Running head: EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SERVICES 1 EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SERVICES 7 Evolution of Human Services Name Professor Course Date Week 1 - Learning Activity Evolution of Human Services Introduction Human service is one of the fields that has continued to evolve over the past ages. This evolution is one of the reasons why policymakers have difficulty dealing with human services (Zins, 2001). To redesign human services to fit the social and academic realms, there is a need to look and understand the history of human services. By looking at the past of human services from the early 11th century, we shall analyze the key advancements that have shaped the field up to the modern-day. Discussion 11th Century Almshouse One of the ancient human services from the 11th century is the almshouse. An almshouse or poorhouses are places that are targeted towards helping the poor people. A poorhouse, also known as a workhouse, is aimed at helping people from poor backgrounds that for one reason or another have been unable to pay their rent or have been rejected by their families. Such target groups include widows, widowers, the elderly, and orphans. The origin of poor houses extends from religious groups. Church systems often adopted the poor in the society who could not help themselves. This was later extended to the local authorities and other local officials. 16th Century By the 16th century, the church and other social institutions were managing human services. However, their provision of services was messy and disorganized. The English government, on the other hand, was repressive and punitive in handling matters of poverty and vagrancy (Kunze, 1971). To sort this issue, the first poor law was set in 1536. This law was further supported in 1547, through taxes that were levied to specifically help the poor in the community. These taxes were further aided in 1576 when the government of England set the rule that the local authorities should provide aid to the poor by the provision of raw materials to aid them in getting work done. 17th Century The 17th century saw the introduction of the Elizabethan Poor Law. The law was introduced in 1601. The law set a requirement for parishes. The parishes had to select certain overseers for the poor. A minimum of two overseers was required for each parish and the main role of the overseer was to set and collect taxes to help the poor. The tax was collected from the landowners. After collection of the taxes, the overseer was responsible for the equitable distribution of food and money to the poor in the community. The overseer was not paid a salary. 18th Century In the 18th century, most of Europe was emerging from the Renaissance period. This is a period that saw England rise from a slumber in various aspects including academics. During this period, there was the advancement of technology and psychology. One particular physician, Philippe Pinel, was instrumental in the development of humane ps.

1. Running head: EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SERVICES
1
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SERVICES
7
Evolution of Human Services
Name
Professor
Course
Date
Week 1 - Learning Activity
Evolution of Human Services
Introduction
Human service is one of the fields that has continued to evolve
over the past ages. This evolution is one of the reasons why

2. policymakers have difficulty dealing with human services (Zins,
2001). To redesign human services to fit the social and
academic realms, there is a need to look and understand the
history of human services. By looking at the past of human
services from the early 11th century, we shall analyze the key
advancements that have shaped the field up to the modern-day.
Discussion
11th Century Almshouse
One of the ancient human services from the 11th century is the
almshouse. An almshouse or poorhouses are places that are
targeted towards helping the poor people. A poorhouse, also
known as a workhouse, is aimed at helping people from poor
backgrounds that for one reason or another have been unable to
pay their rent or have been rejected by their families. Such
target groups include widows, widowers, the elderly, and
orphans. The origin of poor houses extends from religious
groups. Church systems often adopted the poor in the society
who could not help themselves. This was later extended to the
local authorities and other local officials.
16th Century
By the 16th century, the church and other social institutions
were managing human services. However, their provision of
services was messy and disorganized. The English government,
on the other hand, was repressive and punitive in handling
matters of poverty and vagrancy (Kunze, 1971). To sort this
issue, the first poor law was set in 1536. This law was further
supported in 1547, through taxes that were levied to specifically
help the poor in the community. These taxes were further aided
in 1576 when the government of England set the rule that the
local authorities should provide aid to the poor by the provision
of raw materials to aid them in getting work done.
17th Century

3. The 17th century saw the introduction of the Elizabethan Poor
Law. The law was introduced in 1601. The law set a
requirement for parishes. The parishes had to select certain
overseers for the poor. A minimum of two overseers was
required for each parish and the main role of the overseer was
to set and collect taxes to help the poor. The tax was collected
from the landowners. After collection of the taxes, the overseer
was responsible for the equitable distribution of food and
money to the poor in the community. The overseer was not paid
a salary.
18th Century
In the 18th century, most of Europe was emerging from the
Renaissance period. This is a period that saw England rise from
a slumber in various aspects including academics. During this
period, there was the advancement of technology and
psychology. One particular physician, Philippe Pinel, was
instrumental in the development of humane psychological
approaches. Through Pinel's work, early discovery of some
conditions such as dementia was made possible which enabled a
better understanding of special human needs. To add on, Pinel
is known to unshackle his patients, which was the norm for
mental asylums, and choose to interact with them as normal
human beings.
19th Century
The 19th century saw the development of various aspects of
human services. To begin with, in the US mental conditions
were still not recognized as treatable conditions by many
people. The mentally ill were taken to prisons where they were
treated harshly. There was a need to change this mentality.
Dorothea Dix, a French-born woman, helped change this
mentality. During her work, Dix campaigned endlessly for the
fair treatment of mentally-ill patients. This was made possible
through the extensive documentation of the harsh treatment that

4. people living in asylums and poorhouses were subjected to. This
work went on to influence the establishment of over 30 mental
health institutions around the US.
In the mid 18th century, charitable organizations began to rise.
More so, the Charity Organization Society (COS), became one
of the first organizations that made home visits to the poor.
Using visitors, the COS provided charity to the poor through
home visits thus giving birth to caseworkers. To boost this, in
1889, there was the development of the first settlement house.
The house, known as the Hull House, was co-founded by
Addams Jane and Gates Ellen. The Hull House provided social
services to many people especially incoming immigrants from
Europe. The house proceeded to cover a vast region offering
various social services.
20th Century
The 20th century has seen lots of modern developments. To
begin with, many poor houses and asylums were shut down. The
people in asylums and poor houses were transferred to state
institutions which became the main providers for care for
mentally-ill people. In 1912, there was the establishment and
development of the Children's Bureau which was aimed at
investigating and dealing with the matter of child welfare.
By 1929, there were about 30,000 orphans living in the streets
of New York, USA. To curb this, the last orphan train was
started. This was a movement that aimed at moving the orphans
to aid institutions, in and out of the US. The aid institutions
included homes of civilians. Shortly after 1929, the last orphan
train, there was the development of the social security act. In
1935, under President Roosevelt, the Social Security Act was
set up. This is a scheme that helps people to save for their
retirement. To boost this act, the Federal Security Agency was
set up. This agency has the target of housing health, education,
and other welfare programs in the US. This enabled easier

5. coordination of various services.
In 1965, the Medicare Act was established. This act was
developed from the social security act and is a health insurance
policy for the elderly. Through Medicare, some of the stresses
of families that resulted from taking care of the elderly were
absorbed. In 1997, a similar child insurance policy named CHIP
was developed.
21st Century
The turn of the century saw the largest amount of social workers
offering mental and family health services. Some of the most
notable events that contributed to this situation are the
September 11th terrorist bomb attacks and severe hurricanes. In
2005, Hurricane Katrina caused devastating damage to the US
and was followed three years later by the 2008 economic
recession. In the same year, 2008, the Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act was put into law to offer various services
such as physical health guidance and offering affordable mental
health services. More recently, the Affordable Care Act in 2011
was passed under President Obama which required all people to
get health insurance or pay for it through taxes. The Affordable
Care Act also introduced subsidies that are paid for by charging
high-income members of the society and healthcare providers.
References
Kunze, L. N. (1971). The Origins of Modern Social Legislation:

6. The Henrician Poor Law of 1536. The North American
Conference on British Studies; 3(1):9-20
Zins, C. (2001) "Defining Human Services," The Journal of
Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 28: Iss. 1, Article 2.Available
at:https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol28/iss1/2
2019
Synopsis
GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX
THE CHALLENGE OF HUNGER AND CLIMATE CHANGE
October 2019
THE GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX
The GHI scores are based on a formula that captures three
dimensions
of hunger—insufficient caloric intake, child undernutrition, and
child
mortality—using four component indicators:
> UNDERNOURISHMENT: the share of the population that is
under-
nourished, reflecting insufficient caloric intake
> CHILD WASTING: the share of children under the age of
five who are

7. wasted (low weight-for-height), reflecting acute undernutrition
> CHILD STUNTING: the share of children under the age of
five who
are stunted (low height-for-age), reflecting chronic
undernutrition
> CHILD MORTALITY: the mortality rate of children under
the age
of five
Data on these indicators come from the Food and Agriculture
Orga-
nization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health
Organization
(WHO), UNICEF, the World Bank, Demographic and Health
Surveys
(DHS), and the United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child
Mortal-
ity Estimation (UN IGME). The 2019 GHI is calculated for
117 countries for which data are available and reflects data
from
2014 to 2018.
The GHI ranks countries on a 100-point scale, with 0 being the
best score (no hunger) and 100 being the worst, although neither
of

8. these extremes is reached in actuality. Values less than 10.0
reflect
low hunger; values from 10.0 to 19.9 reflect moderate hunger;
values
from 20.0 to 34.9 indicate serious hunger; values from 35.0 to
49.9
are alarming; and values of 50.0 or more are extremely alarming
(Figure 1).
The 2019 Global Hunger Index report (GHI)—the 14th in an
annual
series—presents a multidimensional measure of global,
regional, and
national hunger. The latest data available show that while we
have
made progress in reducing hunger on a global scale since 2000,
we
still have a long way to go. Of the 117 countries with GHI
scores,
levels of hunger are still serious or alarming in 47 countries and
extremely alarming in one country. This year’s report focuses
on
climate change—an increasingly relevant threat to the world’s
hungry

9. and vulnerable people that requires immediate action.
FIGURE 1 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES BY HUNGER LEVEL
≤ 9.9
low
46 countries
10.0–19.9
moderate
23 countries
20.0–34.9
serious
43 countries
35.0–49.9
alarming
4 countries
extremely alarming
1 country
100 20 35 50
GHI Severity Scale
≥ 50.0
Source: Authors.

