Emanuel Swedenborg

2. ONTOLOGY
OR
The Signification of Philosophical Terms
Annotations by
EMANUEL SWEDENBORG
Translated and Edited by
ALFRED ACTON
Late Professor of Theology in the
Academy of the New Church
Swedenborg Scientific Association
Bryn Athyn. Pennsylvania
1964

3. Pub1ished by
Massachusetts New-Church Union
Boston, Mas s., 1901
Reproduced in 1964 by
Swedenborg Scientific As sociation
100 copies
Photo Offset Printing by
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

4. PREFACE.
IN the first catalogue of Sweden borg's manuscripts,
which was that prepared by his heirs in 1772 at the
time they consigned the manuscripts to the Royal
Academy of Sciences of Stockholm, we find, under
the heading "Philosophical Works," the following en­
try: "Several larger and smaller fragments written in
various styles of handwriting, yet apparently by Swe­
den borg himself; they seem to belong to his Oeconomz'a
Naturalis (sz"c) and to his Regnum Animale.*' In a
later catalogue, prepared by Chastanier, in 1785, after
a great number of the manuscripts had been bound,
these "larger and smaller fragments" with the addition
of one or two other manuscripts are described as "pre­
cious fragments of the Oeconomia Regni Animalis and
the Regnum Animale." t Two years later, at the in­
stance of the Exegetic and Philanthropie Society, of
Stockholm, the Swedenborg manuscripts were, for the
first time, catalogued separately, each being classified
according to the size of the manuscript page. In that
catalogue we find one of these "fragments," a manu­
script of 256 pages, entered under the class of small
oblong folios, as Codex 54, Pltysiologz'ca et Metaphysica.{
The same entry is found in the official catalogue of
Swedenborg's writings in the library of the Royal
Academy of Sciences, made sorne years later,§ and
also in the official manuscript catalogue of the same
• Documents Concerning Swedenborg, Vol. II., p. 784. t Ibid.,
p. 793. t Ibid., p. 796. § Ibid., p. 799·

5. IV PREFACE
library.* Dntil the year 1845, there is no record of
any endeavor having been made to ascertain and de­
scribe the exact contents of this Codex, and for up­
wards of fifty years it was known only as Codex 54,
Physz'ologica et Metaphysica. It was under this vague
title that the treatise on the" Soul," and the Ontologia,
were so long neglected and unknown.
The first indication of the existence of these works,
was given in 1845 by Dr. Svedbom, the Librarian of
the Royal Academy of Sciences. in a memoir communi­
cated to the London Swedenborg Society. In this me­
moir, which is published as an appendix to the English
translation of the" Economy of the Animal Kingdom,"
Dr. Svedbom says: "Among these [unpublished phys­
iological and philosophical manuscripts of Swedenborg
preserved in the Library of the Royal Academy] the
first place appears to me to belong to a volume which
1 will now endeavor to describe a little particularly.
This book, which is in Swedenborg's own handwriting,
contains 130 leavesjol. max. On the back it has the
title, printed by the binder, Pflysiologica et Metaphys­
z'ca, and it bears the same title also in the old manu­
script catalogue of our library. On the first page,
without any title preceding it, we have the word prae­
jatùmcula. . . ." Then follows a very complete de­
scription of the work now known as " The Soul," which
fills jols. t 1-1 17; Dr. Svedbom then continues: "The
remainder of this book, from jol. 118-127 (pp. xx.),
is occupied by a dissertation which has the title Onto­
,. Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Appendix.
t It must be noted that the manuscript is counted by ieaves, not by
pages.

6. PREFACE v
logia prefixed to it at the head of fol. 118." After
describing this work, the memoir continues: "Like
many other things contained in Swedenborg's manu­
scripts, this 'Ontology' is not complete, being only
a sketch which the author proposed to develop after­
wards. The whole book is closely written, and in
sorne parts in a cramped hand, and will be difficult to
read and decipher."
Thus, more than a hundred years after they were
written (1742), the work on the "Soul" and the On­
tologia were at last discovered un der the binder's am­
biguous title, Physiologica et Metaphysica, and their
existence publicly announced.
But the discovery did not lead to any immediate
practical result so far as the latter work was concerned.
The Swedenborg Association, founded in 1845, ob·
tainecl from the Academy of Sciences the loan of the
manuscript which had been so fully described by Dr.
Svedbom; and, under the auspices of the Association,
Dr. Immanuel Tafel published fols. 1-117, under the
title, De Anima (Tubingen, (849). In his preface to
this work, Dr. Tafel, after quoting from Dr. Svedbom's
description of fols. (18-127, arJds: "According to the
wishes of the Swedenborg Association, I have for the
present omitted the treatise inscribed Ontologz'a, fols.
II8-127, which is contained at the end of the manu­
script. The titles of the chapters of this work are," etc.
We hear no more about the" Ontology" for twenty
years after the publication of the first part of Codex 54.
But in 1869 the last twenty pages of the Codex, being
the oft-mentionedfols. 118-127, were photolithographed
by Dr. R. L. Tafel, and published in Vol. VI. of the

7. VI PREFACE
Photolithographed Manuscripts, where they may be
found on pages 323-342.
From this copy, the Rev. Philip B. Cabell, at that
time Professor of Ancient Languages in Urbana Uni­
versity, prepared both a Latin transcription and an
English translation. In 188o, the translation was pub­
lished by Messrs. J. B. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia,
Pa., this publication being the first appearance of the
" Ontology" in print - 138 years after it had been
written by the author.
When the limited edition of ML Cabell's translation
was exhausted, an offer was made by the Massachusetts
New-Church Union to republish the work. Accepting
this offer, Mr. CabeH after carefully revising his tran­
scription of the Latin text, prepared an emended trans·
lation which he submitted to the Union with the re­
quest that independent criticism be invited for the
sake of further revision. Upon the receipt of this re­
quest, Dr. Whiston, the Manager of the Union, invited
the present translator to undertake the work.
In accepting the invitation, I had proposed to do
nothing more than to suggest to ML Cabell such
changes in his translation as seemed necessary or de­
sirable; but as the work proceeded, it became apparent
that this plan would not be productive of the best re­
sults. Especially was this found to be the case in
respect to the quotations made by our author, many
of which are so elliptical as to be hardly intelligible.
When he made his translation, and also his revision,
Mr. Cabell did not have the opportunity of comparing
these quotations with the original passages, as the
works in which these occur are quite rare. After Sorne

8. PREFACE Vll
enquiry, 1 was fortunate enough ta secure access to
these works.· Reference to them showed the neces ­
sity of making very material alterations in the quota­
tions, not only as translated, but also as originally made
by our author; moreover, in several cases, light was
thrown on Swedenborg's own remarks. The work of
revision was, therefore, gradually abandoned, and with
Mr. Cabell's concurrence, an entirely new translation
was undertaken. The result of this undertaking is
now laid before the reader.
The Latin transcription prepared by Mr. Cabell has
been carefully compared with the photolithographed
copy of the original manuscript, and a few slight
changes have been made. The handwriting of the
original is very difficult to read, being in some places
almost illegible, and it is with pleasure that 1 take this
opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to Mr.
Cabell for his careful and painstaking transcription. 1
am also indebted to him for various suggestions and
criticisms, and for his assistance in reading the proofs.
Nor must 1 omit to mention the valuable suggestions
contained in Dr. R. L. Tafel's review of the first edi­
tion of the "Ontology."t These suggestions have,
for the most part, been adopted in the present trans­
lation.
In editing the work, 1 have endeavored to confine
myself to such changes as will, 1 hope, make the
"Ontology" more easy for reading and study; a few
• Wolff's Ontologia and Cosmologja are preserved in the Library of
the Academy of the New Church, Huntingdon Valley, Pa.; Dupleix's
Corps de Philosophie, at the Columbia University Library, New York,
N. Y.; and Baron's Metaphysica Generalis, at the Ridgway Library,
Philadelphia, Pa.
t Words for the New Church, Vol. II., p. 352.

9. Vlll PREFACE
explanatory footnotes have been added to the text, but
of these l have been very sparing. To the simple
title "Ontology," which is the only title given in the
original manuscript, has been added a descriptive sub­
title taken from one of the prospectuses mentioned
below. The paragraphs have been numbered, several
of the original paragraphs having been subdivided for
the purpose of facilitating reference to the work. Ref­
erences have been supplied to th~ quotations and sub­
quotations, and ail the former and many of the latter
have been verified. These changes will be found noted
in the appendix to the translation. In the appendix
l have also added critical notes on the Latin text.
These, though somewhat unusual in a translation, seem
desirable in the present case, both because of the many
changés which have been made, and because the Latin,
being accessible only in the original manuscript or the
photolithographed copy, is not easy of reference to the
majority of readers. An index to the work has been
prepared, which, it is hoped, will be found useful in
enabling the reader to get a more extended view of
Swedenborg's philosophy than can be obtained by a
mere perusal of a work professing to be nothing more
than a definition of philosophical terms.
The" Ontology," which was written by Swedenborg
in the year 1742, is one of those numerous small trea­
tises which marked his progress in the search for the
soul. These separate treatises or studies were su b­
sequently to be inc1uded, according to a definite plan,
in one grand work of several volumes, in which, as the
end of the labor, "the crown of all human wisdom,"*
the soul was to be discovered in the body.
.. Photolithographed Manu'scripts, Vol. VI., p. 351, Pra~.latio.

