 All these elements were to be echoed in the speech itself.
On 22 June 1921, the day of the opening, The Times issued a very critical editorial echoing one of its articles in which it showed its great disappointment in the Cabinet’s discussions: “[…] any hopes that had been formed of a new departure linked with the King’s visit to Ulster were quickly dispelled. The Lord Chancellor’s survey was as sombre as that of the Irish peers who had gone before, but, unlike them, he had no contribution to make a peaceful settlement. On the contrary, the text of his speech was war”.122 In this respect the King’s speech, which was “being jealously guarded”123, came all the more as a surprise to the rest of the Government unaware of its stance.
The Irish Times made a similar criticism on the Cabinet on the following day, opening a “London Correspondence” article with:
It was with regret – almost consternation – that the Lord Chancellor’s speech last night was at
117 Idem
118 H. C. G. Matthew, “George V (1865–1936)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., May 2013 <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/printable/33369> , retrieved 28 March 2014
With reference to Harold Nicolson, King George the Fifth, His Life and Reign, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953; and to Kenneth Rose, King George V, New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1984.
119 The Times, 20 June 1921, editorial: ‘The King of Ireland’
120 Idem
121 Idem
122 The Times, 22 June 1921
123 Idem

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first received, for it seemed to extinguish the last hope of an Irish settlement by negotiation. The fact that it was delivered on the very eve of Their Majesties’ visit to the Northern capital made it appear especially inopportune.124
However, the article did not fail to criticise also the “malign energy of the irreconcilables”125: the Irish republicans.
On 23 June, both The Times and The Irish Times gave a detailed and lively account of the day’s proceedings; and the King’s speech was finally accessible to all, in full-length (see Annex 5), in both newspapers. It clearly reached out to the South (to Sinn Féin), and in an extract that has been much quoted, the King expressed his wish for a united island:
I speak from a full heart when I pray that My coming to Ireland to-day may prove to be the first step towards the end of strife amongst her people, whatever their race or creed. In that hope I appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and forget, and to join in making for the land they love a new era of peace, contentment and goodwill.126
In an editorial entitled ‘Playing the Game’, which The Irish Times published afterwards, The Times underlined the gap between the positive King’s speech and what had been going on in the Cabinet the day before: “[The Government] have failed to “play the game” towards a Sovereign who, with high courage and sense of duty, has played the game with them, with his peoples, and with the Empire.” It also greatly emphasised the historical aspect of such a declaration; and the editorial proudly stated that “[as they] hoped, the Royal visit to Belfast has been a supreme and unqualified success”, and that the King’s speech was “a triumph of tact and statesmanship – the statesmanship that is great enough to be human and obviously sincere”.127
The Irish Times joined in by writing in its editorial how the speech “combined a message of good-will with an appeal perhaps the most sincere and urgent that ever was uttered from the Throne”.128 It is interesting how, from the first sentence of the editorial, the paper emphasizes Ireland’s subjecthood to the Crown, something not as much felt in The Times:
Yesterday […] furnished, very fittingly, a striking proof of His Majesty’s secure place in the hearts of his loyal subjects […]. He came, regardless of risk, to open the Parliament of Northern Ireland and to deliver on Irish soil a message of affection and good-will to all his Irish subjects.129
124 The Irish Times, 23 June 1921
125 Idem, quoting the Evening Standard
126 The Times, 23 June 1921, full speech: ‘The King’s Triumph’
127 The Times, 23 June 1921, editorial: ‘Playing the Game’
128 The Irish Times, 23 June 1921, editorial: ‘The King and Ireland’
129 Idem

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But most of all, The Irish Times underwent quite a transformation regarding its opinion of Ulster. While it was very resentful a little more than a year earlier, now it had become much more understanding:
We may not judge the end by the beginning; but we can say already that the Northern City has shown itself capax imperii. North-East Ulster did not ask for the Government of Ireland Act and did not desire it. Since, however, circumstances have compelled it to accept the Act, it is approaching the task of self-government with a high and resolute heart.130
On that day, The Times also issued a special eight-page report on the city of Belfast; and within the regular publication, not less than 10 articles dealt with the royal visit – of which one was dedicated to the transcription of the speech without comments, and 4 of them had a political stance (the rest being the description of the day’s proceedings). Usually though, only 2 to 4 articles were attributed to the Irish question. As for The Irish Times, on 23 June it published almost 5 full columns (on a page of 7) on the King’s visit.
During the following week, The Times presented very optimistic headlines reading as “The King’s Great Acclaim”131, “New Hopes in the South – The Moment for a Truce”132, “Bright Hopes”133, or “The Irish Olive Branch”.134 But all this enthusiasm for the speech hid a major Northern Irish issue: although the speech indeed paved the way for future negotiations, James Loughlin reminds that “the inaugural occasion itself was complex […]. At the same time as it encouraged Unionists, for instance, it deeply alienated Catholics caught against their will in the new northern statelet: no Catholic clerical or nationalist representative was present at the event.”135 While King George V called for “forbearance and conciliation”, the period surrounding the opening of the Parliament, and later on the signing of the truce, was one of violent sectarian violence and Catholic pogroms in Ulster:
Riots in the Bogside area of Derry turned into gun battles […], Catholics and socialists were driven from their jobs in the shipyards of Belfast, accompanied by kicks, blows, and showers of rivets136. Catholic homes, shops and pubs were burnt down. Thousands of Catholics were forcibly expelled from the big engineering firms.137
130 Idem
132 Idem
135 James Loughlin, The British Monarchy and Ireland: 1800 to the Present, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 317
136 On 22 July 1920, The Irish Times covered such a riot in Belfast, when unionist shipyard workers attacked nationalists. It wrote that some employees working in the shipyards were “alleged to be Sinn Féiners” (as was the common excuse given by Crown forces at the time for instance), and they were the ones who had provoked the ire of the Unionists workers (The Irish Times, 22 July 1920).

