Possibilities for application of soft power to promote disarmament and non-proliferation.

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The Future of Non-Proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?
23/02/2011
Author : Jean Pascal Zanders
Controlling the proliferation of non-conventional weaponry, let alone their full
disarmament has long been a complex undertaking. Nevertheless, Jean-Pascal Zanders
contests that if we wish to see concrete progress, it must be soft power that leads the way
forward.
Disarmament is a process whose ambition it is to reduce a discrete category of
weaponry to zero and maintain this condition. It thus has a backward dimension,
namely the destruction or conversion to legitimate purposes of existing weapon
stockpiles and related infrastructure and equipment for the development, production,
storage and delivery of such weapons. It also has a forward-looking dimension, in the
sense that future armament is prohibited. The most important, but arguably least
noticed, dimension of disarmament is the removal of the weapon category from the
military doctrine of a country.
Arms control concerns the management of levels of weaponry at pre-agreed
quantitative or qualitative levels. This mostly results in the freezing at or reductions
from existing levels of weaponry. In contrast to disarmament, residual military
capabilities mean that the weaponry in question is not taken out of the military
doctrine, and all central actors and mechanisms to sustain the armament dynamic
remain in place. Proliferation is a process of technology diffusion from a possessor of
such technology to a non-possessor. Respecting conventional weapons, the process
is referred to more benignly as arms trade, arms transfers or armament cooperation.
‘Proliferation’ as such has more sinister overtones and has mostly been reserved for
the group of non-conventional weapons: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) and their means of delivery (particularly missiles).
If ‘hard power’ is about coercion and payment, then ‘soft power’ is about creating a
policy-enabling environment through persuasion and cooperation to mutual benefit
based on attraction to the societal values, policies and institutions, as well as to the
culture of the actor that seeks to wield soft power. It is about establishing relationships
that foster understanding and remove misunderstanding. Many such relationships
result in transnational networks, which contribute to greater stability and predictability
in international relations. Both state and non-state actors (including industry, scientific
communities, civil society and non-governmental organisations) can contribute to the
density of those networks. Moreover, their emergence is likely to enhance the efficacy
of soft power. The tools used to exert soft power may vary and the outcome of any
particular approach is likely to depend on the specific context or the ultimate strategic
goals. Trade, technology transfers, educational and cultural exchanges, development
assistance are among the soft power instruments.
Soft power can support the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation in many ways.
Unilateral disarmament by a major power can contribute to delegitimising a particular
weapon category and set a moral imperative for others to follow suit or pave the way
for multilateral disarmament diplomacy. The US renunciation of biological warfare in
1969 shaped the negotiations of the future Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC). Universalisation of multilateral disarmament treaties relies greatly on the
application of soft power. In certain regions the removal of the threat posed by the
banned weaponry will be the primordial reason for countries to join the treaty. Besides
the formal prohibitions and tools to ensure compliance, a disarmament treaty will
typically include clauses on assistance with treaty implementation, development and
technology transfers, cooperation on defence and protection against weapon use, and
security guarantees in case of threats with or actual use of the banned weapon.
Particularly if countries with the necessary technical and financial resources are seen
to be actively involved in their implementation, then the reluctance by some states to
become a party (for, e.g., financial or security reasons) can be overcome.
An international treaty implementation body, such as the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in support of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), can become an appreciable conduit for soft power. It enjoys a far
greater perception of neutrality than an individual country and must execute its
responsibilities irrespective of a member’s political regime or regional security
conditions. In 1997 Jordan was surrounded by at least two chemical weapon (CW)
possessors (Iraq and Syria) and is located in an area of major conflict. Security
guarantees formally communicated by the Director General of the OPCW enabled the
country to accede to the CWC. The existence of an implementing organisation does
not preclude supplementary activities by individual states parties, but these have a
greater likelihood of involving allies and friends (which may or may not be a party to
the treaty in question) unless they have a broader regional dimension.
Important for the soft power impact of an international organisation, however, are its
formal status under the treaty and its size. The BTWC does not establish an
implementation organisation. At the 6th Review Conference (2006) the states parties
decided to grant the treaty some form of institutional permanency by funding an
implementation support unit (ISU), consisting of three mid-level staff. Its mandate has
to be renewed at the 7th Review Conference (2011). This unit functions more as a
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contact and transmittal centre on behalf of the states parties, and has limited scope of
initiative (both in terms of the framing of the mandate and budgetary restrictions). For
parties to the BTWC, however, the existence of the ISU may actually reduce their
individual initiatives in support of treaty universalisation and implementation, as they
funnel their resources through the ISU or incorrectly assume that the ISU is a
functional substitute for their own responsibilities. Such an outcome would actually
weaken the soft power support for the disarmament goals. Fortunately, the annual
meetings of experts and states parties guarantee solid interaction and coordination
with the ISU, which helps to build up its international status.
