How did the Manor structure life for most peasants in the Middle Ages? What innovations increased the productivity of medieval agriculture? What factors strengthed the powers of medieval kings? How did feudal ties limit those powers? Most people during the Middle Ages lived on the land. Describe the manorial system. What was the relationship between lord and peasant? The dominant political and military system during the period after about 1000 A.D. is usually called "feudalism". What does this term mean? What was the basis of the feudal tie? One of the important developments during the Middle Ages was the growth of cities and towns as centers of manufacture, trade, and administration. What classes of people lived in a medieval city? What were some distinctive characteristics of city-life (as opposed to life in the countryside)? What were the causes, both immediate and underlying, of the crusades? How did the Crusades affect European society?  Note their impact on economic and cultural life as well as their military aspects On January 10, 2008, Ratan Tata, chairman of Tata Motors Limited (Tata Motors), drove onto the stage at the New Delhi Auto Expo in the world’s cheapest car. As he parked next to two other models of the Nano, he thought back on the day several years prior when he had promised the world an affordable car that could be bought for under $2,500.1 At the time, India was an emerging economy that had begun to invest millions of dollars in transportation infrastructure. Ratan saw the influx of roads and new prosperity for Indians as the perfect environment to debut a car that could be pur- chased by almost anyone. Like his personal hero, John F. Kennedy, Ratan challenged the people around him to design and produce something that had previously been unthinkable. Ratan’s ability to deliver on such a bold aspiration instilled in his investors and him the confidence that Tata Motors was capable of competing in the international automobile market. The Nano’s production was made possible by a wide range of capabilities within the Tata Group, which, along with Tata Motors, owned 98 other companies operating in 80 countries. Such a diverse and complete range of resources made Tata’s future bright.2 And even as Ratan stood on the stage introducing his accomplishment, he wondered what the next step ought to be to move his company forward. A lifelong interest in automobiles and an appreciation of the Western car market led Ratan to believe that he would have to estab- lish a firm foothold in the United States and the United Kingdom to be considered a contender in the global automotive industry. His mind turned to the ongo- ing bid and negotiations to acquire Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) from Ford Motor Company (Ford). Establishing a luxury brand would go a long way toward separating Tata Motors from regional automotive firms. Yet he had to think about whether the firm was well positioned to execute the ac ...

1. How did the Manor structure life for most peasants in the
Middle Ages?
What innovations increased the productivity of medieval
agriculture?
What factors strengthed the powers of medieval kings? How did
feudal ties limit those powers?
Most people during the Middle Ages lived on the land. Describe
the manorial system. What was the relationship between lord
and peasant?
The dominant political and military system during the period
after about 1000 A.D. is usually called "feudalism". What does
this term mean? What was the basis of the feudal tie?
One of the important developments during the Middle Ages was
the growth of cities and towns as centers of manufacture, trade,
and administration. What classes of people lived in a medieval
city? What were some distinctive characteristics of city-life (as
opposed to life in the countryside)?
What were the causes, both immediate and underlying, of the
crusades?
How did the Crusades affect European society? Note their
impact on economic and cultural life as well as their military
aspects
On January 10, 2008, Ratan Tata, chairman of Tata
Motors Limited (Tata Motors), drove onto the stage at
the New Delhi Auto Expo in the world’s cheapest car.
As he parked next to two other models of the Nano, he

2. thought back on the day several years prior when he
had promised the world an affordable car that could
be bought for under $2,500.1 At the time, India was an
emerging economy that had begun to invest millions of
dollars in transportation infrastructure. Ratan saw the
influx of roads and new prosperity for Indians as the
perfect environment to debut a car that could be pur-
chased by almost anyone. Like his personal hero, John
F. Kennedy, Ratan challenged the people around him to
design and produce something that had previously been
unthinkable.
Ratan’s ability to deliver on such a bold aspiration
instilled in his investors and him the confidence that Tata
Motors was capable of competing in the international
automobile market. The Nano’s production was made
possible by a wide range of capabilities within the Tata
Group, which, along with Tata Motors, owned 98 other
companies operating in 80 countries. Such a diverse and
complete range of resources made Tata’s future bright.2
And even as Ratan stood on the stage introducing his
accomplishment, he wondered what the next step ought
to be to move his company forward. A lifelong interest
in automobiles and an appreciation of the Western car
market led Ratan to believe that he would have to estab-
lish a firm foothold in the United States and the United
Kingdom to be considered a contender in the global
automotive industry. His mind turned to the ongo-
ing bid and negotiations to acquire Jaguar Land Rover
(JLR) from Ford Motor Company (Ford). Establishing
a luxury brand would go a long way toward separating
Tata Motors from regional automotive firms. Yet he had
to think about whether the firm was well positioned to
execute the acquisition if it won the bid. Or was organic