10. 2
RANKINGS AND TRENDS
The 2019 Global Hunger Index (GHI) indicates that the level of
hun-
ger and undernutrition worldwide, with a GHI score of 20.0,
falls on
the cusp of the moderate and serious categories. This value
reflects
a decline in the global GHI score in each period examined since
2000, when the global GHI score was 29.0 and fell into the
serious
category. This achievement coincides with a global decline in
poverty
and increased funding for nutrition initiatives worldwide.
However,
current action and spending are still insufficient to reach global
goals
such as the second Sustainable Development Goal—Zero
Hunger—
and the World Health Assembly global nutrition targets to
which
countries have declared their commitment. Furthermore, we
need to

11. strengthen our efforts to cope with extreme climatic events,
violent
conflicts, wars, and economic slowdowns and crises that
continue to
drive hunger in many parts of the world. Inequalities within
country
borders allow hunger and undernutrition to persist even in
countries
that appear to do well according to national averages. The
number
of people who are undernourished actually rose from 785
million in
2015 to 822 million in 2018.
The Regions
South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara have the highest
regional
2019 GHI scores in the world, at 29.3 and 28.4, respectively.
These
scores indicate serious levels of hunger according to the GHI
Sever-
ity Scale. South Asia’s high GHI score is driven by its high
rates of
child undernutrition: rates of child stunting and child wasting
there

12. are the highest levels of any region in the report. In Africa
South of
the Sahara, the region’s high GHI score is driven up by its
undernour-
ishment and child mortality rates, which are the highest of any
region,
while its child stunting rate is nearly as high as that of South
Asia.
Troublingly, while the prevalence of undernourishment in
Africa South
of the Sahara consistently declined from 1999–2001 to 2013–
2015,
it has since reversed course and begun to rise.
In contrast, the 2019 GHI scores for Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Latin America and the
Carib-
bean, East and Southeast Asia, and the Near East and North
Africa
range from 6.6 to 13.3, indicating low or moderate hunger
levels. Yet
even some countries in those regions have serious or alarming
levels
of hunger and undernutrition.

13. The Countries
According to the 2019 GHI, of the countries for which data are
avail-
able, one country, the Central African Republic, suffers from a
level
that is extremely alarming, while four countries—Chad,
Madagascar,
Yemen, and Zambia—suffer from levels of hunger that are
alarming.
Out of 117 countries that were ranked, 43 countries have serious
levels of hunger.
GHI scores for several countries could not be calculated
because
data were not available for all four GHI indicators. However,
the hun-
ger and undernutrition situations in nine of these countries—
Burundi,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Libya, Papua
New
Guinea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria—are identified as
cause
for significant concern. In some cases, the hunger levels might
be

14. higher than in the countries for which GHI scores were
calculated.
An examination of child stunting rates at subnational levels
reveals
substantial inequality of children’s nutrition within country
borders,
even in countries that fare well on average. Also, the 2019 GHI
report
takes a closer look at the hunger and nutrition situations of two
coun-
tries—Haiti and Niger—which have serious levels of hunger and
are
vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
FIGURE 2 GLOBAL AND REGIONAL 2000, 2005, 2010, AND
2019 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES, WITH
CONTRIBUTION OF COMPONENTS
2
9
.0
2
6
.9
2
3

15. .0
2
0
.0
3
8
.4
3
7
.6
3
2
.1
2
9
.3
4
3
.5
3
7

16. .8
3
2
.4
2
8
.4
1
6
.3
1
4
.7
1
3
.2
1
3
.3
2
0
.3

17. 1
7
.8
1
5
.0
1
1
.5 1
3
.6
1
1
.1
9
.4
8
.2 9
.9
1
3
.9

18. 8
.1
6
.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
'00 '05 '10 '19
World South Asia Africa South
of the Sahara
Near East &
North Africa
East &
Southeast Asia
Latin America
& Caribbean
Eastern Europe &
Commonwealth
of Independent

19. States
'00 '05 '10 '19 '00 '05 '10 '19 '00 '05 '10 '19 '00 '05 '10 '19 '00
'05 '10 '19 '00 '05 '10 '19
Under-five mortality rate
Prevalence of wasting in children
Prevalence of stunting in children
Proportion of undernourished
G
H
I
sc
or
e
Source: Authors.
Note: See Appendix B in the full report for data sources. The
regional and global GHI scores are calculated using regional
and global aggregates for each indicator and the formula
described in
Appendix A. The regional and global aggregates for each
indicator are calculated as population-weighted averages, using
the indicator values reported in Appendix C. For countries
lacking undernour-
ishment data, provisional estimates provided by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) were
used in the calculation of aggregates only, but are not reported
in Appendix C.
3

20. Russian Federation
China
Brazil
Canada
Australia
India
United States
of America
Iran
Greenland
Algeria
Argentina
Libya
Mali
Mexico
Sudan
Kazakhstan
Peru

21. Chad
Niger
Mongolia
Egypt
Angola
Bolivia
Saudi
Arabia
Ethiopia
Turkey
Nigeria
Iraq
Colombia
Namibia
Mauritania
Zambia
Spain
Tanzania

22. Ukraine
Kenya
Venezuela
Yemen
Poland
Chile
Congo,
Dem.
Rep.
Pakistan
South
Africa
Sweden
Somalia
Myanmar
Finland
Italy
South
Sudan
Norway

23. Thailand
Mozambique
Botswana
Afghanistan
Indonesia
Oman
Congo,
Rep.
Morocco
Germany
Madagascar
Uzbekistan
Japan
Paraguay
Cameroon
Viet Nam
Syria
Turkmenistan
Zimbabwe

24. Gabon
Belarus
Ghana
Guinea
Romania
Central
African
Republic
Ecuador
Nepal
Lao
PDR
Guyana
Western Sahara
Uganda
Côte
d'Ivoire
Senegal
Tunisia
Malaysia

25. Iceland
Uruguay
Kyrgyz Rep.
Cuba
Burkina Faso
Benin
Cambodia
Eritrea
South KoreaTajikistan
Greece
Serbia
Bulgaria
Suriname
Latvia
Austria
Malawi
New Zealand
Jordan
Liberia
Hungary

26. Ireland
Nicaragua
Honduras
Bangladesh
Portugal
Togo
Philippines
Guatemala
Georgia
Lithuania
Panama
Azerb.
Croatia
North Korea
Czech Rep.
Estonia
Sri Lanka
Bhutan

27. Haiti
Taiwan
French Guiana
Bel.
Costa Rica
Moldova
Fiji
Denmark
Israel
Albania
Lesotho
Belize
U. A. E.
Burundi
Dominican Rep.
Djibouti
Rwanda
Kuwait

28. Equatorial Guinea
Papua
New
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Qatar
Eswatini
Jamaica
Timor-Leste
Lebanon
United
Kingdom
Brunei
Trinidad & Tobago
Comoros
Hong Kong
El Salvador
Mont.
N. Mace.
Bos.&
Herz.

29. Switz.
Slovak Rep.
Slov.
Lux.
Armenia
Cyprus
Bahrain
Mauritius
Sierra Leone
Gambia
Neth.
Singapore
France
2019 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX BY SEVERITY
Extremely alarming ≥ 50.0
Alarming 35.0–49.9
Serious 20.0–34.9
Moderate 10.0–19.9

30. Low ≤ 9.9
Insufficient data, significant concern*
Not included or insufficient data**
*See Box 2.1 in the GHI 2019 full report for details.
**See Chapter 1 in the GHI 2019 full report for details.
www.globalhungerindex.org
Russian Federation
China
Brazil
Canada
Australia
India
United States
of America
Iran
Greenland
Algeria
Argentina
Libya

31. Mali
Mexico
Sudan
Kazakhstan
Peru
Chad
Niger
Mongolia
Egypt
Angola
Bolivia
Saudi
Arabia
Ethiopia
Turkey
Nigeria
Iraq
Colombia

32. Namibia
Mauritania
Zambia
Spain
Tanzania
Ukraine
Kenya
Venezuela
Yemen
Poland
Chile
Congo,
Dem.
Rep.
Pakistan
South
Africa
Sweden
Somalia
Myanmar

33. Finland
Italy
South
Sudan
Norway
Thailand
Mozambique
Botswana
Afghanistan
Indonesia
Oman
Congo,
Rep.
Morocco
Germany
Madagascar
Uzbekistan
Japan
Paraguay

34. Cameroon
Viet Nam
Syria
Turkmenistan
Zimbabwe
Gabon
Belarus
Ghana
Guinea
Romania
Central
African
Republic
Ecuador
Nepal
Lao
PDR
Guyana
Western Sahara

35. Uganda
Côte
d'Ivoire
Senegal
Tunisia
Malaysia
Iceland
Uruguay
Kyrgyz Rep.
Cuba
Burkina Faso
Benin
Cambodia
Eritrea
South KoreaTajikistan
Greece
Serbia
Bulgaria
Suriname
Latvia
Austria

36. Malawi
New Zealand
Jordan
Liberia
Hungary
Ireland
Nicaragua
Honduras
Bangladesh
Portugal
Togo
Philippines
Guatemala
Georgia
Lithuania
Panama
Azerb.
Croatia

37. North Korea
Czech Rep.
Estonia
Sri Lanka
Bhutan
Haiti
Taiwan
French Guiana
Bel.
Costa Rica
Moldova
Fiji
Denmark
Israel
Albania
Lesotho
Belize
U. A. E.

