SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 8
Download to read offline
ISSUE BRIEFING 5 JUNE 2015
TOWARDS A FAIR AND JUST
FISCAL POLICY IN PAKISTAN
‘The impact of economic growth on the lives of people is partly a
matter of income distribution, but it also depends greatly on the use
that is made of the public revenue generated by economic
expansion’.
Drèze and Sen (2013)1
Pakistan does not mobilize sufficient tax revenue required to
finance essential public services, including healthcare and
education, on which the poor rely the most. Consequently, these
services remain inadequate, hampering efforts to reduce poverty
and address extreme inequalities.
Furthermore, the current tax system in Pakistan is characterized as
unfair and inequitable. Two-thirds of tax revenue is mobilized
through indirect taxation which is regressive in nature and unfairly
burdens the poor and middle classes.
1 BACKGROUND
There is an emerging concern that rising income and wealth inequalities
in Pakistan are having social and economic costs including violence,
political instability and social fragmentation.2
There has also been a
realization over time by experts, that fiscal policy in Pakistan has not
been redistributive.3
In 2014, total revenue generation by the public
sector was around 9.8 percent of GDP, which is among the lowest in
emerging economies.4
The low level of domestic resource mobilization has three visible
implications. First, essential public services, including basic education,
health and clean drinking water – services which the poorest sections of
society depend on the most – are under financed. Second, public debt is
2
increasing, caused by the government’s need to borrow both from internal
and external sources to meet essential expenditure.5
This has a knock-on
effect in terms of the higher future tax burden. Thirdly, the government
has had to resort to borrowing from the banking sector which leaves little
for the private sector to borrow.6
A large wealth portfolio, including real estate, remains untaxed, while the
goal of a progressive taxation structure is undermined by current tax
exemptions, high compliance costs and related tax evasion, and an
overall tax framework that allows several agricultural and service sectors
to slip through the tax net. According to the Federal Board of Revenue’s
(FBR) own survey estimates, the tax gap, representing those transactions
not being taxed, stands at 79 percent.7
Provincial governments have also
struggled to increase their tax revenues. They currently only contribute 6.5
percent to the consolidated tax revenues in Pakistan.
Against this backdrop, this paper explains the four basic elements
necessary for a fair and just tax regime, which, if implemented, would
strengthen the domestic revenue base, increase equity and improve
overall development outcomes, as the public sector will have more
resources at its disposal to spend on human and social well-being.
2 BROADENING THE (DIRECT) TAX BASE
The difficulties in expanding the direct tax base partially come from the
exemptions granted to commodity producing sectors and from an
increased reliance on withholding taxes (WHT), which are particularly
burdensome for small enterprises.8
The WHT results in higher prices of
goods and services which are passed on to the end consumers. The
increased cost of compliance also keeps a significant proportion of small
enterprises from entering the formal, documented economy. There are
varying estimates as to the size of the shadow or undocumented economy
in Pakistan;9
however, there is a consensus among experts that this
segment of the economy is on the rise.10
Pakistan currently has less than a million voluntary tax return
filers.11
Sustainable Development Policy Institute’s (SDPI) household
survey conducted in 2013 revealed that 71 percent of eligible taxpayers
did not pay because of a lack of faith that tax revenue will be utilized
correctly and weak administration. The respondents also revealed giving
informal gifts to tax officials for: curtailing intrusion and harassment (40
percent), reducing time towards tax compliance (29 percent), and
preventing arbitrary evaluations and levies (37 percent).12
The absence of robust tax audits, the multiplicity of taxes, the difficulties in
calculating tax liability, a lack of adequate incentives to file taxes and the
poor relationship between taxpayer and payee are key reasons why levels
of tax evasion are so high in Pakistan.13
This also reflects an erosion of
the social contract between citizens and the state. The latter has not been
able to show that tax money is being spent on people’s welfare.
3
The corporate sector uses aggressive tax avoidance strategies; in the
overall tax gap identified by Ahmed and Rider (2013) almost 25 percent
can be attributed to the corporate sector.14
Kemal (2010) notes how
corporate entities show a large part of their incomes coming from
agriculture and other exempted or zero-rated sectors.15
The loopholes in
tax policy allow businesses to claim tax exemptions against activities
which are falsely classified as corporate social responsibility.16
In the future, the use of ICT tools, biometric information and a data
warehouse that links banking information with the NADRA’s database
could help the tax authorities to earn revenue from untapped sources.
Provincial governments also have an opportunity to improve the valuation
of real estate, capital gains, the rental value of property and assets, and
to bring them into an effective tax regime.
Following the enactment of the 18th
Constitutional Amendment, public
service delivery in social sectors is the responsibility of the provincial
governments. Therefore as their revenue authorities begin to demand
statutory taxes, it is important that citizens are informed regarding the
efficiency with which government resources are spent. This may be one
of the ways to restore tax payers’ confidence.
3 REDUCTION IN INDIRECT TAXES
A recent study carried out by the Lahore University of Management
Sciences and Oxfam on inequality in Pakistan indicates that around 60
percent of FBR revenues come from indirect taxes, which are regressive
in nature. The current tax regime effectively increases the disposable
income of the rich, while simultaneously pushing the disposable incomes
of the poor downwards.17
The report also explains that inequalities could be mitigated through: a)
phasing out federal excise duty; b) simplifying and gradually reducing the
rates of general sales tax (GST); and c) further lowering customs duties
and reducing the tariff slabs.18
Tax incidence studies from Pakistan also
suggest that reducing indirect taxation has a pro-welfare impact.19
For
immediate relief to poor and lower-middle-income groups, food and fuel
items widely used by poor groups should be exempted from sales tax,
including cooking oil, bread, milk, vegetables, fruits, tea and sugar.
An ongoing concern is that there are three provincial governments20
which
have enacted the GST on Services Act. Independent studies have pointed
out that as a result of this legislation there is a double taxation on several
services, as the Federal Government has been slow in withdrawing from
its jurisdiction.21
At least two provinces have also imposed their own forms
of excise and regulatory duties. This multiplicity of taxes is further
contributing to the regressivity of the overall tax framework.
The Tax Reforms Commission, established by the federal government in
September 2014, has already noted (in the case of indirect taxes) the
existence of smuggling, fake invoices, under invoicing, illegal
adjustments and delays in tax refunds. These issues are leading to
4
higher transactions costs for formal businesses, which are being passed
on to clients, ultimately leading to a loss of consumer welfare.22
There are case studies from other economies where governments have
bridged the revenue gap arising from a reduction in indirect taxes through
broadening of direct tax base. A key example comes from Turkey which
was able to double its tax-to-GDP ratio between 1995 and 2006, while
also achieving a reduction in share of indirect taxation. In 2002 the
Turkish Government abolished 16 indirect taxes and introduced a special
consumption tax which was levied on items most consumed by higher
income groups. Taxes on wealth, such as property, inheritance and high-
value gifts, were increased. An environmental tax was imposed in order
to finance expenditure in social sectors.
4 EQUAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS BY ALL
SECTORS
Under a fair tax system all sectors pay their due share of taxes according
to their contribution towards national income; however, under the current
system, some economic sectors pay more tax than others. Currently the
industrial sector is taxed disproportionately high in comparison to
agriculture and service sectors. The various exemptions allowed to
agriculture and some other sectors should be revisited. New sub-sectors
of the service industry, such as private educational institutions, IT
establishments and electronic media outlets, should also be considered
for sharing tax burden.
The prevalence of exemptions is one of the contributing factors to the low
tax-to-GDP ratio. And where exemptions and concessions are granted to
certain sectors and organizations, the benefits have not been passed to the
end consumer.23
The overall exemptions in 2013-14 were reported to be
PKR 477 billion, equivalent to two percent of GDP (Figure 1). In 2014, sales
tax exemptions (PKR 211billion) and customs duty exemptions (PKR 131
billion) also increased against the previous year.24
The gradual removal of
exemptions allowed to large-scale operators in the agriculture and livestock