3. growth a safer route to the same end?
Global Automobile Landscape
The automobile industry was a revolving door of brand
ownership and development among a limited number of
conglomerates. Underlying the swapping and bargain-
ing of various marques between companies was a tone of
nationalism. Traditional American firms such as General
Motors (GM) and Ford pitted themselves against foreign
competitors, particularly those in the Far East, where
automotive production was growing at a tremendous
rate: Between 2005 and 2008, U.S. motor vehicle produc-
tion declined 13%, while China’s production increased
63%, and India’s jumped 51%.3
The disparity between the Eastern and Western car
markets reflected a global economic slowdown, which
favored cheaper and more efficient vehicles. Ford, which
had been pouring money into its fledgling Premier
Automotive Group (PAG), had determined it would be
more cost-effective to dismantle the sector altogether,
raise capital, and reinvigorate its mainstay marques to
form a cohesive and unified campaign. A return to core
CASE 27
Tata Motors Limited: Ratan’s Next Step
354
©
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This case was prepared by Andrew Biladeau, Case Writer; Gerry
Yemen, Senior Researcher; Michael J. Lenox, Samuel L. Slover
Professor of Business Administration; and
Jared D. Harris, Assistant Professor of Business Administration.
It was based exclusively on public sources and contains some
fictionalized content. All company data
is actual. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather
than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an
University of Virginia Darden School Foundation,
Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send
an e-mail to [email protected] No part
of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by
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5. CHE-HITT11E-13-0403-CaseStudy27.indd 354 10/25/13 2:53
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Case 27: Tata Motors Limited: Ratan’s Next Step 355
brands for Ford meant eliminating luxury models, which
had experienced a significant decline from 2004 to 2006.4
Luxury brand or not, without two raw materials—
steel and aluminum—auto production lines would be
idle. Steel was at the heart of the car manufacturing pro-
cess. The prices of those resources were either a threat
or benefit to a firm’s operating costs. In 2006, Tata faced
downward pressure on its margins when the price of
aluminum ingot rose 23% and steel increased $9 per
ton over the previous year.5 Auto production was highly
dependent upon the steel and aluminum industries.
The main factors in being able to produce automobiles
on a mass scale across different vehicle types were R&D,
manufacturing capability, and access to successful plat-
forms. Most major auto companies used platforms to pro-
duce varying types of vehicles while saving on design par-
ticulars. A dashboard display, for instance, could be used
for multiple vehicles. In addition to aesthetic nuances to
vehicles, platform technology incorporated features under
the hood including engines and chassis. Platform tech-
nologies were valuable for companies because when one
was developed, it could be applied to multiple vehicles of
the same class to produce identical internal components
while allowing for multiple body designs.
In addition to platform production, most auto com-