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This was indeed an aspect rather left out by The Times in its coverage of the speech on that day, focusing only on the positive repercussions it might have. However later on the newspaper would condemn the Belfast anti-Catholic riots in its 12 July editorial for instance.
In any case, the King’s speech indeed represented a turning point for the British policy in Ireland, something The Times would remind again at the time of signing of the Treaty: “Almost in a night, the Administration changed not merely their policy, but their whole attitude in regard to the Irish people”.138 As Churchill himself would later recall too: “no British government in modern times has ever appeared to make so complete and sudden a reversal in policy… In May the whole power of the State and all the influence of the Coalition were used to “hunt down the murder gang”; in June, the goal was “a lasting reconciliation with the Irish people”.”139
II) Truce Between the British Army and the IRA: 9-11 July 1921
The King’s speech was the trigger of the coming truce. Already from 24 June, The Times wrote:
All Ireland is hoping to-day that the Government will hesitate no longer to announce the concessions which it is prepared to make for the sake of peace and to invite a truce with the object of discussion on this new basis between the Northern Parliament and the elected representatives of the South.140
Lloyd George and de Valera exchanged letters from the day after the speech – the King did not want the “favourable reaction […] to be dissipated by delay”141, regularly exposed in the newspapers. Both newspapers emphasised how these exchanges, reviving hopes for peace, were “the outcome of the King’s appeal for reconciliation”142, which had “made the Prime Minister’s appeal to the Irish leaders almost inevitable”.143
As often on such events, The Times became poetic: “[The King] raised [his Ministers’] eyes from the dark and tortuous path which lies behind, and pointed the straight way forward and upward”144; The Irish Times wrote of a “sudden and blessed change from shadow to sunlight”.145
138 The Times, 7 December 1921, editorial: ‘The Irish Free State’
139 Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, op. cit., p. 161, with reference to Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath, London, 1929, p. 290
141 Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, op. cit, p. 163
143 The Irish Times, 9 July 1921, editorial: ‘Dawn’
144 The Times, 12 July 1921

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As The Times noticed (taking the following expression as headline), “essential unity” was one of the focus points on which de Valera did not want to compromise. He wished political discussions to be between Ireland and England; he did not seek a triangular situation in which Britain would act as an arbiter between Northern and Southern Ireland over their issues: “Nothing, de Valera insisted, could come from a conference of three parties”.146 For this purpose of unity, de Valera invited Craig to an Irish leaders’ conference in Dublin; but Craig had already accepted Lloyd George’s invitation and could not decently retract it.147 However, the Northern Irish Prime Minister did not seek to be taken as third party into these dealings either; in fact, the only thing he wanted was for Northern Ireland to remain as she was, with the powers she inherited from the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Thus he “resisted Lloyd George’s pressure for further discussion, contending that negotiations were solely between Great Britain and Southern Ireland”.148 As Fitzpatrick more humorously described it: “Northern Home Rule was institutionalized at breakneck speed, as Sir James Craig and his Unionist ministry sought successfully to make the ‘province’ impregnable before the perfidious Welshman [Lloyd George] could seal a deal with Sinn Féin.”149
On 30 June 1921, The Times’ editorial showed its deception in the refusal of James Craig to come to the Dublin Conference, and in another article applauded the Southern unionists’ acceptance, showing their will to “smooth the path for Mr. de Valera’s acceptance of the Prime Minister’s offer”.150 The Irish Times corroborated this claim – as another display of the Southerners’ good-will and devotion to make things work – on 9 July, in its editorial:
The country owes also a heavy debt of gratitude to the four representatives of Southern Unionism who had the courage and patriotism to accept Mr. de Valera’s invitation. […]
The quiet forces of Southern Unionism have come at last into action: we have been confident always that they must be a vital factor in any Irish settlement.151
On 4 July, the conference in Dublin took place, with the four Southern unionist representatives. The Times’s issue of that day balanced its earlier deception in James Craig with a very careful editorial, writing how “the delicate position of Sir James Craig must be borne in mind before his rejection of Mr. de Valera’s invitation is unreservedly condemned”.152 It generally did not dare to “analyse the motives of the Sinn Fein leader or to predict the course he may take”153, and warned
146 Idem
152 The Times, 4 July 1921, editorial: ‘The Dublin Conference’
153 Idem

