Presentation of Arif Asalioglu on Valdai Discussion Club

1. Middle East in the Radicalism
Deadlock and
Recommendations.
Arif Asalioglu

2. Rising Concern about Extremism in Middle East
81
92
71
80
69
75
54
62
37
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2010 2014
Very / partially concerned about extremism in their countries, %
Lebanon
Tunisia
Egypt
Jordan
Turkey
TABLE 1 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2014

3. More Say They Are ‘Very Concerned’
about Rise of Extremism
52
80
75
65
50
69
36
19
22
31
37
25
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lebanon
Tunisia
Egypt
Palestine
Jordan
Bangladesh
% who are ___ concerned about the rise of …
Very Not too / Not at all
TABLE 2
66
63
39
72
46
84
14
24
55
21
47
14
0 20 40 60 80 100
Pakistan
Malaysia
Indonesia
Nigeria
Senegal
Israel
% who are ___ concerned about the rise of …
Very Not too / Not at all
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2014

4. Historical Causes
1. Failure of the secular movements in Middle East and Arab countries;
2. Iran's Islamic Revolution took place in 1979, causing another factor of the
increase of Islamist populism influence in the region;
3. The Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and 1980s accelerated radicalism
tendencies;
4. Historical events exprericenced throughout 90s in the Balkans, and in
particular in Bosnia, led broad masses of society to the radicalism
deadlock;
5. Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of the September 11
attacks were another trigger for the radicalism;
6. The success of the counter-revolutionary forces after 2011 uprisings gave
birth to a new wave of radicalization.TABLE 3

5. Socio-Economic Causes (1)
1. Welfare state understanding weakened and the state's social functions decreased as a result of neoliberal policies
followed in the 1980s 'and 90s. As a result of this social vacuum, radical organizations with their similar to
government socio-economic structures obtained an opportunity to expand their influence areas;
2. Although nationalism as a modernist ideology lost power in civilized Western countries, it is still a serious factor for
the Middle Eastern ethnic groups;
3. Political authority vacuum and vulnerable security systems are among the most important causes of this situation.
As a result of power vacuum liberal, secular, Islamic fractions are struggling to expand their influence in the Middle
East and radical groups are also trying to establish their own social habitat;
4. Religious conflicts in the region, governments by a single person, usage of radical terrorist organizations as an
element of foreign policy by the countries of the region.
5. Political Islamic movements that for many years couldn't be politically active came to power with the Arab uprisings
in a wide geographical area, but these groups did not meet expectations.
6. People involved in terrorist groups like ISIS commonly have strong religious sentiments and are low educated,
possibly it can be young men committed crime before. They usually are open for manipulation, being involved via
Salafi social media groups, offered marital and financial support. Although nationalism as a modernist ideology lost
power in civilized Western countries, it is still a serious factor for the Middle Eastern ethnic groups;
TABLE 4

6. Socio-Economic Causes (2)
7. In Europe, the ISID mostly attracts youth suffering form the identity crisis.Although nationalism
as a modernist ideology lost power in civilized Western countries, it is still a serious factor for
the Middle Eastern ethnic groups;
8. Participants from the Arab world are oftenly provided using ideological reasons. Sermons of
Salafi and radical clerics spreading through the Internet (with the language advantage) plays an
important role in this regard;
9. Education systems of the countries with increased radicalization are bankrupt;
10. The social and economic problems arising from the situation of the years dedicated to war and
conflict;
11. Unfair policies and the lack of legal regulations;
12. Situation becomes even more complicated when even widely accepted religious authorities
discuss the issue as a totally religious problem neglecting its political, sociological and criminal
dimensions.
TABLE 4

7. The Geographical Distribution of Foreign Fighters (1)
Country Estimated Quantity
Afghanistan 50
Albania 90
Algeria 200
Australia 100-250
Bahrain 12
Bosnia 330
Canada 100
China 300
Egypt 360
Israel / Palestine 120
Jordan 1500
Country Estimated Quantity
Kazakhistan 250
Kosovo 100-250
Kuwait 70
Kirghizistan 100
Lebanon 900
Libya 600
Macedonia 12
Morocco 1500
New Zeland 6
Pakistan 500
Qatar 15
ICSR, 2015

8. The Geographical Distribution of Foreign Fighters (2)
Country Estimated Quantity
Russia 800-1500
Saudi Arabia 1500-2500
Serbia 50-70
Somali 70
Sudan 100
Tajikistan 190
Turkey 600
Turkmenistan 360
Tunisia 1500-3000
Ukraine 50
United Arab Emirates 15
Country Estimated Quantity
United States of America 100
Uzbekistan 500
Yemen 110
Austria 100-150
Belgium 440
Denmark 100-150
Finland 50-70
France 1200
Germany 500-600
Ireland 30
Italy 80
ICSR, 2015

9. The Geographical Distribution of Foreign Fighters (3)
Country Estimated Quantity
Holland 200-250
Norway 60
Spain 50-100
Sweden 150-180
Switzerland 40
Britain 500-600
Country Estimated Quantity
ICSR, 2015