38. Burundi
Dominican Rep.
Djibouti
Rwanda
Kuwait
Equatorial Guinea
Papua
New
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Qatar
Eswatini
Jamaica
Timor-Leste
Lebanon
United
Kingdom
Brunei
Trinidad & Tobago
Comoros

39. Hong Kong
El Salvador
Mont.
N. Mace.
Bos.&
Herz.
Switz.
Slovak Rep.
Slov.
Lux.
Armenia
Cyprus
Bahrain
Mauritius
Sierra Leone
Gambia
Neth.
Singapore
France

40. Source: Authors.
Note: For the 2019 GHI, data on the proportion of
undernourished are for 2016–2018; data on
child stunting and wasting are for the latest year in the period
2014–2018 for which data are
available; and data on child mortality are for 2017. GHI scores
were not calculated for countries
for which data were not available and for certain high-income
countries, countries with small
populations, and non-independent territories; see Chapter 1 for
details.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on
this map do not imply official
endorsement or acceptance by Welthungerhilfe (WHH) or
Concern Worldwide.
Recommended citation: K. von Grebmer, J. Bernstein, R.
Mukerji, F. Patterson, M. Wiemers,
R. Ní Chéilleachair, C. Foley, S. Gitter, K. Ekstrom, and H.
Fritschel. 2019. “Figure 2.4: 2019
Global Hunger Index by Severity.” Map in 2019 Global Hunger
Index: The Challenge of Hunger and
Climate Change. Bonn: Welthungerhilfe; Dublin: Concern
Worldwide.
ex
tr
em
el
y
al
ar

41. m
in
g
G
H
I
S
ev
er
it
y
S
ca
le
al
ar
m
in
g
se
ri
ou
s
m

42. od
er
at
e
lo
w
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Absolute change in GHI score since 2000
Lower
hunger
Higher
hunger
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Absolute change in GHI score since 2000
55
50
45
40
35
30

43. 25
20
15
10
5
Lower reduction
in hunger
Higher reduction
in hunger
2
0
1
9
G
lo
b
al
H
u
n
ge
r
In
d

44. ex
S
co
re
Increase in
hunger
Zimbabwe
Liberia
Chad
Yemen
Madagascar
Zambia
Afghanistan
Haiti
North Korea
Angola
Niger
Djibouti
Mali
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia

45. Malawi
Lao PDR
Rwanda
Mauritania
Congo, Rep.
India
Uganda
Tanzania Pakistan
Guinea
Bangladesh
Namibia
Côte d’Ivoire
Botswana
Togo Benin
Kenya
Nepal
Lesotho
Cameroon
Myanmar
Senegal

46. Nigeria
Bolivia
Ghana
Viet Nam
Indonesia
Iraq
Gambia
Guatemala
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Egypt
Malaysia
Jordan
Gabon
Honduras
Guyana
Venezuela
Oman
Lebanon

47. Nicaragua
Eswatini
Uzbekistan
Algeria
Ecuador
Turkmenistan
Central African
Republic
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
South
Africa
Cambodia
Suriname
Guinea-Bissau
FIGURE 3 2019 GHI SCORES AND PROGRESS SINCE 2000
Source: Authors.
Note: This figure illustrates the change in GHI scores since
2000 in absolute values. This figure features countries where
data were available to calculate 2000 and 2019 GHI scores and
where

48. 2019 GHI scores show moderate, serious, alarming, or
extremely alarming hunger levels. Some likely poor performers
may not appear due to missing data.
It is reasonable to view the progress made globally in reducing
hunger and undernutrition over almost 20 years and find
grounds to
believe that the world can and will continue to make progress in
the
quest to eliminate these maladies. At the same time, there are
many
reasons for concern. The number of undernourished people in
the
world is increasing. Too many countries are in the midst of
violent
conflicts that have precipitously increased their hunger levels.
Extreme weather events are jeopardizing food production and
food
security and are only expected to increase in number and
severity in
conjunction with global climate change. It will take humanity’s
inge-
nuity, dedication, and perseverance to ensure that we
collectively
achieve Zero Hunger while tackling the unprecedented

49. challenge of
climate change.
6
CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUNGER
Rupa Mukerji
Helvetas
Human actions have created a world in which it is becoming
ever
more difficult to adequately and sustainably feed and nourish
the
human population. A 150-year run of rapid economic growth
and a
consequent rise in greenhouse gas emissions have pushed
average
global temperatures to 1°C above preindustrial levels. With the
cur-
rent rate of emissions, the increase in average global
temperatures
is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052. Climate models
project higher average temperatures in most land and ocean
regions,
hot extremes in the majority of inhabited regions, and heavy

50. precip-
itation and an ever-greater probability of drought in some areas.
These
changes will increasingly affect human systems—including food
sys-
tems—across the world on a large scale.
Understanding the Impacts of Climate Change
Climate change has direct and indirect negative impacts on food
security and hunger through changes in food production and
avail-
ability, access, quality, utilization, and stability of food
systems.
Food production is likely to fall in response to higher
temperatures,
water scarcity, greater CO
2
concentrations in the atmosphere, and
extreme events such as heat waves, droughts, and floods.
Already,
yields of major food crops such as maize and wheat are
declining
owing to extreme events, epidemics of plant diseases, and
declining
water resources.

51. Weather anomalies and climate change, particularly extreme
events, can contribute to rising food prices and thereby
jeopardize
people’s access to food. They can also threaten people’s
nutrition.
Recent studies show that higher CO
2
concentrations reduce the pro-
tein, zinc, and iron content of crops. Moreover, climate change
may
make the lean seasons before harvests longer and more severe.
A changing climate may worsen food losses in a global food
sys-
tem in which massive amounts of food are already lost or
wasted.
Given that the current food system contributes between 21 and
37 percent of total net anthropogenic emissions, these losses
exac-
erbate climate change without contributing to improved food
security
or nutrition.
In addition, climate change can contribute to conflict, especially

52. in vulnerable and food-insecure regions, creating a double
vulnera-
bility for communities, which are pushed beyond their ability to
cope.
The combined impact of conflict and climate change destroys
liveli-
hoods, drives displacement, widens economic and gender
inequali-
ties, and undermines long-term recovery and sustainable
development.
Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change
Current actions are inadequate for the scale of the threat that
climate
change poses to food security. Countries’ existing mitigation
efforts—
as defined by their own pledges, which extend only to 2030—
are
collectively projected to result in a warming of 3–4°C over
preindus-
trial averages by 2100. This is a massive overshoot of both the
1.5°C
and 2°C targets that have been set and will lead to substantial
impacts
on food and nutrition security.

53. More ambitious actions are required to reduce the risks of
climate
change (mitigation) and to cope with its impacts (adaptation) on
food
and nutrition security. Small or incremental changes will not
deliver
the scale or pace of change needed to remain within the 2°C
warm-
ing threshold as defined by the Paris Agreement.
Transformation—a
fundamental change in the attributes of human and natural
systems—
is now recognized as central to climate-resilient development
path-
ways that address the goals of Agenda 2030, particularly the
Sustainable Development Goal 2 of Zero Hunger, and the Paris
Agree-
ment. These pathways must include actions for mitigation,
adapta-
tion, and sustainable development. More broadly, they demand a
profound and deliberate shift toward sustainability, facilitated
by
changes in individual and collective values and behaviors and a
fairer

54. balance of political, cultural, and institutional power in society.
Both mitigation and adaptation measures need to be combined
with safety net policies that protect the most vulnerable people
from
hunger, food insecurity, and other adverse impacts of these
mea-
sures. Furthermore, good governance, capacity building,
participatory
planning, and downward accountability are essential to help
people
and institutions negotiate and define measures that are fair and
sus-
tainable for the benefit of the food security and nutrition of all
people.
7
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Prioritize resilience and adaptation among the
most vulnerable groups and regions
> Governments and donors must invest in vulnerable
communities
in the Global South, such as small-scale farmers, to develop and

55. carry out context-specific adaptation strategies that will
strengthen
food and nutrition security and food sovereignty. Actions can
include supporting and diversifying agricultural production;
improv-
ing farmers’ access to extension services, resources, and
markets;
and creating non-agricultural jobs in rural areas.
> Governments must facilitate public participation in climate
deci-
sion making. Adaptation strategies should be developed together
with affected communities based on local needs. These strate-
gies should integrate indigenous and traditional knowledge—
par-
ticularly of women—and be supported with access to additional
research, technologies, and agricultural and meteorological
data.
Better prepare for and respond to disasters
> Donors and governments must increase investments in
disaster
prevention and disaster risk reduction, especially in vulnerable

56. regions prone to extreme weather events. This includes
investing
in early warning and response systems, forecast-based financing
mechanisms, and adapted infrastructure. Donors must make rap-
idly dispersible and flexible funding available to tackle food
crises
and respond to disasters when they occur.
> Because climate change poses risks to peace and stability,
gov-
ernments and donors must invest in resilience building to
prevent
conflicts related to the use of natural resources, such as water
and land, in fragile contexts.
Transform food systems and address inequalities
> A radical transformation of production and consumption
patterns,
especially in high-income countries, is crucial to reduce emis-
sions and ensure people’s access to healthy and sustainable
diets.
Governments must promote sustainable production systems,
con-

57. sumption of nutritious foods, and reduction of food loss and
waste.
> Measures to reduce poverty and existing inequalities are key
to
building resilience to the effects of climate change among the
most vulnerable people. Therefore, governments and donors
must
significantly increase investments in rural development, social
protection, health services, and education.
> As climate change increases competition for natural
resources,
governments must secure the land and water rights, including
customary rights, of indigenous peoples and rural
communities—
for example, by following frameworks such as the Voluntary
Guide-
lines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT).
> Governments must enact and enforce regulatory frameworks
to
ensure that production of globally traded agricultural commodi-

58. ties does not impede the right to food or infringe on land rights
in areas where those commodities are produced. Private compa-
nies must act in compliance with these regulations and
guidelines
such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.
Take action to mitigate climate change without
compromising food and nutrition security
> All countries, particularly high-income countries, must
urgently
meet their commitments to Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agree-
ment. They must implement more ambitious measures, such as
decarbonizing their energy sector, building green infrastructure,
and boosting carbon sequestration.
> Countries must harmonize climate policy with food and trade
pol-
icies to prevent mitigation and CO
2
removal measures—such as
the use of scarce agricultural land for bioenergy production—
from
harming people’s food and nutrition security.