sector could provide an additional PKR 115 billion to the government.
Figure 1: Exemptions from indirect taxes (PKR billions)
Source: Multiple Inequalities and Policies to Mitigate Inequality Traps in Pakistan, Oxfam
and LUMS
25
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
477.1
5
The services sector accounting for over 60 percent of GDP is vastly
underestimated according to the tax gap survey conducted by the FBR.
There has been a growth in new services which can only be brought into
the tax system if a new survey of services establishments is conducted
by both the provincial and federal boards of revenue.
The government may also decree through the Finance Act a requirement
for any future exemption or concession to be comprehensively debated in
parliament or in the relevant standing committee, with the overall aim to
discourage exemptions. Their endorsement should be necessary for
creating new tax exemptions, which themselves should only be enacted
where there is evidence that they will reduce incidence of inequality and
poverty. The standing committees should have the provision to consult
economists and legal experts before an Statutory Regulatory Order
(SRO) is endorsed.
5 TAX ADMINISTRATION REFORMS
Tax policy formulation and tax collection should be made separate. The
responsibility for policy formulation should rest with the parliament (or its
relevant committee). Tax policy should originate from the overall fiscal
policy vision with the aim of creating a fair and just society with a strong
focus on redistribution and pro-poor spending. The tax administration
should be an autonomous body to implement this vision.
The mandate of the tax administration is not supported by strong enough
legislation to establish a social contract between citizens and the state.
There is a need to look into open budget initiatives and citizen oversight
of the tax system as seen in several Commonwealth countries.26
It is recommended that FBR and provincial tax authorities should be
allowed greater autonomy. This should allow the tax entities to have their
own human resource and management structures. There should be no
political intervention in the recruitment, promotion and reward structures
of revenue authorities. These authorities should be helped in developing
functional expertise. This is only possible once these tax departments put
in place medium-term strategic plans and monitoring of key performance
indicators. Provincial tax authorities should now develop better
databases and forecasting capacities to carry out regular assessments of
revenue that may accrue from agriculture, services and real estate.
There is also a need to look into taxes rendering nominal revenues with
high administrative costs.27
Such taxes should be merged with a uniform
rate and gradually phased out. Any lost revenue can be compensated
through progressive increases in direct taxes.
6
6 CONCLUSION
The tax system in Pakistan in its current state is both inefficient and
unfair. The revenue-to-GDP ratio in Pakistan remains unacceptably low.
The redistributive potential of the tax system has not been realized, both
because the tax system overburdens the poor through direct taxes, while
providing privileges to a wealthy few, and because it does not generate
sufficient revenue for public services, such as health, education, safe
drinking water and sanitation. This paper outlined four elements of a just
and fair fiscal policy that would help to make the Pakistani tax system
both more efficient and more equitable: broadening the tax base through
expanding direct taxes; reducing the number of indirect taxes that
primarily affect the poor; redistributing the tax burden more fairly between
various sectors of economy; and implementing a number of tax
administration reforms. When implemented, these changes in the tax
system would help to reverse the trend of growing economic inequality in
Pakistan.
7
NOTES
1
J. Drèze and A. Sen (2013) An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions, London:
Allen Lane.
2
SDPI (2013) ‘Managing Intra-country Growth Disparities in South Asia’, 6
th
South Asia
Economic Summit - Theme Paper, Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka
3
S. Ahmed, V. Ahmed and C. O. Donoghue (2011) ‘Reforming indirect taxation in
Pakistan: A macro-micro analysis’, Journal of Tax Research 9(2), pp. 153-74.
4
Government of Pakistan (2014) Economic Survey of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance
5
IMF’s Seventh Review document reveals that the debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 62
percent. Forty percent of total federal spending goes for repayment of debt and
interest payments (followed by defence at 22 percent and the Public Sector
Development Programme at 17 percent).
6
SBP (2013) ‘State Bank of Pakistan – Annual Report 2012-13’, Karachi.
7
For details: FBR Chairman’s interview, Business Recorder, 7 June 2011.
8
WHT is the amount of an employee's pay (or expenditure) withheld by the employer (or
supplier) and sent directly to the revenue authority as partial payment of income tax.
In 2013 the growth of revenue from WHT was 3.7 percent.
9
S. Ahmed, V. Ahmed and C. O. Donoghue (2011) op. cit.
10
S.A. Khan and V. Ahmed (2014) ‘Peaceful Economies: Assessing the Role of the
Private Sector in Conflict Prevention in Pakistan’, Stability: International Journal of
Security & Development 3(1): 24, pp. 1-9.
11
A. Waris (2013) ‘Growing tax evasion a serious threat: Only 1.2m Pakistanis file tax
returns, which is even less than 1 percent’, The Daily times [Online] 29th December,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/business/29-Dec-2013/growing-tax-evasion-a-serious-
threat-only-1-2m-pakistanis-file-tax-returns-which-is-even-less
12
V. Ahmed and M. Adnan (2014) ‘Energy and Tax Reforms: Household Analysis from
Pakistan’, Working Paper 147, Sustainable Development Policy Institute,
http://ow.ly/NQXMd
13
M. M. Mughal and M. Akram (2012) ‘Reasons of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion:
Reflections from Pakistan’, Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 4(4), pp. 217-22
V. Ahmed and C. O. Donoghue (2009) ‘Redistributive Effects of Personal Income
Taxation in Pakistan’, Pakistan Economic and Social Review 47(1), pp. 1-17
14
R. A. Ahmed and M. Rider (2013) ‘Using Microdata to Estimate Pakistan’s Tax Gap by
Type of Tax’, Public Finance Review May 2013 Vol. 41(3), pp. 334-59
15
M.A. Kemal (2010) ‘Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in Pakistan: A Critical
Evaluation’, PIDE Research Report 184.
16
K. Majid et al. (2014) ‘Analysis of the Relationship between CSR and Tax Avoidance:
An Evidence from Pakistan’, The International Journal of Business & Management,
Vol. 2(7)
17
A.A. Burki, R. Memon and K. Mir (2015) ‘Multiple Inequalities and Policies to Mitigate
Inequality Traps in Pakistan’, Oxfam and LUMS, http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/multiple-inequalities-and-policies-to-mitigate-
inequality-traps-in-pakistan-346432
18
See also SDPI (2014) ‘Energy and Tax Reforms: Household level analysis from
Pakistan’, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.
19
V. Ahmed and C.O.Donoghue (2010) ‘Tariff Reduction in a Small Open Economy’,
Seoul Journal of Economics 23(2010)
20
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh.
21
SDPI (2015) ‘A Green Budget for Sustainable Development and Jobs – Pre-Budget
Proposals 2015-16’, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.
22
Consumer welfare (surplus) in this case implies the reduced different between: a) the
price which consumer is willing to pay and b) the price actually paid by the consumer.
23
This also implies that the structure of exemptions is not progressive.
24
Youth Parliament Pakistan (2015) ‘Tax reforms in Pakistan’, Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), Islamabad
25
A.A. Burki, R. Memon and K. Mir (2015) op. cit.
26
For example, ‘Open Government Partnership’ in UK, http://ow.ly/Nzb9K
27
For example, cess on crop sectors, excises on hotels and cinemas.
8
© Oxfam International and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute June 2015
This paper was written by Dr. Vaqar Ahmed (SDPI), Mustafa Talpur (Oxfam) and Sadaf
Liaquat (SDPI). Oxfam acknowledges the assistance of Daria Ukhova and Jonathan
Mazilah in its production. It is part of a series of papers written to inform public debate on
development and humanitarian policy issues.
For further information on the issues raised in this paper please e-mail
advocacy@oxfaminternational.org
This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of
advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is
acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with
them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-
use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured
and a fee may be charged. E-mail policyandpractice@oxfam.org.uk.
The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.
Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78077-877-8 in June
2015. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.
Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in more
than 90 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a future free from the
injustice of poverty. Please write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit
www.oxfam.org.
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) is an independent, public interest think
tank that is not only a knowledge generator but also a knowledge disseminator. It
provides research based policy advice to legislators, policy makers, students, journalists,
trade unions, farmers, public, private and voluntary organizations, etc.

