2006 failure of 20th century intelligence
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Nine books later most still do not get it -- secret intelligence is largely waste -- unprocessed technical collection that feeds Congressional pork, nothing more.
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2006 failure of 20th century intelligence
- 1. ® The Failure of 20th Century Intelligence Hackers on Planet Earth (HOPE) 6 Robert David Steele Updated 20 July 2006
- 2. ® Elements of Intelligence Collection • Human • Technical Analysis • Current • Estimative Covert Action • Black Ops • Mind Ops Counter-intelligence • Defensive • Offensive Leadership • Mindset • Courage
- 3. ® Brief History of Intelligence • Secret War – For centuries, this has been the primary focus on national-level intelligence. It remains valid. • Strategic Analysis – Sherman Kent introduced this as the focal point, but he was not successful. It remains valid. • Smart Nation – This is where I think we need to go. More later.
- 4. ® Global Collection Failure I Ignored Open Source Information • 80% of what we need to do intelligence is not secret, not digital, not in your language, and not owned by the government. • We failed to treat open sources with respect. We need OSINT! AC L A NT Open Sources BBrruusssseellss $$11550000 AAnnaallyysstt -- 55 ddaayyss 11 OOSSIINNTT TTeerrmmiinnaall 33 mmoonntthhss sseerrvviiccee 1100 ccooppiieess ooff OORRBBAATTSS 1100 ccooppiieess ooff pprroolliiffeerraattiioonn ddaattaabbaasseess 11 yyeeaarr ooff eelleeccttrroonniicc ssuubbssccrriippttiioonn 33 ffrraammeess ooff EEOO IImmaaggeerryy 55 ffrraammeess ooff RRaaddaarr IImmaaggeerryy 5500 ccoouunnttrryy rreeppoorrttss 5500 bbooookkss
- 5. ® Global Collection Failure II Very Limited Non-Official Cover • 80% of the bad boys and girls that we need to recruit/monitor for clandestine operations do not attend Embassy cocktail parties. • We have been lazy and cheap about non-official cover (in USA).
- 6. ® Global Collection Failure III Almost no Technical Processing • If we do not process what we have collected (generally at great expense), we might as well not collect it at all--we can save the money. • CN + PN = IntelNN • Processing Matters!
- 7. ® Global Processing Failure I No Data Standards • Data standards (for instance, XML) are vital if we are to be able to exploit modern information technology. • Microsoft is the enemy of the state! Open source software, and data standards, add value to your work.
- 8. ® Global Processing Failure II No Geospatial Attributes • Automated “all-source fusion” is not possible unless every datum, in every medium, has both a time and a geospatial attribute. • XML Geo needs to be an international standard--you can lead.
- 9. ® Global Processing Failure III No Interoperability or All-Source Mixing • Security is the opposite of intelligence. • Compartmentation is the enemy of knowledge. • There must be one single processing agency where everything can be mixed and evaluated.
- 10. ® Global Analysis Failure I Emphasis on Security Instead of Answers • Intelligence is about decision-support--about answering the question! • Must not confuse expertise, foreign languages, and security clearances nor should we require that the same person have them all! Mix and match...
- 11. ® Global Analysis Failure II Focused on Threats Instead of Opportunities • Threats that are here and now represent a strategic warning failure. • Intelligence is at its best when it makes the case for preventive investments-- anticipatory policy-- opportunities for advantage.
- 12. ® Global Analysis Failure III Emphasis on Local Now Vice Global Future • Greatest intelligence value comes from strategic estimative analysis about big issues--global issues • Politicians already know the local nuances--must teach them--and the public-- the global tradeoffs
- 13. ® Global Policy Failure I Failure to Impact on Budget • National intelligence has virtually no impact on how the citizen’s taxes are allocated across various national priorities. • We spend too much on hard power and almost 0 500 nothing on soft power. Others Russia Europe USA Health Culture Education Assistance Intelligence Diplomacy Military
- 14. ® Global Policy Failure II Failure to Impact on Policymaker Wisdom • Policymakers are loosely-educated and often dismiss the value of global knowledge. • Intelligence is most valuable to the public interest when it constantly educates policymakers in a compelling manner.
- 15. ® Global Policy Failure III Failure to Win Public Support for Intelligence • Intelligence is not taught in schools and there is no public appreciation for its vital contributions. • We must establish a public discipline of intelligence across the seven tribes and in the public eye.
- 16. ® Global Acquisitions Failure I Failure to Impact on What We Buy • US military buys what contractors want to sell, not what we need. • Strategic generalizations about the real world have no impact on procurement. • US ignores allied interoperability and affordability needs. Examples • Aviation temperatures • Cross-country mobility • Line of sight distances • Bridge loading limits • Ports (-), Airheads (+) • C4I anti-Internet/open • OOTW assets (MP etc.)
- 17. ® Global Acquisitions Failure II Failure to Impact on Private Sector IT • Failed to legislate stable transparent Application Program Interfaces (API). • Failed to define generic functionalities for joint development. • Failed to define an agile security architecture. Microsoft Systran Finished Intelligence and Reporting Revision Tracking and Realtime Group Review Publishing and Word Proce ssing Collaborative Work Interactive Search and Retr ieval of Data Cluster ing and Linking of Related Data Conver sion of Paper Documents to Digital Form Production of Graphics, Videos and Online Brief ings Structured Argument Analysis Modeling and Simulations Detection of Alert Situations Notetaking and Organizing Ideas Desktop Graphic and Map- Based Visualization Detection of Changing Trends Automated Extraction of Data Elements From Text and Images Standardizing and Converting Dat a Formats of Data Statistical Analysis to Reveal Anomalies Processing Images, Video, Audio, Signal Data Automated For eign Language Translation Open Literature Non-Text Data Restricted Information A B C
- 18. ® Global Acquisitions Failure III Failure to Provide for Intelligence • US mobility, weapons, and C4I systems do not program funds for the acquisition and delivery of necessary data. • Intelligence is treated as a “free” good. • Commanders “assume” intelligence will be provided when needed.
