Increasing presence of China in the Indian Ocean Strategy and Security implications for India Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd) Head, Strategy and Security Studies Center for Asia Studies, Chennai

1. Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd)
Head, Strategy and Security Studies
Center for Asia Studies, Chennai
Increasing presence of China in the Indian Ocean
Strategy and Security implications for India

2. Maritime Challenges
Long Coast line 7516 Kms
Far flung Islands on both sides
Nine maritime states
Heavy sea traffic along the Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOCs) around the sub-continent
13 Major and 200 minor ports
Unresolved maritime borders with Pakistan and
Bangladesh
Troubled waters in the South.
Asymmetric threats

3. RHQ(East)
RHQ(West)
RHQ(A&N)
Mandapam
Tuticorin
(
Total 2013410 Sq Kms
West Coast
9,73,182 Sq Kms
A&N
5,95,217 Sq Kms
East Coast
4,45,011Sq Kms
Extent of EEZ

4. Illegal immigration
Smuggling
Poaching
Gun running
Refugees/Stow aways
VNSAs
Safety of lives and property
Marine Pollution/Oil spills
Off shore assets/ Islands/Port security
Security Challenges

5. Security Challenges
Increasing maritime and coastal trade
SEZ including in port sector, Increased Private
participation in maritime sector
Off shore oil exploration and protection issues
Issues of Governance of sensitive maritime
boundaries.
Energy Security
Terrorism and Piracy (Somalian waters)
China Factor??

6. Triggers and Trends
70,000 ships would transit the
Straits in a few yrs.
Over 43% of piracy attacks
reported in the Malacca Straits
last decade. Another 16% is
reported in the Singapore
Somalia overtaking Malacca
Straits as hot spot for piracy
attacks
Dead/missing crew has
increased threefold since 2002 as
per the IMB.
The cost due to piracy attacks
was estimated to be at 16 billion
per annum.

7. China India Power Play in the IOR

8. Triggers for Chinese interest in IOR

9. Hambanthota
U/C
Seeing Red…
S
L
O
C
s

10. Vital Sea Lines of Communication

11. China overtook Japan in Feb 2010 as the
second largest economy
SE Asian economies would grow at comparable
rates.
China export /import up by 30%+ during 2000-
2009.
China became top export destination of
Singapore 7 yrs ago.
 Indonesia’s FDI receipts in respect of China
67%.
ASIAN TRADE TRENDS

12. Other Littoral
States
Straits of
Hormuz
Persian
Gulf
Straits of
Malacca
Geo-Strategic/Geo- political
Interests-Influences
South Asia
Singapore
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia
Energy Security
Asian Century
Pakistan,
West Asia,
Iran , Iraq,
Oman ,GCC
Nepal,
Bhutan,
Myanmar
Volatile
Middle East
Region
Burma,
Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka
SE Asian
Countries
Extra-regional
Powers
US, UK,
France,
Canada, Japan,
Australia
Russia ,China ,
CAR

13. Main trigger ‘ENERGY NEEDS’

15. Gulf of Aden Challenge
Surge in Piracy off Somalia
Increasing number of
Hijackings at far off distances
from coast
Each Navy despatching ships
to area for protection of
merchantmen
No resolute action for
Coordinated action
Origins over land
Both China and India
despatched naval units and
maintain presence

16. Hijackings off Somalia

17. Based on IMB Reports

18. 2010 Projections
140 Bn USD
High estimate
90Bn USD
low estimate
50Bn USD
Official/
Announced
Estimates of Chinese Def Expenditure

20. Offshore Defence Strategy
 “Overall, our military strategy is defensive. We attack
only after being attacked. But our operations are
offensive.”
 “Space or time will not limit our counter offensive.”
 “We will not put boundaries on the limits of our
offensives.”
 “We will wait for the time and conditions that favor
our forces when we do initiate offensive
operations.”
 “We will focus on the opposing force’s weaknesses.”
 “We will use our own forces to eliminate the enemy’s
forces”
 “Offensive operations against the enemy and
defensive operations for our own force protection
will be conducted simultaneously”