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against easy generalisations about both de Valera and Craig’s positions. In its wish to see peace negotiations develop, The Times gave advice to the Sinn Féin leader in a very diplomatic way: “Though the great majority of the Irish people have placed their immediate interests in [his] hands […], it may be assumed that he is fully aware of the disappointment which an entirely uncompromising attitude on his part would occasion throughout Ireland and beyond her shores.”154 It also appealed to the Government once more, speaking on behalf of the British people: “English public opinion will, we believe, await from the Government some plain statement of their policy, framed in a spirit and on lines in harmony with the King’s Speech”.
On 5 July, Smuts went to meet de Valera in Dublin in order to secure his acceptance of discussions with Lloyd George. Present with the Sinn Féin leader were Griffith, Duggan and Barton, who were also to be present later on to the Treaty negotiations.155 Smuts managed to convince them not to refuse discussion with Lloyd George – already a great achievement in itself: for instance on 29 June, in a reply to the Prime Minister, de Valera warned him that the truce would not be so easily settled since “[the British Government denied] Ireland essential unity and set aside the principle of national self-determination.”156 Indeed if really Britain insisted on proposing a dominion status, “it should at least not contain irksome limitations inconsistent with that status […]; the settlement must be an ‘everlasting peace’.”157 On this positive note158 whereby de Valera “[chose] the path of negotiation in preference to that of continued warfare”159, the truce was signed between the Crown forces and the IRA on 9 July 1921, taking effect two days later at noon.160
The Irish Times naturally celebrated the truce, “arguing that the wording of the statement from Downing Street preceding the draft publication of the truce details itself was highly significant for future negotiations in that it read that on the appointed day ‘hostilities’ would cease.”161 It also gratefully acknowledged the role of General Smuts – far from insignificant indeed – in its editorial of 9 July: “the hearty thanks of all Irishmen will be rendered to that Ulysses of Empire, General Smuts, who brought his ripe wisdom and unique experience to the task of peace.”162
154 The Times, 4 July 1921, editorial: ‘The Dublin Conference’
157 Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, op. cit, p. 164, with reference to Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, London: ed. K. Middlemas, 3 vols, Vol. III, Ireland 1918-1925, 1971, pp. 82-4
158 Churchill “warmed to the phrase” (Idem).
159 The Times, 9 July 1921, editorial: ‘Good News from Ireland’
160 The Times, 12 July 1921, editorial: ‘The Path to Peace’
161 Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall, op. cit., p. 145, with reference to The Irish Times, 9 July 1921, editorial: ‘Dawn’

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But it also remained careful, much like The Times, when it wrote:
During the anxious days of the Dublin Conference we refrained from any mention of the inevitable result of the failure of peace negotiations. We should have continued to refrain, now that negotiation has been transferred to London; for in these days the most obvious advice or warning is liable to be misconstrued.163
Both newspapers therefore were aware of their influence over public opinion and politics, and thus restrained themselves from making any extreme comment, not to inflame passions and jeopardize such delicate truce negotiations.
Still on 11 July, The Times also issued an article entitled “U.S. Joy over Irish Truce”. Considering the newspaper’s long-standing anxiety about the negative impact of Anglo-Irish relations on the Anglo-American ones, this article was therefore the expression of a great relief about Britain’s international perception. And it was indeed an international matter, since “the thought of the effect of a settlement of the Irish question on world affairs appear[ed] uppermost in the minds of nearly all editorial writers”164, wrote a correspondent for The Times. However, the United-States still warned that “[t]his time there must be no failure”.165
The Times’s editorial of the following day (see Annex 6 for full editorial) set the scene for the rocky road that were about to take the long talks for a settlement, reminding that the “Dublin conferences were purely introductory, and [that it would] only be in London that the negotiators [would] encounter the major obstacles to settlement”.166 The editorial also condemned, as we briefly saw earlier, the riots which occurred in Belfast on the day of the signing of the truce.167 It firmly asserted the general will for peace, addressing all parties – “Belfast Unionists, Sinn Feiners, and Nationalists” alike – that “even if they continue[d] on their present mad course, their deeds [would] not alter the determination of this country to do full justice to Ireland.”168
164 The Times, 11 July 1921
165 Idem, with reference to the New York Evening Post, 10 July 1921
167 It was a very restless overall period in Northern Ireland: “Over twenty deaths had occurred in northern riots during the week following agreement on the ceasefire, and disturbances recurred during the transitional months.” (David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, op. cit., p. 104)

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PART THREE: TOWARDS AN ANGLO-IRISH TREATY: OCTOBER 1921 – DECEMBER 1921
I) Negotiations: 11 October 1921 – 6 December 1921
Two fundamental issues remained at the heart of the divergence between the Irish and British leaders from the truce to the Treaty: unity and status. What was sought from the Irish side was unity with Northern Ireland, and self-determination – though the two could not be achieved simultaneously. And indeed by agreeing to enter negotiations, “the Dáil implicitly accepted the impracticability of immediately achieving either a united Irish dominion or a southern republic.”169 As for Lloyd George, Ulster should be kept within its actual borders as Craig had asked him, and the rest of Ireland – the 26 Southern counties – should take on a “‘royal’ dominion [status] in the guise of dominion status, but with quite a bit subtracted from it”.170 He was not prepared to let Ireland secede from the Empire. So in the end, and as Mansergh rightly pointed out, “that which earlier the British had repudiated171 and the Irish never asked for – dominion status – had become central to the negotiations.”172
The conference first met on 11 October 1921. President173 de Valera did not join the Irish delegation sent to negotiate in London, in which were Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins; on the opposite side notably stood Lloyd George and Winston Churchill174 (see Annex 7 for the exhaustive lists of both delegations). On this “eventful date”175, The Irish Times and The Times measured the progress made over the past year, and naturally prayed for peace. But the way in which the Irish delegates were encouraged differed from one paper to another: The Irish Times for instance encouraged them ‘negatively’: as usual, while the British Government was often source of praise and hope, on the other hand the Irish leaders were often seen as those to be basically untrustworthy, ‘but maybe there is still hope’. In this editorial therefore, the newspaper wrote:
We refuse to be pessimists, since pessimism would be an admission of the bankruptcy of Irish statesmanship. We cannot be optimists.
171 And not that long ago: only months before
173 In August 1921 De Valera had been appointed President of the Republic, as well as the ministry, by the Second Dáil (which was still an illegal assembly). (Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, op. cit., pp. 104-105)
174 There also was Sir Hamar Greenwood: interestingly enough, while Greenwood had been actively defending the Auxiliaries and Black and Tans in Ireland, “his Canadian origin […] left him among the most understanding of the Irish point of view in the British delegation.” (Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, op. cit., p. 175, with reference to Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. III, Ireland 1918-1925, London, 1971, p. 156)
175 The Irish Times, 11 October 1921