10. PREFACE ix
Swedenborg made seven prospectuses or outlines of
this great work. The seventh, or final prospectus, was
prefixed to the first volume of the" Animal Kingdom,"
published in 1744; the remaining six may be found in
the Photolithographed Manuscripts, Vol. VI., pp. 349­
353. In the published prospectus, the projected work,
of which the" Animal Kingdom" constituted the be­
ginning, is divided into seventeen "Parts" which are
enumerated; in four of the six manuscript prospec­
tuses - which differ but slightly from each other - it
is divided into four" Tomes" or volumes, the proposed
contents of which are given in detail; while in the
remaining two manuscript prospectuses, which likewise
substantially agree with each other, it is divided into
six "Transactions," of which the last four only are
enumerated and their proposed contents given.
According to these two "transaction" prospectuses,
it appears to have been Swedenborg's first intention
to continue the series of the" Economy of the Animal
Kingdom." Neither of the prospectuses makes any
mention of Transactions I. and II., and since the term
" transaction" is used by Swedenborg to refer to the
"Economy of the Animal Kingdom," it is evident
that the two published volumes of that work consti­
tu te the first two transactions of the proposed larger
work. The subjects to be treated in the four transac­
tions that were to complete the work, are. given in the
prospectuses referred to, as follows : -
Trans. III. The cerebrum. Trans. IV. The cere­
bellum, etc.; diseases of the head. Trans. V. Intro­
duction to rational psychology. Trans. V 1. Rational
psychology.

11. x PREFACE
Instead, however, of fol1owing this plan, Swedenborg
prepared a new plan, in which he proposes to begin
his investigations, not from the blood, as in the" Econ­
orny of the Animal Kingdom," but from the organs of
the body. This new plan wasl sketched in the four
" tome" prospectuses. According to these prospec­
tuses, the work was to be contained in four" Tomes,"
or volumes, the proposed contents of which are: ­
Tome l. The anatomy of the body; the generative
organs; the organs of the senses. Tome Il. The
anatomyof the brain; diseases of the head. Tome Ill.
Introduction to rational psychology. Tome IV. Rational
psychology.
The position assigned to the "Ontology," in both
the" transaction" and the" tome" prospectuses, is as
the concJuding part or chapter of the" Introduction
to rational psychology," which constitutes Transaction
V. of the first plan and Tome Ill. of the second. The
plan of this Introduction, as given in one of the two
prospectuses of Transaction V., is as follows : ­
INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. 1. The
cortex. 2. The medul1ary and nerve fibre. 3. The
arachnoid tunic. 4. The doctrine of order, degrees,
and society. S. The doctrine of forms. 6. The doc­
trine of correspondences and representations. 7. On­
tology or First philosophy." 8. (Added at a later
time) The doctrine of modifications.
The other prospectus of this transaction omits parts
3 and 8, and gives part 7 as simply "Ontology."
In the four "fome" prospectuses, the Introduction
• This is the complete title of Wolff's " Ontology," which was written
as a preparation to his " Cosmology," and" Rational Psychology."

12. PREFACE XI
to rational psychology is planned somewhat differently.
The most complete of these prospectuses is as fol­
lows : ­
INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. I. The
doctrine of forms and modifications. 2. The doctrine
of order, degrees, and society. 3. The doctrine of
representations. 4. The cortex. 5. The medullary
and nerve fibre. 6. The arachnoid tunic. 7. The
motor fibre. 8. (Added at a later time.) The signifi­
cation of philosophical terms, or Ontology.
The three other " tome" prospectuses omit several
of these parts, and none of them mentions" Ontology."
They are not, however, put in the form of prospectuses,
but are rather general statements in narrative form, of
the author's intentions. That which we have quoted
seems to be the last written of the "tome" prospec­
tuses.
From what has been sai d, it will be seen that our
author first designed the" Ontology" to be a treatise
on First Philosophy, that is, to contain the primary
principles and notions which enter into our reasoning,
for so "First Philosophy" is defined by Wolff.· Later,
however, he narrowed the ground to be covered by the
«Ontology," for in the later prospectus he gives as its
design, "the definition of philosophical terms."t When
this prospectus was written Swedenborg evidently in­
tended, before proceeding to the rational psychology
itself, to clearly define, both to himself and to his
• Ontologia, § 1.
tAs this is the latest prospectus in which " Ontology" is mentioned,
this title has been adopted in the present translation. It full Ydescribes
the nature of the treatise.

13. Xli PREFACE
readers, the terms and hence the phiJosophical ideas
which would enter into the crowning work of the
series. But when he wrote the final prospectus (that
published in the "Animal Kingdom") in which the
whole work is divîded into seventeen "Parts," he had
given up the idea of writing a separate treatise on the
definition of philosophical ter ms, deeming, perhaps, that
the In troduction to rational psychology would of itself
sufficiently define his terms. According to this pro­
spectus, that Introduction, which is to constitute Part
12, was to treat of the doctrines of forms, order and
degrees, series and society, influx, correspondences, and
modification. There is no mention of "Ontology."
When, in 1743, Swedenborg began the "Animal
Kingdom," he had already written smaU or large treat­
ises on almost every subject that was to be incorpo­
rated in that work. His plan was to write on whatever
subject had been occupying his thought, and on which
he had reached some definite conclusion. For we read
in an address to the reader prefixed to one of these
preliminary treatises: "I have long been in doubt
whether to comprise aU that l have meditated about
the soul and the body . . . in one volume, or to divide
them into numbers and parts, and publish each sepa­
rately. . . . To exhibit the soul and its state . . . is a
labor of some years, and must extend over several
volumes. And sin ce l suspected and foresaw that so
vast a work could never be accomplished at one time,
and as it were with one effort and intention of the
mind . . . therefore, after deliberation, l have decided
to distribute the work into treatises and tracts, and to
tJ.ke up my pen at short intervals." The author then

14. PREFACE Xlll
states that he will publish these treatises probably
"not less than five or six times a year." *
Either at the time he wrote these works, or subse­
quently, our author intended to rewrite them, bringing
to bear on each the knowledge the study of the whole
had brought him. In one case he actually did this,
for in 1744 he wrote, apparently for publication, a
treatise on the senses, which he subsequently rewrote,
and published as Volume III. of the" Animal King­
dom" ; and in the preliminary work he plainly implies
an intention of rewriting a treatise on the blood, al­
though this had already been treated of in the" Econ­
omy of the Animal Kingdom," published three years
previously·t
As was said before, among these preliminary works
written as a preparation for the great work, is to be
inc1uded the" Ontology." And though none of them
was published by Swedenborg. it is c1ear from the ad­
dress to the reader prefixed to one, from the preface to
another (The Soul), and from an index added to a
third (Hieroglyphic Key), that sorne, if not ail of them,
were written with a view to publication. Indeed, sev­
eral were public1y announced by the author, as about
to be published.:j:
Whether this was the case with the" Ontology" is
not c1ear. It is c1ear, however, that the manuscript of
that work which we have, is little more than a sketch
and was written more or less hurriedly. This is evi­
dent both from the handwriting, which is perhaps the
.. De anima d ejus et corporis ha,.monia, in Opuscula Philosophica, p. 91.
t Regnum Animale, Pars IV., § 3.
t Documents Concerning Swedenborg, Vol. L, p. 585.

15. XIV PREFACE
most difficult to read of ail the specimens of Sweden­
borg's writing which we have, and by the frequent
ellipses not only in the quotations, but also in the
subject matter, especially towards the end of the
manuscript.
The work appears to have been suddenly dropped,
the last chapter containing only quotations without
any remarks by the author. In view of the fact that
these quotations end at the bottom of the manuscript
page, it may be that investigation will bring to light
the continuation of the work, though if this be the
case, the missing page or pages must have been lost
prior to r845, as our manuscript contains ail the pages
mentioned by Dr. Svedbom in that year. It is not im­
probable, however, that Swedenborg purposely stopped
at the doctrine of modification because that doctrine
was to form the subject of a separate work.
The" Ontology" was written immediately after the
work on the "Soul," the two works being written in
the same manuscript volume in that order. It is the
last of Swedenborg's purely philosophical works setting
forth his final views respecting the soul and the rela­
tion of spirit to matter. In this work he went as far
as philosophy unaided by revelation could take him,
and he failed to reach his goal. By pursuing his meta­
physical studies he could have obtained no further
light, and might, perchance, have come into greater
obscurity. He himself seems to have seen lhis, for
immediately after writing the "Ontology" he girded
up his loins afresh, and entered upon a new journey
in search of the soul. He began this time from the
lips, the outermost gate to the body, intending to pur­

16. PREFACE xv
sue the course through the viscera to the blood and
the brain and thence to the soul itself. But he was not
permitted to go far on this new journey. After pub­
lishing (1744-1745) three "parts" of the "Animal
Kingdom," in which he treats of the viscera and of
the senses, his ripened mind was turned to the consid­
eration of other subjects. In 1745 he wrote the "Wor­
ship and Love of God"; this was followed by the
Adversaria, the Index Biblicus, and these, after his illu­
mination, by the Arcana Cœ!estia.
In the "Ontology," the last of the philosophical
works, we may, therefore, expect to find much light
thrown on the development of Swedenborg's mind,
ever soaring to the causes of things, by which he was
prepared to enter into the world of causes, and ration­
ally receive the truths of revelation. And this indi­
cates one of the uses which the New-Church reader
will derive from a perusal and study of this work.
With our author's theological writings before us, we
cannot go to his philosophical works for instruction in
spiritual subjects, but we can in those works follow the
development of his mind, and see the graduaI growth
of those natural ideas which prepared him for his mis­
sion. Though before his illumination, Swedenborg did
not see the truth respecting spiritual causes, yet it is
evident that he had clear basic philosophical ideas which
brought him to an. obscure perception of higher things,
and prepared him to receive them later. And we may
surely take it for granted that that which thus prepared
Swedenborg, when studied by us in the light of revela­
tion, will establish spiritual truth more clearly in our
minds, by affording us invaluable illustrative and con·
firmatory ideas.

17. XVI PREFACE
But what is, doubtless, a more obvious use of the
"Ontology," is indicated in the sub·title. It is a Defi­
nition of Philosophical Terms - terms which occur not
only in the scientific but also in the theological v/orks,
particularly in the" Divine Love and Wisdom," and a
study of the definitions here given cannot but contri­
bute to a clearer understanding of the passages, even
those in the theological writings, in which the terms
defined occur. To quote from the preface to the former
edition of this work: "Although it was written at
a period prior to the author's illumination, it seems
reasonable to infer that the meaning of those terms
remained essentially the sa me in his theological works."
ALFRED ACTON.
HUNTINGDON VALLEY, PA.
AUGUST, 1901.