6. panies were focused on building brands that would be
familiar to consumers. In general, automobiles were big-
ticket items for consumers, and when faced with such a
large purchasing decision, many buyers were swayed by
their comfort with the brand. For that reason, particular
brand names were especially valuable in the global auto-
motive market—Jaguar and Land Rover were primary
examples of universally recognized brands.
Jaguar was originally known as the Swallow Sidecar
Company until World War II, when the similarity of its
initials to those of Hitler’s elite guard, the Schutzstaffel
(SS), drew negative connotations. In 1968, almost 25 years
after the name change, Jaguar merged with British Motors
Company (BMC) and deepened its ties to England.
Jaguar’s cars were known for having a sporty look and
were driven by the aristocracy of England. After collabo-
rating with Ford throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Ford
finally purchased Jaguar outright in 1989 for $2.5 billion.
Land Rover’s image and reputation was also built in
the United Kingdom. The two automakers even shared
the same parent company in the 1960s when they were
owned by British Leyland Company, which became BMC.
Land Rover spun off from BMC and operated indepen-
dently in the United Kingdom until being acquired by
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) in 1994. It was
then sold to Ford in 2000.
Tata Motors’ Market in India
Ratan had always had a personal interest in automobiles
and even considered applying his Cornell architecture
degree to the field of auto design following graduation
from college. Instead, he spent two years working on the
floor of Tata Steel and gained an intimate understand-
ing of the business and its capabilities. Throughout his

7. ascension to the top of Tata Motors, he won traction with
Indians by catering to their price sensitivity, but he did
so with the long-term goal of extending the company’s
reach outside India’s borders. He believed, however, that
it was necessary to establish a sufficient base in India
before expanding to Europe and the Americas.6
As Ford was experiencing a fluctuating market in
the West (Exhibit 1), Tata Motors was capitalizing on
an emerging automotive market in India (Exhibit 2). In
an attempt to compete with China as an up-and-comer
in the global automotive industry, the Indian govern-
ment passed massive legislation—called the National
Highways Authority of India (NHAI) Act—that would
fund the creation of highways and other domestic travel
infrastructure. The increased ease of transportation
would not only broaden the company’s capabilities to
transport goods around the country but also increase
demand for the automobile among Indian citizens.
Before the NHAI Act was passed in 1988, the major-
ity of Indians owned a two-wheel vehicle. Construction
associated with the act was scheduled to be completed
between 2005 and 2007, which coincided with Ratan’s
unveiling of the Nano; analysts called the timing a stroke
of brilliance.
The task of building “The People’s Car,” as the Nano
was sometimes called, began with Ratan’s directive to
Tata Motors that it was in a time of great opportunity and
it had to capitalize. There was competition from other
firms to supply a car to the Indian consumer that could
be safe and reliable. The auto firm Mahindra & Mahindra
had recently begun to distribute the Maruti 800, which
Exhibit 1 Ford’s Revenues 2003–2007

8. Year Automotive Revenues (in
billions of U.S. dollars)
Growth
2003 138.2
2004 147.1 6.44%
2005 153.5 4.35%
2006 143.3 –6.64%
2007 154.4 7.75%
Data source: Ford Motor Company annual reports, 2003–2007.
CHE-HITT11E-13-0403-CaseStudy27.indd 355 10/25/13 2:53
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Part 4: Cases356
had more features than the Nano—including air condi-
tioning, sun visors, and radio—but it was still roughly
twice the price. Ratan rode the wave of India’s infrastruc-
ture growth by becoming strongly leveraged in domestic
vehicle sales. In 2006, 81% of Tata Motors’ revenue came
from domestic vehicle sales.7
Even though car sales in India were robust, Tata
Motors faced some brawny competitors—Maruti Udyog
Limited (also known as Maruti Suzuki) and Korean-
owned Hyundai Motor Company (see Exhibit 3 for key

9. 2007 comparison data).
To produce vehicles in line with regulations and with
international appeal, Tata Motors would have to devote
a major amount of capital and resources to R&D, and
even then, recognition and trust would be granted spar-
ingly. Tata Motors had certainly been successful in joint
ventures and acquisitions to expand internationally, but
those achievements were largely made by selling generic
vehicles on large contracts to governments and other
public entities.
Competing globally for luxury buyers would put Tata
in the company of four premium brands that dominated
the market: BMW, Mercedes, Audi, and Volvo (85% in
2006).8 And it would require becoming attractive to a
distinct group of car owners, a majority of whom were
55 years and older (Exhibit 4).9 Several other factors
made this cohort unique. Luxury car owners tended
to buy used cars more than new (although the chances
of purchasing a new luxury car increased with age and
income; see Exhibit 5 for the geographic distribution of
the world’s richest people), were more likely to pay in
cash, were markedly more inclined to see foreign name-
plates as more prestigious than domestic, and were less
influenced by gas mileage or environmental benefits.10
Exhibit 3 Competitor Data, 2007 (in millions of U.S. dollars
except
as noted)
Hyundai Maruti Udyog Tata
New car market
share, India