More Related Content

What's hot

National program for countering shadow economy in Serbia
National program for countering shadow economy in SerbiaNational program for countering shadow economy in Serbia
National program for countering shadow economy in SerbiaNALED Serbia
 
Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...
Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...
Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...Alexander Decker
 
Analysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeria
Analysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeriaAnalysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeria
Analysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeriaAlexander Decker
 
Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries
 Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries
Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing CountriesDr Lendy Spires
 
Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...
Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...
Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...Dr Lendy Spires
 
Report on tax evasion in bangladesh
Report on tax evasion in bangladeshReport on tax evasion in bangladesh
Report on tax evasion in bangladeshAbid Hasan
 
Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh
Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh
Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh Abid Hasan
 
Engendering a healthy_tax_culture
Engendering a healthy_tax_cultureEngendering a healthy_tax_culture
Engendering a healthy_tax_cultureTunde Fowler
 
IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIA
IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIAIMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIA
IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIAIyanda Abdulwasiu
 
Klibel5 acc 32_
Klibel5 acc 32_Klibel5 acc 32_
Klibel5 acc 32_KLIBEL
 
Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...
Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...
Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...IOSR Journals
 
Revised Makati Revenue Code ultra vires
Revised Makati Revenue Code ultra viresRevised Makati Revenue Code ultra vires
Revised Makati Revenue Code ultra viresMark Darryl Caniban
 
General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...
General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...
General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...ijtsrd
 
Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...
Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...
Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...ALTAX Consulting
 
Effect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra State
Effect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra StateEffect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra State
Effect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra Stateijtsrd
 
losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14
losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14
losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14Christian Hallum
 

What's hot (20)

National program for countering shadow economy in Serbia
National program for countering shadow economy in SerbiaNational program for countering shadow economy in Serbia
National program for countering shadow economy in Serbia
 
Tax stamps role in implementing ideal state excise policy
Tax stamps role in implementing ideal state excise policyTax stamps role in implementing ideal state excise policy
Tax stamps role in implementing ideal state excise policy
 
Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...
Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...
Determinants of tax compliance behavior in ethiopia the case of bahir dar cit...
 
Analysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeria
Analysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeriaAnalysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeria
Analysis of tax morale and tax compliance in nigeria
 
Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries
 Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries
Registering for Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries
 
Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...
Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...
Tax Justice: The Domestic Perspective - A Synthesis of Studies of the Tax Sys...
 
Report on tax evasion in bangladesh
Report on tax evasion in bangladeshReport on tax evasion in bangladesh
Report on tax evasion in bangladesh
 
Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh
Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh
Report on tax Evasion in Bangladesh
 
VAT Compliance Challenges in Ghana and How to Address Them
VAT Compliance Challenges in Ghana and How to Address ThemVAT Compliance Challenges in Ghana and How to Address Them
VAT Compliance Challenges in Ghana and How to Address Them
 
Engendering a healthy_tax_culture
Engendering a healthy_tax_cultureEngendering a healthy_tax_culture
Engendering a healthy_tax_culture
 
IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIA
IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIAIMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIA
IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON REVENUE GENERATION IN N IGERIA
 
Klibel5 acc 32_
Klibel5 acc 32_Klibel5 acc 32_
Klibel5 acc 32_
 
Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...
Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...
Tax Morale and Its Effect on Taxpayers’ Compliance to Tax Policies of the Nig...
 
Revised Makati Revenue Code ultra vires
Revised Makati Revenue Code ultra viresRevised Makati Revenue Code ultra vires
Revised Makati Revenue Code ultra vires
 
General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...
General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...
General Perception of Self Employed Nigerian on Tax Aviodance and Evasion A S...
 
Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...
Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...
Albania Taxation, 2014: Growing tax compliance for ensuring government’s publ...
 
Effect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra State
Effect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra StateEffect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra State
Effect of E Taxation on Revenue Generation in Anambra State
 
Examining the Effect of Tax Authority Regulation and Administration on Volunt...
Examining the Effect of Tax Authority Regulation and Administration on Volunt...Examining the Effect of Tax Authority Regulation and Administration on Volunt...
Examining the Effect of Tax Authority Regulation and Administration on Volunt...
 
losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14
losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14
losing_out_-_sierra_leone_report_tax_incentives_08_apr_14
 
Local government revenue option uganda
Local government revenue option ugandaLocal government revenue option uganda
Local government revenue option uganda
 

Similar to Fair & Just Fiscal Policy

Tax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdf
Tax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdfTax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdf
Tax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdfM S Siddiqui
 
Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.
Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.
Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.Alexander Decker
 
Ghana women-informal-sector
Ghana women-informal-sectorGhana women-informal-sector
Ghana women-informal-sectorDr Lendy Spires
 
Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -
Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -
Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -Chidi Izuwah
 
TAX ANALYSIS (CASE OF RWANDA).pptx
TAX ANALYSIS (CASE  OF RWANDA).pptxTAX ANALYSIS (CASE  OF RWANDA).pptx
TAX ANALYSIS (CASE OF RWANDA).pptxSadamuFrancois
 
Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...
Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...
Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...IJAEMSJORNAL
 
Deterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeria
Deterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeriaDeterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeria
Deterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeriaAlexander Decker
 
FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...
FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...
FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...paperpublications3
 
The Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in Nigeria
The Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in NigeriaThe Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in Nigeria
The Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in Nigeriaijtsrd
 
A PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMS
A PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMSA PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMS
A PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMSDebkumar Ganguly
 
Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...
Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...
Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...SHILLIE PETER (DBA Fellow)
 

Similar to Fair & Just Fiscal Policy (20)

Political Economy of Taxation in Pakistan
Political Economy of Taxation in PakistanPolitical Economy of Taxation in Pakistan
Political Economy of Taxation in Pakistan
 
Taxation Reforms in Pakistan
Taxation Reforms in PakistanTaxation Reforms in Pakistan
Taxation Reforms in Pakistan
 
Tax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdf
Tax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdfTax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdf
Tax justice from 100 years old income tax law.pdf
 
Private Enterprise in Pakistan
Private Enterprise in Pakistan Private Enterprise in Pakistan
Private Enterprise in Pakistan
 
Provincial Tax Reforms: Case of Punjab
Provincial Tax Reforms: Case of PunjabProvincial Tax Reforms: Case of Punjab
Provincial Tax Reforms: Case of Punjab
 
Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.
Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.
Effect of vat and tax on economy an analysis in the context of bangladesh.
 
Ghana women-informal-sector
Ghana women-informal-sectorGhana women-informal-sector
Ghana women-informal-sector
 
Presentation 02-12-2021.pptx
Presentation 02-12-2021.pptxPresentation 02-12-2021.pptx
Presentation 02-12-2021.pptx
 
Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -
Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -
Deloitte the nigerian tax system and vision 2020 -
 
Provincial Tax Reforms: Case of Sindh
Provincial Tax Reforms: Case of SindhProvincial Tax Reforms: Case of Sindh
Provincial Tax Reforms: Case of Sindh
 
Property Taxation Case Study - ICTD Learning Portal
Property Taxation Case Study - ICTD Learning PortalProperty Taxation Case Study - ICTD Learning Portal
Property Taxation Case Study - ICTD Learning Portal
 
TAX ANALYSIS (CASE OF RWANDA).pptx
TAX ANALYSIS (CASE  OF RWANDA).pptxTAX ANALYSIS (CASE  OF RWANDA).pptx
TAX ANALYSIS (CASE OF RWANDA).pptx
 
Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...
Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...
Effect of Republic Act 10963 “Tax reform for Acceleration and inclusion (Trai...
 
Deterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeria
Deterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeriaDeterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeria
Deterrent tax measures and tax compliance in nigeria
 
FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...
FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...
FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KITALE...
 
The Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in Nigeria
The Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in NigeriaThe Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in Nigeria
The Relationship between Tax Avoidance Strategies and Economic Growth in Nigeria
 
Accounting for Poverty
Accounting for PovertyAccounting for Poverty
Accounting for Poverty
 
ch24.ppt
ch24.pptch24.ppt
ch24.ppt
 
A PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMS
A PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMSA PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMS
A PROJECT REPORT ON TAX REFORMS
 
Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...
Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...
Mobilising domestic resources for sustainable development in cameroon is the ...
 

More from Sustainable Development Policy Institute

Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...
Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...
Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...Sustainable Development Policy Institute
 

More from Sustainable Development Policy Institute (20)

Digital Trade Integration in Central Asia
Digital Trade Integration in Central AsiaDigital Trade Integration in Central Asia
Digital Trade Integration in Central Asia
 
Reducing Industrially Produced Trans Fatty Acids in Pakistan
Reducing Industrially Produced Trans Fatty Acids in PakistanReducing Industrially Produced Trans Fatty Acids in Pakistan
Reducing Industrially Produced Trans Fatty Acids in Pakistan
 
Institutions, Regulations, Trade, and Industry
Institutions, Regulations, Trade, and IndustryInstitutions, Regulations, Trade, and Industry
Institutions, Regulations, Trade, and Industry
 
Framework for Economic Growth
Framework for Economic GrowthFramework for Economic Growth
Framework for Economic Growth
 
Population, Economic Growth & Employment
Population, Economic Growth & EmploymentPopulation, Economic Growth & Employment
Population, Economic Growth & Employment
 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Policy
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban PolicyKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Policy
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Policy
 
Fiscal Policy Response to COVID-19 Pandemic in Pakistan
Fiscal Policy Response to COVID-19 Pandemic in PakistanFiscal Policy Response to COVID-19 Pandemic in Pakistan
Fiscal Policy Response to COVID-19 Pandemic in Pakistan
 
Do export schemes deliver for small businesses?
Do export schemes deliver for small businesses? Do export schemes deliver for small businesses?
Do export schemes deliver for small businesses?
 
On knowledge systems & evidence use
On knowledge systems & evidence useOn knowledge systems & evidence use
On knowledge systems & evidence use
 
Does Tariff Rationalization Deliver for Small firms?
Does Tariff Rationalization Deliver for Small firms?Does Tariff Rationalization Deliver for Small firms?
Does Tariff Rationalization Deliver for Small firms?
 
Pakistan Digital Trade
Pakistan Digital TradePakistan Digital Trade
Pakistan Digital Trade
 
Evidence & Knowledge Systems in International Perspective
Evidence & Knowledge Systems in International PerspectiveEvidence & Knowledge Systems in International Perspective
Evidence & Knowledge Systems in International Perspective
 
Digital Trade Integration: Role of South-South and Triangular Cooperation
Digital Trade Integration: Role of South-South and Triangular CooperationDigital Trade Integration: Role of South-South and Triangular Cooperation
Digital Trade Integration: Role of South-South and Triangular Cooperation
 
Strengthening Food Security in Pakistan During the Covid-19 Pandemic
Strengthening Food Security in Pakistan During the Covid-19 PandemicStrengthening Food Security in Pakistan During the Covid-19 Pandemic
Strengthening Food Security in Pakistan During the Covid-19 Pandemic
 
Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System
Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International SystemGlobal Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System
Global Pakistan: Pakistan's Role in the International System
 
Improving the fiscal policy response to Covid-19 in Pakistan
Improving the fiscal policy response to Covid-19 in PakistanImproving the fiscal policy response to Covid-19 in Pakistan
Improving the fiscal policy response to Covid-19 in Pakistan
 
Supporting organisational change through an evidence diagnostic
Supporting organisational change through an evidence diagnostic Supporting organisational change through an evidence diagnostic
Supporting organisational change through an evidence diagnostic
 
Brokering Evidence for Development Impact
Brokering Evidence for Development ImpactBrokering Evidence for Development Impact
Brokering Evidence for Development Impact
 
REFORM OF PENSIONS: LESSONS FROM PAKISTAN AND BEYOND
REFORM OF PENSIONS: LESSONS FROM PAKISTAN AND BEYOND REFORM OF PENSIONS: LESSONS FROM PAKISTAN AND BEYOND
REFORM OF PENSIONS: LESSONS FROM PAKISTAN AND BEYOND
 
Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...
Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...
Marginalization of Researchers in the Global South in Economic-Development Co...
 

