[Ppt] Survey Of Vehicular Network Security
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

[Ppt] Survey Of Vehicular Network Security

on

  • 2,086 views

VANET security

VANET security

Statistics

Views

Total Views
2,086
Views on SlideShare
2,084
Embed Views
2

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
83
Comments
0

1 Embed 2

http://www.slideshare.net 2

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Microsoft PowerPoint

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

    [Ppt] Survey Of Vehicular Network Security [Ppt] Survey Of Vehicular Network Security Presentation Transcript

    • Survey of Vehicular Network Security Jonathan Van Eenwyk
    • Contents
      • Design Issues
      • Certificate-Based Solution
      • Privacy Concerns
      • Data Validation
    • Design Issues
      • The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles
        • IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo
      • Attacks on Inter-Vehicle Communication Systems-an Analysis
        • Aijaz, et al (supported by industry)
      • Challenges in Securing Vehicular Networks
        • HotNets-IV: Parno and Perrig
      • Security Issues in a Future Vehicular Network
        • European Wireless, 2002: Zarki, et al
      1 2 3 4
    • Design Issues
      • The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles
        • IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo
        • System model
          • Ad-hoc communication between vehicles and base stations
          • Base stations provide services
          • Vehicles provide sensor data
          • Vehicles have more resources than most ad-hoc networks
        • Applications
          • Traffic and safety alerts
          • Travel tips
          • Infotainment (including Internet access)
      1 2 3 4
    • Design Issues
      • The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles
        • IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo
        • Challenges
          • Authentication and data encryption
          • Auditing sensor data
          • Privacy (avoid tracking)
          • Infrastructure boot-strapping
          • Negative perception of smart vehicles
      1 2 3 4
    • Design Issues
      • The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles
        • IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo
        • Key Features
          • Context sensors (front-end radar, ultra-sound, etc)
          • Event data recorder (i.e., “black box”)
          • Tamper-proof device to handle encrypted transmissions
          • Location detection (GPS or distance bounding)
          • Communication with road-side base stations
      1 2 3 4
    • Certificate-Based Solution
      • The Security of Vehicular Networks
        • EPFL Technical Report, March 2005: Raya, Hubaux
      • Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks
        • LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux
      1 2 3 4
    • Certificate-Based Solution
      • The Security of Vehicular Networks
        • EPFL Technical Report, March 2005: Raya, Hubaux
        • Attacks
          • Bogus information
          • Message tampering
          • Cheating (data manipulation, impersonation)
          • Identity disclosure for vehicle tracking
          • Denial of service
      1 2 3 4
    • Certificate-Based Solution
      • The Security of Vehicular Networks
        • EPFL Technical Report, March 2005: Raya, Hubaux
        • Security Mechanisms
          • Electronic License Plate (post-mortem auditing)
          • Asymmetric encryption using public key infrastructure
            • Large number of anonymous keys (no identity information)
            • Vehicles frequently change keys to avoid tracking
            • Keys can be revoked (more later)
          • Physical layer protection against denial of service
            • Channel switching
            • Implement more than one communication technology
      1 2 3 4
    • Certificate-Based Solution
      • Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks
        • LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux
        • Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC 2 RL)
          • Large number of vehicles, so potentially huge revocation list
          • Lossy compression using Bloom filter
            • Configurable rate of false positives
            • Definitely no false negatives
          • Bit vector of length m
          • Hash a with k hashing functions
          • Each function sets one bit
          • Later, verify membership if all k bits are set as expected
      1 2 3 4
    • Certificate-Based Solution
      • Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks
        • LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux
        • Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD)
          • Send message to vehicle’s TPD to revoke all activity
            • Send to base stations nearest last known location
            • Broadcast over low-bandwidth radio (AM/FM) or satellite
          • Lower overhead approach as long as TPD is reachable
          • Send localized revocation list to surrounding area
      1 2 3 4
    • Certificate-Based Solution
      • Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks
        • LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux
        • Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP)
          • Vehicles that detect malicious nodes can warn others
          • Requires an honest majority
          • Warnings have lower weight if sending node has also been condemned by other nodes
          • Node 4 condemns node 2
          • But this warning has less weight because node 4 has itself been condemned by nodes 1 and 3
      1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
    • Privacy Concerns
      • Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks
        • Q2SWinet '05: Choi, Jakobsson, Wetzel
      • CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy for VANET
        • ESCAR '05: Sampigethaya, Huang, Li, Poovendran, Matsuura, Sezaki
      1 2 3 4
    • Privacy Concerns
      • Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks
        • Q2SWinet '05: Choi, Jakobsson, Wetzel
        • Provide privacy
          • From peer-to-peer vehicles
          • From infrastructure authorities
        • Support auditability
          • Linkability between anonymous handles and owner identity
          • Requires off-line permission granting (court order, etc)
      1 2 3 4
    • Privacy Concerns
      • Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks
        • Q2SWinet '05: Choi, Jakobsson, Wetzel
        • Two-Level Infrastructure
          • Back-end (ombudsman)
            • Creates long-term “handle” from node identities
            • Nodes initialized with set of handles
            • Off-line approval can grant identity from pseudonym
          • Front-end (road-side base stations)
            • Uses short-term pseudonyms created from long-term handles
            • Pseudonym and shared key created from handle and timestamp
      1 2 3 4
    • Privacy Concerns
      • CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy for VANET
        • ESCAR '05: Sampigethaya, Huang, Li, Poovendran, Matsuura, Sezaki
        • Provide privacy from vehicle location tracking
        • Proposed Techniques
          • Update pseudonym after random silence period
            • Fixed-interval updates can be tracked by estimating trajectory
            • Silence period obscures nodes if other nodes are present
          • Designate group leader to proxy communications
            • Avoids redundant transmissions
            • Extends length of time to use each pseudonym
      1 2 3 4
    • Data Validation
      • Probabilistic Validation of Aggregated Data in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
        • VANET '06: Picconi, Ravi, Gruteser, Iftode
      • Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs
        • VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, Staddon
      1 2 3 4
    • Data Validation
      • Probabilistic Validation of Aggregated Data in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
        • VANET '06: Picconi, Ravi, Gruteser, Iftode
        • Allow sensor data to be aggregated
        • Use signing certificates to validate data
        • Randomly force one complete record to be included
          • Relies heavily on tamper-proof device
      1 2 3 4
    • Data Validation
      • Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs
        • VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, Staddon
        • Nodes attempt to identify malicious data via information sharing
          • Nodes detect neighbors and contribute to global database
          • Malicious nodes may contribute invalid or spoofed data
            • May try to fake a traffic jam
          • Friendly nodes build models to explain database observations
            • Is there one malicious node attempting to spoof three other nodes?
            • Are all four nodes malicious?
            • Possible heuristic: choose scenario with fewest bad and spoofed nodes
      1 2 3 4
    • Data Validation
      • Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs
        • VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, Staddon
        • Example
          • Actual Scenario
          • Possible Explanations
      1 2 3 4
    • Questions? 1 2 3 4 Design Issues Certificate-Based Solution Privacy Concerns Data Validation