10. 17.3% 55.3% 20.6%
Luxury brands Genesis (concept
car 2007)
SX4 Grand
Vitara XL7
None
Revenues 74,418.6 3,688.0 6,717.2
Net income 1,711.2 377.7 650.5
Profit margin 2.3% 10.2% 9.7%
Total assets 89,650.6 1,850.3 2,820.7
Total liabilities 70,310.1 604.9 1,159.7
Sources: Scott Gibson, “Asian Action Pack; Equities,” Abnam.
Ambro Research,
December 14, 2006; Datamonitor, “New Cars in India,”
December 2007 (0102-0358);
Datamonitor, “New Cars in India,” December 2008 (0102-
0358).
Exhibit 2 Tata Motors Financials 2003–2007
Sources of Revenue
2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Domestic Vehicle Sales 85.70% 85.14% 80.88% 82.80%

11. Exports 6.75% 7.35% 9.86% 8.55%
Vehicle Spare Parts 4.26% 3.79% 4.05% 3.77%
Dividend 0.38% 0.80% 1.19% 0.76%
Hire Purchase 0.90% 0.77% 1.78% n/a
Other 2.04% 1.87% 2.23% 4.12%
Uses of Revenue
2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Materials 57.05% 59.77% 60.23% 61.78%
Taxes & Duties 17.93% 17.16% 16.45% 16.23%
Operation & Other Expenses 10.87% 9.43% 9.53% 9.29%
Employees 5.67% 5.03% 4.71% 4.26%
Reserve 3.16% 3.49% 3.96% 3.85%
Shareholders 1.81% 2.20% 2.05% 1.80%
Depreciation 2.46% 2.18% 2.04% 1.82%
Interest 1.04% 0.75% 0.93% 0.97%
Data source: Tata Motors Limited annual report, 2007.
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12. Case 27: Tata Motors Limited: Ratan’s Next Step 357
Despite the competition, acquiring JLR would put
Tata in a niche market and make it one of the truly
global players in the automobile industry. The company
also had a favorable rating from its customers—a 2006
Customer Satisfaction Study placed Tata at the top of its
market for customer satisfaction.11 That kind of service
would be expected in the luxury brand market and the
company would no doubt benefit from it.
Previous Acquisitions
Tata Motors was somewhat of a pioneer in foreign auto-
mobile acquisition. In 2004, it became the first India-based
automobile firm to make an overseas acquisition when
it bought Daewoo Commercial Vehicles. The move was
a calculated attempt to meet the company’s public goal
of increasing its revenue stream from other countries by
10% to 15% over the three-year period of 2004–2007. At
the time, Tata Motors was nearing maximum capacity
at 200,000 units annually, 85% of which were being sold
domestically in India. As a leading South Korean automo-
bile company, Daewoo offered a low-risk means of entering
the global auto market for a modest price of $116 million.12
The acquisition allowed Tata Motors to combat
domestic overexposure because Daewoo had significant
markets in South Korea and Pakistan. The deal was also
in line with Tata Motors’ aggressive global expansion
goal. According to Praveen Kadle, executive director of
finance, “We acquire a company only if it gives us a new
technology, new markets, new products, new customer
bases, or a new product development capability. The deal
must also make financial sense.”13

