Survey of Vehicular Network Security Jonathan Van Eenwyk
Contents <ul><li>Design Issues </li></ul><ul><li>Certificate-Based Solution </li></ul><ul><li>Privacy Concerns </li></ul><...
Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June...
Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June...
Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June...
Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June...
Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>The Security of Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>EPFL Technical Report, March 2...
Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>The Security of Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>EPFL Technical Report, March 2...
Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>The Security of Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>EPFL Technical Report, March 2...
Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Ray...
Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Ray...
Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Ray...
Privacy Concerns <ul><li>Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Q2SWinet '05: Choi...
Privacy Concerns <ul><li>Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Q2SWinet '05: Choi...
Privacy Concerns <ul><li>Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Q2SWinet '05: Choi...
Privacy Concerns <ul><li>CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy for VANET </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ESCAR '05: Sampigethaya, Huan...
Data Validation <ul><li>Probabilistic Validation of Aggregated Data in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VAN...
Data Validation <ul><li>Probabilistic Validation of Aggregated Data in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VAN...
Data Validation <ul><li>Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, ...
Data Validation <ul><li>Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, ...
Questions? 1 2 3 4 Design Issues Certificate-Based Solution Privacy Concerns Data Validation
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[Ppt] Survey Of Vehicular Network Security

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[Ppt] Survey Of Vehicular Network Security

  1. 1. Survey of Vehicular Network Security Jonathan Van Eenwyk
  2. 2. Contents <ul><li>Design Issues </li></ul><ul><li>Certificate-Based Solution </li></ul><ul><li>Privacy Concerns </li></ul><ul><li>Data Validation </li></ul>
  3. 3. Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Attacks on Inter-Vehicle Communication Systems-an Analysis </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Aijaz, et al (supported by industry) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Challenges in Securing Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>HotNets-IV: Parno and Perrig </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Security Issues in a Future Vehicular Network </li></ul><ul><ul><li>European Wireless, 2002: Zarki, et al </li></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  4. 4. Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>System model </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Ad-hoc communication between vehicles and base stations </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Base stations provide services </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Vehicles provide sensor data </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Vehicles have more resources than most ad-hoc networks </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Applications </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Traffic and safety alerts </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Travel tips </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Infotainment (including Internet access) </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  5. 5. Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Challenges </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Authentication and data encryption </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Auditing sensor data </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Privacy (avoid tracking) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Infrastructure boot-strapping </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Negative perception of smart vehicles </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  6. 6. Design Issues <ul><li>The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2004: Hubaux, Čapkun, Luo </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Key Features </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Context sensors (front-end radar, ultra-sound, etc) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Event data recorder (i.e., “black box”) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Tamper-proof device to handle encrypted transmissions </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Location detection (GPS or distance bounding) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Communication with road-side base stations </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  7. 7. Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>The Security of Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>EPFL Technical Report, March 2005: Raya, Hubaux </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux </li></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  8. 8. Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>The Security of Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>EPFL Technical Report, March 2005: Raya, Hubaux </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Attacks </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Bogus information </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Message tampering </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Cheating (data manipulation, impersonation) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Identity disclosure for vehicle tracking </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Denial of service </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  9. 9. Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>The Security of Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>EPFL Technical Report, March 2005: Raya, Hubaux </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Security Mechanisms </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Electronic License Plate (post-mortem auditing) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Asymmetric encryption using public key infrastructure </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Large number of anonymous keys (no identity information) </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Vehicles frequently change keys to avoid tracking </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Keys can be revoked (more later) </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Physical layer protection against denial of service </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Channel switching </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Implement more than one communication technology </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  10. 10. Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC 2 RL) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Large number of vehicles, so potentially huge revocation list </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Lossy compression using Bloom filter </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Configurable rate of false positives </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Definitely no false negatives </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Bit vector of length m </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Hash a with k hashing functions </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Each function sets one bit </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Later, verify membership if all k bits are set as expected </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  11. 11. Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Send message to vehicle’s TPD to revoke all activity </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Send to base stations nearest last known location </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Broadcast over low-bandwidth radio (AM/FM) or satellite </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Lower overhead approach as long as TPD is reachable </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Send localized revocation list to surrounding area </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  12. 12. Certificate-Based Solution <ul><li>Certificate Revocation in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>LCA Report 2006: Raya, Jungels, Papadimitratos, Aad, Hubaux </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Vehicles that detect malicious nodes can warn others </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Requires an honest majority </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Warnings have lower weight if sending node has also been condemned by other nodes </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Node 4 condemns node 2 </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>But this warning has less weight because node 4 has itself been condemned by nodes 1 and 3 </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
  13. 13. Privacy Concerns <ul><li>Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Q2SWinet '05: Choi, Jakobsson, Wetzel </li></ul></ul><ul><li>CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy for VANET </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ESCAR '05: Sampigethaya, Huang, Li, Poovendran, Matsuura, Sezaki </li></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  14. 14. Privacy Concerns <ul><li>Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Q2SWinet '05: Choi, Jakobsson, Wetzel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Provide privacy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>From peer-to-peer vehicles </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>From infrastructure authorities </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Support auditability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Linkability between anonymous handles and owner identity </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Requires off-line permission granting (court order, etc) </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  15. 15. Privacy Concerns <ul><li>Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Q2SWinet '05: Choi, Jakobsson, Wetzel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Two-Level Infrastructure </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Back-end (ombudsman) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Creates long-term “handle” from node identities </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Nodes initialized with set of handles </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Off-line approval can grant identity from pseudonym </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Front-end (road-side base stations) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Uses short-term pseudonyms created from long-term handles </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Pseudonym and shared key created from handle and timestamp </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  16. 16. Privacy Concerns <ul><li>CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy for VANET </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ESCAR '05: Sampigethaya, Huang, Li, Poovendran, Matsuura, Sezaki </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Provide privacy from vehicle location tracking </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Proposed Techniques </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Update pseudonym after random silence period </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Fixed-interval updates can be tracked by estimating trajectory </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Silence period obscures nodes if other nodes are present </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Designate group leader to proxy communications </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Avoids redundant transmissions </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Extends length of time to use each pseudonym </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  17. 17. Data Validation <ul><li>Probabilistic Validation of Aggregated Data in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '06: Picconi, Ravi, Gruteser, Iftode </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, Staddon </li></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  18. 18. Data Validation <ul><li>Probabilistic Validation of Aggregated Data in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '06: Picconi, Ravi, Gruteser, Iftode </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Allow sensor data to be aggregated </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Use signing certificates to validate data </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Randomly force one complete record to be included </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Relies heavily on tamper-proof device </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  19. 19. Data Validation <ul><li>Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, Staddon </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Nodes attempt to identify malicious data via information sharing </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Nodes detect neighbors and contribute to global database </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Malicious nodes may contribute invalid or spoofed data </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>May try to fake a traffic jam </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Friendly nodes build models to explain database observations </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Is there one malicious node attempting to spoof three other nodes? </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Are all four nodes malicious? </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Possible heuristic: choose scenario with fewest bad and spoofed nodes </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  20. 20. Data Validation <ul><li>Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data in VANETs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>VANET '04: Golle, Grenne, Staddon </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Example </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Actual Scenario </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Possible Explanations </li></ul></ul></ul>1 2 3 4
  21. 21. Questions? 1 2 3 4 Design Issues Certificate-Based Solution Privacy Concerns Data Validation

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