Recently uploaded

Q3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast Slides
Q3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast SlidesQ3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast Slides
Q3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast SlidesMarketing847413
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfGale Pooley
 
OAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptx
OAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptxOAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptx
OAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptxhiddenlevers
 
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111Sapana Sha
 
Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...
Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...
Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...Pooja Nehwal
 
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service AizawlVip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawlmakika9823
 
Interimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance Company
Interimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance CompanyInterimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance Company
Interimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance CompanyTyöeläkeyhtiö Elo
 
Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024
Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024
Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024Bladex
 
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur EscortsHigh Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escortsranjana rawat
 
VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...
VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...
VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...Suhani Kapoor
 
Shrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdf
Shrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdfShrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdf
Shrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdfvikashdidwania1
 
Chapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th edition
Chapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th editionChapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th edition
Chapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th editionMuhammadHusnain82237
 
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikHigh Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikCall Girls in Nagpur High Profile
 
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Delhi Call girls
 
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of MarketingQuarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of MarketingMaristelaRamos12
 
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130 Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130  Available With RoomVIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130  Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130 Available With Roomdivyansh0kumar0
 
(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Serviceranjana rawat
 
call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️9953056974 Low Rate Call Girls In Saket, Delhi NCR
 
New dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business Review
New dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business ReviewNew dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business Review
New dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business ReviewAntonis Zairis
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Q3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast Slides
Q3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast SlidesQ3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast Slides
Q3 2024 Earnings Conference Call and Webcast Slides
 
Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024
Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024
Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
 
OAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptx
OAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptxOAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptx
OAT_RI_Ep19 WeighingTheRisks_Apr24_TheYellowMetal.pptx
 
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
 
Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...
Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...
Dharavi Russian callg Girls, { 09892124323 } || Call Girl In Mumbai ...
 
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service AizawlVip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
 
Interimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance Company
Interimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance CompanyInterimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance Company
Interimreport1 January–31 March2024 Elo Mutual Pension Insurance Company
 
Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024
Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024
Bladex Earnings Call Presentation 1Q2024
 
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur EscortsHigh Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
 
VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...
VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...
VIP Call Girls LB Nagar ( Hyderabad ) Phone 8250192130 | ₹5k To 25k With Room...
 
Shrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdf
Shrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdfShrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdf
Shrambal_Distributors_Newsletter_Apr-2024 (1).pdf
 
Chapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th edition
Chapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th editionChapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th edition
Chapter 2.ppt of macroeconomics by mankiw 9th edition
 
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikHigh Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
 
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
 
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of MarketingQuarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
 
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130 Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130  Available With RoomVIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130  Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Jodhpur Park 👉 8250192130 Available With Room
 
(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(TANVI) Call Girls Nanded City ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
 
call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
 
New dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business Review
New dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business ReviewNew dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business Review
New dynamic economic model with a digital footprint | European Business Review
 