18. s c":' 1'" 0''''-_
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.
The following parti cul ars respecting Dupleix and Baron may be of
interest to the reader; Christian Wolff, the philosopher (1679-1754), is
too well known to need any further mention.
SCIPIO DUPLEIX (I569-166I) was "Historiographer of France"
and one of the Counsellors of State. He was for sorne time under
the protection of Marguerite de Valois, who brought him to Paris in
1605, and made him her Master of Requests. His more important
works are, Corps de Philosopllie, containing la Logique, la Pllysiq/ll!,
la Metapllysique, and l'Etllique (1607, reprinted 1626), written for his
pupi!, Antoine de Bourbon, and notable as being the tirst treatise on
philosophy to be published in the French language; Memo;"es des
Caules (1619), long highly esteemed on account of the facts contained
in them; and Histoire Cazeral dl! Frartce(5 vols., 1621-1643). He also
wrote a history of Rome, a disputation on the purity of the French
language, and a history of the Gallican Church. The manuscript of the
last·named work, when presented to the Chancellor Seguier for permis­
sion to print, was thrown by him into the tire. This so affected the
old man that he died soon afterwards, at the age of ninety-two years.
Dupleix's works are said to be methodical in narration, but ponderous
and defective in style. He is praised for his habit of constantly citing
the sources of his information.
ROBERT BARON (I 593 ?-1639), a learned Scotch divine who served
the Presbyterian Church both as minister and as Professor of lJivinity.
In 1638, when he was minister in Aberdeen, he participated in the
famous debate against the Covenanting Commissioners. supporting the
episcopal form of government which Charles l. attempted to force
upon the church in Scotland. He was nominated by Charles to the
See of Orkney, but was never consecrated, for when Montrose, at the
head of the Covenanters, entered Aberdeen in March, 1639, he Red to
England, and in the following August he died at Berwick, wh en on his
return to Scotland. Among other works he published Pltilosophia
Theologiae Ancillans (162[), De Scripturae Sacrae Divina et Cmzonica
Auctoritate ([627), and De vero discrimine peccati mortalis et venialis
(1633)' He also left several works in manuscript, among which was
the Metaphysica Cmeralis, published at Leyden, in 1657, nearly twenty
years after his death, and reprinted in Cambridge, in 1685. It was
very highly esteemed by eminent scholars on the Continent.
It may be added that, so far as is known, the" Ontology" is the
only work by Swedenborg in which any reference is made to these tw.o
authors.

20. ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER 1.
FüRM. FüRMAL CAUSE.
1.
tu'nal. External or extrinsz"c form is not 1.
ROBERT BARON. Form is divided into external and in­
that which is out­
side the essence of a substance, for then every accidentaI form
might be called an external form; but by extrinsic form we un­
derstand the exemplary cause or idea, according to the likeness
of which the effect is formed. hztrinsic form is that which
constitutes the thing formed, wh ether that thing be substantial
or accidenta!. Accidentai z'ntrz'nsz'c form is that which exists in
substance, whether the substance be spiritual or material, and
which, together with that substance in which it exists, constitutes
an accidentaI compound. Substantz"al z'ntrz'nsic form is either
form z'nforming or form assistz"ng. Form ùiformùzg is regarded
either as the other of the two parts of a physical compound,
wh en it is called the form of a part; or as the whole quiddity of
any substance, when it is called the form of the whole. In the
latter sense, the whole essence of the natural body is called form.
Form z'nformz'ng, regarded as the other of the two parts of a
physical compound, is divided into form sejJarable and form in­
sejJarable.' There is only one form sejJarable from matter,
namely, the rational sou!. Form z'nsejJarable is that which is so
bound to matter, that it cannot exist or operate outside of matter.
(Baron also divides form informing 3 into generz"c and sjJecijic
forms.) Form assistz"ng is that which does not actuate or inform
its matter, but only assists it, contributing motion and operation
to it. Form, in the general acceptation of the term, is divided
into metajJhysz'cal and jJhysz'cal. MetajJhysz"cal form, regarded
as essence, is the whole essence of a substantial thing, or, accord­
ing to others, its entire nature. (MetajJhysz'ca, Sect. X.)
• Figures indicate references to the Appendix.

21. 2 ONTOLOGY.
2. ROBERT BAROX. No form constitutes a compound ex­
cept with sorne matter. Sorne have asserted that the form pre­
exists. in matter, before the generation of the thing. Others have
said that forms are actually in matter before things are generated,
and that nevertheless they do not appear, but lie hid in the po­
tenc)' of matter, as it were in confusion, and that they are made
manifest by generation; as for instance, a plant in the matter of
its seed.- Others have asserted that form has an actual existence
in matter before generation, imperfect indeed and as it were in­
choate, but that by generation it begins to be in matter as a per­
fect existence. Sorne have said that ail substantial forms come
into existence de novo by creation. The peri patetic philosophers
taught that, of substantial forms, some are spiritual and inde­
pendent of matter although they truly inform it; while others are
material, so cleaving ta matter that they depend on it, both in
their creation and in their existence; of the former kind are
human souls alone. (MetajJhysica, Sect. X.)
3. DUPLEIX. Form is incomplete and imperfect substance,
or half-substance, but joined to matter, it becomes entire sub­
stance. (Form is described by Dupleix as being the second be­
ginning, the second part, and the second ingredient of natural
things,t which regards the act but not the potency; it being
matter that regards the potency.4) Aristotle says that matter
desires form 5 as the female desires the male.t Form is that
which not only gives existence ta things, but also makes them
diverse and distinguishes them one from the other. (De la Phy­
sique, Liv. IL, Ch. 6.)
4. WOLFF. Essential determinations are what is commonly
called form, and also formai cause. Thus, he understands the
form of the human body, who understands, not only its structure
- The illustration is quoted elliptically. The full illustration as given
by Baron is as follows: "Before a plant can come from the seed of a
plant, they say that the form of the plant exists actually in the matter
of that seed, and, together with it, infinite other forms; but by genera­
tion that one form cornes to the light above ail the others."
t Matter being the first beginning, etc. See n. 39. tPhysica, Lib. 1.,
Cap. 9.

22. FüRM. FüRMAL CAUSE. 3
and hence the figures of its organic parts and the manner in
which they are interjoined, but also the combination of the similar
parts whence the organic parts are composed. In like manner,
he clearly sees the form of a stone who knows how the particles
are produced by combinations, and how these again are inter­
joined so as to produce the mass of the stone. That an ens is
of a given genus or species and that it is distinguishèd fram
others, is from its form. That it can act in a given manner, is
also from its form. Form must be classed among the causes of
things; for by means of its form, we understand why an ens is
what it is, rather than something else, and why it is fitted to act
in a given manner. Consequently in its form is contained the
reason for these things. Form, therefore, is the beginning of
the ens upon which depends the existence of such an ens; hence
it is a cause of the ens. 1n this respect essential determinations
are called form. Form is, therefore, the beginning of the actuality
of the ens, upon which the existence of such an ens certainly
depends. Thus form and essence, although they are both con­
stituted by essential determinations, are yet distinguished from
each other by the diverse respect which they have to the ens.
(Ontologia, Pars. II., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)
S, Form is the entire construction of a body;
namely, the composition, coordination, subordination,
and determination of the parts, both integral and in­
dividual, in a compound, whence that compound de­
rives, not only its essence, but also the quality of that
essence; for it is from its form that an ens is what it
is taken to be. Therefore, from a knowledge of the
form, there follows a knowledge of the quality and es­
sence of any given body, as also of its dependence and
relation; since a knowledge of the form involves a
knowledge of the connection, the position, the order,
the fluxion, and many other things which cause the
body to be what it is rather than something else.
6. In compounds and bodies, matters, or things

23. 4 Û!'TÛLÛGY.
which flow from matters, are what determine the form;
for, in corporeal things, form without matter is an ens
ratio1lis, or an idea which does not reallyexist. Hence,
by sorne, ail that is called matter, by which form is de­
termined, so that where form is, there is matter; for
the existence of form must be drawn from matter.
Therefore three beginnings are established, namely,
matter, form, and the privation of form. Ali that is
matter, from which is form. But the material, as op­
posed to the spiritual, is another thing.
7. Spiritual form, on the other hand, cannot be
called a construction, composition, and ,determination
of parts; for ail these terms are such as apply to forms
pure!y material and corporeal. But in spiritual forms a
certain determination must be understood, yea also, an
ordination of cntia and of forces flowing therefrom,
which bear an analogy and a certain correspondence to
those which exist in bodies. For spiritual forms, and
their operations, exceed al! ideas that are mate rial or
that are joined to material things, consequently, the
very words by which such ideas are expressed ; for they
are most eminent analogies, which are too unlimited
and too indefinite [to be expressed by such words].
Vith spiritual forms it is the same as with other forms,
namely, thaÎ: spirits derive from their form, that they
are what they are taken to be. And this is the reaSOn
why there is so great a variety of spirits, or of spiritual
forms.
8. Further, simple forms, or forms considered simply,
are superior and inferior. Sorne or ail of th.ese may
occur in a compound form ; as in the animal body, in
which are contained ail forms considered simply. And,

24. FORM. FORMAL CAUSE. 5
because we cannot understand what corporcal form
can be, without an understanding of simple forms,
therefore these latter must be explained.
9. The term external form is regarded in two ways.
First: As denoting inferior form. Second: As the
external construction and determination of a body.6
1. As denoting z"nferior form. For the inferior is al­
ways exterior, and the superior is always interior.
Thus the rational mind is an internai form, while the
body is an external form. Or, the cause is the internai
form, and the effect is the external form; that is, so
long as the effect reproduces in an image its cause.
II. Tite externat construction and determinati01l of a
body, from which is comeliness, deformity, a bcautiful
form, a lovely form, and so forth, is also called external
form. This external form is likewise an image of the
internai form; for, as form has its determinations, so
also it must have its terminatiolls, namely, such as cor·
respond to the internai determination. For example:
Every circular form must consist of perpetuai circles
as its parts, while the common circle itself by its own
determination indicates the quality of its internai form.
Thus internai form and external form must correspond
to each other.
10. On the other hand, the angular form may ex­
trinsically assume the circular, and even the spiral
form; not, however, from itself and its own nature, but
artificially; for, from its very hardness, coldnes!>, and
resistance, it is evident that the form itself is angular.
It must therefore be seen whether the internai form
produces the external naturally, thus whether they cor­
respond to each other; or whether a more perfect form

25. 6 ONTOLOGY.
has been superinduced, as in the case of the human
form impressed upon wax or engraved on marble or
brass. That the form may be truly human, the human,
or the human soul, must be inspired in every least part
of it.
l 1. Ali things must have their own form in order
that there may be anything. From form is derived
actuality or essence, the quiddity of the ancients, qual-
ity, causality, and the faculty itself of acting and being
acted upon. Thus a thing without form is an atom
without a beginning, that is, nothing. Every thing,
mode, sense, or force has its own form. Every body,
viscus, or part, whether solid or liquid, as the parts of
the blood or of the animal spirit, has its own form;
yea, the soul has its own form. Every society, least
and greatest, has its own form of government, its de-
pendence and relation, its order, laws, and many other
things which are determined simultaneously with its
form.

