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Lost and Found
Certificates
Ian Foster & Dylan Ayrey
Who We Are
Ian
Information Security Engineer
CertGraph
https://dns.coffee
https://lanrat.com
https://github.com/lanrat
@LANRAT
Dylan
truffleHog
WPA2-HalfHandshake-Crack
Pastejacking
Other stuff…
https://github.com/dxa4481
dylanayrey@gmail.com
The Problem
A certificate can outlive a the ownership of a domain
This potentially leaves the domain owner with a valid SSL certificate for the next owner
How can you know?
● Buy a new domain… hope for the best?
● In the early 2000’s and early 2010’s, you’d never know
Alice registers foo.com for 1 year Bob registers foo.com
Alice’s 3 year SSL certificate for foo.com
foo.com unregistered
Bob’s certificate for foo.com
Certificate Transparency!
● Log of all certificates issued by public Certificate Authorities
● Designed to catch bad or misbehaving Certificate Authorities
● Publicly auditable and searchable
● ½ billion certs and growing
We Can find pre-existing certificates
● Note the purchase date of said domain
● Search CT logs for certs pre-dating that date and valid after
● Monitor
○ Old certs may not show up in logs for years, if ever
A significant example
stripe.com
How big is this issue?
Searched Certificate Transparency (CT) for certificates that overlap multiple
domain registrations
Data
● 3 million domains
○ 1% of internet
● Looked for changes...
○ Expiration date
○ Email contacts
○ Registrar
○ Etc...
Sources
● CT logs
● Historical WHOIS
● Historical nameservers https://dns.coffee
● WayBack Machine https://archive.org
1.5M (0.45%)
Of domains tested have pre-existing certificates
25% haven't expired yet
BygoneSSL
noun
An SSL certificate created before and supersedes
its domains’ current registration date
Could it be worse?
● Certificates can have many domains
● Certificates can contain some bygone domains and some not
Cert
foo.com
bar.com
foo.com
<bygone>
bar.com
CertGraph Example of BygoneSSL
https://github.com/lanrat/certgraph
Example: do.com
Can we revoke these certs?
If no….
● Spend 10k on a domain, you’re screwed for years
● Bad guys could squat on desirable domains
● Cry
If yes…
● You can take down production certs you don’t own
● You can DoS companies
Digging deeper....
● Rules that dictate how CA’s and browsers operate
● If broken browsers distrust the CA
Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates
Can revoke if information becomes incorrect
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.5.7-29-Apr-2018.pdf
Within 24 hours
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.5.7-29-Apr-2018.pdf
We can DoS production sites
Cert
foo.com
bar.com
foo.com
<bygone>
bar.com
Certificate for bar.com can be revoked because it is shared with
foo.comwhich has changed ownership during the certificates lifetime
7M (2.05%)
Of domains share a certificate with bygone domains
41% haven't expired yet
Sounds like we can
break stuff….
BygoneSSL
BygoneSSL Man in the Middle
If a company acquires a previously owned
domain…
Previous owners could still have valid
certificates
MitM the SSL connection with a certificate
generated by the previous owner
BygoneSSL Denial of Service
If a certificate has a subject alt-name for a
domain no longer owned…
Revoke the certificate with a vulnerable
domain and non-vulnerable domain listed in
the alternative names
You can DoS the service if the shared
certificate is still in use!
Trying to revoke with Let’s Encrypt
● Instant automated turn around
● I emailed security@letsencrypt.org
Trying to revoke with Digicert
● 1 day turn around
● I emailed support@digicert.com
Trying to revoke with Amazon AWS
● 1 week turn around
● I emailed ec2-abuse@amazon.com
Trying to revoke with Comodo….
● Still waiting….
● I opened many support chats and emailed security@comodo.com
What about resellers? (ssl’s)
● 1 week turn around
● I emailed tech@ssls.com
Instantly revoked a cert used in production
● I still own and use security.love
BygoneSSL Certificate Transparency Log Monitor
Fork of SSLMate’s CertSpotter Log Monitor Tool
https://github.com/lanrat/certspotter
Watchlist file example:
insecure.design valid_at:2018-04-18
defcon.org valid_at:1993-06-21
wikipedia.org valid_at:2001-01-13
toorcon.net valid_at:2012-03-13
BygoneSSL Facebook Search Tool
● Requires auth to Facebook
● Faster!
BygoneSSL Search https://github.com/dxa4481/bygonessl
Unanswered Questions
● How do you give notice when revolving a certificate to its alt-names?
○ How much notice?
● Revocation is broken a best....
○ Our demo certificate has been revoked for months, still works fine
Things you can do to protect your domain
● Use the Expect-CT HTTP header with enforce to ensure that only CT logged
certs will be trusted for your domain
○ If a previous owners certificate is in CT logs, request the CA revoke it
■ Hope user checks CRL lists or OCSP
● We should continuously monitor CT logs for old certs
○ CT has only been required for non-EV since April 2018
■ Only required for certificates issued after April
○ Check currently owned domains as well for older certificates
○ Use CertSpotter with BygoneSSL to monitor logs
Things the internet can do
● Registrars could show pre-existing certificates for domain registrations
○ Include related alt-names
● CAs could only issue short lived certificates
○ Let’s Encrypt!