21. First and second Island chains

22. Missile Launch Ranges from China
Hit any one, anywhere
Super sonic ASCM-YJ62 on Luyang II DDGs, SSN 22 Sun
burn on Sovremennyy, SSN27B/Sizzler on Kilo class Submarines
By Dec 09 deployed 1050 CSS 6 and 1150 CSS 7(SRBMs)
ASBMs based on CSS 5 MRBMs 1500 kms with manoeuvrable
warhead

23. ORBAT: Fleet Disposition
North Sea Fleet
East Sea Fleet
South Sea Fleet

24. PLAN
Destroyers:
1 Type 052C (Lanzhou class )
1 Type 052B (Guangzhou class)
2 Sovremenny class
1 Type 051B (NATO codename: Luhai class)
2 Type 052 (NATO codename: Luhu class)
16 Luda class destroyers (some modernised, others mostly old tech)
Total: 23
Frigates:
4Type 053H2G/Jangwei class
10 Type 053H3/Jangwei-II class
23 Jianghu-class (I+II+III, most old ships)
Total: 37

25. Type 051 C-DDG Luzhou

26. Red Navy (DDG/FFG)

27. 40 Type 035 Ming class and
older Type 033 Romeo class
diesel submarines
4 Russian-made Kilo class
5 indigenous Type 039 Song
class diesel submarines
5 Type 091 Han class nuclear
attack submarine (SSN)
1 Type 092 Xia class nuclear
missile submarine (SSBN)
Sentinels of the Deep PLAN
Total: 54 subs

28. Sentinels of the sea
(Type 094-Jin Class)
Hainan Island ?

29.  Type 093, SSN, new nuclear powered
attack submarine
 Type 094, SSBN, new nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarine
 Type 039, Song class SSK, ddvanced
diesel electric attack submarine
 Proj 636, Yuanzheng SSK, imported
advanced Russian Kilo diesel electric
attack submarine
 Yuan Class SSK, new advanced diesel
electric attack submarine with Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) Capabilities
Potent force in the making

30. PLA Naval base
also completed

31. Han class sub

32. 052 Class

33. Special Ops: PLAN

34. All eyes on Varyag
Could also start commencing indigenous aircraft carrier
programme by end of this year (2010)
 Plans to train 50 pilots including from Varyag in a four year
programme

35. Blue water navy in the making?
Bases in China, Dependency ports in IOR,ASBMs, Modernisation
OTH targeting capabilitiy with Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH
Radars
Satellites for long range surveillance for precision attacks with
ASBMs
‘Informatisation’ for Integrated Joint Ops (Concept in 2004)
Up to five new SSBNs JIN 094 class and 095 advanced SSNs, 13
Song class Diesel electric submarines(YJ 82 ASCM) follow on is Yuan
class(AIP)- 15 more planned in addition to four existing – All likely
to be capable of launching CH-SS_NX13 ASCM on acceptance
Surface combatants with long range HHQ9 LRSAMs on LUYANG(052
C) and SA-N-20 LRSAM (Russian) on LUzhou( 051 C), 6 Jiangkai
II(054A) FFG with medium range HHQ-16 VLSAMs
Houbei Type 0222 missile patorl boats for local defence carrying up
to eight YJ83 ASCMs
Development of AEW&C based on KJ-200 and KJ 2000(IL76)
Cyber space initiatives-

36. Concept of ops (CONOPS) India
 CBG
 Both Sea Control
and Denial forces
 LND
 Amphibious forces
 Layered defence
using marine police
wing, Coast Guard
and the Navy
 Integrated Coastal
defence network

37.  Shore
based and
integral
aviation
for
surveillance
 NCW/NCO
 Satellite
Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

38. Indian Navy
Surface: Total 36
1 Carrier
3 type 15
5 Rajput (with Brahmos capability)
3 Type 16
3 Talwars
3 Type 16A
3 Type 25
3 Type 25A
13 Veer
Submarines :Total 14
10 kilos (upgraded with klub N) can strike surface
4 HDW 209