26. FIGURE. 7
CHAPTER II.
FIGURE.
12. WOLFF. In a compound not continuous, the single parts
have a determined position in respect to each other. The boun­
dary of an extent is called figure. A terminated compound ens
is endowed with a certain figure. A compound ens designates,
in the imaginary space in which it is supposed to exist, a figure
corresponding to its own - plane if its own be plane, concave if
its own be convex, and convex if its own be concave. If, in a
compound ens, sorne parts be added, or taken away, or trans­
posed, and in the boundary of its extension anything occurs
which was before different, the figure of the ens is changed; but
if nothing then occurs which was not apprehended in the same
manner in the former boundary, the figure of the ens is not
changed. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. l, Cap. iii.)
13. WOLFF. Figure is an accident, because it is not a modifi­
able ens. For, since figure is the boundary of an extent, we can
conceive of no other change in it than that it be taken away and
sorne other figure succeed in its place. We can by no means
conceive of it as possessing intrinsic determinations, of which
sorne are changed into others, while others remain the same; nor,
consequently, as being a subject capable of diverse determina­
tions, for such a subject is the extent which is bounded, but
not the boundary of the extent. Figure, therefore, is an accident.
(Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)
14. It appears as if figure meant externai form, but
there is a difference between them. Externai form
refers itself ta internaI form as ta its continuum; as
the expression of the face, actions, and speech ta the
mind. Thus the face itself, sa far as it is regarded as
the externat form of the human head, and ref~rs itse!f

27. 8 ONTOLOGY.
to the internaI form thereof, cannot be called a figure.
But wh en it is regarded separately from that form, and
indeed as a surface which belongs to planometry, it
can be so called. Therefore we have the figure of the
face, the figure of the mouth, the figure of the nose,
the figure of the eye; but the form [of the face] in­
volves ail these figures together.
15. Figure differs from form, as, in geometry, a
plane differs from a cube; and the property of figure
in respect to the property of form, is like the property
of figure, geometrically considered, in respect to the
entire construction, and hence resulting nature, of a
compound.'" Thus we recede from figure the more we
elevate our attention to the higher powers, as to the
cubes of the square of a cube,t and so forth; for these
are more removed from planometry.
16. So also with superior forms. These at last can­
not be called figured forms, because they are not termi­
nated by space within themselves, but only by imaginary
space outside themselves. For, that they may include
space within themselves, there must be reference ta a
centre, a surface, a diameter, and many other things;
these perish when there are such determinations, and
with them perishes also the idea of space, of which
there is none in the form itself, but which can be con­
ceived of as being outside the form. Such form is
also void of figure, because void of space and extent.
• Figura a .forma in geometricis diffat sicuti planum a cubo,. et jig'l4rœ
proprietas sicuti ji/l'urœ geometria considerata ad integram construc­
tionem et inde resultantem naturam compositi.
t The cube of the square of a cube can be expressed algebraically,
th us : ( (X 3)2)3; but neither planometry nor geometry affords any figure
corresponding to this higher power.

28. FIGURE. 9
Hence it is without any limitation. Thus superior
forms always recede from the idea of space and figure,
the more highly they are elevated. Therefore, as de­
terminations regarded in space, constitute form, so ter11li­
?lations to be regarded as lf outside tllat space, constitute
figure. But in a form of which there are no termina­
tions, except such as are to be regarded as continuous
forms, figure itself must be ideally conceiveo of as
being outside the form, and not as adjoined to it. For
a form which occupies no space, regarded as such in
itself, cannot be said to be terminated; but the termi­
nus, or ail that termination, must be conceived of as
occupying space outside the form.

29. 10 ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER III.
ORGAN. STRUCTURE.
17. WOLFF. An organic body, by virtue of its composition,
is suited to a peculiar action. A simple organic body is one that
is composed of no other organic parts; the reverse is true of a
compound organic body. The essence of an organic body con­
sists in its structure. The reason for those things which apper­
tain to an organic body, in that it is organic, whether they are
in it actually, or only as to possibility, is contained in its struc­
ture. In its structure must also be contained the sufficient reason
why the organic body is suited to action of a peculiar kind. If
the parts of an organic body consist of mixed matter, and the
mixture of that matter be in any manner dissolved, the organic
body perishes. (Cosmologz"a, Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)
18. Structure is the same as form; but only in
compounds considered physically and mechanically,
and to which are attributed parts, space, extent, mass,
size, matter, weight, motion, figure, and the like.
Form, however, is something more universal than
structure, and is in more simple things, yea, in the
most simple. Still structure corresponds to it. For
we must conceive that such things, as those mentioned
just above, are within every single form, although they
themselves are not in the form, but only their ana­
106"ues and eminents, which cannot be called by the
same name, or, to which such predicates do not apply.
19. An organ is an instrument, and supposes sorne
beginning, or sorne primitive cause, by which it is ac­
tuated. Thus it does not possess of itself the begin­
ning of acting, except as it derives this from a cause

30. ORGAN. STRUCTURE. II
holding the place of beginning. Our body is purely
organic; the soul- the beginning - is its active.
Thus the body consists of perpetuaI organs or instru­
ments of the active sou!.
20. The term organic is properly used when speak­
ing of parts of the animal kingdom; the term instru­
ment, when speaking of inanimate things.

31. 12 ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER IV.
STATE. CHANGES OF STATE.
2r. WOLFF. From the determination of the mutable proper­
ties of a thing, arises its state; so that state is the coexistence
of mutable properties with always the same fixed properties. If
the state of a thing is constituted by intrinsic mutable properties,
namely by modes, it is called internai; but if by extrinsic muta·
ble properties, such as the relations of the thing to other things,
it is called external. If, in two things, A and B, the mutable
properties are the same, the state of those things is the same;
if the mutable properties are diverse, the state is diverse. If the
mutable properties that are predicated of a thing do not remain
the same, the state of that thing is changed. The internai state
of a thing is changed, if its modes do not remain the same; its
external state is changed, if its relations to other things do not
remain the same. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2., Cap. ii.)
22. WOLFF. A finite ens can have different states succéssively,
but not ail at the same time. (Ont., P. l L, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)
23. State is the coexistence of the determinations zn
any given form,o as, in the circ1e, of the determinations
of the diameters from the circumference towards the
centre. The state of a circ1e is not changed so long
as the circle remains a circle. When the circle is
expanded or contracted, its state is not then changed,
but its forces are varied and modified; or, there is a
variation and modification of its forces, from which
variation and modification new forms and new states
are wont to be formed, the essence of the circle re­
maining always the same. From su ch variation, in
the animal body, vital actions are produced; and in

32. STATE. CHANGES OF STATE. 13
the atmospheric world, modifications, which, in the
sensory organs, become sensations.
24. Changes of state are changes of the determina­
tions in any given form, with respect to their coexist­
ence; as, in circular forms, with respect to the co­
existence of the determinations, that is, of the radii,
to the centre. Thus, when the determination of the
centre is changed, the state of the circle is changed;
as when it is raised to an ellipse, a cycloid, a conoid,
a parabola, and other figures. So also in ail other
forms ; except the angular, where no change of form
can occur without destruction and privation thereof,
change of figure alone being possible.
25. These changes of state are called changes of
modes; for the very changes produce among them­
selves new forms, which are properly called modifica­
tions, and, in the animal body, sensations. By means
of such changes, imaginations are effected, these being
so many ideas which are reproduced by similar changes
of state. For this reason, modifications correspond to
sensations, sin ce changes are either changes of forces,
or changes of modes.
26. The perfection of superior forms consists in the
mutability of their state or states. For the soul, from
every change of any organic form in its body, under­
stands the state, and what it signifies, sin ce without
sorne change, there is no sensation nor perception, still
less any action.
27. From changes of state or variation of modes,
new forms exist. Thus they exist successively before
they exist simultaneously, or before they coexist. For
there can be common states unùer which are contained

33. !4 OKTOLOGY.
many particular states; universal states under which
are singular states; and general states under which
are specifie and individual states. The common and
universal state is formed from the particular and singu­
lar states. They are like equations which are built
up successively from ratios and analogies. Thus, in
finite entia there can be many states simultaneously,
not, however, from themselves; but in superior forms
there are infinitely more.