59. Commit to fair financing
> Governments must increase their financial support to the
most
vulnerable people and regions. Financing for climate change
adap-
tation needs to receive the same importance as mitigation.
> Financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation must
especially support least-developed countries (LDCs) and must
be
in addition to official development assistance (ODA) to ensure
that resources for sustainable development are not reduced.
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V.
Friedrich-Ebert-Straße 1
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Tel. +49 228-2288-0
Fax +49 228-2288-333
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Concern Worldwide

60. 52-55 Lower Camden Street
Dublin 2, Ireland
Tel. +353 1-417-7700
Fax +353 1-475-7362
www.concern.net
Member of Alliance2015
Authors:
Welthungerhilfe: Fraser Patterson (Policy Advisor), Miriam
Wiemers (Policy and
External Relations); Concern Worldwide: Réiseal Ní
Chéilleachair (Head of Global
Advocacy), Connell Foley (Director of Strategy, Advocacy, and
Learning); Indepen-
dent Consultants: Klaus von Grebmer, Jill Bernstein, Heidi
Fritschel; Towson Uni-
versity: Seth Gitter and Kierstin Ekstrom; Guest Author: Rupa
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Advisory Services, and Senior Advisor, Adaptation to Climate
Change, Helvetas).
A Peer-Reviewed Publication
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Photo credit: AFP/Diptendu Dutta 2016
This publication is available under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0),

61. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
THE
VIRTUE
OF
SELFISHNESS
A New Concept of Egoism
by Ayn Rand
With Additional Articles
by Nathaniel Branden
A SIGNET BOOK
2
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
SIGNET
Published by the Penguin Group
Penguin Books USA Inc., 375 Hudson Street,
New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.
Penguin Books Ltd, 27 Wrights Lane,
London W8 5TZ, England
Penguin Books Australia Ltd, Ringwood,

62. Victoria, Australia
Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 10 Alcorn Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4V 3B2
Penguin Books (N.Z.) Ltd, 182-190 Wairau Road,
Auckland 10, New Zealand
Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices:
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England
Published by Signet, an imprint of Dutton Signet,
a division of Penguin Books USA Inc.
39 38 37 36 35
Copyright © 1961, 1964 by Ayn Rand
Copyright © 1962, 1963, 1964 by
The Objectivist Newsletter, Inc.
All rights reserved
This book or any part thereof must not be
reproduced in any form without the written
permission of the publisher.
Permission requests for college or
textbook use should be addressed to the
Estate of Ayn Rand, Box 177, Murray Hill Station,
New York, NY 10157.
Information about other books by Ayn Rand and her philosophy.
Objectivism, may be obtained by writing to OBJECTIVISM,
Box
177, Murray Hill Station, New York, New York, 10157 USA.

63. REGISTERED TRADEMARK—MARCA REGISTRADA
Printed in the United States of America
If you purchased this book without a cover you should be aware
that this book is stolen property. It was reported as “unsold and
destroyed” to the publisher and neither the author nor the
publisher has received any payment for this “stripped book.”
3
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
1. The Objectivist Ethics
by Ayn Rand
Since I am to speak on the Objectivist Ethics, I shall begin by
quoting its best
representative—John Galt, in Atlas Shrugged:
“Through centuries of scourges and disasters, brought about by
your code of morality,
you have cried that your code had been broken, that the
scourges were punishment for
breaking it, that men were too weak and too selfish to spill all
the blood it required. You
damned man, you damned existence, you damned this earth, but
never dared to question
your code. ... You went on crying that your code was noble, but
human nature was not
good enough to practice it. And no one rose to ask the question:
Good?—by what
standard?

64. “You wanted to know John Galt’s identity. I am the man who
has asked that question.
“Yes, this is an age of moral crisis. ... Your moral code has
reached its climax, the
blind alley at the end of its course. And if you wish to go on
living, what you now need is
not to return to morality ... but to discover it.”1
What is morality, or ethics? It is a code of values to guide
man’s choices and
actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and
the course of his life.
Ethics, as a science, deals with discovering and defining such a
code.
The first question that has to be answered, as a precondition of
any attempt to define,
to judge or to accept any specific system of ethics, is: Why does
man need a code of
values?
Let me stress this. The first question is not: What particular
code of values should man
accept? The first question is: Does man need values at all—and
why?
Is the concept of value, of “good or evil” an arbitrary human
invention, unrelated to,
underived from and unsupported by any facts of reality—or is it
based on a metaphysical
fact, on an unalterable condition of man’s existence? (I use the
word “metaphysical” to
mean: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to
existence.) Does an

65. arbitrary human convention, a mere custom, decree that man
must guide his actions by a
set of principles—or is there a fact of reality that demands it? Is
ethics the province of
whims: of personal emotions, social edicts and mystic
revelations—or is it the province of
reason? Is ethics a subjective luxury—or an objective necessity?
In the sorry record of the history of mankind’s ethics—with a
few rare, and
unsuccessful, exceptions—moralists have regarded ethics as the
province of whims, that
is: of the irrational. Some of them did so explicitly, by
intention—others implicitly, by
default. A “whim” is a desire experienced by a person who does
not know and does not
care to discover its cause.
No philosopher has given a rational, objectively demonstrable,
scientific answer to the
question of why man needs a code of values. So long as that
question remained unan-
swered, no rational, scientific, objective code of ethics could be
discovered or defined.
The greatest of all philosophers, Aristotle, did not regard ethics
as an exact science; he
1 Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, New York: Random House, 1957;
New American Library, 1959.
Paper delivered by Ayn Rand at the University of Wisconsin
Symposium on “Ethics in Our Time” in
Madison, Wisconsin, on February 9, 1961.
9

66. Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
based his ethical system on observations of what the noble and
wise men of his time
chose to do, leaving unanswered the questions of: why they
chose to do it and why he
evaluated them as noble and wise.
Most philosophers took the existence of ethics for granted, as
the given, as a historical
fact, and were not concerned with discovering its metaphysical
cause or objective valida-
tion. Many of them attempted to break the traditional monopoly
of mysticism in the field
of ethics and, allegedly, to define a rational, scientific,
nonreligious morality. But their
attempts consisted of trying to justify them on social grounds,
merely substituting society
for God.
The avowed mystics held the arbitrary, unaccountable “will of
God” as the standard of
the good and as the validation of their ethics. The neomystics
replaced it with “the good
of society,” thus collapsing into the circularity of a definition
such as “the standard of the
good is that which is good for society.” This meant, in logic—
and, today, in worldwide
practice—that “society” stands above any principles of ethics,
since it is the source,
standard and criterion of ethics, since “the good” is whatever it
wills, whatever it happens
to assert as its own welfare and pleasure. This meant that
“society” may do anything it
pleases, since “the good” is whatever it chooses to do because it

67. chooses to do it.
And—since there is no such entity as “society,” since society is
only a number of
individual men—this meant that some men (the majority or any
gang that claims to be its
spokesman) are ethically entitled to pursue any whims (or any
atrocities) they desire to
pursue, while other men are ethically obliged to spend their
lives in the service of that
gang’s desires.
This could hardly be called rational, yet most philosophers have
now decided to
declare that reason has failed, that ethics is outside the power of
reason, that no rational
ethics can ever be defined, and that in the field of ethics—in the
choice of his values, of
his actions, of his pursuits, of his life’s goals—man must be
guided by something other
than reason. By what? Faith—instinct—intuition—revela-
tion—feeling—taste—urge—wish—whim. Today, as in the past,
most philosophers agree
that the ultimate standard of ethics is whim (they call it
“arbitrary postulate” or “subjec-
tive choice” or “emotional commitment”)—and the battle is
only over the question or
whose whim: one’s own or society’s or the dictator’s or God’s.
Whatever else they may
disagree about, today’s moralists agree that ethics is a
subjective issue and that the three
things barred from its field are: reason—mind—reality.
If you wonder why the world is now collapsing to a lower and
ever lower rung of hell,
this is the reason.

68. If you want to save civilization, it is this premise of modern
ethics—and of all ethical
history—that you must challenge.
To challenge the basic premise of any discipline, one must
begin at the beginning. In
ethics, one must begin by asking: What are values? Why does
man need them?
“Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept
“value” is not a
primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to
whom and for what? It
presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the
face of an alternative.
Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are
possible.
I quote from Galt’s speech: “There is only one fundamental
alternative in the universe:
existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of
entities: to living organ-
isms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the
existence of life is not: it
depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible,
it changes its forms, but it
10
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a
constant alternative: the
issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and

69. self-generated action. If an
organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements
remain, but its life goes out of
existence. It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept
of ‘Value’ possible. It is
only to a living entity that things can be good or evil.”
To make this point fully clear, try to imagine an immortal,
indestructible robot, an
entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by
anything, which cannot be
changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or
destroyed. Such an entity
would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to
gain or to lose; it could
not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or
threatening its welfare, as fulfilling
or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no
goals.
Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. And it
is only a living
organism that has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed
action. On the physical
level, the functions of all living organisms, from the simplest to
the most complex—from
the nutritive function in the single cell of an amoeba to the
blood circulation in the body
of a man—are actions generated by the organism itself and
directed to a single goal: the
maintenance of the organism’s life.2
An organism’s life depends on two factors: the material or fuel
which it needs from the
outside, from its physical background, and the action of its own
body, the action of using

70. that fuel properly. What standard determines what is proper in
this context? The standard
is the organism’s life, or: that which is required for the
organism’s survival.
No choice is open to an organism in this issue: that which is
required for its survival is
determined by its nature, by the kind of entity it is. Many
variations, many forms of
adaptation to its background are possible to an organism,
including the possibility of
existing for a while in a crippled, disabled or diseased
condition, but the fundamental
alternative of its existence remains the same: if an organism
fails in the basic functions
required by its nature—if an amoeba’s protoplasm stops
assimilating food, or if a man’s
heart stops beating—the organism dies. In a fundamental sense,
stillness is the antithesis
of life. Life can be kept in existence only by a constant process
of self-sustaining action.
The goal of that action, the ultimate value which, to be kept,
must be gained through its
every moment, is the organism’s life.
An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser
goals are the means—and
it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An
organism’s life is its
standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that
which threatens it is the
evil.
Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals or
means: a series of
means going off into an infinite progression toward a

71. nonexistent end is a metaphysical
and epistemological impossibility. It is only an ultimate goal,
an end in itself, that makes
the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only
phenomenon that is an
end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of
action. Epistemologically,
the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and
derived from the antecedent
2 When applied to physical phenomena, such as the automatic
functions of an organism, the term “goal-
directed” is not to be taken to mean “purposive” (a concept
applicable only to the actions of a con-
sciousness) and is not to imply the existence of any teleological
principle operating in insentient nature. I
use the term “goal-directed,” in this context, to designate the
fact that the automatic functions of living
organisms are actions whose nature is such that they result in
the preservation of an organism’s life.
11
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is
worse than a contradiction in
terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of
‘Value’ possible.”
In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can
be established between
ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress
that the fact that living

72. entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values
and of an ultimate value
which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the
validation of value judgments is
to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that
a living entity is,
determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the
relation between “is” and
“ought.”
Now in what manner does a human being discover the concept
of “value”? By what
means does he first become aware of the issue of “good or evil”
in its simplest form? By
means of the physical sensations of pleasure or pain. Just as
sensations are the first step
of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of
cognition, so they are its
first step in the realm of evaluation.
The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man’s
body; it is part of his
nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about
it, and he has no choice
about the standard that determines what will make him
experience the physical sensation
of pleasure or of pain. What is that standard? His life.
The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man—and in the
bodies of all the living
organisms that possess the faculty of consciousness—serves as
an automatic guardian of
the organism’s life. The physical sensation of pleasure is a
signal indicating that the
organism is pursuing the right course of action. The physical
sensation of pain is a