39. INDIAN NAVY
Submarines: Total 17
2 Vela (Foxtrot) Class
4 Shishumer Class(HDW)
10 (Kilo) Sindhogush
1 Akula Class on lease
Air craft carriers
Viraat
Vikramaditya
ADS U/C

40. Maritime Capability Perspective
Plan
 11th through 13th plan aimed at balanced growth in ship
building, submarine construction and aviation development
 About 20 percent of def budget expected for Navy (capital
to revenue about 60:40)
 Six Scorpene at MDL first delivery 2012 last in 2017?
 Mod Plans include induction of major surface combatants,
surveillance platforms ,ASW/ASV platforms, multi role
helicopters, space based surveillance and satellite
communications, NCW

41. Maritime Capability Perspective Plan
 U/C Aircraft Carrier, 2 HDW submarines, and six
Scorpene. Total 32 ships and subs u/c
 Building of ships by non PSUs due to heavy orders
 15 yrs indigenous plan
 R&D both by DRDO and Indian Industries
 Opportunities for Marine Eng Equipment and
Technologies exist for Indian Industry
 Vikramaditya by 2012?

42.  Force structuring two CBG, LND forces, well
defined submarine force, shore based LRMR,
ASW,ASV, integral helicopters
 Translates to a force consisting of three aircraft
carriers,35 frigates/destroyers, four supprt ships,
about 100 LND units, about 20 subs, amphibious
ships
 2 carriers by 2014 and the third to join by 2019?
 Seven frigates and four Destroyers approved to be
built by DPSUs by 2021 @ Rs 45,000 crores
 Present level is of 130 ships plans to get it up to 160

43. Viraat

44. Vikramaditya
Many Questions
Still ?

45. Sindhuvijay

46. Advanced Technology Vehicle -Arihant

47. Shivalik Stealth ships

48. Vindhyagiri

49. INS Shishumar

50. Talwar

51. Charlie Class sub-Chakra

52. Tsunami sensitive areas in IOR

53. China’s IOR Ambitions
 Energy/SLOC protection
 “Warm water Ports” referred to
also as dependency ports in IOR
for future (Gwadar,
Hambanthota, Myanmar)
 Containment of India
 Protection of own ships from
Piracy-Somalia/Gulf of Aden
 Enablement of operation Carrier
Task Force

54. On the Anvil

55. Economic Developments
 Post war - Hong Kong-based conglomerate
Huichen Investment Holdings Ltd. investing $28
million to develop SEZ located in Mirigama, 55
km (34 miles) from Colombo port and 40 km
from the international airport.
 Hambantota Port Development Project (worth
US$1 billion)
 Norochcholai Coal Power Plant Project (worth
US$855 million)
 Colombo-Katunayake Expressway (worth
US$248.2 million)
 2006 to 2008, Chinese aid to Sri Lanka grew
fivefold, replacing Japan as Sri Lanka ’s largest
donor.
 Interest free loans, subsidised loans

56. From the Sea…

57. ..Over land..
Colombo Kattunayake Highway and
many investments in projects and
infrastructure

58. Hambanthota..
 Three times the size of Colombo
 Service and Industrial Port
 12 berths bunkering and refueling
 LNG refinery
 Aviation fuel storage
 Dry docks
 6000 direct and 50,000 indirect job
creation

59. Artist’s view of Hambanthota
‘Over 200 ships sail this route [daily]
and we want to attract them… Our vision is to
consolidate the position of Sri Lanka as the
premier maritime logistic centre of
the Asian region.’
Dr. Priyath Bandu Wickrama Chairman
Sri Lanka Port Authority