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The rewards of settlement are so substantial and inspiring, the necessary results of failure so terrible, that contemplation of the possibility of failure seems to be almost […] an insult to the intelligence of the Irish negotiators. Let us take care, at least, that these men shall not fail for lack of our prayers and our good-will.
In the meanwhile we must possess our souls in patience, hoping that the passion for peace at home will react upon the temper of the negotiators in London.176
By the undermining word “temper” is to be understood the Sinn Féiners’ wish to acquire complete independence: an “illusion”177 the newspaper deemed “foolish and inexcusable”.178 Certainly the best path to take was that of compromise, especially since that period saw ex- colonies of the Empire granted the status of dominion, and not of independent countries – however The Times rightly pointed out that “Ireland [was] not and never [had been] a colony”.179 Still, The Irish Times took risks by calling a long-standing wish as “foolish”, at such a period when “the most obvious advice or warning [was] liable to be misconstrued”180 as it had written not so long earlier. Indeed it seemed the Irish newspaper had dropped its “refrain”.181 But the paper was right though when it wrote: “If [de Valera’s words] are – as they seem to be – a re- assertion of the claim that Ireland is an independent State, the Conference must fail”; indeed the Treaty would never have been agreed if Ireland had not eventually given allegiance to the Crown.
The Times was much more hopeful about the Conference and even the unfruitful letter exchanges – counterbalancing de Valera’s declaration with the Prime Minister’s reply as well, thereby putting the focus back on the two parties rather than only paying attention to the Irish black sheep:
Even Mr. de Valera’s insistence in claiming what no British Government could have conceded, and Mr. Lloyd George’s proper steadfastness in refusing him, have helped to reduce the Irish problem to an issue of manageable dimensions. Out of these interchanges, fruitless though they may have seemed, has grown a new conception of the possibilities of Anglo-Irish friendship, and, as the result of it, a new method of approaching the Irish question.
Whatever be its outcome, a fresh path lies open for the Irish Conference, infinitely more promising than any hitherto essayed.182
At least, The Irish Times conceded: “The mere fact that the Conference has been arranged is, we
176 The Irish Times, 11 October 1921, editorial: ‘The Conference’
177 Idem
178 Idem
179 The Times, 11 October 1921, editorial: ‘The Irish Conference’
181 Idem

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must presume, a proof […] that Sinn Fein wants peace”183; the paper’s faith in Irish motives seemed rather hesitant though. In comparison, The Times was, again, more optimistic and put the focus on both parties once more: “The Government and Sinn Fein alive have, by the very fact of their agreement to confer, given an earnest of the sincerity of their intentions.”184
It is true that the Irish delegates (Griffith the least though) were “positively hostile”185 to dominion status; especially since “what was being asked for was inconsistent with dominion status as that applied in the overseas Dominions”186. If ever this was to be accepted, it had to explicitly lead to an eventual secession187; indeed, confusion concerning the meaning of this status was omnipresent in the period of discussions, and even once the Treaty was signed.188
About the Northern Irish issue, Collins’ first preoccupation, what was asked by the Irishmen was to have back “Tyrone, Fermanagh, Armagh and Derry, all of which would have voted against partition”189 (to a certain extent at least for Derry and Armagh which did have a large Protestant community too). Therefore a new bargain was agreed: if unity was attained, Southern Ireland would be willing to “enter into free partnership with the British Commonwealth”.190 For this aim, the British Government tried to negotiate with Ulster to enter into an all-Ireland Parliament, something to which Ulster remained cool. It was therefore proposed that Ulster should retain the choice to enter or not in this Parliament, so that she did not feel snared, and by this compromise republicans also believed unity was still within reach. But on 10 November the Northern Cabinet declared that there could be “no surrender of Ulster’s rights”191: The Irish Times counselled them that this was “the moment of all moments when leaders must be trusted”. This time, the paper was not bothered by Nationalists’ “foolish” claims of independence (it even wrote: “In respect of patience and confidence Nationalist Ireland is setting a good example”), but by Ulster’s “ridiculous” feel of betrayal: there was none, since “[w]hatever the North may decide to do it will do of its own free will”.
183 The Irish Times, 11 October 1921, editorial: ‘The Conference’
186 Ibid., p. 179
187 Ibid., p. 181, with reference to F.M.A. Hawkins, “Defence and the role of Erskine Childers in the treaty negotiations of 1921”, in Irish Historical Studies, vol. XXII, n° 87, March 1981, p. 259
188 Even during post-Treaty conferences at Westminster, Lloyd George never answered what dominion status clearly meant: he talked instead “of the dangers of definition of limiting development by too many finalities, of introducing rigidities alien to British constitutional thinking” (Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, op. cit., p. 201).
189 Ibid., p. 183
190 Ibid., p. 186
191 The Irish Times, 11 November 1921, editorial: ‘Ulster’s Choice’ (same source for the following quotes up to the end of the paragraph)