13. To convince Daewoo that its new Indian owner was
capable of a smooth transition, Tata Motors translated
all its literature into Korean for the board and hired
professional translators to facilitate communication.
Tata Motors’ management also interacted directly with
Daewoo employees and assured them that they would all
retain their positions after the acquisition, a promise they
would eventually keep. In a poignant tone, Tata Motors’
managing director Ravi Kant explained, “We are con-
nected to the local society and want to add value to it. It’s
not a question of thrusting ourselves. That is one thing,
which we are strictly avoiding, anywhere we are going.”14
In another concerted effort to increase its interna-
tional presence, Tata Motors acquired a portion of the
Spain-based bus company Hispano Carrocera SA (HC)
in 2005. The deal gave Tata Motors rights to 21% of HC’s
shares, technology, and brand rights. Tata Motors was
primarily interested in HC’s large commercial vehicle
platforms and in replicating its compliance with safety
and emissions standards. In an act of forward think-
ing, Tata Motors stipulated in the deal that the remain-
ing 79% of HC could be purchased in the future if both
companies came to agreeable terms.
The deal allowed Tata Motors to simultaneously enter
the bus market and develop a presence internationally.
Exhibit 5 Global Wealth Overview
Africa
1%
India
2%

14. Latin America
4%China
8%Asia-Pacific
22%
North America
31%
Europe
32%
Source: Credit Suisse Research Institute, Global Wealth Report,
October 2010,
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/enseig/ecoineg/EcoIneg_fichier
s/DaviesShorrocks
2010(CSGlobalWealthReport).pdf (accessed September 1,
2011).
Exhibit 4 U.S. Luxury Car Owner Profile
Race/Ethnicity % Purchased New
White 92
Black 2
Asian 6
Hispanic 7
Age
18–24 2

15. 25–34 13
35–44 11
45–54 20
55–64 22
65+ 32
Marital Status
Married 71
Not married 29
Household Income
Under $25K 12
$25K–$49.9K 12
$50K–$74.9K 18
$75+ 57
Data source: “Auto Market: Sport & Luxury Cars, United
States, January 2003,”
Mintel Oxygen database, August 30, 2011.
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Part 4: Cases358

16. HC produced high-end public transportation buses,
which were in high demand in Middle Eastern countries;
similar demand was emerging in India as the govern-
ment’s infrastructure overhaul began.
In both the Daewoo and HC acquisitions, Tata
Motors was intent on obtaining platform technologies
for new vehicle types so it didn’t have to engineer new
components to generate new categories of vehicles (see
Exhibit 6 for vehicle types). As a result of its experience
with these two foreign acquisitions (among others), Tata
Motors had realistic expectations and confidence pur-
suing a potential deal with JLR. Kadle said, “The most
important thing in acquisitions is human integration.
Employees from shop floor workers to senior manage-
ment must be comfortable about working with us.”15
Ford and the Premier Automotive
Group
The PAG housed Ford’s most luxurious and expensive
brands: Jaguar, Land Rover, Aston Martin, Volvo, and
Lincoln. Formed in 1999, the PAG was intended to separate
Ford’s marquee brands from its mass-production vehicles.
Originally, the group incorporated Volvo, Aston Martin,
Jaguar, and Lincoln. Land Rover was added to the group
in 2000 when Ford purchased the firm for $2.7 billion.
The brands produced anemic returns over the next several
years and forced Ford to reevaluate their status and place
within the company (Exhibit 7). In 2006, Ford unveiled its
“The Way Forward” campaign, which opened discussion
about selling off particular brands to avoid further losses.
Particularly Jaguar, and to a lesser extent Land Rover, had
experienced significant declines in production and sales.
In addition to those losses, Ford had continued to invest in
marketing and advertising with JLR over the previous six

17. years, which resulted in estimated losses of up to $10 billion.
On the cost side of JLR operations, several factors
contributed to what the firm described as unfavorable
earnings—an increase impairment charge for long-lived
assets, costly currency exchange rates (mostly related to
hedges), higher charges for personnel-reduction pro-
grams, and warranties on previous model year cars were
noted as problematic.16 Based on the year’s operating
results, the PAG 2006 business plan review projected a
continuing decline in net cash flows in the next year and
perhaps beyond. There was talk of refocusing the firm’s
commitment to its core automotive operations. Because
PAG was a division within Ford, there were unions that
would be affected by the potential sale of JLR. Although
Jaguar had 871 dealers in 64 markets, and Land Rover
had 1,376 dealers in 138 markets, most of JLR’s design
and production took place in the United Kingdom;
if the brands were sold, it was feared that jobs would
be shipped out of the United Kingdom (see Exhibit 8
for dealers, sales, and locations). JLR’s presence in the
United Kingdom was also due to the fact that a majority
of sales took place there and in the United States.
Ford formally decided to sell the JLR brands
in June 2007. Over the next several months, Ford
accepted bids from a variety of companies including
Exhibit 7 Jaguar and Land Rover Financial Data (in millions of
U.S.
dollars except as noted).
CY2006 CY2007 CY2008E
Revenue 12,969 14,942 13,336