States also hope to obtain soft power credits from joining multilateral disarmament
treaties, a fact that is, for instance, reflected in their efforts to become an original
party. Those credits can then be utilised during the process of regime building and
early treaty implementation, as well as in any bilateral or regional activities in support
of the treaty’s goals or the promotion of other disarmament and non-proliferation
activities.
The limits to soft power in disarmament and non-proliferation emerge in the case of
treaty violations or if certain states refuse to join weapon control treaties or comply
with non-proliferation expectations. The lack of any progress on limiting
non-conventional weapons in the Middle East or even a glimmer of building
confidence and transparency cannot be resolved by soft power alone, including the
inducements of formal weapon control treaties. Where cases of persistent
non-compliance with international standards are concerned, there exists the recourse
to the UN Security Council and the imposition of sanctions, whether or not these are
endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. Sanctions are about coercion and
consequently belong in the hard power toolbox. Another tool are counterproliferation
policies, which may include military interdiction operations on the high seas or in the
air and rely heavily on intelligence operations.
Notwithstanding, non-proliferation policies and tools can support the goals of
disarmament and arms control. Export controls in particular may induce states to
become a party to an international agreement. The CWC, for example, has
progressively limited access by non-states parties to certain commercially and
industrially important toxic chemicals from sources located in states parties. Several
states have decided to join the OPCW in the light of cost of converting the industry to
use uncontrolled chemicals.
However, export controls operated outside the treaty regime can have adverse political
effects, particularly if they target parties to a convention. This division has come
particularly to the fore in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, where a number of
non-nuclear weapon states express their deep dissatisfaction about limited or
controlled access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes despite their treaty
commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. Similar situations occur in the framework
of the CWC and the BTWC, as large group of countries coordinate their export control
policies for materials and equipment relevant to CBW development and production in
an informal arrangement known as the Australia Group. At several occasions the
standoff has deadlocked progress on building the respective treaty regimes, but today
tensions appear to be receding as chemistry and biotechnology have become more
ubiquitous across the world and the quasi permanent interactions among states
parties to the BTWC and CWC have yielded fresh common understandings and
uncovered new areas of potential cooperation.
Nuclear weapons are one area where comprehensive disarmament remains illusive.
The BTWC and CWC benefited from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, a simple international
agreement that bans the use of CBW in armed conflict, but does not restrict weapon
development or possession. This prohibition on use and the reciprocity of the
obligation among parties gradually pushed CW to the fringes of military doctrine of the
principal powers, which eventually enabled their removal altogether. In contrast, the
no-first-use pledges issued in 1995 by the five official nuclear weapon states appear
to reinforce the centrality of nuclear weapons in national security policies.
The question thus arises whether an agreement equivalent to the Geneva Protocol
banning the use in war of nuclear weapons might become a well of soft power for
nuclear disarmament. As noted in the introduction, disarmament removes a particular
type of weaponry from military doctrine, and a state must thus seek alternative,
non-prohibited means to fill the gap in its security policies. This search for alternatives
implies fundamental debates on the roles of weaponry and societal values with regard
to armed conflict and peace.
Presently, nuclear weapons are the subject of arms control, which leaves residual
capacities deployed with the armed forces. The hurdle to move from some to none
remains enormous, because arms control leaves the core doctrinal role for the
weapons unchallenged. Consequently, constituencies with a strong interest in the
preservation of the weapon capacity will stay vocal and powerful.
While it is true that the proposed process would be slow, at least it would start shifting
the parameters for considering the future utility of nuclear weapons. Indeed, between
the Geneva Protocol and the BTWC and the CWC lie 47 and 67 years respectively.
During this interval, the possible roles of CBW were continuously challenged, and
both civilian and military authorities preferred alternatives for a variety of reasons. The
debates on possible substitutes for nuclear weapons while maintaining security
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—abolition leading to increased outbreaks of major wars is not a desired
outcome—must still take off. Based on historical experience, a protocol banning
nuclear weapon use may be a good departure point. The interval between the
protocol and a nuclear weapons convention may be much shorter. After all, in 1925,
arms control and disarmament law still had to come into being and on-site verification
was a distant, abstract dream. Today, the core principles, procedures and tools of
disarmament have been established, so there exists far greater clarity of purpose.
Jean Pascal Zanders is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies in
Paris.
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