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On 4 December the Irish delegates came back to London after having consulted the Dáil, and presented a draft “unmodified in essentials”.192 These appeared very compromising, as The Irish Times expressed on 5 December in a leading article.193 Lloyd George made one fiscal concession; as for the rest, the Prime Minister threatened of an “immediate and terrible war”194 if the Irish did not accept a settlement right away, without reporting back to the Dáil. The Irish delegates, now taking personal responsibility, could not assume to plunge their country into war again195: thus the “Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland” was signed on 6 December 1921.196
On 6 July, the editorial of The Times was filled with anxiety as “the fate of the negotiations [seemed] to tremble in the balance”.197 It also showed some weariness of these negotiations, and this time kept rather good terms for the British Government and admonished the Irish delegates, quite a change from the past years:
In so far as it has been possible for Great Britain to clear the path of settlement, her task has been accomplished. The Government have gone to the extreme limit of generous concession. Upon the point of allegiance there can be no compromise, no concession, no argument. No niggardly considerations of the cost and no baseless timidity on our part can be alleged to stand in the way. If Irishmen had ever reason for mistrust of either British Imperialism or British commercialism, they have now no shadow of foundation for it.198
In fact, it would keep on praising the British Government and the King from this period on, now that the horrors in Ireland had been stopped at last – they do recall it quickly though: “in [the Government’s] past methods of Irish government, we have found it necessary to criticize them sternly. […] None of these things can, however, detract from the supreme achievement of this month. In Irish affairs they now stand where no British Government has ever stood”.199
But the newspaper also proved to be foretelling on the question of Ulster, when it warned: “Ulster Unionists […] are realizing that if the truce is observed and Southern Ireland remain united and determined, the odium of Irish disorder may lie increasingly upon their own
193 The Irish Times, 5 December 1921, ‘Rumours Rejection of Proposals’
195 De Valera would later say that this threat was a bluff, which Griffith and Collins had failed to see (David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, op. cit., p. 110).
196 Treaty between Great Britain & Ireland, signed 6th December, 1921, at 10 Downing Street, London; Department of the Taoiseach, 2002/5/1, National Archives, pp. 2-3 < http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/document-gallery/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921/ > retrieved 28 April 2014
197 The Times, 6 December 1921, editorial: ‘The Irish Negotiations’
198 Idem
199 The Times, 14 December 1921, editorial: ‘The Irish Session’

29
province”200: already then, this somehow could be read as a prelude to the effective disorder and Troubles laying ahead of Northern Ireland.
II) The Anglo-Irish Treaty
1) Scope of the Treaty
The word “Treaty” was the first time it was used in British dominion relations; but “there was no new departure in prescribing an oath – that was uniform dominion practice”201 – there was only in its formulation. For instance there was no mention of subjecthood per se, for the sake of not reviving disagreement over symbols between the two parties. However there were some “impositions unknown in the dominions, including continued control of various ports and harbours by the Admiralty, and liability to a share in the public debt of the United Kingdom”.202
The Treaty was met, generally speaking, with great relief. But in spite of the Treaty’s “elaborate and ingenious formulas […] devised to allow both parties to save face with their deeply suspicious constituencies”203, with a title “designed to reassure republicans that sovereignty had not after all been surrendered”204, the most diehard republicans back in Ireland – led by de Valera – were not being deceived: they understood that an oath was to be taken, and this was met with violent opposition from their part.205 Collins saw this coming when he signed the agreement: on 6 December, he wrote to his friend John O’Kane “I tell you this – early this morning I signed my death warrant”206; and indeed he was to be assassinated by anti-Treaty partisans a few months later, on 22 August 1922. But however hard this step might have been, he was persuaded it was the right thing to do: in the same letter, he wrote: “[t]hese signatures are the first real step for Ireland. If people will only remember that – the first real step.”207
Three articles concerned defence: article 6 stated that Irish coastal defence would be ensured by His Majesty’s forces until the Irish Free State would undertake her own coastal defence; article 7 detailed the facilities that were to be afforded to the Imperial Forces by the Irish Free State, in
200 Idem
201 Ibid., p. 191
203 Idem
204 Idem
205 Ibid., p. 109
206 Rex Taylor, Michael Collins, London: Hutchinson, 1958, p. 388
207 Idem