18. Cost of sale 10,909 11,871 10,802
Gross profit 2,060 3,071 2,534
MKTG and selling
expense (% to revenue)
8.2 7.2 6.5
R&D expense (% to
revenue)
5.3 5.5 5.8
General and admin
expense (% to revenue)
2.8 2.4 2.5
EBITDA (prior to
adjustment)
26 1037 700
Depreciation 383 387 333
Data source: Data source: Vaishali Jajoo, “Commercial Vehicles
Sector Update,”
Angel Broking, December 2008
Exhibit 6 Tata Motors Vehicle Types 2003–2007
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Passenger

19. Percent 50% 48% 48% 46% 42%
Number 104,000 140,000 179,000 189,000 228,000
Commercial
Percent 50% 52% 52% 54% 58%
Number 106,000 152,000 190,000 215,000 299,000
Data source: Tata Motors Limited annual report, 2007
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Case 27: Tata Motors Limited: Ratan’s Next Step 359
Capital Management LLC, TPG Capital, Mahindra &
Mahindra, One Equity, and Tata Motors. By November,
Ford had narrowed the offers down to three preferred
bidders: One Equity, Mahindra & Mahindra, and
Tata Motors. JLR trade union members feared that
the buyer would not ultimately be able to maintain
the prized and celebrated iconic branding of JLR; to
address those union concerns, each bidder would be
given the opportunity to present its plan directly to the
UK trade unions.
Terms of the Deal
Negotiations between Ford and its suitors dated back to
June 2007. Throughout that period, Ford had refined
what it was actually selling in addition to the JLR brands.
Included in the sale would be access to JLR’s R&D

20. departments and ownership of their respective intellec-
tual property. The inclusion of these terms ensured that
JLR’s new owner would gain ownership of the platforms
used to produce all JLR’s vehicles.
The sale of JLR was part of a portfolio restructuring
Ford was undergoing. Ford had lost $15 billion the previ-
ous two years and had decided to dismantle PAG in an
attempt to revive its core business. Ford believed that the
strength of the entire company rested on the value of the
brands under the PAG umbrella, but after 2004, a major
decline in the global automotive industry had begun to
diminish that value.
The strategy was part of Ford’s “The Way Forward”
campaign. It was inefficient to try to maintain such a vari-
ety of marques when they were so unprofitable. Ford had
spent 15 years and approximately $17 billion to establish
and maintain the PAG division. In 2005, Jaguar produced
85,000 vehicles—a 20% reduction from the 100,000 vehi-
cles sold in 2001. And there had been a 37% drop in sales in
the same time period. The dismantling of Ford’s PAG had
begun in 2006 when it put the niche brand Aston Martin
up for sale. “As part of our ongoing strategic review, we
have determined that Aston Martin may be an attractive
opportunity to raise capital and generate value,” said Bill
Ford, chairman and CEO.17 By the time Ford decided to
sell Jaguar in 2007, the company was not able to cover
the fixed production costs. And it had posted losses of
$282 million in the first quarter of the year. Part of the
conclusion reached by the consultants was that adverse
economic conditions in the West had greatly decreased
demand for luxury cars (Exhibit 4).
A major obstacle for any company bidding on JLR