34. SUBSTANCE. 15
CHAPTER V.
SUBSTANCE.
28. WOLFF. Substance is a subject, durable and modifiable;
or, Substance is the subject of intrinsic determinations, both
constant and variable; or, Substance is a subject in which essen·
tials and attributes are the same, while the modes are successively
varied. According to the Aristotelico-scholastic philosophy,7 it
is an ens which subsists jJer se, and sustains accidents. Leibnitz,
for a notion of substance, requires action as its genuine charac­
teristic j- so that he agrees that substance is distinguished from
accidents by the power of acting. Descartes defines substance
as being that which so exists that it has need of nothing else for
its existence; thus by substance, he understands God.t Clauberg
defines it as being that which so exists that it has no need of any
subject for its existence; and ils opposite, accident, he defines
as being that which exists in something else as its subject, or,
whose esse is ùzesse.t Thus, according to the Schoolmen, God
is not in predicates, but above predicates. Locke adheres to the
corn mon notion of substance, nor do es he advance beyond it,
since he calls it the substratum or support of such qualities as
are capable of producing simple ideas in us, and which are com­
monly called accidents. Il (01/1., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)
29. WOLFF. The common notion of substance is an imagin­
ary one. The state of substance can be changed; and therefore
substances are endowed with force. In substances whose state
is actually changed, there is a continuai conatus to action. Acci­
dents cannot subsist without ·substances. In a compound ens
there is nothing substantial except the simple entia. There are
no substances except simple substances; and compound entia
are the aggregates of these. Therefore simple substance is that
which is properly called substance; and compound substance is
- A da E rudi/orum, A 11. 1694, p. Il 1. t Principia Philosophiœ, Pars.
1., § SI. tll1etaph)'sica de Ente, § 44. Il Human {/nderstanding, Bk.
11., ch. xxiii., § 2.

35. 16 ONTOLOGY.
that which is the aggregate of simple substances, or, that which,
on account of the simple substances entering into a compound
ens, is called substance; 8 for it is according ta usage ta cali com­
pound entia in the material world, substances. Robert Green,
an Englishman, defends the notion of Leibnitz,9 that substance
differs from accident by its active force.- If there is force in
a compound subs~~nce, it must result from the forces of simple
substances. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. H.)
30 . WOLFF. In the modifications of things, nothing substan­
tial is either destroyed or produced. (Ont., P. Ir., Sect. 2, Cap.
iii.)
3 1 . DUPLEIX. Substance is that which subsists and has its
being by means of itself. Primary substances are individual
things and singular substances, t called primarily, properly, and
principaHy substance, because they are as the foundation of ail
things that are in them, or are predicated of them. ID Secondary
substances are universal substances, as are the genera and spe­
cies.t For example: Socrates, Rome, this book, this cane, are
primary substances; and man, city, book, cane, are secondary
substances." (Dupleix divides substances into most universal,
universal, generic, specifie, and individual. He maintains that
ail accidents are in primary substances.)" There are spiritual
and incorporeal substances, as angels and souls. (De la Logique,
Liv. 111., Ch. 6.)
3 2 . WOLFF. That subject in which are ail those properties
that we observe ta belong ta a thing, we cali substance i and
when we reflect as ta its quality, we are able ta attribute nothing
ta it, since, in fact, we remove ail qualities from it, and refer them
to accidents. (Wolff adds, that therefore the substantial of things
is unknown.) Thus the notion of substance is an imaginary one;
and consequently, substance itself, as we commonly imagine it,
is an imaginary ens. Descartes has weil observed that we can­
nat conceive of substance except by a certain primary determina­
tion to which ail other determinations are referred.t But he has
- p,..incipia Phi/osophiœ de vi etc., Lib. V., Cap. 8. t Cf. § 84, Du­
pleix on the predicables. t Principia PI"Josoplliœ, Pars. L, § 53.

36. SUBSTANCE. 17
not progressed so far as to discover i~, since he holds extension
to be that which constitutes corporeal substance, and thought
that which constitutes incorporeal substance;· for there is some­
thing more universal than these. If the sta te of substances is
changed, it necessarily fol1ows that they are endowed with force.
For, let us suppose that only one substance exists, and that its
state is changed. There must be in that substance, a sufficient
reason for such change j and thus there must be action. Where­
fore, since it must be admitted that there is something in the
agent which con tains in itself the sufficient reason for the actual­
ity of the action, and therefore a certain force, it fol1ows that
that substance must be endowed with force. (Ont., P. IL,
Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)
33. Substances, like forms, are simple and com­
pound, prior and posterior, superior and inferior. But
primarily and properly, there are no substances except
the simple, first, and supreme, which at the same time
are the most perfecto Yet posterior and compound
substances cannot be called non-substances, seeing that
forms, attributes, forces, modes, accidents, and qualities
bel9ng to them. Therefore, every form distinct from
another is a substance, since it is a subject in which
is form together with its adjuncts and predicates.
Thus substance remains substance even though the
state of its form is changed; for nothing substantial
is either destroyed or produced by variation of form
or modification. In this way, ail the definitions can
be made to agree. But to give a single definition
which shaH exhaust the subject, 1 scarcely believe
possible. That ail the definitions agree, can be dem­
onstrated. In superior substances, predicates, acci­
dents, and qualities have no place; for superior sub­
stances are above every notion belonging to predicates.
• Principia Pki/osophiœ, Pars. L, § 53.

37. 18 ONTOLOGY.
34. That substances be substances, they must be
modifiable and able to change their state. Thus they
must be endowed with force. The modifications them­
selves, which are changes of state or variations of
forces, although they are forms, still cannot be called
substances, but only the operations of substance. For
these modifications, regarded in themselves, are not
modifiable nor can they change "their state, and the re­
fore they are only the operations of substances, which
do change their state. Thus thought cannot be called
substance, nor can sensation; for it is the sensory
organs that are the very substance of the sensations.
That is to say, the eye is the organic substance of the
sensation of sight; the ear, of hearing; the tongue,
of taste; the brain, of all the sensations; the cortical
glands are the organic substances of the imagination,
and, together with the pure intellectories, * of the
thought.
The sensories, therefore, and not the sensations, are
substances, because they are organic for ms. The
• As the term sensory is used to signify the seat of the sensations,
so our author uses the term intellectory or pure intellectory to signify
the seat or organ of the pure intellect. In his work De Anima, he
teaches that the intellectory is composed of the pure cortex within the
cortical glands j this is barn of the soul and is the origin of the simple
fibre. The cortical glands themselves from which proceed the com­
pound or medullary fibres, constitute what he calls the internal unso­
rio/um which is the organ of the imagination. Thought or the human
intellect is intermediate between the pure intellect and the imagination,
being the result of the operation of the one upon the other. Thought,
therefore, draws its essence from bath the pure intellect and the im­
agination, or, as it is stated.in the present work, the organ of thought
is " the corticJ.1 glands . . . together with the pure intellectories," that
is, the pure cortex. (See De Anima, pp. 57 seq. English translation,
n. 123 seq.)

38. SUBSTANCE. 19
whole body is a substance composed of aIl organic
substances; the soul is a substance whose operations
are spiritual, for it is a form, and indeed a spiritual
form; and so with other things.
35. We must conceive of active and motive force,
and also of nature, after the manner of substance;
but they are not substance, they only so appear.

39. 20 ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER VI.
MATTER. THE MATERIAL.
36. WOLFF. Ali matter is in continuai motion. If matter
does not change its place, its motion '3 is resisted by contiguous
things. The active force in a body must be conceived of after
the manner of a durable thing, just as we conceive of matter.
(Cosmol., Sect. Ir., Cap. I.)
37. WOLFF. Matter and active force are not substances. In
the elements are contained the ultimate reasons for everything
that is observed in mate rial things. Consequently, in simple sub­
stances is contained the ultimate reason why matter and active
force appear like two substances diverse from each other. (Cos­
mol., Sect. II., Cap. 2.)
38. WOLFF. That which is determined in a compound ens is
called matter j whence a compound ens is said to consist of
matter. The word matter is commonly taken in a wider sense,
to mean the substantial which is made specifie by essential deter­
minations so that this particular ens cornes forth, and no other.
But from this loose signification we very properly abstain, lest,
while attributing matter in a transcendental sense to simple sub­
stances, we appear to attribute it in a physical sense j which lat­
ter obtains in common speech and is involved in the definition.
Matter is often called matter out of which [ex qua], to distinguish
it from the subject, which is called matter in which [in qua], and
from the object which is called matter about which [circa quam].
(Ont., P. II., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)
39. DUPLEIX. Matter is considered in three ways: 1. As
the subject and seat of form and accidents. Thus the human
body is the seat of the rational soul, which is its form, and also
of manyaccidents. 2. In so far as anything is made out of it,
as out of stone,14 wood, and so forth. 3. As the subject of an
agent. Thus wood is the subject of fire. Thus we have matter

40. MATTER. THE MATERIAL. 21
in which [ill qua), matter out of which [ex qua], and matter
through which '5 [pel' quam). Primary matter is the first begin­
ning of natural things, and the first part which enters into their
building and composition. N evertheless, it is considered as being
without form or accident;·6 sa that it is a thing entirely mental.
But, in nature, matter is never actually without form or accident;
it is, as it were, before form, and is the su bject of form and acci­
dent. Secondary matter is, in effect, the same as primary matter,
but joined ta its form.'l If we speak of matter as the beginning
of natural things,18 we understand only primary matter. (De la
Pl/ys., Liv. 11., Ch. 3.)
40. DUPLEIX. Primary matter is abstruse and obscure of
consideration. Many great philosophers '9 have said that it was
not known, nor, in the nature of things, could be known; except,
sa Plata teaches, by an indirect and faulty conception;· and, ac­
cording ta Aristotle, by sorne analogyand similitude.t It must
be considered as being without form or accidents, Iike the light by
which we perceive the existence of things. zo Aristotle says that
matter is the first subject out of which, because it endures, ail
things are barn, of themselves primitively and not by means of
another; t and that it is the last part into which things are dis­
solved and terminated.§ If we hold that there is an arder in the
creation of the world, we must of necessity conceive of the exist­
ence of matter before form, as the subject and suppositum out of
which, by alternations and series, forms corne forth. This is what
the Physicists teach, who say that form is derived from the po­
tency of matter j that is, from the faculty, potency, disposition,
and natural aptitude which is in matter, for successively receiving
• Timatus. tPhysica, Lib. L, Cap. 7.
t Aristotties dieil, quod mate ria sit primum sub/utum, lX quo sub­
sistant, omnlS res "': st naseantur princi/Jalitlr lt non plr mldium ahus.
The original French is as follows: La matièrl, dit It Philosophl, c'est
Ù prlmier sub/d, duquti, ln tant qu'il dlmeure, toutes chous naisunt
dl soy,principaltm;nt lt non par It mOYln d'autray. This is a para­
phrase of the words of Aristotle (lac. cit.), which, literally translated,
are: lIfateriam lnim voco primum cU/USqul rli sub/tctum, lX quo nas­
citur ali'luid, non plr aeeidlnJ.
§ Physiea, Lib. L, Cap. 9.