30
time of peace as in time of war; article 8 dealt with Irish limitation of armaments208. As Arthur Bromage put it: “These articles were a thorn in de Valera’s flesh”209 (see Annex 8 for the points of agreements).
Another main aspect of de Valera’s objection was the oath to the Crown, as spelled out in article 4 – something about which The Times was slightly too optimistic, when it wrote that the “form of oath agreed to [would] […] be generally regarded as satisfactory”.210 De Valera was thus against the Treaty because it “gave away republican independence by bringing Ireland as a dominion within the British Empire and more precisely by insisting on the recognition of the English King as the source of executive authority in Ireland”.211
The Treaty was to be formally applied to the whole of Ireland; however Northern Ireland benefited from an opt-out clause, and could secede from Southern Ireland within the end of the month after the Treaty’s ratification, if she wanted to. This was made possible by the creation of a “boundary commission”, which proved, according to Fitzpatrick, “remarkably effective in […] raising false hopes of future unification.”212 This commission, composed of an appointee from the Southern Government, one from the Northern Government, and one from the British Government, supposed to then re-establish the border separating Southern and Northern Ireland “in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants”213 – though immediately followed by a condition: “so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions”, quite a broad and vague condition indeed from which any outcome was possible, making therefore all parties agree, each one retaining its own interpretation.
208 Treaty between Great Britain & Ireland, signed 6th December, 1921, at 10 Downing Street, London; Department of the Taoiseach, 2002/5/1, National Archives, pp. 2-3 < http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/document-gallery/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921/ > accessed on 28 April 2014
209 Arthur W. Bromage, “Anglo-Irish Accord”, in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4, December 1938, University of Michigan, p. 524
213 Treaty between Great Britain & Ireland, signed 6th December, 1921, at 10 Downing Street, London; Department of the Taoiseach, 2002/5/1, National Archives, p. 4 < http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/document-gallery/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921/ > accessed on 28 April 2014

31
2) Press coverage of the Treaty
On 7 December 1921, the editorial of The Times was unsurprisingly very hopeful, opening with “Reason has prevailed”. It underlined again how “Great Britain [had] gone to lengths of generosity greater than many of her sternest critics [had] ever demanded”214, and continued further down by writing that “[the fact that] the representatives both of this country and of Southern Ireland had the vision to bring the Conference to a triumphant end [constituted] one of the greatest achievements in our Imperial history”215 – no mention was made on Lloyd George’s threat of an “immediate and terrible war” though216, and on the contrary the Prime Minister was spoken of in almost heroic terms217. The paper then went on to recall the Conference’s evolution and how all these years the ‘Irish question’ had damaged Great Britain’s national and international reputation. But the newspaper also wrote about its own role:
Since the end of the war we have spared no effort to impress the urgent necessity of an Irish settlement upon the Government and the country.
[…] with all the power at our command, this journal sought to persuade them to return to the paths of responsible statesmanship. At last they realized whither evil counsels were leading them.
The vision of Lord Northcliffe, who ventured so long ago as June, 1919, to prophesy the coming of a “Dominion of Ireland” seems at last to be on the point of realization.218
The Irish Times was equally jolly, underlining first and foremost the sudden change in events: “Men rubbed their eyes yesterday like people who step suddenly from darkness into sunshine. Forty-eight hours ago a renewal of civil warfare seemed to be imminent. To-day we are offered […] “the sure and certain hope” of peace […].”219 The Times used a similar imagery when writing that the “sudden change from gloom to joy made “the man in the street” a little dizzy”220; and it commended the Irish delegates, who “proved themselves courageous statesmen”221 by stopping to pursue “the shadow of an Irish union enforced by legislation” in favour of “substance”.222
214 The Times, editorial of 7 December 1921, “The Irish Free State”
215 Idem
216 Maybe was it not known at the time. And in any case, even without this direct threat, this would have been the logical alternative to a complete breakdown in negotiations.
217 “In this high matter Mr. Lloyd George and his Cabinet have challenged the reputation of their predecessors back to Queen Elizabeth and beyond her.” (The Times, 14 December 1921, editorial: ‘The Irish Session’)
219 The Irish Times, 7 December 1921, editorial: ‘The Treaty’
220 The Times, 7 December 1921, ‘Joy After Gloom’
222 Idem

32
The Irish Times dedicated more than a whole page of its publication to the Treaty’s coverage, spanning the main points of the Treaty such as taxation and the oath, and laying out Ulster’s options. In the editorial, it again advised Ulster to join, so as to “contribute her great experience and political knowledge” to this young all-Parliament; but most of all, if Ulster would join, it would unify the island again, which was the newspaper long-standing and dear will:
Will the Treaty hasten the event towards which everything that was best in the heart and soul and brain of the Irish people has yearned for a hundred years? Will it give us now, or in the near future, a united Ireland?
[…] at last the foundations of Irish unity have been laid. Will Ireland build upon them?223
It did not want to be too optimistic though, rightfully seeing obstacles to such an enterprise, such as for instance potential “objections on the question of allegiance” in the Dáil. And even though the Treaty did not deal with the Southern community, the paper ended its editorial with a direct link between two:
The Southern loyalists’ gifts of education, character, and experience are essential to the building up of a new nationhood. They will rejoice to put those gifts into the common stock. During the darkest hours they never lost their faith in Ireland’s high destiny. Will that faith be rewarded now?224
As for The Times, as it had done for the King’s speech of 22 June 1921225, it issued a three-page “Special Section” comprising the full text of the Treaty and a history of the events from 1919 leading up to the agreement, where The Times underlined once more its own role:
The history of the negotiations for an Irish settlement, which culminate in the happy news that an agreement has been reached, begins with a leading article in The Times of June 16, 1919.
Difficult as it may be to estimate the various factors that make public opinion, we venture to claim for [our] articles a very large share in the judicial attitude towards the Irish affairs which became noticeable in the people of [Great Britain].
There was criticism […]; but it was felt and declared that the scheme must have an important influence on the future of Irish politics.226
There also were articles dealing with the reception of news abroad, notably in the United-States – the ever-sensitive point for The Times – and in Canada – the dominion status of which had been
223 The Irish Times, 7 December 1921, editorial: ‘The Treaty’
224 Idem
225 Speaking of whom: the King himself concluded a message to the Prime Minister with “I am indeed happy in some small way to have contributed by my speech at Belfast to this great achievement.” (The Times, 7 December 1921, ‘The King’s Message’)
226 The Times, 7 December 1921, ‘Story of the Negotiations – A Lead from The Times’