21. would be the unions, which represented a large portion
of the work force. They complicated the bargaining pro-
cess by demanding that the new owner keep jobs and
plants in the United Kingdom. JLR had strong ties there;
its departure would mean many lost jobs and also be a
blow to national pride.
When the three bidders presented their proposals to
union members, Tata Motors came away a clear favorite
because it planned to continue the incumbent business
strategy through 2011 using the existing team. Its plans
included expanding its presence in emerging markets and
keeping management in place. In fact, Tata Motors intended
to let all of JLR’s 16,000 UK-based employees stay put.18
The unions were also concerned that the other two
bidders, each backed by private equity firms, did not
have the same capabilities to maintain JLR. Tata Motors,
however, already had supply chain logistics in place for
distribution and would therefore be able to use some of
the money saved in those areas to bid higher for JLR.
The financial terms of the deal stipulated that for
$2.3 billion, Ford would transfer the entire businesses of
JLR to the winning bidder. But none of JLR’s debt would
be transferred; that included $600 million that Ford
agreed to pay into union pensions. Furthermore, Ford
would continue to supply the acquirer with various sup-
ports and services associated with and tied to the brands.
Supplemental support came in the form of accounting
services, powertrain supply, vehicle stamping, vehicle
components, and technological support.19
Exhibit 8 Jaguar and Land Rover Dealers and Sales, 2005–2007
Jaguar

22. 2005 2006 2007
Dealers 880 871 859
Vehicles Sold 89,802 74,593 60,485
Europe 53% 55% 59%
N. America 36% 29% 27%
Asia-Pacific 7% 10% 9%
Rest of World 4% 6% 5%
Land Rover
2005 2006 2007
Dealers 1,400 1,376 1,397
Vehicles Sold 185,120 193,640 226,395
Europe 60% 51% 60%
N. America 26% 26% 23%
Asia-Pacific 7% 8% 7%
Rest of World 7% 15% 10%
Data source: Ford Motor Company annual reports, 2005–2007.
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23. Part 4: Cases360
If Tata Motors won the bid, it would be able to secure
the money for the acquisition by obtaining a bridge loan
of $3 billion from Citigroup and JPMorgan. Taking on a
large loan of short duration during a global financial crisis
had analysts skeptical about the Tata Motors deal— espe-
cially for a potentially difficult brand to manage. Citing a
major decline in JLR’s major markets of the United States
and United Kingdom and Ford’s inability to make a profit
on Jaguar in 10 years, S&P threatened to seriously consider
downgrading Tata Motors’ rating from its lofty B+ status.
In addition to the challenge of taking on large debt,
many people were interested in how Tata Motors would
go about advertising high-end products that stood in
stark contrast to its current line of cars, including the
Nano. Tata Motors was also facing new emissions stan-
dards litigation from the European Union that all JLR
vehicles would have to comply with in the future.20
With respect to synergies that could be realized upon
the completion of the deal, Ratan was excited about the
opportunity to combine his company’s stable of sport
utility vehicles with Land Rover’s lineup. Ratan was pre-
pared to use Land Rover technologies to upgrade his
own models and hoped to reduce the cost of Land Rover
vehicles with technologies developed during production
of the Nano. The upside of Tata Motors’ array of prod-
ucts was that there would not be an overlap in competing
market segments.
If Ratan made the deal, there would be an immediate
need to begin working on a marketing strategy because

24. both Jaguar and Land Rover had promising vehicles in
their respective pipelines. Jaguar was moving in the direc-
tion of producing performance vehicles: The XFR and
XKR, both upgrades from current models, were slated
to roll off the assembly line in 2009 (the X-type car had
a price tag in the mid-30K range in 2006).21 Land Rover
was in the process of updating the aesthetics of its mod-
els by giving their bodies face-lifts and redesigning the
interiors of the Range Rover and the Range Rover Sport,
which would be unveiled in 2009 (the Range Rover SUV
had a price tag in the low-60K range in 2006).22
Conclusion
The crowd cheered as Ratan Tata finished speaking and
made his way backstage. He was excited and wondered
what would come next. If Ford did not choose Tata
Motors as the preferred bidder for JLR, Ratan would
either have to wait for another brand to be up for sale or
try to figure out a way to grow the current Tata Motors
brands to enter overseas markets. His stomach churned
as he thought of the time and energy it would take to
research foreign markets, tailor products to their indi-
vidual needs, and then find ways to affordably distribute
Tata Motors’ vehicles.
N O T E S
York Times, http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.
-nano-the-worlds-
cheapest-
Tata.com, http://www.tata.com/aboutus/