41. 22 ONTOLOGY.
diverse forms. The human form alone, they say, does not result
from rnatter,u Aristotle also recognized that the human form
cornes from sorne other source than from matter.* (Dupleix
adds, that primary matter is separate from ail Jorm, and that
from it results every form.) (De la Phys., Liv. 1L, Ch. 4.)
41. WOLFF. Matter is extent endowed with the force of in­
ertia. Matter is modified by variation of figure. (Cosmol., Sect.
1L, Cap. 1.)
42. WOLFF. A substantiated phenomenon t is a phenomenon
which, in appearance, is like substance. Matter and motive force
are substantiated phenomena. Motive force and matter must, in
appearance, be diverse substances. (Cosmol., Sect. 1L, Cap. 3.)
43. WOLFF. Although the Schoolmen held that the multiple
is a composition in things, yet in the opposition of material and
immaterial substance, they defined the simple as being that
which is not cornposed of quantitative parts; as wh en they said
that the soul was a simple." (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. L)
44. DUPLEIX. A unit is not a number; it is only the com­
mencement of numbers. 2 3 (De la Log., Liv. IlL, Ch. 7.)
45. That is called matter, which is determined that
there may be form, or, from which is form. For with­
out matter there can be no determinations, and hence
no form. So that if from form you take away matter,
nothing remains, and substance falls into nothing; as,
if from the body you take away the viscera, or from
a building the stones, which are therefore caUed mate­
rials. The word matter was used in this sense by the
ancients, and is also used in the same way by modern
philosophers, though they have no desire to confound
it with the substantial.
46. The material, however, according to aU modern
• De Animalium Generatione, Lib. II., Cap. 3. t See § 52 ad Jin.

42. MATTER. THE MATERIAL. 23
usage of the word, is that which is heavy, endowed
with the force of inertia, and in space. It is used in
this sense, from stones, marble, wood, and the like,
which are called materials. And, inasmuch as these
are inanimate and gros s, the same word can never
apply to simples, such as spiritual and other substances
are. Therefore, philosophers, that they may avoid in­
consistencies and confliction, distinguish between first
elements and substances. This is the reason why
su ch substances are called immaterial, that is, not
heavy or inert, nor partaking of motion, part, or extent.
But that the confliction may be removed, it is abso­
lutely necessary to define what matter is, and also
what the material is according to common understand­
ing and received usage.
47. Matter, understood philosophically, may be at­
tributed even to spiritual forms. For matter is that
out of which form is, whether you call it substance or
element. No form can ever exist, without matter out
of which, just as there can be no sensation without an
object; for matter is the subject itself which is deter­
mined. Yea, we also speak of a matter of dispute,
but the matter of the dispute is not therefore any­
thing material; thus we have philosophical matter,
psychological matter, and theological matter. Matter,
therefore, considered philosophically, is not taken to
be heavy, inert, or corporeal, but it is taken as the
beginning of existence,'" and as that without which
there is no determination and no form ; for that some­
thing which is determined, is called matter.
48. Physical matter, on the other hand, or the ma­
• See note to No. 77.

43. 24 ONTOLOGY.
terial, is that which is found only in the lowest forms,
especially in the angular form, and on the earth. This
material begins ta be put off by superior forms; for
the less a thing is finited, the less material does it
become. Therefore the soul is not material, because
it is void of part, extent, figure, and gravity. But it
does not cease ta be matter, that is, the Beginning
from [ex] which is the body; nor does it cease ta exist
and subsist from [ex] its matter or beginning; since it
is a form, and form without matter is a non-entity, a
thing undetermined and, still more, undeterminable.
But we must not conceive of that matter, according
to the common acceptation of the term and in a grossly
physical sense, as being material.
49. From these things it is evident, what confusion
mere criticism and the signification of a word inevita­
bly produce. All such things are puerile, insignifi­
cant, and trifling, nor are they becoming to men.

44. EXTENT. EXTENSION. 25
CHAPTER VII.
EXTENT. EXTENSION. THE CONTINUOUS.
THE CONTIGUOUS. PART.
50. WOLFF. If we represent to ourselves several things di-
verse from each other, and therefore existing outside each other,
as being in one, the notion of extension arises. Thus extension
is the coexistence in one, of many diverse things, or, if you pre-
fer, of many things existing outside each other; and it is consti-
tuted by the union of these. Therefore, for the notion of exten-
sion, it is requisite, not only that there be many diverse things,
but 24 also that these be united to each other, and thus make
a one. Since in an extent there are many things which, taken
together, are the same as the extent regarded as a one, and
which indeed constitute it, therefore every extent has parts, each
existing outside the other; and these parts are united to each
other. That which has parts, each existing outside ,the other but
mutually united, is an extent. Jung defint:s extension as that,
on account of which corporeal substance has part outside part.-
Clauberg defines body or extent, which with the Cartesians are
synonymous terms, as that which has part placed outside parq
They make no mention of the union of the parts; yet they tacitly
suppose it, since they conceive of extension as being in a body,
where, surely, the parts are united to each other. The intermi-
nate parts of an extent, regarded as an extent in the abstract,
do not differ except in number. To a straight !ine we do not
attribute extension, unless extension be regarded in the abstract;
but the parts of the !ine do Ilot differ except in number. The
case is the same in solids or in mathematical bodies. But, in
the nature of things, there is no such extent. A, B, and C, in
whatsoever way they be assumed in an extent which is regarded
in the abstract, differ as to none of their qualities, nor are there
- Logica Hamburgensis, Lib. 1., Cap. 5, § 5.
t Physica Contracta, § 34.

45. 26 ONTOLOGY.
in them any diverse intrinsic determinations, except that each has
its own proper existence. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. l, Cap. ii.)
5r. WOLFF. Things contiguous are not continuous. Contin­
uity excludes the possibility of the existence of a diverse inter­
mediate part between two given parts which are in proximity to
each other. Interruption or non-conti nuity 25 supposes the actual
or possible existence of a diverse part between the two given
parts. Two terminated extents are called contiguous. whose sur­
faces mutually touch each other so that they remain two, in no
way making a single extent. Contiguity, therefore, excludes the
actual existence of an intermediate third. N othing pre vents the
interposition of a third extent between two contiguous ones.
(Ont., P. IL, Sect. l, Cap. ii.)
52. WOLFF. The elements of material things exist outside
each other j and are united among themselves. Aggregates of
elements are extended j they are also continuous. Every body
arises from that which is not extended; nevertheless, it itself is
extended; for the elements themselves of material things are 110t
extended. We perceive extension and continuity in a body,only
in a confused way. Extension and continuity are phenomena;
for everything obvious to sense which we perceive confusedly, is
called a phenomenon. (Cosmol., Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)
53. WOLFF. An actual part is one that is contained within its
own proper limits. A possible part is one to which limits may
be assigned at pleasure. In the continuum, regarded in the ab­
stract, the parts are only possible, not actual. But in a continu­
ous series of contiguous things the parts are actual. Contiguous
parts do not 26 constitute the continuum. (Ont., P. l L, Sect. l,
Cap. ii.)
54. An extent is defined as that which has parts
outside parts, and which is thus a united whole.* It
is commonly believed that there can be no form which
does not consist of parts outside parts; for there must
,. Extensum definitur per id quod habet partes extra partes, ac sic
unitum sit [est? J.

46. EXTENT. EXTENSION. 27
be something that shaH be determined, in order that
form may exist, and this something we conceive of as
a part. But let us see what that extent must be, of
which it must be said that it consists of parts; and
what that, of which it must be said that it is void of
parts.
55. In every inferior and more imperfect form, is
an extent that consists of parts, or a mate rial extent;
or, what amounts to the same thing, an extension of
matter; hence bodies are such extents. But extension
cannot be denied to superior forms, so long as there
is form, and so long as there are essential determina­
tions, and so long also as the form is actual and not
ideal, in the con crete [and not in the abstract]. To
say that such a farm is void of extent, would be saying
that it is non-existent, or that it is an ens not possible
in nature. Such an extent cannot be said to consist
of parts; nor of parts outside parts; nor can it be
said to be consistent with the idea of breadth, length,
and thickness. Hence It is not corporeal. 1. 5uch
an extent does not consist of parts. For parts, if they
are contained within their own boundaries, are figured,
elementary, heavy, inert, terres trial forms. Therefore,
in an extent not material, there are no such parts;
but there are either substances or forms, or, if you
would so express it, things which are determined.
These things, forms, or substances have no figure or
gravity, or, they have no material predicate. 2. Nor
does such an extent consist of parts outside parts. For
that which is outside must be either above, below, or
at the sides; and there, it must be given a position
either towards the centre or towards the surface, or

47. 2R ONTOLOGY.
somewhere. When in a form such a relation has per­
ished, as for instance in the circle [nothing can be said
to be above, or below, or at the sides]. Who shall say
that any point of a circle is above or below any other ?'"
So it is in every superior form. 3. Hence tlze zdea of
breadtll, lengtll, and thz'ckness jJerishes. The idea of
these as being in the form, perishes; thus also the
idea of an extent such as has been described. But
the idea of space, and thus of extent, outside the form
does not perish; for whatever is in the form is void
of place within itself; it is Ilot, however, void of place
in the universe, but outside itself.
56. Every [superior] form, therefore, is extended,
even the supreme and spiritual. It does not, however,
consist of parts such as terrestrial parts are, angular,
heavy, and inert forms, and the elements of material
things. But superior forms consist of substances or
forms which are determined ; for there must be some­
thing determinable and determined that shall be the
analogue of part.
57. Therefore, such an extent is not material, seeing
that a mate rial extent is described as consisting of
parts which are heavy and inert. It is rather to be
called a pure or substantial extent, for bodies are aggre­
gates of substances.
58. The substances themselves, considered as parts
in such forms, are without any idea of place, or of
tendency towards centre or circumference, upwards or
downwards. Thus the idea of breadth, length, [and
• .. et ibi dabitur locus versus centrum vel superficiem, vel alicubi,
quando in forma talis respectus perierit, uti in circulo, quis dicet punc­
tum aliquod circuli esse supra vel infra alterum.