33
the reference for Ireland’s status.227 However the main difference – not underlined in newspapers – was in geographical location, especially for the lending of ports to the Crown fleet: while Canada was far away from Great Britain, the fact that Ireland was just next to her complicated matters greatly, particularly in terms of Ireland’s neutrality should any country declare war on Great Britain (or Great Britain declare war).
It also pointed out that the loyalist community of Cork was awaiting Ulster’s final call. The Times also reminded, regarding the city’s burning one year ago, that the due compensations for the reconstruction of the city were still pending.228 As for Southern unionists more generally, The Times noticed that there was “in the agreement no reference to the Unionist and Protestant minority in the South of Ireland, but there is authority for stating that the Southern Unionists have received certain definite assurances from Sinn Féin […].”229
The Times also presented Ulster’s view (from a correspondent writing the day before) as “favourable” to the Treaty – however Ulster had still not replied to the Prime Minister. The newspaper wrote: “The terms of the offer that has been made render it scarcely thinkable that Ulster should reject them.”230 It based itself on the impression of officials from the Ulster Cabinet saying they did not find any great opposition to make to the terms so far, though some of them needed further examination. It wrote:
The first impression is that the whole thing depends upon the details regarding the frontier readjustments. If these entail a great change of population they would not be acceptable to Ulster, but it is understood here that they amount in reality to small adjustments, in some cases involving only a hamlet or a farmstead.231 232
In both The Irish Times and The Times, the expressed view of Lord Birkenhead, from the British delegation, was published. He remained hopeful that Ulster would join the all-Ireland Parliament; however there was still the possibility that she may say no, and this would be “an attitude [she would] be entitled to maintain”233, though he “would regret that decision”.234
227 The Times, 7 December 1921
228 Ibid, ‘Cork Looking Ahead’
229 The Times, 7 December 1921, ‘The King to Open Parliament’
230 The Times, 8 December 1921, ‘Towards Irish Peace’
231 The Times, 7 December 1921, ‘Ulster’s Views’
232 This was not Sinn Féin’s first will: as we saw earlier, what mattered to Collins was the fate of all Fermanagh and Tyrone. We can then foresee a soon-to-be bitter separation between North and South.
233 The Irish Times and The Times, 7 December 1921
234 Idem

34
On 9 December, a Belfast correspondent wrote in The Times about many Ulstermen’s criticism of England and their feeling of abandonment.235 Indeed information concerning Ulster’s views was rather confused: on the one hand, James Craig seemed quite positive although cautious regarding the Treaty236; on the other hand, during the debate over the Treaty in Westminster on 14 December, Lord Carson made a virulent attack against the Treaty in the House of Lords. According to him England had ceded to the enemy, had abandoned the Unionist policy and gave up on Ireland. “Like everybody else, the Government has betrayed Ulster.”237 The Times deemed that preaching “nauseating”.238 Carson also blamed the press, “the whole vitriolic power of which, he said, inspired by Downing-street, had been carrying on week after week a campaign of falsehood and misrepresentation against Ulster.” In its editorial, The Times was very disappointed in him, he who in the past had “shown that in Irish affairs he was capable of a broader and truer vision”239. Eventually, Ulster’s attitude would be positively hostile to the terms of the Treaty.240
But there was still hope on the side of Southern Ireland: The Irish Times prayed for Dáil Éireann to approve the Treaty, like The Times – although since the signing of the Treaty, the London- based newspaper covered mainly the Westminster debates. “The world applauds the British Empire’s greatest act of Imperial magnanimity”, The Irish Times wrote; “It judges Britain to be wholly in the right, and will judge Ireland, is she rejects the Treaty, wholly in the wrong.”241 It feared that such bitter debates in the Dáil against the Imperial link might dissuade further Northern Ireland from joining in the Irish Free State: “Again, Ireland will not be Ireland without Ulster.”242 It thus hoped that Griffith, his view being the more moderate and sensible one in the Dáil, would become “the authentic spokesman of the Irish people”.243 The paper also pointed out that in any case, the option of an Irish republic had died with the acceptance of negotiations – an argument taken up by some orators in the Dáil244; and it attacked the republican diehards by writing they would never be satisfied “until they [had] build an Irish Republic on the ruins of the
235 The Times, 9 December 1921, ‘Sir James Craig’s Mission – Ulster Complaint of “Betrayal” ’
236 “Sir J. Craig’s friendly, though cautious, remarks about the agreement have inspired high hopes regarding Ulster’s attitude.” (The Irish Times, 9 December 1921, ‘London Letter – Ulster and the Free State’)
237 The Times, 15 December 1921, ‘Irish Peace Debates’
238 Idem
239 Idem
240 The Irish Times, 9 December 1921, ‘Ulster’s Attitude – Treaty Terms Disliked’, ‘Disappointment’
241 The Irish Times, 20 December 1921, editorial ‘The Two Voices’
242 Idem
243 Idem
244 “According to Kevin O’Higgins […], ‘the fact that we were willing to negotiate implied that we had something to give away’”; and “Seán MacEoin […] declared that ‘there is not a man in the Dáil from the President down but has eaten principles from the start (Hear, hear). There is not one who has stood definitely for the ideal that was before us.” (Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, op. cit., p. 112, with reference to Dáil Éireann, Treaty Report, p.43; and to T.P. O’Neill, Private Sessions of the Second Dáil, Dublin, 1972, pp. 225-226)