73. warning signal of danger, indicating that the organism is
pursuing the wrong course of
action, that something is impairing the proper function of its
body, which requires action
to correct it. The best illustration of this can be seen in the rare,
freak cases of children
who are born without the capacity to experience physical pain;
such children do not
survive for long; they have no means of discovering what can
injure them, no warning
signals, and thus a minor cut can develop into a deadly
infection, or a major illness can
remain undetected until it is too late to fight it.
Consciousness—for those living organisms which possess it—is
the basic means of
survival.
The simpler organisms, such as plants, can survive by means of
their automatic
physical functions. The higher organisms, such as animals and
man, cannot: their needs
are more complex and the range of their actions is wider. The
physical functions of their
bodies can perform automatically only the task of using fuel,
but cannot obtain that fuel.
To obtain it, the higher organisms need the faculty of
consciousness. A plant can obtain
its food from the soil in which it grows. An animal has to hunt
for it. Man has to produce
it.
A plant has no choice of action; the goals it pursues are
automatic and innate,
determined by its nature. Nourishment, water, sunlight are the
values its nature has set it

74. to seek. Its life is the standard of value directing its actions.
There are alternatives in the
conditions it encounters in its physical background—such as
heat or frost, drought or
flood—and there are certain actions which it is able to perform
to combat adverse
conditions, such as the ability of some plants to grow and crawl
from under a rock to
reach the sunlight. But whatever the conditions, there is no
alternative in a plant’s
function: it acts automatically to further its life, it cannot act
for its own destruction.
12
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
The range of actions required for the survival of the higher
organisms is wider: it is
proportionate to the range of their consciousness. The lower of
the conscious species
possess only the faculty of sensation, which is sufficient to
direct their actions and
provide for their needs. A sensation is produced by the
automatic reaction of a sense
organ to a stimulus from the outside world; it lasts for the
duration of the immediate
moment, as long as the stimulus lasts and no longer. Sensations
are an automatic
response, an automatic form of knowledge, which a
consciousness can neither seek nor
evade. An organism that possesses only the faculty of sensation
is guided by the pleasure-
pain mechanism of its body, that is: by an automatic knowledge

75. and an automatic code of
values. Its life is the standard of value directing its actions.
Within the range of action
possible to it, it acts automatically to further its life and cannot
act for its own destruction.
The higher organisms possess a much more potent form of
consciousness: they possess
the faculty of retaining sensations, which is the faculty of
perception. A “perception” is a
group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the
brain of a living
organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single
stimuli, but of entities, of
things. An animal is guided, not merely by immediate
sensations, but by percepts. Its
actions are not single, discrete responses to single, separate
stimuli, but are directed by an
integrated awareness of the perceptual reality confronting it. It
is able to grasp the
perceptual concretes immediately present and it is able to form
automatic perceptual
associations, but it can go no further. It is able to learn certain
skills to deal with specific
situations, such as hunting or hiding, which the parents of the
higher animals teach their
young. But an animal has no choice in the knowledge and the
skills that it acquires; it can
only repeat them generation after generation. And an animal has
no choice in the standard
of value directing its actions: its senses provide it with an
automatic code of values, an
automatic knowledge of what is good for it or evil, what
benefits or endangers its life. An
animal has no power to extend its knowledge or to evade it. In
situations for which its

76. knowledge is inadequate, it perishes—as, for instance, an
animal that stands paralyzed on
the track of a railroad in the path of a speeding train. But so
long as it lives, an animal
acts on its knowledge, with automatic safety and no power of
choice: it cannot suspend its
own consciousness—it cannot choose not to perceive—it cannot
evade its own
perceptions—it cannot ignore its own good, it cannot decide to
choose the evil and act as
its own destroyer.
Man has no automatic code of survival. He has no automatic
course of action, no
automatic set of values. His senses do not tell him automatically
what is good for him or
evil, what will benefit his life or endanger it, what goals he
should pursue and what
means will achieve them, what values his life depends on, what
course of action it
requires. His own consciousness has to discover the answers to
all these questions—but
his consciousness will not function automatically. Man, the
highest living species on this
earth—the being whose consciousness has a limitless capacity
for gaining
knowledge—man is the only living entity born without any
guarantee of remaining
conscious at all. Man’s particular distinction from all other
living species is the fact that
his consciousness is volitional.
Just as the automatic values directing the functions of a plant’s
body are sufficient for
its survival, but are not sufficient for an animal’s—so the
automatic values provided by

77. the sensory-perceptual mechanism of its consciousness are
sufficient to guide an animal,
but are not sufficient for man. Man’s actions and survival
require the guidance of concep-
13
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
tual values derived from conceptual knowledge. But conceptual
knowledge cannot be
acquired automatically.
A “concept” is a mental integration of two or more perceptual
concretes, which are
isolated by a process of abstraction and united by means of a
specific definition. Every
word of man’s language, with the exception of proper names,
denotes a concept, an
abstraction that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of
a specific kind. It is by
organizing his perceptual material into concepts, and his
concepts into wider and still
wider concepts that man is able to grasp and retain, to identify
and integrate an unlimited
amount of knowledge, a knowledge extending beyond the
immediate perceptions of any
given, immediate moment. Man’s sense organs function
automatically; man’s brain inte-
grates his sense data into percepts automatically; but the
process of integrating percepts
into concepts—the process of abstraction and of concept-
formation—is not automatic.

78. The process of concept-formation does not consist merely of
grasping a few simple
abstractions, such as “chair,” “table,” “hot,” “cold,” and of
learning to speak. It consists
of a method of using one’s consciousness, best designated by
the term “conceptualizing.”
It is not a passive state of registering random impressions. It is
an actively sustained
process of identifying one’s impressions in conceptual terms, of
integrating every event
and every observation into a conceptual context, of grasping
relationships, differences,
similarities in one’s perceptual material and of abstracting them
into new concepts, of
drawing inferences, of making deductions, of reaching
conclusions, of asking new
questions and discovering new answers and expanding one’s
knowledge into an ever-
growing sum. The faculty that directs this process, the faculty
that works by means of
concepts, is: reason. The process is thinking.
Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material
provided by man’s
senses. It is a faculty that man has to exercise by choice.
Thinking is not an automatic
function. In any hour and issue of his life, man is free to think
or to evade that effort.
Thinking requires a state of full, focused awareness. The act of
focusing one’s
consciousness is volitional. Man can focus his mind to a full,
active, purposefully directed
awareness of reality—or he can unfocus it and let himself drift
in a semiconscious daze,
merely reacting to any chance stimulus of the immediate
moment, at the mercy of his

79. undirected sensory-perceptual mechanism and of any random,
associational connections it
might happen to make.
When man unfocuses his mind, he may be said to be conscious
in a subhuman sense of
the word, since he experiences sensations and perceptions. But
in the sense of the word
applicable to man—in the sense of a consciousness which is
aware of reality and able to
deal with it, a consciousness able to direct the actions and
provide for the survival of a
human being—an unfocused mind is not conscious.
Psychologically, the choice “to think or not” is the choice “to
focus or not.”
Existentially, the choice “to focus or not” is the choice “to be
conscious or not.”
Metaphysically, the choice “to be conscious or not” is the
choice of life or death.
Consciousness—for those living organisms which possess it—is
the basic means of
survival. For man, the basic means of survival is reason. Man
cannot survive, as animals
do, by the guidance of mere percepts. A sensation of hunger
will tell him that he needs
food (if he has learned to identify it as “hunger”), but it will not
tell him how to obtain his
food and it will not tell him what food is good for him or
poisonous. He cannot provide
for his simplest physical needs without a process of thought. He
needs a process of
thought to discover how to plant and grow his food or how to
make weapons for hunting.

80. 14
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
His percepts might lead him to a cave, if one is available—but
to build the simplest
shelter, he needs a process of thought. No percepts and no
“instincts” will tell him how to
light a fire, how to weave cloth, how to forge tools, how to
make a wheel, how to make
an airplane, how to perform an appendectomy, how to produce
an electric light bulb or an
electronic tube or a cyclotron or a box of matches. Yet his life
depends on such
knowledge—and only a volitional act of his consciousness, a
process of thought, can
provide it.
But man’s responsibility goes still further: a process of thought
is not automatic nor
“instinctive” nor involuntary—nor infallible. Man has to initiate
it, to sustain it and to
bear responsibility for its results. He has to discover how to tell
what is true or false and
how to correct his own errors; he has to discover how to
validate his concepts, his
conclusions, his knowledge; he has to discover the rules of
thought, the laws of logic, to
direct his thinking. Nature gives him no automatic guarantee of
the efficacy of his mental
effort.
Nothing is given to man on earth except a potential and the
material on which to

81. actualize it. The potential is a superlative machine: his
consciousness; but it is a machine
without a spark plug, a machine of which his own will has to be
the spark plug, the self-
starter and the driver; he has to discover how to use it and he
has to keep it in constant
action. The material is the whole of the universe, with no limits
set to the knowledge he
can acquire and to the enjoyment of life he can achieve. But
everything he needs or
desires has to be learned, discovered and produced by him—by
his own choice, by his
own effort, by his own mind.
A being who does not know automatically what is true or false,
cannot know
automatically what is right or wrong, what is good for him or
evil. Yet he needs that
knowledge in order to live. He is not exempt from the laws of
reality, he is a specific
organism of a specific nature that requires specific actions to
sustain his life. He cannot
achieve his survival by arbitrary means nor by random motions
nor by blind urges nor by
chance nor by whim. That which his survival requires is set by
his nature and is not open
to his choice. What is open to his choice is only whether he will
discover it or not,
whether he will choose the right goals and values or not. He is
free to make the wrong
choice, but not free to succeed with it. He is free to evade
reality, he is free to unfocus his
mind and stumble blindly down any road he pleases, but not free
to avoid the abyss he
refuses to see. Knowledge, for any conscious organism, is the
means of survival; to a