48. EXTENT. EXTENSION. 29
thickness,] such as is proper to every [material] ex­
tent, perishes.
59. This non-material extent of which we are speak­
ing, cannot be said to occupy space within itself, though
the extent outside it is said to occupy· space. For,
while within itself there is no respect of centre and
place, still it occupies space in the universe.
60. Part, signifies that which is of an angular, ter­
restrial, and figured form; thus the elements of mate­
rial things are parts. And, because angular forms can
put on a superior appearance, and, superficially, a supe­
rior form, such as the circular and spiral, therefore a
circular [or spiral] part is aJso called part. But if it
were purely circular or spiral, it would at once cease to
be such part.
• Our author here has occupasse which seems to be a mistake for oc­
cuparc.

49. 3° ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER VIII.
BODY. CORPOREAL THINGS.
61. WOLFF. Primitive corpuscles are those in which the
reason for the composition can be assigned only in the elements.
Derivative corpuscles are those in which the reason for the com­
position is in lesser corpuscles. Ali visible bodies consist of
derivative corpuscles. The reason for the things that belong to
visible bodies, is contained in the qualities of the derivative cor­
puscles, and in the manner in which those corpuscles are joined
together. (Cosmo/., Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)
62. WOLFF. Bodies are compound substances. (Cosmo/.,
Sect. II., Cap. 2.)
63. DUPLEIX. The word body has several meanings. (1) It
signifies quantity; and in mathematics, it stands for the three
dimensions of a natural body conjoined or united together, but
considered as abstracted from ail solidity and matter. 27 (2) 1t
signifies corporeal substance, as man, tree, stone, and so forth,
which is its signification in physics. This is distinguished into 28
artificial bodies, such as houses and statues, or ail works which
are of art and not of nature; and natural bodies. (3) When ap­
plied to artificial bodies, it is matter joined to its form, and thus
an entire body. (4) Wh en applied to natural bodies, it is primary
matter, the subject of natural form, which, of itself, is without
form, but is, nevertheless, susceptible of many and diverse forms
successively.29 N atural bodies are sub-divided into simple and
compound or mixed. The simple are those which are not com­
pounded or mixed with the matter of any other body. (De /a
Pitys. Liv. 1., Ch. 7-)
64. Material bodies are al! those that arise from the
elements of material things; or, from so many most
minute triangular and square particles. Thus they are
al! angular forms, whatsoever be their figure and com­

50. BODY. CORPOREAL THINGS. 31
position. For those triangular and square particles are
the primitive corpuscles, yea, the very elements, from
the aggregates of which material bodies arise and are
derived.
65. But aU animate bodies are compound substances,
and forms derived and thus compounded in order, from
the first to the ultimate natural. Onlyone substantial,
however, reigns in the whole of an animate body,
namely, the soul; and, except this substantial, there is
nothing living in such body. Animate bodies, there­
fore, are compound substances; or, it is mere simple
substance which is their soul, that forms its body by
way of derivation. What body is, has been indicated
above.
66. Every body has its own soul, which is whoUy
present in its every part, and which has formed the
body after its own image. AU other things which are
adjoined, are taken from the mineraI kingdom.

51. 32 ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER IX.
ESSElCE. ESSENTIALS.
67. WOLFF. Essence is distinguished from ail the other things
that are in an ens, by the fact that it has no intrinsic reason why
it should befong to the ens, but must be posited at first, while ail
other things that are in or can be in the ens, have their reason in
its essence. Essence, therefore, may be dcfined as that which is
first conceived about an ens, and in which is contained the suffi­
cient reason why the other things are in it, whether actually or as
to possibility. Suarez says that the essence of a thing is that
which is first and radical, the inmost beginning of ail the· actions
and properties that belong to the thing; and he adds, that it is
that which we conceive of as first belonging to a thing, and as
being first constituted in the existence of the thing, and in its
quality. He says further, that real essence is the beginning or
root of real operations or effects.* Descartes, defining essence,
says: "In every substance there is one leading property which
constitutes its nature and essence, and to which ail the other
properties are referred."t And Clauberg: " Of aIl that we attrib­
ute to any given thing, there is one which we are accustomed to
consider as the first, the chief, and the inmost of that thing, em­
bracing in a manner ail the rest, or being as it were their very
root and foundation. This one, we cali the essence of the thing;
and, with respect to the properties and operations resulting from
it, we cali it also the nature of the thing." t But these philoso­
phers confound the notions of essence and nature. (Ont., P. L,
Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)
68. WOLFF. Those things in an ens which are not mutually
repugnant, nor yet are determined by each other, are called its
essentials, and they constitute the essence of the ens. For ex­
• Disputationu Mdapl'ysicae, Tom. L, Dis. 2, Sect. 4, § 5.
t Principia Philosophiae, Pars 1., § 53.
t Mdaphysica de Ente, § 56.

52. ESSENCE. ESSENTIALS. 33
ample: The number three and equality of sides, are the essentials
of an equilateral triangle. In morals likewise, tbe essentials are
not mutually repugnant. For example: Action conformable to
naturallaw, proceeds from a habit of the will; but these two,
namely, the conformity of the action with natural law, and the
habit of the will, are by no means determined by each other;
consequently, they are the essentials of virtue and constitute its
essence. 3° Essence is the first thing that is conceived about an
ens, and without it an ens cannot be. Anything that is deter­
mined by the essentials of an ens, must be in the ens constantly.
Anything that is not determined by the essentials of an ens and
yet is not repugnant to them, may be in the ens, even though it
be not actually in it. If, however, it is repugnant to the essen­
tials, it cannot be in the ens. For example: Because a tri­
angle has been constructed, it does not follow that there is a
straight line drawn from its vertex to its base, and yet such a line
may be so drawn; but it is repugnant to an obtuse-angled tri­
angle that one of its angles be a right angle, and therefore it can
have no such angleY Again, it is not repugnant to a stone that
it become hot, but it is repugnant to it that it be lighter than air.
(That which is not repugnant to essentials, and yet is in no way
determined by essentials, is called by Wolff, mode; by the
Schoolmen, predicable accident.) Whatever is in an ens cornes
under the head of essentials, attributes, or modes. Those things
which are constantly in an ens, and are not determined by other
things which are in it at the same time, are essentials. But those
things which are constantly in an ens, and are determined by
other things which are in it at the same time, are attributes. By
reason of essence, ens is possible. We understand the essence
of an ens, as soon as we understand the mode by which it can
come into existence; consequently by a genetic definition. Tbere
is no intrinsic reason why the essentials are in an ens. For they
are the first thing that is posited in the ens, and, therefore, we
can conceive of nothing therein as being prior to them,3 2 from
which it can be understood why they are in it; as, for instance,
why an equilateral triangle has three sides. In the essence of an
ens is contained the reason for those things which, besides itself,
are either constantly in the ens, or can be in h. (Ont., P. 1.,
Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

53. 34 ONTOLOGY.
69. WOLFF. Ali similar things have the same essence; and
the essentials are similar if the essence is similar. (Ont., P. L,
Sect. 3, Cap. i.)
70. WOLFF. The essences of things are like integral rational,
or common numbers. For every such number is a combination
of units, and these, while they may be so combined, still are not
so necessarily: yet, despite this, no unit can be taken from or
added to a number without the loss of that number. ln like
manner, essences of things are immutable ; so that if one essen­
tial be taken away, or if one be added, the essence is no longer
the essence of the same ens as before, but is changed into the
essence of a different ens. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. iv.)
71. WOLFF. Essences of things are immutable. A necessity
t1:lat arises from the essence of an ens is an absolute necessity;
while one that proceeds from any other source is only a hypothet­
ical necessity. Essences of things are absolutely necessary.
(Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. iii.)
72. WOLFF. Essentials are qualities; consequently, genera
and species are determined by qualities. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3,
Cap. v.)
73. WOLFF. Singulars have the same essentials, in that they
are contained under the same species; and species and inferior
genera likewise, in that the former are contained under the same
genus, and the latter under the same superior genus. Species
and inferior genera differ by those essentials which can be
diversely determined, the others always remaining the same.
(Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)
74. WOLFF. Essentials and attributes are constant intrinsic
determinations; modes are variable intrinsic determinations.
(Ollt., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)
75. Essence is in al! things as the most common
thing. For this reason, it can hardly be defined; for
that which ail men perceive in single cases, as it were
most clearly, becomes very obscure when defined, nor
can it be presented in a single definition which shaH

54. ESSENCE. ESSENTIALS. 35
inc1ude the whole of it as it is in every particular case.
We must, therefore, proceed by another way, and ar·
rive at the understanding of essence and the like,
sQlely by examples, that afterwards, we may be able to
form distinct definitions which cau be brought together
so as to be seen in one corn mon definition.
76. The most general definition of essence is, that
essence is essence, or, it is what it is. N othing can be
defined by means of itself, except essence; for there
is nothing else in a subject, which properly is, and thus
ail else is nothing.
77. It is seen that in every ens there is its existence, *
its essence and its essential; also, that one proceeds
from the other, or, one supposes the other. 1. The
existence of form, considered universally, is matter;
the essential of form is determination ; and the essence
is the forill' itself. 2. The things which constitute the
essence of a circle are circumference, diameters, and
centre. Without these there is no circ1e, and, there­
* The Latin ward thus translated is esse. This ward is used by
our author in the sense of actual being or existence. For example:
he defines matter as the" beginning of existence" (principium esse)ldi)
(n. 47), and in this number, he calls it the" existence (esse) of form,"
distinguishing it from the essence of form, which, he says, is the form
itself. This is the ordinary meaning of the ward esse as used by the
philosophers. Thus Baron says that "form has an actual existence
(esse actualt) in matter before generation," alld that "by generation it
begins ta be in matter as a perfect existence (esse.perfectum)" (n. 2,
sup.); and he quotes the Peripatetic philosophers as teaching that
material forms depend on matter "bath in their creation (jieri) and
in their existence (esse)." It is a formula of the Schoolmen, that form
gives existence (esse) ta a thing and distinguishes it from other things
(forma dat esse rei, dat distingui) (cfn. 3). Our author uses the ward
esse in a very different sense in his theological writings, a sense which,
in the present work, seems ta be included under the term essence,
which he defines as the only thing in a subject, that properly is (n. 76).