25. (acce
Buy Jaguar and Land Rover?,” [email protected]
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/
European Autos: Segmentation and Margins,
-US-
Anal
Tata Rev Up Jaguar?,” BusinessWeek.com,

26. , “On the Fast Track: Tata
Motors Takes the Inorganic Route to Growth
in Its Mission to Go Global,” Tata.com, April
/Articles/
- –
Leap and Sell Jaguar? Aston Martin Is
a - - -jaguar-usat_x.htm
to Sell Land Rover and Jaguar,” New York
-official-
tata-buys-jaguar-land-rover-for- - -billio/

27. the Deal,” Economic Times (India), March
, http://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/news/news-by-industry/auto/
automobiles/tata-sons-to-lend-support-
forfinancing-the-
-Type Review,”
http://www.edmunds.com/jaguar/x-type/
ost to Own,” http://www.
edmunds.com/land-
CHE-HITT11E-13-0403-CaseStudy27.indd 360 10/25/13 2:53
PM
Giacomo Laffranchini, Ph.D. BUS 596 CRN 2885
Page 19 of 20
APPENDIX
Study Questions for Cases

28. (Not to be used as sole basis for case analyses)
AstraZeneca: Transforming How New Medicines Flow to
Patients (SM) - Week 2
Summarize the major changes in the pharmaceutical industry
which are likely to impact
AstraZeneca’s profitability and future success. With knowledge
of these conditions, what
response is required of the company to strengthen performance
and reinforce its position
in the marketplace?
Chipotle: Mexican Grill, Inc.: Food with Integrity (SM) - Week
3
Evaluate Chipotle’s organizational resources and recent
financial performance
Define the components of Chipotle’s business strategy. How
should the analysis influence
the strategic direction of the firm? In light of economic and
competitive forces, do you
think CMG’s sustainability practices add value or diminish
potential for the company?
Ally Bank (SM) - Week 4
Conduct an internal analysis to identify resources and
capabilities within both the parent
company and subsidiary banking group. What are the linkages
between the two
organizations?
Review Ally Bank’s business strategy and Ally Financial’s
corporate strategy. How do

29. they fit with internal strengths and market conditions?
Tata Motors Limited: Ratan’s Next Step (SM) - Week 5
Conduct an analysis of the company’s internal strengths and
weaknesses at the time of
the case. In what ways do these factors influence Tata’s ability
to successfully implement
the JLR acquisition?
Assess the JLR acquisition in terms of the company’s business
objectives. Is this the best
approach for Tata Motors to expand its international market
position?
Avon (SM) - Week 6
Did Jung’s strategy fit the situation? Why or why not? Does
McCoy’s strategy fit the
current situation? Explain your answer. What suggestions can
be derived from the
analysis to enhance McCoy’s strategic plans?
Giacomo Laffranchini, Ph.D. BUS 596 CRN 2885
Page 20 of 20
Discuss Avon’s decision to retain Jung as the chairman of the
board. Do you believe this
is a good decision? What is the potential downside of keeping
the former CEO in this
leadership role?
Campbell: Is the Soup Still Simmering? (SM) - Week 7
Describe the steps taken by the company to revitalize U.S. soup

30. sales in recent years. Is
the strategy effective? As the domestic segment continues to
experience sluggish results
in Campbell’s core product category, what additional measures
are planned?
Do you share the capital market’s concerns about the company’s
decision to replace
Conant with insider Morrison? Why or why not? Considering
that the decision has
already been made, can you make any recommendations to
improve the likelihood of her
success in the new role?
Krispy Kreme Doughnuts: Refilling the Hole in a Sweet
Strategy (SM) - Week 8
Discuss the failures of leadership demonstrated by Krispy
Kreme’s top management team
since the 1990s, evaluating the company’s leaders in terms of
key strategic actions
required for effective leadership. How can these deficiencies be
corrected to satisfy the
expectations of the organization’s key stakeholders?