82. living consciousness, every “is” implies an “ought.” Man is free
to choose not to be
conscious, but not free to escape the penalty of
unconsciousness: destruction. Man is the
only living species that has the power to act as his own
destroyer—and that is the way he
has acted through most of his history.
What, then, are the right goals for man to pursue? What are the
values his survival
requires? That is the question to be answered by the science of
ethics. And this, ladies and
gentlemen, is why man needs a code of ethics.
Now you can assess the meaning of the doctrines which tell you
that ethics is the
province of the irrational, that reason cannot guide man’s life,
that his goals and values
should be chosen by vote or by whim—that ethics has nothing
to do with reality, with
existence, with one’s practical actions and concerns—or that the
goal of ethics is beyond
the grave, that the dead need ethics, not the living.
Ethics is not a mystic fantasy—nor a social convention—nor a
dispensable, subjective
luxury, to be switched or discarded in any emergency. Ethics is
an objective, metaphysi-
15
Ayn Rand – THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS
cal necessity of man’s survival—not by the grace of the

83. supernatural nor of your
neighbors nor of your whims, but by the grace of reality and the
nature of life.
I quote from …
1
Before Ethics
Eric R. Severson
1
Chapter 3: Arjuna’s Plight
Meno refused his invitation to be initiated onto a contemplative
path, a decision that cost him his
life. But similar proposals have been answered differently in the
history of philosophy. When Socrates
invites Meno to become “initiated in the mysteries,'' he is,
perhaps unknowingly, echoing similar
invitations underway around planet earth. A century before
Socrates, in what is today northeastern India,
a man named Siddhārtha Gautama, eventually called Buddha,
was stirring the imagination of people

84. worlds apart. The wisdom of the Buddha, for thinking about
what comes “before ethics,” will consume
our attention in Chapter 7. In this chapter, my focus will be on
the Indian philosophical gem called the
Bhagavad Gita, a vivid and poetic song recorded by a
mysterious Indian wise man known as Vyasa. The
hero of the Gita is a man named Arjuna, a powerful warrior and
skillful leader. Like Meno, Arjuna is in
the midst of preparing himself for battle when he is beset by
philosophical questions posed to him. Like
Meno, Arjuna is stunned by these questions, which wash over
him and leave him paralyzed and
incapacitated. He says: “My being is paralyzed by faint-
heartedness.”2 Yet unlike Meno, Arjuna is
transformed by this encounter, and moves willingly into the
mysteries.
This chapter will tell the story of Arjuna and in the process,
draw wisdom from ancient and
modern Hindu philosophy. My purpose here is not to provide
any kind of exhaustive summary of this
story, nor to pose as an expert in the philosophies of ancient
India. Instead, I turn to this and other global
philosophical traditions for help with universal human questions
about how we might best prepare to

85. 1 https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/ancient-egypt-
greek-chinese-indian-amerindian-74590051
2 Bhagavad Gita Discourse 2 number 7 [convert to translation
by Goerg Feuerstein]
2
think about human morality. The very fact that Western
philosophy has been the standard “starting point”
for ethical dialogue is already a concern. Additionally, I am
suspicious that Western ethical theory has
fallen into a series of traps, some of which Chinese, Indian,
Muslim, and African (along with many
others) philosophies might help Western thinkers avoid. In fact,
this chapter is merely an attempt to
provide a response to my friends and mentors who specialize in
Indian philosophy, and who have insisted
that there is much to be gained for considering the manner in
which Indian thinking leans into moral
questions. Much is surely to be gained in thinking about what
comes before ethics across cultural,

86. geographical, and philosophical boundaries. Sometimes
priorities may seem to converge, and at other
times the differences between these traditions will be stark. I
hope it becomes obvious that there is little to
be lost by exploring how various world philosophies prepare
people to think about ethics.
Here we turn to Arjuna’s plight because this story was meant,
all along, to invite readers to be
stunned and then allow the impact to reshape the way they live.
Though set in the context of war and the
choice to fight, run away, or do nothing, the Gita is designed to
function as a guide to all decisions, as a
mode of thinking contemplatively about the small and large
decisions that make up human living.3 It is
impossible to do justice to the Bhagavad Gita in this little
chapter, let alone the vast philosophical
tradition behind it. Still, it would be tragic to ignore this
significant global tradition as we think about how
we position ourselves before ethics. In the following chapter, I
will briefly summarize some key themes in
Indian philosophy which provide a framework for understanding
the story of the Gita. After describing
Arjuna’s moment of paralysis, I will explore the ethical
significance of this episode. I will provide several

87. meditations on the importance of this text for our purposes in
this volume, exploring the capacity of this
philosophical tradition to deal with complexity, ambiguity, and
the important tension between ethical
choices and the resulting outcomes.
Stunned by Dharma
Before discussing the philosophical significance of this ancient
text, I must first note a few
difficulties that have often prevented this text, and the Indian
philosophical tradition, from being routinely
considered alongside the ethical texts of the West. These
obstacles cannot be treated fully here but must
absolutely be part of any conversation that hopes to appeal to
non-Western traditions for thinking about
ethical issues. A massive, ancient philosophical tradition cannot
be summarized adequately in a few
pages, but a brief introduction to the Hindu concept of dharma –
the idea at the heart of ethics in this
3 Galvin Flood; Charles Martin (2013). The Bhagavad Gita: A
New Translation. W.W. Norton & Company. pp. xv–

88. xvi. ISBN 978-0-393-34513-1. (provide a quotation from these
pages reinforcing that point).
3
tradition – provides some important context for talking about
the Arjuna’s situation in the Bhagavad
Gita.4
First, this text challenges a number of the trappings of religious
mythology, and even theology
itself. Krishna, the primary dispenser of wisdom in the Gita, is a
deity, and Arjuna asks his ethical
questions in the only way he knows how. For Arjuna, ethical
decisions are made through attending to the
dharma, a concept rooted deeply in Hindu culture and religion.
These are true statements, but misleading.
People who read this text in the West often have a prior
familiarity with religious writings, and these
evoke conversations between mortals and immortals, between
people and deities. Readers familiar with
the Bible, the Torah, and the Qur’an have frequently
encountered stories where people talk to “God” and
in these traditions, the conversations are almost always between
a human being and an external “Other.”

89. The Prophet Mohammed, whose teachings founded Islam,
encountered God as extraordinarily different
and distinct from anything he had ever known.5 Moses had to
remove his shoes before walking in the
presence of God.6 Paul, first known as Saul, was struck
temporarily blind by his encounter with a vision
of Jesus.7 It would be natural for readers of the Gita who have
been conditioned to think in this way about
theophany (the visitations of human beings by a deity), but
something starkly different is underway in the
Hindu tradition.
Truth, indeed ultimate reality itself, is not something found
external to Arjuna. Krishna’s voice
and advice are part of an internal deliberation that relates to the
truth of all things. Gandhi, who tends to
interpret the Gita ethically rather than spiritually, suggests that
readers are to think of Krishna as
imaginary, as the voice of perfection.8 That which is true about
the universe, about “God” (that word itself
may not work across the divide between Western and Eastern
philosophy), is available through a deep
exploration of every person, every “self.” Though the beings of
this world appear to be distinct and

90. independent, they share a common being, an ultimate unity.
Though ancient Indian philosophy knew
nothing of the physics of the Big Bang, there are parallels
between this very ancient way of thinking
about the universe and scientific discoveries. All things were
once one, sharing a primordial,
undifferentiated, infinitely condensed unity. Every atom, before
it was even an atom, and including time
4 Gandhi said, of the Bhagavad Gita: “If all the other scritupres
were reduced to ashes, the seven hundred verses of
this imperishable booklet are quite enough to tell me what
Hinduism is and how one can live up to it.” Mahatma
Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Volume LI
(Ahmedabad: Navajivan, YEAR), 344.
5 Husayn Haykal, Muhammad (2008). The Life of Muhammad.
Selangor: Islamic Book Trust, 79–80 (FIND BOOK
and make citation, quotation).
6 In Exodus 3, Moses approaches a strange bush in the
wilderness that is burning but not consumed. God instructs
Moses: “Do not come near. Remove your shoes from your feet
because the place where you are standing is holy
ground.” Cite NRSV.
7 Acts 9:8-9 Cite NRSV
8 Mahatma Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,
Volume XIV, 175.

91. 4
itself, existed in that unity. All things that exist today consist of
matter that was once part of the
undifferentiated singularity. This is strikingly similar to the
ancient Hindu cosmology, which emphasized
the ultimate unity of all matter and meaning. This unity is
sometimes called Brahman, a word that simply
cannot be translated into English without significant distortion.
Brahman is all things, and God. Brahman
is the meaning, unity, and connectivity that still reverberates in
all things that exist, large and small.
Above all, Brahman indicates the harmonious unity that exists
beneath and beyond the chaos of
the world as we know it. For religion and philosophy in this
tradition, the nature and centrality of that
“center” to the universe is the heart of thinking and living.
Many Hindus wear a small, colored dot on
their forehead, called a bindi. This tiny dot represents that
center, the place of unity that is the history and
destiny of all things. The smudge of paint is simultaneously
indicative of the singularity of the individual
– the atman (self) – and the unity of that self with ultimate
reality. The analogy to the Big Bang theory is

92. again helpful. There is no point in searching for the “center” of
the universe, the “place” where the Big
Bang occurred; every point in the universe is the center, the site
of this original unity. Place, time, and
matter all originate in that singularity; we are all the center of
the universe. Likewise, the bindi is a
reminder, worn by millions of people today, that every person is
Brahman. Every being is the center, the
ultimate.
Yet despite this pre-original and ongoing unity, the world is
highly differentiated. We are
separated, quite distinctly, and our separation is both beautiful
and challenging. The unity between me
and a rock, you and this book, is not immediately evident.
Perhaps even more obvious is the separation
between enemies, between people intent on hurting one another.
Just as the explosion of the Big Bang led
to differentiated atoms, molecules, and living beings, the
diversification of the Hindu “One” into “Many”
is both beautiful and terrible. We can already detect what comes
before ethics in such a tradition; there is
a standing duty of human beings to pursue harmony, unity, good
will, and general benevolence. There is a

