The document discusses lessons that can be learned from crises and research in risk management. It analyzes two case studies: the 2002 acrylamide scare in Sweden and the 1990s BSE crisis in the UK. In both cases, short-term responses involved denial while long-term changes included overhauling leadership and prioritizing transparency and communication. Recommendations are to prevent crises by understanding risk perceptions, training communicators, and enhancing transparency through independent evaluations.

1. Drawing lessons from recent crises and research
Ragnar Lofstedt PhD
Professor of Risk Management
King’s College London

2. Purpose of my talk is 3 fold
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What can policy makers, regulators and others learn from crises and research?
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Getting insights from two case studies;
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Recommendations going forward

3. The crises-risk perception link
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Research shows that folks worry more about some risks than others:
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Natural vis a vis technological
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Voluntary-involuntary
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Familiar-non familiar
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High consequence low probability risk vis a vis Low consequence high probability risk

4. Risk perception continued
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Children-no children
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Men-women
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Fair not fair
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Trust not trust

5. Other important factors
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Social amplification of risk (some risks are more socially amplified than others);
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The role of leadership (strong leaders are vital in a time of crises);
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The importance of communication (at a time of crises one needs strong communicators);

6. Learning from crises –not always clear
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The role of the “Risk regulation reflex” (Mol) and risk tradeoffs (Graham and Wiener)
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Focusing on root cause and not bigger picture
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Cholera in Peru
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Excess car deaths post 9/11
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King’s Cross fire 1987

7. Other issues
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Evaluations not problem free
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Assigning blame (scape goats)
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Costs (is it properly budgeted)
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Honesty

8. Yet learning from crises can have profound implications
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2 case studies
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Swedish acrylamide scare 2002 (Lofstedt 2003)
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UK BSE crises of the 1990s
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Short term denial but long term fundamental changes

9. Acrylamide scare
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Press invitation 23rd April 2002:
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“Researchers at Stockholm University have found an element that can cause cancer and which is formed during cooking a wide range of foodstuffs. SFA has in a pilot study found the substance in many food staples. The levels (of the substance) are high and new research findings will have international importance with regard to risk valuation, food production and consumption. You are therefore invited to receive this information at a press conference by SU and SFA.”

10. Acrylamide continued 2
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Press invitation led to:
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Speculation what the substance was;
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An information vacuum filled by rumours;
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Senior food regulators and the editor of a peer reviewed journal to be harassed;
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A well attended press conference-150 journalists and live coverage by National Television;

11. Acrylamide continued 3
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At press conference Head of Research notes:
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“I have been in this field for 30 years and I have never seen anything like this before. The discovery that acrylamide is formed during the preparation of food an at high levels, is new knowledge. It may now be possible to explain some of the cases of cancer caused by food.”

12. Acrylamide outcomes
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Short term
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Denial
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Hired consultants to support Agency’s position- one even argued that the handling of the acrylamide case led to greater public trust;
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Asked high trust bodies to support the Agency

13. Acrylamide outcomes 2
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Long term (Swedish Food Agency)
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Senior leadership team was replaced
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Communications director replaced
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The then research director moves sideways and goes part time;
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Staff become media trained
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SFA holds a post mortem at Almerdalen-what have we really learned?

14. UK BSE crises
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Late 1980s-UK cattle suffer from unusual neurological diseases-caused by the consumption of ruminant derived meat and bone meal;
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July 1988 Ruminant Feed Ban is put in place;
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In 1989 law is put forward that carcasses of BSE cattle should be destroyed;

15. BSE 2
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In 1989 John MacGregor, Minister of Agriculture argued:
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“Risk of transmission of BSE to humans appears remote and it is therefore most unlikely that BSE will have any implications for public health.”

16. BSE 3
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20th March 1996 Stephen Dorrell, Secretary of State for Health argued that:
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“…a previously unrecognized and consistent disease pattern has emerged and despite their remaining no scientific proof that BSE can be transmitted to man by beef the Committee has concluded that the most likely explanation at present is that those cases are linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the specified bovine offal ban in 1989.”

17. BSE outcomes
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Short term effects:
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Consumption of beef in Europe falls by up to 45% (UK 36%);
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Ministers argue that cows aren’t crazy, people are;
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Regulators adopt knee jerk reactions: Beef on the bone ban and the replacement of multi-use surgical equipment for removing tonsils with single use equipment;

18. BSE outcomes 2
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Long term effects
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MAFF is disbanded;
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1990 UK Food Standards Agency is established;
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Seen as arms length body of Government and as independent;
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First chair: Lord John Krebs
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First chief exec: Geoffrey Podger
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Communication, openness and transparency all key. Slowly public trust in the UK food regulator is restored.

19. Recommendations
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Attempt to avoid crises from occurring in the first place
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Pre-test messages;
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Understand the risk perception/communication factors;
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Work with the media;
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Ensure that the communications staff are media trained and are natural communicators;

20. Recommendations 2
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Agree (with OECD) on the importance of enhancing government capacity
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But then less rotation of civil servants in key jobs;
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Yes-ensure transparency regarding the information used to ensure risk management decisions are better accepted by stakeholders;
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BUT science based transparency and not data dumping;

21. Recommendations 3
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Yes to continue to share knowledge including lessons learned from previous events
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But then “no blame culture”, as well as proper investment in independent evaluations by trusted neutral 3rd parties.
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But be careful re the role of media—leave them out in the initial stages;