Fair & Just Fiscal Policy

  • 1. ISSUE BRIEFING 5 JUNE 2015 TOWARDS A FAIR AND JUST FISCAL POLICY IN PAKISTAN ‘The impact of economic growth on the lives of people is partly a matter of income distribution, but it also depends greatly on the use that is made of the public revenue generated by economic expansion’. Drèze and Sen (2013)1 Pakistan does not mobilize sufficient tax revenue required to finance essential public services, including healthcare and education, on which the poor rely the most. Consequently, these services remain inadequate, hampering efforts to reduce poverty and address extreme inequalities. Furthermore, the current tax system in Pakistan is characterized as unfair and inequitable. Two-thirds of tax revenue is mobilized through indirect taxation which is regressive in nature and unfairly burdens the poor and middle classes. 1 BACKGROUND There is an emerging concern that rising income and wealth inequalities in Pakistan are having social and economic costs including violence, political instability and social fragmentation.2 There has also been a realization over time by experts, that fiscal policy in Pakistan has not been redistributive.3 In 2014, total revenue generation by the public sector was around 9.8 percent of GDP, which is among the lowest in emerging economies.4 The low level of domestic resource mobilization has three visible implications. First, essential public services, including basic education, health and clean drinking water – services which the poorest sections of society depend on the most – are under financed. Second, public debt is
  • 2. 2 increasing, caused by the government’s need to borrow both from internal and external sources to meet essential expenditure.5 This has a knock-on effect in terms of the higher future tax burden. Thirdly, the government has had to resort to borrowing from the banking sector which leaves little for the private sector to borrow.6 A large wealth portfolio, including real estate, remains untaxed, while the goal of a progressive taxation structure is undermined by current tax exemptions, high compliance costs and related tax evasion, and an overall tax framework that allows several agricultural and service sectors to slip through the tax net. According to the Federal Board of Revenue’s (FBR) own survey estimates, the tax gap, representing those transactions not being taxed, stands at 79 percent.7 Provincial governments have also struggled to increase their tax revenues. They currently only contribute 6.5 percent to the consolidated tax revenues in Pakistan. Against this backdrop, this paper explains the four basic elements necessary for a fair and just tax regime, which, if implemented, would strengthen the domestic revenue base, increase equity and improve overall development outcomes, as the public sector will have more resources at its disposal to spend on human and social well-being. 2 BROADENING THE (DIRECT) TAX BASE The difficulties in expanding the direct tax base partially come from the exemptions granted to commodity producing sectors and from an increased reliance on withholding taxes (WHT), which are particularly burdensome for small enterprises.8 The WHT results in higher prices of goods and services which are passed on to the end consumers. The increased cost of compliance also keeps a significant proportion of small enterprises from entering the formal, documented economy. There are varying estimates as to the size of the shadow or undocumented economy in Pakistan;9 however, there is a consensus among experts that this segment of the economy is on the rise.10 Pakistan currently has less than a million voluntary tax return filers.11 Sustainable Development Policy Institute’s (SDPI) household survey conducted in 2013 revealed that 71 percent of eligible taxpayers did not pay because of a lack of faith that tax revenue will be utilized correctly and weak administration. The respondents also revealed giving informal gifts to tax officials for: curtailing intrusion and harassment (40 percent), reducing time towards tax compliance (29 percent), and preventing arbitrary evaluations and levies (37 percent).12 The absence of robust tax audits, the multiplicity of taxes, the difficulties in calculating tax liability, a lack of adequate incentives to file taxes and the poor relationship between taxpayer and payee are key reasons why levels of tax evasion are so high in Pakistan.13 This also reflects an erosion of the social contract between citizens and the state. The latter has not been able to show that tax money is being spent on people’s welfare.
  • 3. 3 The corporate sector uses aggressive tax avoidance strategies; in the overall tax gap identified by Ahmed and Rider (2013) almost 25 percent can be attributed to the corporate sector.14 Kemal (2010) notes how corporate entities show a large part of their incomes coming from agriculture and other exempted or zero-rated sectors.15 The loopholes in tax policy allow businesses to claim tax exemptions against activities which are falsely classified as corporate social responsibility.16 In the future, the use of ICT tools, biometric information and a data warehouse that links banking information with the NADRA’s database could help the tax authorities to earn revenue from untapped sources. Provincial governments also have an opportunity to improve the valuation of real estate, capital gains, the rental value of property and assets, and to bring them into an effective tax regime. Following the enactment of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, public service delivery in social sectors is the responsibility of the provincial governments. Therefore as their revenue authorities begin to demand statutory taxes, it is important that citizens are informed regarding the efficiency with which government resources are spent. This may be one of the ways to restore tax payers’ confidence. 3 REDUCTION IN INDIRECT TAXES A recent study carried out by the Lahore University of Management Sciences and Oxfam on inequality in Pakistan indicates that around 60 percent of FBR revenues come from indirect taxes, which are regressive in nature. The current tax regime effectively increases the disposable income of the rich, while simultaneously pushing the disposable incomes of the poor downwards.17 The report also explains that inequalities could be mitigated through: a) phasing out federal excise duty; b) simplifying and gradually reducing the rates of general sales tax (GST); and c) further lowering customs duties and reducing the tariff slabs.18 Tax incidence studies from Pakistan also suggest that reducing indirect taxation has a pro-welfare impact.19 For immediate relief to poor and lower-middle-income groups, food and fuel items widely used by poor groups should be exempted from sales tax, including cooking oil, bread, milk, vegetables, fruits, tea and sugar. An ongoing concern is that there are three provincial governments20 which have enacted the GST on Services Act. Independent studies have pointed out that as a result of this legislation there is a double taxation on several services, as the Federal Government has been slow in withdrawing from its jurisdiction.21 At least two provinces have also imposed their own forms of excise and regulatory duties. This multiplicity of taxes is further contributing to the regressivity of the overall tax framework. The Tax Reforms Commission, established by the federal government in September 2014, has already noted (in the case of indirect taxes) the existence of smuggling, fake invoices, under invoicing, illegal adjustments and delays in tax refunds. These issues are leading to
  • 4. 4 higher transactions costs for formal businesses, which are being passed on to clients, ultimately leading to a loss of consumer welfare.22 There are case studies from other economies where governments have bridged the revenue gap arising from a reduction in indirect taxes through broadening of direct tax base. A key example comes from Turkey which was able to double its tax-to-GDP ratio between 1995 and 2006, while also achieving a reduction in share of indirect taxation. In 2002 the Turkish Government abolished 16 indirect taxes and introduced a special consumption tax which was levied on items most consumed by higher income groups. Taxes on wealth, such as property, inheritance and high- value gifts, were increased. An environmental tax was imposed in order to finance expenditure in social sectors. 4 EQUAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS BY ALL SECTORS Under a fair tax system all sectors pay their due share of taxes according to their contribution towards national income; however, under the current system, some economic sectors pay more tax than others. Currently the industrial sector is taxed disproportionately high in comparison to agriculture and service sectors. The various exemptions allowed to agriculture and some other sectors should be revisited. New sub-sectors of the service industry, such as private educational institutions, IT establishments and electronic media outlets, should also be considered for sharing tax burden. The prevalence of exemptions is one of the contributing factors to the low tax-to-GDP ratio. And where exemptions and concessions are granted to certain sectors and organizations, the benefits have not been passed to the end consumer.23 The overall exemptions in 2013-14 were reported to be PKR 477 billion, equivalent to two percent of GDP (Figure 1). In 2014, sales tax exemptions (PKR 211billion) and customs duty exemptions (PKR 131 billion) also increased against the previous year.24 The gradual removal of exemptions allowed to large-scale operators in the agriculture and livestock sector could provide an additional PKR 115 billion to the government. Figure 1: Exemptions from indirect taxes (PKR billions) Source: Multiple Inequalities and Policies to Mitigate Inequality Traps in Pakistan, Oxfam and LUMS 25 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 477.1