60. Shape of things to come….

61. From the Air……
Shape of things to come

62. .
Some figures about the airport coming up near
HambanthotaUS$210mn
Extent of land: 2,000 hectares in total.
Initial construction covers an extent of 800 hectares.
Aerodrome design: Designed to meet the ICAO specification
for code 4F.
Runway Length: 3,500 metres in length with a width of 75
metres.
Taxiways: 60 metre long taxiway from the runway centre line
to the edge of the apron.
Apron: 10 parking positions initially with the total being 80.
Air Field Capacity: Annual Service Volume of the aerodrome at
short and medium/long term planning horizons will be 30,000
and 60,000 movements respectively.
Terminal and related buildings: Proposed 10,000 square
metres to accommodate 800 peak hours and 100 domestic
passengers both ways

63. Proposed Air Port at Hambanthota

64. What it portends for future
 Direct flights from China
 Strategic Air Lift Capability
 Support to PLA Navy on IOR missions
 Economic Development
 Air and Sea bridge to IOR (Port +Air
port)
 Dual Use in future
 Hambanthota bids for hosting 2018 CWG

65. Factoring Sri Lanka in China’s equations
 With the geo strategic importance of
Sri Lanka it would assume greater importance
for global players post LTTE defeat
 Many developments and investments in
ports/Airports/transport sector particularly by
China increases China’s leverage
 Chinese overtures in the neighbourhood is
discomforting to India
 What is today an economic investment of huge
proportions is expected to pay dividends for
investors particularly China in increasing its
IOR ambitions and also provides leverages for
future use both for commercial and military use

66. India’s Maritime Posturing of concern to
China
 Cooperative arrangements with maritime
forces of Japan,Vietnam,US,UK,France,
Australia,Singapore,Thailand etc.,
 Maldives security pact
 Regional Initiatives- SAARC,ARF, MILAN,
Bilateral agreements
 Indian Ocean Region Symposium
 Launch of INS Arihant –ATV
 Modernisation of India’s maritime assets
 Infrastructure improvements

67. Invitation for engagement/intervention
Areas of concern: India
 Strategic Location
 Regional power dynamics
 Economic opportunity
 Technological prowess
 Democracy
 Countervailing force to China’s
adventures in the area
 Historical baggage
 Nuclear power

68. Extra regional powers interests/role
 China –Energy, Spheres of influence (SOP) to
counter India's influence
 France- Strategic presence in IOR, bases in
Diego Suareg +Reunion Island
 Japan- Increased interest in IOR, Greater
interaction with the maritime forces of India
(CG) for protection of mercantile marine traffic
from piracy. Benign support?
 US- Diego Garcia, Mobile fleets in areas around
the world (CTF 150 and 151 ) for preemption
and energy security. Global policing
 UK - Play supporting role for US initiatives
while retaining space for its own initiatives,
 Norway –Peace brokering
 Russia - Slowly trying to regain lost space

69. Conclusion
….cont’d
 China’s remote presence already
visible around India
 Areas of interest in IOR would
continue to be under satellite
surveillance and other ISR means
 China’s virtual presence felt alreay
on many Govt and private internet
sites
 China’s actual presence due to
continuous deployment of its ships in
Gulf of Aden and by way of its work
force in projects around IOR countries
 Land divides and Oceans unite
nations.From being a neighbour
sharing land borders China is now a
maritime neighbour as well connected
through narrow Malacca straits

70. Conclusion
 IOR would continue to hold interest
for West and the rest including China
 The 21st century would witness acute
competition between the two Asian
neighbours impacting security and
safety in IOR
 Force level augmentation,
modernisation and greater power play
inevitable in the region
 Conflict for supremacy in IOR and
cooperation (anti piracy/counter
terrorism) where convenient would
continue
 India would continue to enjoy the geo
strategic advantage in the short term
 Cooperative initiatives, collaborative
efforts are inescapable for taking on
the scourge of piracy and maritime
terrorism.

71. Options for India
 Engaging China’s neighbours and those weary
of China’s military ambitions -Kautilya’s
Arthashastra prescriptions
 Strengthening and operationalising second
strike capability
 Greater use of space for surveillance Cyber
warfare
 Sustained support for Modernisation
 Engaging immediate neighbourhood
 Overcoming vacuum in political leadership
 Keeping counters in place and all options open
 Strengthening A&N even more-

72. Thank You