93. difference, though perhaps subtle, to think of ethical ideals as
aimed at harmony, rather than perfection, as
Plato might incline us.
Ethical questions are to be asked in light of this ultimate truth
about the universe. Arjuna has
found his life situated in a system that is oriented toward this
harmony, and now finds himself in an
incredibly difficult position. People, after all, are often unaware
of the unity that bind together all things,
and turn instead toward greed, separation, violence, and apathy.
The world is chaotic, and suffering
abounds, leading people to make decisions that lead to more
pain and separation. A shortsighted view of
the world makes passing problems seem massive, and in this
regard Hindu life depends on a deeply
meditative approach to life. A person who lives
contemplatively, meditatively, and intentionally will see
the bigger picture and make decisions that lead the world
toward peace. One expression of meditative
living is yoga, a practice that is sometimes distorted beyond
recognition in the Western world, in which it
5

94. has been mostly reduced to exercise in meditation and bodily
flexibility. Yoga can take many forms, but
always indicates a mode of living, moving, and being
contemplative and centered. Like boats floating on
a rough sea, we appear to exist in isolation and separation from
one another, and either band together for
survival or turn against one another in violence. Yoga, in this
analogy, is like diving beneath the waves of
chaos that cloud our judgment, and seeing the tranquility of the
ocean below, the reality that binds
together all things. Ethics in the Indian tradition therefore seeks
pathways toward unity and harmony that
are not clouded by shortsighted panic over individual situations.
Arjuna’s story must be understood in
light of this tension.
The true nature of every atman is found in unity, in Brahman,
but the diversity of our lives as
“selves” is profound. Our bodies look different, our skills and
abilities are suited for some tasks but not
others. We also find ourselves capable of doing great harm to
any harmony already present in the universe
and driven to do so by the pressures and sufferings surrounding
us. Each decision, from the miniscule to

95. the massive, either moves with the grain of the universe or
against it. Every action, every word, every
invention, every breath moves either toward harmony or against
it. These choices are guided by eternal
laws, called dharma, which provide the structure and basis for
both the particular and universal journey
toward the unity that is the true nature of all that exists. A
fundamental moral task there for confronts
every person: how do I fit into the world in which I find
myself? In many cases, the laws of dharma are
fairly obvious and straightforward; people should do the work
for which they are best suited. There may
be times in which we are pressed to do work for which we are
not particularly well suited by the overall
needs of the world. However, when we have choices, we should
lean toward that which makes us flourish
and the world around us flourish.
If sometimes we are pressed into work for which we are not
well suited, we sometimes find that
we desire duties for which we are not a harmonious fit. If I had
dreams of becoming a soccer goalie for
professional club, the path to that future would be ridiculously
improbable. I am a small man, 5’4” if I
stand up very straight, and not particularly good at jumping,

96. diving, or blocking fast-moving soccer balls.
I could spend every waking minute practicing, every spare
dollar on trainers and coaches, and every
ounce of my energy trying to become great at something for
which I am not well suited. This would be a
profound waste of energy, of course. Even if I were not well
past my athletic prime, there is nothing to be
done about my height, and no amount of training can overcome
athletic insufficiencies in my DNA. I’m
far better suited for other tasks in the world, such as working in
narrow mineshafts. There are people who
can, with exponentially less time and energy, become adept at
soccer skills. More seriously, many a
human life has been spent attempting to thrive in the wrong
setting, in roles or duties for which they are
poorly suited. Dharma is sometimes hidden and only apparent
after much contemplation and
experimentation. At other times, dharma is obvious.
6
A 2014 children’s book by Bridget Turner, You Can Be
Anything You Want to Be, seeks to help

97. liberate children from limitations that might keep kids from
fulfilling their potential.9 The book names
important components of human life that have been used to limit
the potential of children: disability,
family situations, race and ethnicity, along with environmental
and religious factors. But the book also
pushes a fable: “Do you know that you can do anything you put
your mind to and be anything you want
to be?”10 Such admonitions are well meaning, and often
designed to liberate children from oppressive
categories. Girls have, for far too long, been steered away from
advanced studies in mathematics, science
and engineering. Yet the simplistic “you can be anything you
wish” message is also a dangerous one.
Turner is wrong, plainly, and her words underscore a dangerous
myth. The notion of dharma resists this
notion that with enough hard work, success will always follow.
Sometimes hard work leads to failure;
sometimes the hardest working goalie is still too short to reach
the soccer ball. Dharma is a reminder that
in the midst of our precarious and brief lives there is something
profane about wasting energy trying to
fulfill absurd dreams. This much cannot, for the devotee of this
philosophical system, be doubted.11 At the

98. same time, the true view of the universe, and the place of any
one person in its harmony, is known to no
one.12 This leads to ambiguity and paradox, at times, which
are not necessarily “seen as faults to avoid
but more as mysteries to embrace and explore.”13 In the words
of Swami Vivekenanda, who was
instrumental in bringing Indian philosophy to the United States:
“Each one thinks his method is best.
Very good! But remember, it may be good for you.”14
There is a dharma, for instance, for every stage of life. Children
should not operate heavy
machinery, adults should not spend all day on playgrounds, and
the elderly should not be expected to do
heavy labor. Dharma changes, in every moment, with the
changing of the weather, the aging of bodies,
the wounds and scars we gather in life, and the shifting political
and familial duties. In all things, dharma
seeks harmony, and so the person who wishes to live well in
this tradition must have an exceedingly
flexible approach to their duties. A good choice in one
environment can be a catastrophically bad choice
when the conditions are different. Ethics, in this tradition, will
not be legalistic; dharma is fluid. Yet it
might be easy to reach a misunderstanding here, which is

99. common for Western readers of Hindu
philosophy. The idea of my dharma, of a particular “meaning of
life” for me, is also a distortion of the
9 Bridget Turner, You Can Be Anything You Want to Be
(Bloomington, IN: Archway Publishing, 2014).
10 Ibid, 6.
11 “[The person who is] unknowing and without faith and of
doubting self will perish. For the doubting self, there is
no happiness either in this world or the next.” Bhagavad Gita,
Goerg Feuerstein trans., 147, Lines 4.40. [convert]
12 Rather than presuming universal knowledge, the Gita
repeatedly advocated virtues such as “lack-of-pride,
unpretentiousness, nonharming, patience, uprightness, reverence
for the preceptor, purity, steadiness, self
restraint…” Bhagavad Gita, Goerg Feuerstein trans., 255, Lines
13.7.
13 Edward Viljoen, The Bhagavad Gita: The Song of God
Retold (New York: St. Martins, 2019), 76.
14 Swami Vivekanada, Collected Works, Volume 1 (Calcutta:
Advaita Ashrama, 1926), 470.
7
concept of duty in Indian thought. Sometimes Gandhi’s
interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita has been

100. critiqued for leaning too heavily on the implications of this
poetry on the application of these teachings
for individuals. J. T. F. Jordens claims that for Gandhi the Gita
is about “self control,” which means
“interpretations of the historical, academic or theological type
only skim the surface. The real task of the
interpreter becomes self-evident: it is to put the ethical code of
the Gita into effect in his own life.”15 This
does not mean Gandhi is wrong; it does mean we should be
careful about reading this text with merely
individual ethical formation in mind.
Dharma is certainly about what choices an individual person
makes in the world, but it would be
a mistake to think of it individualistically. It would be a waste
of my energy to train for a career as a
soccer goalie, but the real problem lies in the world I would
abandon in order to pursue that foolish goal.
The likelihood that somebody pays me to block soccer balls is
astronomically low and there are a number
of people who depend upon me to provide food and shelter.
Then, there is the time I would spend doing
things that help nobody and energy spent developing skills that
are not helpful to my family, to my
friends, to my colleagues. Dharma is not principally about each

101. person finding their own destiny or
individual fulfillment in the universe. Dharma is about the big
picture. Some portions of the big picture
are specific to each person, but other pieces are available for all
to see. One of those, for Arjuna and for
traditional interpretations of dharma, is family.
The Bhagavad Gita is the most famous excerpt from the massive
Hindu epic The Mahabharata.
Hinduism may very well be the most diverse of the world’s
religious traditions and Indian philosophy is
one expression of that diversity. There are, for instance, many
thousands of holy writings in Hinduism;
various Hindu groups gravitate toward different texts, different
deities, and diverse practices. In the midst
of this multiplicity, the Bhagavad Gita may very well stand
alone as the most universally celebrated.
Gerald James Larson, a scholar of Hindu philosophy, claims: “if
there is any one text that comes near to
embodying the totality of what it is to be a Hindu, it would be
the Bhagavad Gita."16 The popularity of
this text, though, has often led readers to overlook an important
decision made by Arjuna before the
verses of the Gita begin.

102. The story begins with a great deal of action already underway,
as is often the case with good
stories. Two armies are assembled, one significantly larger and
better armed. The smaller army is led by
Arjuna, a great archer and the prince of his people, known as
the Pandavas. The field of battle is empty,
15 J. T. F. Jordens, “Gandhi and the Bhagavadgita,” Modern
Indian Interpretations of the Bhagavad Gita, Robert
Minor, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), 104.
16 Gerald James Larson, “The ‘Tradition Text’ in Indian
Philosophy for Doing History of Philosophy in India,” in R.
T. Ames, ed., The Aesthetic Turn: Reading Eliot Deutsch on
Comparative Philosophy (Peru, IL: Carus Publishing),
132.
8
waiting for a great war to begin. This war that is about to begin
was not inevitable; Arjuna had already
done a great deal to avoid it. Opposite his army, the Kauravas
are assembled, led by his cousins. The
Pandavas had been methodically squeezed out of their territory.
The powerful Kauravas had declined

103. Arjuna’s request that his people be allowed a small village in
which to dwell. In an act of genocidal greed,
the leader of the Kauravas, a man named Duryodhana, had
denied the Pandavas even a piece of land the
size of needlepoint: “I will not surrender to the Pandavas even
that much of land which may be covered
by the sharp point of a needle.”17 And so the cornered
Pandavas, facing genocide, had turned to Arjuna to
prevent their annihilation.
This is what makes the Bhagavad Gita brilliant; it positions
Arjuna between family members,
with genocide in the air, and places a bow in his hand. Family
members die no matter what he does. There
is no simple, clear duty that would guide him forward at this
point. Dharma pulls him in opposing
directions. The Gita is therefore a text built to help people
grapple with conflicts with the systems of
dharma. In fact, this text was composed in an era of great unrest
within Hinduism, as certain
manifestations of Hindu dharma were being called into question
by new generations. Particularly, the
laws of dharma had been used, from time immemorial, to
establish and support a caste (varna) system for