● CAs should not issue certificates valid for longer than domain registration
● Be careful with subject alt-names
○ If you’re a hosting client domains, check CRL’s and replace certs as needed
Questions?
https://insecure.design
CertSpotter https://github.com/lanrat/certspotter
BygoneSSL Search https://github.com/dxa4481/bygonessl

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Lost and Found Certificates: dealing with residual certificates for pre-owned domains

  • 1. Lost and Found Certificates Ian Foster & Dylan Ayrey
  • 2. Who We Are Ian Information Security Engineer CertGraph https://dns.coffee https://lanrat.com https://github.com/lanrat @LANRAT Dylan truffleHog WPA2-HalfHandshake-Crack Pastejacking Other stuff… https://github.com/dxa4481 dylanayrey@gmail.com
  • 3. The Problem A certificate can outlive a the ownership of a domain This potentially leaves the domain owner with a valid SSL certificate for the next owner How can you know? ● Buy a new domain… hope for the best? ● In the early 2000’s and early 2010’s, you’d never know Alice registers foo.com for 1 year Bob registers foo.com Alice’s 3 year SSL certificate for foo.com foo.com unregistered Bob’s certificate for foo.com
  • 4. Certificate Transparency! ● Log of all certificates issued by public Certificate Authorities ● Designed to catch bad or misbehaving Certificate Authorities ● Publicly auditable and searchable ● ½ billion certs and growing
  • 5. We Can find pre-existing certificates ● Note the purchase date of said domain ● Search CT logs for certs pre-dating that date and valid after ● Monitor ○ Old certs may not show up in logs for years, if ever
  • 7. How big is this issue? Searched Certificate Transparency (CT) for certificates that overlap multiple domain registrations Data ● 3 million domains ○ 1% of internet ● Looked for changes... ○ Expiration date ○ Email contacts ○ Registrar ○ Etc... Sources ● CT logs ● Historical WHOIS ● Historical nameservers https://dns.coffee ● WayBack Machine https://archive.org
  • 8. 1.5M (0.45%) Of domains tested have pre-existing certificates 25% haven't expired yet
  • 9. BygoneSSL noun An SSL certificate created before and supersedes its domains’ current registration date
  • 10. Could it be worse? ● Certificates can have many domains ● Certificates can contain some bygone domains and some not Cert foo.com bar.com foo.com <bygone> bar.com
  • 11. CertGraph Example of BygoneSSL https://github.com/lanrat/certgraph
  • 13. Can we revoke these certs? If no…. ● Spend 10k on a domain, you’re screwed for years ● Bad guys could squat on desirable domains ● Cry If yes… ● You can take down production certs you don’t own ● You can DoS companies
  • 14. Digging deeper.... ● Rules that dictate how CA’s and browsers operate ● If broken browsers distrust the CA Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates
  • 15. Can revoke if information becomes incorrect https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.5.7-29-Apr-2018.pdf
  • 17. We can DoS production sites Cert foo.com bar.com foo.com <bygone> bar.com Certificate for bar.com can be revoked because it is shared with foo.comwhich has changed ownership during the certificates lifetime
  • 18. 7M (2.05%) Of domains share a certificate with bygone domains 41% haven't expired yet
  • 19. Sounds like we can break stuff….
  • 20. BygoneSSL BygoneSSL Man in the Middle If a company acquires a previously owned domain… Previous owners could still have valid certificates MitM the SSL connection with a certificate generated by the previous owner BygoneSSL Denial of Service If a certificate has a subject alt-name for a domain no longer owned… Revoke the certificate with a vulnerable domain and non-vulnerable domain listed in the alternative names You can DoS the service if the shared certificate is still in use!
  • 21. Trying to revoke with Let’s Encrypt ● Instant automated turn around ● I emailed security@letsencrypt.org
  • 22. Trying to revoke with Digicert ● 1 day turn around ● I emailed support@digicert.com
  • 23. Trying to revoke with Amazon AWS ● 1 week turn around ● I emailed ec2-abuse@amazon.com
  • 24. Trying to revoke with Comodo…. ● Still waiting…. ● I opened many support chats and emailed security@comodo.com
  • 25. What about resellers? (ssl’s) ● 1 week turn around ● I emailed tech@ssls.com
  • 26. Instantly revoked a cert used in production ● I still own and use security.love
  • 27. BygoneSSL Certificate Transparency Log Monitor Fork of SSLMate’s CertSpotter Log Monitor Tool https://github.com/lanrat/certspotter Watchlist file example: insecure.design valid_at:2018-04-18 defcon.org valid_at:1993-06-21 wikipedia.org valid_at:2001-01-13 toorcon.net valid_at:2012-03-13
  • 28. BygoneSSL Facebook Search Tool ● Requires auth to Facebook ● Faster! BygoneSSL Search https://github.com/dxa4481/bygonessl
  • 29. Unanswered Questions ● How do you give notice when revolving a certificate to its alt-names? ○ How much notice? ● Revocation is broken a best.... ○ Our demo certificate has been revoked for months, still works fine
  • 30. Things you can do to protect your domain ● Use the Expect-CT HTTP header with enforce to ensure that only CT logged certs will be trusted for your domain ○ If a previous owners certificate is in CT logs, request the CA revoke it ■ Hope user checks CRL lists or OCSP ● We should continuously monitor CT logs for old certs ○ CT has only been required for non-EV since April 2018 ■ Only required for certificates issued after April ○ Check currently owned domains as well for older certificates ○ Use CertSpotter with BygoneSSL to monitor logs
  • 31. Things the internet can do ● Registrars could show pre-existing certificates for domain registrations ○ Include related alt-names ● CAs could only issue short lived certificates ○ Let’s Encrypt! ● CAs should not issue certificates valid for longer than domain registration ● Be careful with subject alt-names ○ If you’re a hosting client domains, check CRL’s and replace certs as needed