35
Irish Free State”.245 The paper condemned de Valera for wanting to bring “his country to ruin for the sake of his personal convictions”.246
Therefore when the Treaty was approved by a small majority (64 votes to 57) in the Dáil on 7 January 1922, The Irish Times naturally applauded the decision. The turn of events led Arthur Griffith to become President of Sinn Féin on 10 January (thus finally becoming the “authentic spokesman of the Irish people”), and the Dublin-based newspaper continued on supporting the pro-Treaty Provisional Government led by Collins and Griffith. It perceived this as good news for Southerners indeed: “so far as [Mr Griffith] can have his way, all minorities will get their fair play and full consideration in the Irish State”247, and Southern unionists would keep on playing the game to make the settlement and cohabitation work. The Times also concluded happily this page of history (“We have indeed come to the threshold of a new epoch”248) on 9 January, taking again the opportunity to place a last little sting to the Government’s late reaction:
As we have long foreseen, it needed only that the Government should offer Irishmen the reality of independence in their own affairs to sweep aside all that was adventitious and impermanent in the Sinn Fein position. So long as the essential measure of freedom was denied, Ireland was ready to endorse any political programme, however extreme, that bade fair to obtain it.
We as a nation have beheld a nobler vision of our Imperial destiny than was vouchsafed to even the greatest of our older statesmen: and we have dared to seek its attainment.249
It also predicted that Sinn Féin, inexperienced in administrative matters, “probably [would] make mistakes”. But that was the logical course, and was a positive matter:
[They] are about to attempt an experiment in political architecture which, if they succeed, may enrich civilization.
We, at all events, do not feat the growth of a Celtic civilization within the natural confines of this realm. Infinitely better that, than the continuing revolt of Irishmen against exotic forms of government.250
All in all, both newspapers bade farewell to warfare and welcomed a new and reasonable Irish Government, all believing that the majority of the Irish people wanted peace, in spite of the close majority that won in the Dáil. This was the illusion for the time being, and the Irish population could, although for a very short while, enjoy a time of peace.
245 The Irish Times, 22 December 1921: editorial: ‘The Dáil and the People’
246 The Irish Times, 3 January 1921: editorial: ‘Dáil Éireann’s Duty’
247 The Irish Times, 9 January 1921, editorial: ‘The Dáil Decides’
248 The Times, 9 January 1920, editorial: ‘The Irish Free State’
249 Idem
250 Idem

36
Conclusion
We saw that war not only takes place on the battlefield or in the streets, but in words. During the Irish Independence War between 1919 and 1921, newspapers were not mere spectators but actors part in the Anglo-Irish conflict, conveying and influencing public opinion and Government policies: in particular The Times and The Irish Times, two leading newspapers in each country. The Government, acting in Ireland through the Irish Administration, understood this “war of words” very well, and tried to counter-attack with a propaganda of their own, or with violence, as with Crown forces reprisals against newspapers. However these reprisals were a dark spot in British policing: not officially encouraged by the Government, but only half-heartedly answered to, they attracted many criticisms and did more wrong than good to Britain’s reputation.
The Times, very critical of the Government during that period, was decidedly an influential paper in high political spheres as the episodes of the setting of the Government of Ireland Act or the King’s speech showed us. The Irish Times for its part, attached to the Empire, remained more or less faithful to the Government’s decisions and stood for the loyal and ‘quiet force’ of the Southern unionist community of Ireland; it was often demonstrating how Ireland and Great Britain should be thankful for their exemplary patience and diplomatic behaviour.
The two newspapers held very different views, and conveyed their own vision of History. While the London-based newspaper spotted the faults of the Government’s policy and royal military’s ill-doings, The Irish Times counterbalanced these claims by focusing on Sinn Féin’s revolutionary claims and the republicans forces’ exactions on the Crown forces. Both newspapers spoke of the truth, and to retain only one view would be to read only at one side of History. But of course, while these two editorial lines were the newspapers’ main stance, these do remain only tendencies – which means that the papers nevertheless held a more moderate and analytical view of events than a mere liberal or unionist grotesque view.
In the end, in spite of their differences, both newspapers’ wish was to see peace restored: they both welcomed the Treaty with open arms, opening a new era in Anglo-Irish politics, with Ireland as a dominion of the Empire.

The Role of "The Times" and "The Irish Times" in the Anglo-Irish Settlement, 1921 (without annexes)

The Role of "The Times" and "The Irish Times" in the Anglo-Irish Settlement, 1921 (without annexes)

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The Role of "The Times" and "The Irish Times" in the Anglo-Irish Settlement, 1921 (without annexes)