104. social organization. In this type of caste system, which is illegal
in India today but continues to exert
significant influence on social and political relations, the
channels for dharma are largely determined by
one’s birth. This means that the principle duties that one
performs in the world are largely determined by
gender, ethnicity, social, and economic situation of ones
parents. One can see some functional importance
to this practice, especially in its earliest history. Fathers who
were fishermen trained their children to fish,
and their whole family diet and schedule would revolve around
the practices that led to effective fishing.
If a child in a fisher-family decided she would prefer to train to
be a shoemaker rather than deal with fish,
this choice would push against the grain of the family dynamic.
Shoemaking requires different tools;
cobbler’s instruments are unlikely to coincide with tools
designed for fishing. Cobblers have particular
skills and tricks and abilities, and these would not be readily
available to the daughter of a fisherman. The
caste system came to structure which families, groups, and
ethnicities could provide religious and
political leadership. It determined which persons should take
military leadership, which persons should

105. carry away trash, who should deal with sewage, and who should
live in luxury. We should not be
surprised that scholars and leaders have soundly rejected this
system as a distortion of the concept of
dharma, and an abuse of the concept of varna in the Gita.18
People familiar with the legacy of racism and
17 Mahabharata, Book 5, Section LVIII [find best translation]
18 For instance, Vijay Kumar Saxena argues that: “Arjuna is
extremely concerned about the varna-admixture
(pollution of varna). It is necessary to understand why Arjuna is
giving so much emphasis on ‘varna-pollution.’
Varna these days is usually translated as caste but the existing
caste system, based on heritage and not attributes of
9
classism around the world should also be unsurprised that the
legacy of the caste system continues to
haunt societies around the world influenced by these practices.
From Paralysis to Action

106. Arjuna, knowing that he needs help, goes to see the wise and
powerful deity Krishna, who
simultaneously gives audience to Arjuna’s enemy,
Duryodhana.19 Krishna is not a king, but does have a
powerful army supporting him. He chooses neutrality in the
battle but offers two gifts for their use in the
war to come: his armies and his counsel. The armies and
weapons at his disposal are vast so when Arjuna
values Krishna’s wisdom over his power, Duryodhana is
surprised and pleased. Thinking Arjuna to be the
fool, he gladly takes the army of 10,000 soldiers over the mere
advice of Krishna. Duryodhana longs for
victory in war and seeks the advantages that lead to such an
outcome. Arjuna, he thinks, has chosen
foolishly by thinking that words of advice from Krishna might
have as much value as legions of well-
armed troops. The contrast with Meno is palpable; Meno left
Athens with troops, but no wisdom. Both
Duryodhana and Meno paid dearly for choosing power over
wisdom and contemplative action.
When the day arrives and the battle lines are formed, Arjuna
rides with his charioteer, who is
Krishna in disguise, for a moment of reflection before the war
begins. Like Meno, who before a great

107. battle stopped for a conversation with Socrates about what it
means to be virtuous, Arjuna paused. As he
looks across the battlefield, he sees the faces of his uncles, his
cousins, his teachers, his friends. This is
not a battle between a distant invader but a war between
relatives and friends. The people who will lie
dead on the field afterward are people he loves. “Arjuna said:
My dear Krishna, seeing my friends and
relatives present before me in such a fighting spirit, I feel the
limbs of my body quivering and my mouth
drying up.”20 Behind him and before him, Arjuna sees faces of
those he loves. There are no right answers
here; all choices lead to death. It is at this very moment in this
epic story that it becomes glaringly clear:
this is a story about ethics. After all, ethical reasoning is not an
adventure in thinking about morality when
there is no skin in the game. Arjuna must decide. And his
decision will lead to suffering. Indecision will
also lead to suffering. There is no road before him that neatly
moves through the minefield of suffering

108. nature, is very different from the ancient social
classification…” Saxena, Feel the Bhagavad Gita: A New
Interpretation (Bloomington, IN: Archway Publishing, 2016),
89. However, Saxena advocates against both the
modern and the ancient version of varna as the basis for social
organization. Sri Aurobindo writes: “[The Gita] lays
very little stress on the external rule and very great stress on the
internal law which the Varna system attempted to
put into regulated outward practice. And it is on the individual
and spiritual value of this law and not on its
communal and economic or …
A reading for Eric Severson’s Ethics course 1
Animal Liberation
Peter Singer
A few excerpts:
“Animal Liberation” may sound more like a parody of other
liberation movements than a
serious objective. The idea of “The Rights of Animals” actually

109. was once used to parody the
case for women’s rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft published
her Vindication of the Rights
of Women in 1792, her views were widely regarded as absurd,
and before long, an anonymous
publication appeared entitled A Vindication of the Rights of
Brutes. The author of this satirical
work (now known to have been Thomas Taylor, a distinguished
Cambridge philosopher) tried
to refute Mary Wollstonecraft’s arguments by showing that they
could be carried one stage
further. If the argument for equality was sound when applied to
women, why should it not be
applied to dogs, cats, and horses? …
A reading for Eric Severson’s Ethics course 2
When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed,
or sex, are equal, what is it
that we are asserting? Like it or not, we must face the fact that
humans come in different
shapes and sizes; they come with different moral capacities,
different intellectual abilities,
different amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the

110. needs of others, different
abilities to communicate effectively, and different capacities to
experience pleasure and pain.
In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual
equality of all human beings, we
would have to stop demanding equality. …
The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines
of race or sex, however,
provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated
opponent of equality, one who
proposes that, say, the interests of all those with IQ scores
below 100 be given less
consideration than the interests of those with ratings over 100.
Perhaps those scoring below
the mark would, in this society, be made the slaves of those
scoring higher. Would a
hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than
one based on race or sex? I think
not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual
equality of the different races or
sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism
does not provide us with any
basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. …

111. Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one
particular outcome of a
scientific investigation. … There is no logically compelling
reason for assuming that a factual
difference in ability between two people justifies any difference
in the amount of
consideration we give to their needs and interests. The principle
of the equality of human
beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among
humans: It is a prescription of
how we should treat human beings.
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school
of moral philosophy,
incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his
system of ethics by means of the
formula: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.” In
other words, the interests of
every being affected by an action are to be taken into account
and given the same weight as
A reading for Eric Severson’s Ethics course 3
the like interests of any other being. …
It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern

112. for others and our readiness to
consider their interests ought not to depend on what they are
like or on what abilities they may
possess. Precisely what our concern or consideration requires us
to do may vary according to
the characteristics of those affected by what we do: concern for
the well-being of children
growing up in America would require that we teach them to
read; concern for the well-being
of pigs may require no more than that we leave them with other
pigs in a place where there is
adequate food and room to run freely. But the basic element—
the taking into account of the
interests of the being, whatever those interests may be—must,
according to the principle of
equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or
feminine, human or
nonhuman.
Thomas Jefferson, who was responsible for writing the principle
of the equality of men into
the American Declaration of Independence, saw this point. It
led him to oppose slavery even
though he was unable to free himself fully from his
slaveholding background. He wrote in a

113. letter to the author of a book that emphasized the notable
intellectual achievements of Negroes
in order to refute the then common view that they have limited
intellectual capacities: “Be
assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I do, to
see a complete refutation of
the doubts I myself have entertained and expressed on the grade
of understanding allotted to
them by nature, and to find that they are on a par with ourselves
… but whatever be their
degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir
Isaac Newton was superior to
others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the
property or person of others.”
Similarly, when in the 1850s the call for women’s rights was
raised in the United States, a
remarkable black feminist named Sojourner Truth made the
same point in more robust terms
at a feminist convention: “They talk about this thing in the
head; what do they call it?
[“Intellect,” whispered someone nearby.] That’s it. What’s that
got to do with women’s rights
or Negroes’ rights? If my cup won’t hold but a pint and yours
holds a quart, wouldn’t you be

114. A reading for Eric Severson’s Ethics course 4
mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?”
It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case
against sexism must both ultimately
rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that the attitude
that we may call “speciesism,”
by analogy with racism, must also be condemned. Speciesism—
the word is not an attractive
one, but I can think of no better term—is a prejudice or attitude
of bias in favor of the interests
of members of one’s own species and against those of members
of other species. It should be
obvious that the fundamental objections to racism and sexism
made by Thomas Jefferson and
Sojourner Truth apply equally to speciesism. If possessing a
higher degree of intelligence does
not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends,
how can it entitle humans to
exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?
Many philosophers and other writers have proposed the
principle of equal consideration of

115. interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but
not many of them have
recognized that this principle applies to members of other
species as well as to our own.
Jeremy Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a
forward-looking passage written
at a time when black slaves had been freed by the French but in
the British dominions were
still being treated in the way we now treat animals, Bentham
wrote:
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may
acquire those rights which never
could have been withholden from them but by the hand of
tyranny. The French have already
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a
human being should be
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may
one day come to be
recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin,
or the termination of the os
sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a
sensitive being to the same fate.
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the
faculty of reason, or perhaps the

116. faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond
comparison a more rational, as
well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a
week or even a month, old.
But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The
question is not, Can they reason?
A reading for Eric Severson’s Ethics course 5
nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
In this passage, Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as
the vital characteristic that
gives a being the right to equal consideration. … If a being
suffers, there can be no moral
justification for refusing to take that suffering into
consideration. No matter what the nature of
the being, the principle of equality requires that [his or her]
suffering be counted equally with
the like suffering—insofar as rough comparisons can be made—
of any other being. …
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater
weight to the interests of members of
their own race when there is a clash between their interests and
the interests of those of

117. another race. Sexists violate the principle of equality by
favoring the interests of their own
sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own
species to override the greater
interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in
each case.
Most human beings are speciesists. … [O]rdinary human
beings—not a few exceptionally
cruel or heartless humans, but the overwhelming majority of
humans—take an active part in,
acquiesce in, and allow their taxes to pay for practices that
require the sacrifice of the most
important interests of members of other species in order to
promote the most trivial interests
of our own species.…
Even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals
only when it is quite certain
that the interests of humans will not be affected to anything like
the extent that animals are
affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our
treatment of animals that would
involve our diet, the farming methods we use, experimental
procedures in many fields of
science, our approach to wildlife and to hunting, trapping and