55. 36 ONTOLOGY.
fore, if they are not in it actual!y, they are ta be as­
sumed as being in it. 3. The essence of a triangle
is, that it consists of three sides and three angles. 4.
But the essence of a form is within the single forms
as a universal, nor does it recede therefrom. Thus
every principal essence is deduced fram that which is
first or supreme, or from that which is universal. 5.
Animal essence is, that the animal enjoys a soul and
a body. This essence remains present in all genera
and species of animaIs. 6. The human essence, be­
skIes what was said above, is, specifically, that man
rejoices in a rational mincI; otherwise he is not a man.
7. The universal essence in every body is the soul,
whence the body; this reigns in al! the single things
of the body. Essences, therefore, are like differences,
specifie and singular. Thus we say that sa and sa is
the essence of a thing, or its soul ; if the soul or es­
sence recedes, the thing is destroyed. 8. The essen­
tials of a muscle are its fibres; specifical!y, they are
the fibres sa determined, or, the form. Thus essence
and form must agree.
78. The ruling essence, therefore, in al! things is
cal!ed their sou l, which is in them from their very be­
ginning, and, indeed, is that beginning itself; all the
other things which depend on the soul, are its body.
The essence of a body, however, is its form, which is
constituted of pure essential determinations, or, of de­
terminations of the soul. The essence of a special
form is expressed in the very ward, or the name of that
form; as, a triangle, a quadrangle, a rational animal or
man, and sa forth. Provided only, that the name spe­
cifically designates the quality, namely, gives the genus,
and in apposition ta it, the specifie difference.

56. ATTRIBUTE. 37
CHAPTER X.
ATTRIBUTE.
79. WOLFF. Anything that is determined by the essentials
of an ens, must be in the ens constantly. Those things that are
determined by essentials are called attributes; $uch as are de·
termined by ail the essentials taken together, being called proper
attributes, and such as are determined by some only of the
essentials, common attributes. Thus, in an equilateral triangle,
the three equal33 sides are the essentials; there being three
angles, is a corn mon attribute; while those angles being equal to
each other, is a proper attribute. Whatever is in an ens cornes
under the head of essentials, attributes, or modes. Attributes
are in an ens constantly j modes may or may not be in it. Those
things which are constantly in an ens, and are not determined by
other things which are in it at the same time, are essentials; but
those things which are constantly in an ens, and are determined
by other things which are in it at the same time, are attributes.
For, if in our idea we comprise ail the things that are in an ens,
we will observe that sorne are determined by others which are in
the ens at the same time; and, enquiring what these are that
thus serve for determining the rest, we will then see that certain
of the things in the ens are to be put in the first place; such,
namely, as are not mutually repugnant, nor yet are determined by
other things which are in the ens at the same time. The suffi­
cient reason for the attributes in an ens, is contained in its essen­
tials; the sufficient reason for the corn mon attributes being con·
tained in sorne of the essentials, and the sufficient reason for the
proper attributes, in ail of them. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)
80. WOLFF. Those things which are of the same species,
have the same attributes and the same proximate possibilities of
modes; they have also the same remote possibilities of modes,
given the same conditions. Things which are of the same genus,
have the same common attributes, and the same possibilities of

57. 38 ONTOLOGY.
modes such as are like common attributes. Things which have
the same proper attributes and the same possibilities of modes
such as are like proper attributes, are of the same species. Things
which have the same corn mon attributes or the same possibilities
of modes such as are like corn mon attributes, are referred to a
common genus. (Ont., P. I., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)
81. WOLFF. Essences of things are absolutely necessary;
likewise, attributes of things; and also the proximate possibility
of mode. The attributes of things and the proximate possibilities
of modes, are in themselves immutable. (Ont., P. I., Sect. 3,
Cap. iii.)
82. WOLFF. Attributes and modes, excluding guantity, are
qualities. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. v.) They are also accidents.
Attributes are not modifiable, but they are immutable, and there­
fore incapable of receiving other determinations successively;
thus they are accidents. (Ont., P. 1 L, Sect. 2., Cap. ii.)
83. WOLFF. The possibility of those modes, the reason for
which is contained in essentials, must be included among attri­
butes. For example: The divisibility of a parallelogram by its
diagonal into two equal parts, is determined by the parallelism
and number of its sides; therefore it is an attribute of the par­
allelogram. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)
84. DUPLEIX. The predicable or attributive words are five.
[. Genus - comprising the supreme and most general genus
which is always genus; and the subaltern genus, which, in differ­
ent respects, is either genus or species. 2. Species - comprising
the lowest and most special species' which is always species being
attributed immediately to the individuals j and subaltern species,
which, in different respects, is either genus or species. 3. Differ­
ence -essential when constituting part of the definition or essence
of the thing; and accidentai when not partaking of the essence of
the thing. 4. Proper.ty -(a) which belopgs generally to a whole
subject but nat to it alone, as the possession of two feet, which
is proper to all men but not to men alone; or (b) which belongs
to one subject alone but not generally to the whole of it, as the

58. ATTRIllUTE. 39
being a musician or doctor, which is proper to man alone but not
to ail men; or (c) which belongs to the whole of one subject and
to it alone but not always, as hoariness, which belongs to man
alone and to every man, but only in old age; or (d) which belongs
to the whole of one subject and to it alone and always, as the
faculty of laughiog. 5. Accident, which is common - compri­
sing accident separable from its subject in effect; and accident
inseparable from its sllbject except by perception. 34 (De la Log.,
Uv. 1L, Chap. 7-)
85. There are many things required in an ens be­
sides essentials, for these do not so constitute it that it
is what it is. That it is a form, it derives from essen­
tials; that it is such a form, from determinations; and
that it can be such a form, both from essentials and
from attributes. That an ens can be what it is, is an
attribute; that its essence is everywhere in it, is an at­
tribute, and consequently an accident.
86. The essentials of a muscle are its motor fibres;
the attributes are, that the motor fibres are held to­
gether in limits by their bonds, are surrounded by a
common membrane, and are thus adapted to produce a
certain action. It is an attribute, in that the muscle
is determined to a special action, that it should have a
tendon, and should be attached to sorne part of a bone,
or to a movable and an immovable part. The corn mon
membrane itself, the tendons, and the other things,
have their own essentials; but still, to the muscle,
they are attributes. The essentials of the eye are its
fibres, vessels, and humors; its attributes are, the pos­
sibilities of the modes of receiving the phenomena of
sight, and thus the form itself and the things accessory
to its essentials.
87. The attribute of the angular form is, that it is

59. 40 O!'TOLOGY.
hard, heavy, and angular; and this attribute reigns uni­
versally in ail the species and individuals [of the form].
The essentials are the elements whence are the essen­
tial determinations, which are continually opposite and
repugnant, thus contrary, to each other; from this
comes their gravity.
88. The attribute of the circular form is. that it can
be expanded and compressed, the greatest hardness
being concentrated in the centre, and mobility in the
circumference outside the centre, motion and rest, or
liberty and compulsion, being thus together in one
body; that it can revolve about its axis; can resist and
yielc1; can undergo change of state ; can be the mea­
sure of aU angles; and can furnish their sines.
89. We cannot know what any form, organ, or body
is, or what any subject is, unless we know its attri­
butes. For example, - We cannot know what the cir­
cular form is, unless we know its attributes,* which
are that it can be compressed and expanded; can yield
and resist; can revolve about its axis, and at the same
time reverse the directions of its revolutions; that ail
motion can be referred to the centre, and ail rest dif­
fused to the circumference; that every triangular form
can be measured by it; that, respectively to what is
angular, it can have a perpetuai something; that in it
there is no angle, no plane, no opposite direction ex­
cept in one place, namely, the centre where direction
is absolu te. These attributes are, by some, called
predicates because they are determined by essentials;
but they are proper [to the circular form], so that we
• Non scire jJossumus quid sil aliqua forma, . . . nisi sciamus e.fus
attriiJuta, sicuti formœ ârcu/aris attriiJuta quod possit comprimi. etc.

60. ATTRIBUTE. 41
must distinguish between things praper, and things
camman.*
90. That attribute is praper [ta a subject] which
can be attributed ta it alane, and nat ta any ather; an
attribute is camman, which can be attributed ta supe­
riar [subjects] and reigns everywhere.
• Bau a quibusdam vocantur praedicata, quia detcrmina>ltu,- ab es­
sentia!ibus sed s,mt propria, ideo ut propria, communia SU>lt distin·
..,"·ucnda.

61. 42 ONTOLOGY.
CHAPTER XI.
PREDICATE.
91. WOLFF. Absolute predicates are such as are attributed
to a subject absolutely, without any condition being added. Hy­
pothetical predicates occur only under a given condition; they
are assum~d as possible, but still as being only in potency.35
(Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. i.)
92. Whatever is in an ens, or whatever can be
therein, can be predicated of it and is called a predi­
cate. Thus predicate is a universal term embracing
all essentials, attributes, accidents, and modes.
93. From the predicates which belong to an ens,
and from those which do not belong or which are re­
pugnant to it, we can recognize what the ens is, and
what its quality. For an ens is described by mere
predicates, these being so many its characteristics and
marks. Predicat es are also set forth by means of
types and representations, in order that, when the
whole of an essence and nature cannot be described,
this may still be done by similitudes.

62. SUBJECT. 43
CHAPTER XII.
SUBJECT.
94. That is called a subject, in which all those predi­
cates and adjuncts treated of above, are. Every sub­
stance is a subject of determinations, that is, a subject
of which something is predicated; and that which is
described and defined, is a subject.