  • 5. 5 The services sector accounting for over 60 percent of GDP is vastly underestimated according to the tax gap survey conducted by the FBR. There has been a growth in new services which can only be brought into the tax system if a new survey of services establishments is conducted by both the provincial and federal boards of revenue. The government may also decree through the Finance Act a requirement for any future exemption or concession to be comprehensively debated in parliament or in the relevant standing committee, with the overall aim to discourage exemptions. Their endorsement should be necessary for creating new tax exemptions, which themselves should only be enacted where there is evidence that they will reduce incidence of inequality and poverty. The standing committees should have the provision to consult economists and legal experts before an Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) is endorsed. 5 TAX ADMINISTRATION REFORMS Tax policy formulation and tax collection should be made separate. The responsibility for policy formulation should rest with the parliament (or its relevant committee). Tax policy should originate from the overall fiscal policy vision with the aim of creating a fair and just society with a strong focus on redistribution and pro-poor spending. The tax administration should be an autonomous body to implement this vision. The mandate of the tax administration is not supported by strong enough legislation to establish a social contract between citizens and the state. There is a need to look into open budget initiatives and citizen oversight of the tax system as seen in several Commonwealth countries.26 It is recommended that FBR and provincial tax authorities should be allowed greater autonomy. This should allow the tax entities to have their own human resource and management structures. There should be no political intervention in the recruitment, promotion and reward structures of revenue authorities. These authorities should be helped in developing functional expertise. This is only possible once these tax departments put in place medium-term strategic plans and monitoring of key performance indicators. Provincial tax authorities should now develop better databases and forecasting capacities to carry out regular assessments of revenue that may accrue from agriculture, services and real estate. There is also a need to look into taxes rendering nominal revenues with high administrative costs.27 Such taxes should be merged with a uniform rate and gradually phased out. Any lost revenue can be compensated through progressive increases in direct taxes.
  • 6. 6 6 CONCLUSION The tax system in Pakistan in its current state is both inefficient and unfair. The revenue-to-GDP ratio in Pakistan remains unacceptably low. The redistributive potential of the tax system has not been realized, both because the tax system overburdens the poor through direct taxes, while providing privileges to a wealthy few, and because it does not generate sufficient revenue for public services, such as health, education, safe drinking water and sanitation. This paper outlined four elements of a just and fair fiscal policy that would help to make the Pakistani tax system both more efficient and more equitable: broadening the tax base through expanding direct taxes; reducing the number of indirect taxes that primarily affect the poor; redistributing the tax burden more fairly between various sectors of economy; and implementing a number of tax administration reforms. When implemented, these changes in the tax system would help to reverse the trend of growing economic inequality in Pakistan.
  • 7. 7 NOTES 1 J. Drèze and A. Sen (2013) An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions, London: Allen Lane. 2 SDPI (2013) ‘Managing Intra-country Growth Disparities in South Asia’, 6 th South Asia Economic Summit - Theme Paper, Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka 3 S. Ahmed, V. Ahmed and C. O. Donoghue (2011) ‘Reforming indirect taxation in Pakistan: A macro-micro analysis’, Journal of Tax Research 9(2), pp. 153-74. 4 Government of Pakistan (2014) Economic Survey of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance 5 IMF’s Seventh Review document reveals that the debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 62 percent. Forty percent of total federal spending goes for repayment of debt and interest payments (followed by defence at 22 percent and the Public Sector Development Programme at 17 percent). 6 SBP (2013) ‘State Bank of Pakistan – Annual Report 2012-13’, Karachi. 7 For details: FBR Chairman’s interview, Business Recorder, 7 June 2011. 8 WHT is the amount of an employee's pay (or expenditure) withheld by the employer (or supplier) and sent directly to the revenue authority as partial payment of income tax. In 2013 the growth of revenue from WHT was 3.7 percent. 9 S. Ahmed, V. Ahmed and C. O. Donoghue (2011) op. cit. 10 S.A. Khan and V. Ahmed (2014) ‘Peaceful Economies: Assessing the Role of the Private Sector in Conflict Prevention in Pakistan’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 3(1): 24, pp. 1-9. 11 A. Waris (2013) ‘Growing tax evasion a serious threat: Only 1.2m Pakistanis file tax returns, which is even less than 1 percent’, The Daily times [Online] 29th December, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/business/29-Dec-2013/growing-tax-evasion-a-serious- threat-only-1-2m-pakistanis-file-tax-returns-which-is-even-less 12 V. Ahmed and M. Adnan (2014) ‘Energy and Tax Reforms: Household Analysis from Pakistan’, Working Paper 147, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, http://ow.ly/NQXMd 13 M. M. Mughal and M. Akram (2012) ‘Reasons of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion: Reflections from Pakistan’, Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 4(4), pp. 217-22 V. Ahmed and C. O. Donoghue (2009) ‘Redistributive Effects of Personal Income Taxation in Pakistan’, Pakistan Economic and Social Review 47(1), pp. 1-17 14 R. A. Ahmed and M. Rider (2013) ‘Using Microdata to Estimate Pakistan’s Tax Gap by Type of Tax’, Public Finance Review May 2013 Vol. 41(3), pp. 334-59 15 M.A. Kemal (2010) ‘Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in Pakistan: A Critical Evaluation’, PIDE Research Report 184. 16 K. Majid et al. (2014) ‘Analysis of the Relationship between CSR and Tax Avoidance: An Evidence from Pakistan’, The International Journal of Business & Management, Vol. 2(7) 17 A.A. Burki, R. Memon and K. Mir (2015) ‘Multiple Inequalities and Policies to Mitigate Inequality Traps in Pakistan’, Oxfam and LUMS, http://policy- practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/multiple-inequalities-and-policies-to-mitigate- inequality-traps-in-pakistan-346432 18 See also SDPI (2014) ‘Energy and Tax Reforms: Household level analysis from Pakistan’, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad. 19 V. Ahmed and C.O.Donoghue (2010) ‘Tariff Reduction in a Small Open Economy’, Seoul Journal of Economics 23(2010) 20 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh. 21 SDPI (2015) ‘A Green Budget for Sustainable Development and Jobs – Pre-Budget Proposals 2015-16’, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad. 22 Consumer welfare (surplus) in this case implies the reduced different between: a) the price which consumer is willing to pay and b) the price actually paid by the consumer. 23 This also implies that the structure of exemptions is not progressive. 24 Youth Parliament Pakistan (2015) ‘Tax reforms in Pakistan’, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), Islamabad 25 A.A. Burki, R. Memon and K. Mir (2015) op. cit. 26 For example, ‘Open Government Partnership’ in UK, http://ow.ly/Nzb9K 27 For example, cess on crop sectors, excises on hotels and cinemas.
  • 8. 8 © Oxfam International and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute June 2015 This paper was written by Dr. Vaqar Ahmed (SDPI), Mustafa Talpur (Oxfam) and Sadaf Liaquat (SDPI). Oxfam acknowledges the assistance of Daria Ukhova and Jonathan Mazilah in its production. It is part of a series of papers written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues. For further information on the issues raised in this paper please e-mail advocacy@oxfaminternational.org This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re- use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail policyandpractice@oxfam.org.uk. The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press. Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78077-877-8 in June 2015. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK. Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in more than 90 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty. Please write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) is an independent, public interest think tank that is not only a knowledge generator but also a knowledge disseminator. It provides research based policy advice to legislators, policy makers, students, journalists, trade unions, farmers, public, private and voluntary organizations, etc.