- 19. ® Global Operations Failure I Cannot Do Wide Area Surveillance • US satellites optimized for finding Soviet missile silos • Air-breather options never had the processing system created to do near real time change detection. • Still a labor intensive “hit or miss” activity.
- 20. ® Global Operations Failure II Cannot Do Last Mile • Can’t see under jungle canopy or into city streets • Can’t find single individuals with technology--still a clandestine human endeavor and generally can’t do it
- 21. ® Global Operations Failure III Cannot Do Real-Time Change Detection • Air Operations Plans now require 24+ hours to prepare (US/NATO) • Sensor to shooter processing is terrible-- and mostly manual • Have lost ability to do quick reaction strikes-- when the lawyers let us.
- 22. ® Philosophical Failure I National Tribe instead of Global Tribes • National intelligence tribe has monopolized the money/attention. • Failed to create generic intelligence discipline with seven tribes. • Failed to develop regional or global intelligence networks.
- 23. ® Philosophical Failure II Government Secrecy Over Public Sharing • The new paradigm rewards sharing more than secrecy. • Secrets are primarily valuable in the context of a rich open source knowledge foundation. • Cannot have smart spies within dumb nation.
- 24. ® Philosophical Failure III Letting Americans Lead is Wasteful • American dominance of NATO intelligence is wasteful & dangerous. • We need a European alternative emphasizing commercial security, web-based sharing, multi-cultural approaches, global burden-sharing.
- 25. ® Conclusion I ...spies only know secrets • Intelligence is about discovering, discriminating, distilling, and delivering ANSWERS. • The problem with spies is they only know secrets. • So, we still need secrets, but we need to be smarter about the context for our secrets.
- 26. ® Conclusion II Spies & schoolboys • We do not get extra points for collecting information in the hardest or most expensive way. • Do not send a spy where a schoolboy can go. • Find, Get, Buy, Steal--in that order.
- 27. ® Conclusion III Make sense or add value • If you cannot make sense of the raw data, or add value, you are not creating intelligence. • It’s about actionable answers, not about secrets, or spies, or toys. • Intelligence saves time, lives, money, and honor.
- 28. ® Secret Intelligence Misses 80% of the Relevant Information! ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS HUMINT SIGINT IMINT MASINT 95% of cost 20% of value 5% of cost 80% of value OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION
- 29. ® Policy/ Threats Poverty Disease Ecology State War Civil War Genocide Oth. Atroc. Proliferation Terrorism Trans. Crime Education Debt Economy Energy Diplomacy Immigration Family Justice Revenue Soc. Sec. Security Water Big Dogs Brazil China India Indonesia Iran Russia Venezuela Wild Cards
Editor's Notes
- To set the stage for considering how intelligence has failed at the national level, it is helpful to first emphasize that intelligence is about much more than simply secret collection or general analysis. Especially important in this illustration is the co-equal importance of counterintelligence--including operational security which most commanders and policymakers refuse to respect--and covert action, the “third way” between diplomacy and warfare. Finally, leadership is essential. The mindset and moral courage of intelligence leaders is the sine qua non for successful intelligence. Bureaucrats will fail.
- There are many excellent books on the history of intelligence so here I just wish to offer a very general summary of the three major eras in our history. Secret Wars have been the primary focus for centuries. This remains valid. Strategic Analysis is a well-intentioned idea from America that failed because of opposition from the U.S. military, and an obsession with secret collection. Smart Nation is how I describe my own contributions that emphasize the lessons of history, global burden sharing, harnessing the private sector, and using spies in context. More on this as we go on.
- My awakening to open sources came when I spent $20 million U.S. dollars in creating the Marine Corps Intelligence Command, only to discover that 80% of what I needed to do good intelligence for my generals was not secret, not online, not in English, and not available from anyone in the U.S. Government. If 80% of what we need--including geospatial information--is openly available, then we must treat this source with respect, and devise conccepts, doctrine, budgets, and organizations competent in this core disciplinary area.
- It is a huge honor to be a clandestine case officer. These are t he Jesuit priests of the holy world of intelligence. They take great risks and rarely receive proper recognition. However, to ask clandestine case officers to do what they do using only official cover, working out of official installations that are easily monitored by both hostile governments as well as hostile non-state actor groups including terrorists, is irresponsible. In America we have been lazy and cheap about this. We have also failed to properly explore multilateral clandestine operations in which our allies provide better clandestine case officers than we can grow.
- We will talk about Processing in the next three slides,so for now I will simply observe that it is foolish to spend money or take risks to collect information that is not processed. We can double or triple the value of collection if we add open sources in 31+ languages to our inputs, and we can double or triple the value of what we collect if we process it using modern technology to digitize, visualize, and store what we know. Sense-making matters. We do not do it—Able Danger was a good start, but destroyed for the wrong reasons.
- The Administration is not stupid. The bureaucracy is not stupid. The American people are not stupid. What is stupid is “the system” that President and General Ike Eisenhower warned us of in the 1950’s. The system, notably the Pentagon and its military-industrial-congressional complex, has taken on a life of its own, and good people are swept along in the fast strong current of this out of control monolith. More on that as we go on.