Case Summaries for Criminal Procedure, 6eJohn Scheb and John M. .docx

Case Summaries for Criminal Procedure, 6e
John Scheb and John M. Scheb IIChapter 1
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968). Here the Supreme Court made the
right of trial by jury applicable to defendants in state criminal
cases. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas,
Justice Black expressed his satisfaction with what the Court had
done under the mantle of selective incorporation: “I believe as
strongly as ever that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. I have been
willing to support the selective incorporation doctrine, however,
as an alternative, although perhaps less historically supportable
than complete incorporation. ... [T]he selective incorporation
process has the virtue of having already worked to make most of
the Bill of Rights protections applicable to the States.”
Boykin v. Alabama (1969). Boykin pled guilty to five counts of
common law robbery; however, at this time Alabama law
provided for a jury to determine a defendant’s sentence. At the
sentencing phase, the trial judge asked Boykin no questions
regarding the voluntariness of his plea agreement nor did
Boykin address the court. The prosecution presented
eyewitness testimony; however, Boykin’s attorney failed to
present any mitigating evidence on behalf of Mr. Boykin
including the fact that there was no indication the defendant had
a prior criminal history. The jury returned a death sentence.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, held
“several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver
that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state
criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment…. Second, is
the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one’s
accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of these important
federal rights from a silent record.” The Supreme Court

reversed the defendant’s sentence because there was no
indication in the court record that his plea was made “voluntary
and understandingly.”
Chapter 2
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). Clarence Earl Gideon, a 51 year-
old indigent “drifter” who had been in and out of jails all his
adult life, was charged with felonious breaking and entering. At
trial, he requested that the court appoint an attorney to represent
him. The court refused, citing the Florida law that required
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants only in capital
cases. While serving his sentence in the Florida State Prison,
Gideon unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in the Florida
Supreme Court on a writ of habeas corpus. He then obtained
review by the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. In a
unanimous decision, the Court reversed Gideon’s conviction.
Writing for the Court, Hugo Black opined that “[t]he right of
one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it
is in ours.” Gideon v. Wainwright overruled the Supreme
Court’s 1942 holding in Betts v. Brady. Because Gideon was
made retroactive, it allowed numerous persons serving time in
state prisons to win their freedom by seeking writ of habeas
corpus in the state and federal courts. Without question, Gideon
was one of the most important decisions of the Warren Court in
the field of criminal justice.
Williams v. Florida (1970). Two years prior to this case, the
Supreme Court held “that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right to a trial by jury in all criminal cases in
Duncan v. Louisiana. Here, the defendant was charged with
robbery and tried by a jury composed of six members. The
question before the Supreme Court was “whether the
constitutional guarantee of a trial by ‘jury’ necessarily requires
a trial by exactly 12 persons.” The Court held that a jury of

twelve is not a requirement under the Sixth Amendment’s right
as applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment to a trial
by jury in criminal cases.
Solorio v. United States (1987). While Petitioner Richard
Solorio was on active duty in the Seventeenth Coast Guard
District in Juneau, Alaska he “sexually abused two young
daughters of a fellow coastguardsmen.” Authorities learned of
these alleged crimes after the Coast Guard transferred the
Petitioner to New York. New York authorities investigated the
Petitioner for similar sexual abuse allegations while stationed in
New York. As a result of the investigations, the Governors
Island commander convened a general court-martial to try the
Petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and
New York. The question presented was whether the
“jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try a member of
the Armed Forces depends on the ‘service-connection’ of the
offense charged.” The Court held it did not, overruling its prior
holding in O'Callahan v. Parker.
Ex Parte Milligan (1866). Lambdin P. Milligan, a civilian
residing in Indiana, was an active collaborator with the
Confederacy. In 1864, he was arrested and tried for treason by a
military commission established by order of President Lincoln.
Milligan was convicted and sentenced to death, but the sentence
was not carried out. In 1866, some time after hostilities had
ceased, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction. Its
landmark decision in Ex parte Milligan was a ringing
endorsement of civil liberties. The Supreme Court took note of
the fact that the civilian courts were open and operating in
Indiana when Milligan was arrested and tried by the military. In
ordering Milligan’s release, the Court condemned Lincoln’s
directive establishing military jurisdiction over civilians outside
of the immediate war area. It strongly affirmed the fundamental
right of a civilian to be tried in a regular court of law, with all

the procedural safeguards that characterize the criminal process.
It must be remembered that this strong assertion of
constitutional principles occurred a year after the close of the
Civil War and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Viewed in
this light, Ex parte Milligan may be more aptly described as an
admission of judicial weakness during time of war than as a
bold pronouncement of constitutional limits on presidential
power.
Ex parte Quirin (1942). In a special term of the Supreme Court
in 1942, the Supreme Courthanded down this opinion regarding
seven consolidated petitions for writs of habeas corpus. All the
Petitioners were born in Germany and lived in the United
States, and all but one were citizens of the German Reich. After
war was declared between the United States and Germany, the
Petitioners received training “at a sabotage school near Berlin,
where they were instructed in the use of explosives and in
methods of secret writing.” Some of the Petitioners made their
way to New York City, others to Florida, “in the hours of
darkness” carrying with them “a supply of explosives, fuses and
incendiary and timing devices.” The Federal Bureau of
Investigation apprehended all Petitioners and learned their
objective was to destroy “war industries and war facilities in the
United States.” The President, by Executive Order, appointed a
Military Commission and directed it to try the Petitioners for
offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War. The
executive order also delineated regulations and procedures on
the trial and for review of the trial record and of any judgment
or sentence of the Commission. Also, the President, by
Proclamation, declared “that ‘all persons who are subjects,
citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States
or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the
United States through coastal or boundary defenses, and are
charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the

law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals’.” In addressing the
President’s exercise of his war powers as commander in chief,
the Court stated that the exercise of those powers, including the
detention and trial of the Petitioners, will not be set aside “in a
time of war and of grave public danger” unless they are in clear
conflict with the Constitution.” The Court stated that “lawful
combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of
war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they
are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts
which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly
and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in
time of war, seeking to gather military information and
communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are
familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not
to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment
by military tribunals.”
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006). A Yemeni national detained at
Guantanamo Bay brought suit to challenge the legality and
constitutionality of the military tribunal before which he was to
be tried. Hamdan’s brief to the Supreme Court argued that
President Bush had “claimed the unilateral authority to try
suspected terrorists wholly outside the traditional civilian and
military judicial systems, for crimes defined by the President
alone, under procedures lacking basic protections, before judges
who are his chosen subordinates.” In Hamdan’s view, the
president’s actions “reach far beyond any war power ever
conferred upon the Executive, even during declared wars.”
Dividing 5-to-3 (Chief Justice Roberts not participating because
he had previously voted in the case at the court of appeals level)
the Court held that the Bush Administration’s plan to try
Guantanamo Bay detainees before military commissions was

unauthorized by statute and violated international law. The
overarching rationale of the Court’s decision is summed up by
Justice Stevens’ assertion that: “Even assuming that Hamdan is
a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to
innocent civilians given the opportunity, the executive
nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in
undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment.”
The majority indicated that Congress could, through appropriate
legislation, provide for the use of military tribunals to try
Guantanamo Bay detainees.
In re Gault (1967). Gerald Francis Gault, a juvenile, was
arrested in 1964 while his mother and father were at work. The
police made no attempt to notify the juvenile’s parents that their
son had been taken into custody. During the course of trying to
find her son, Mrs. Gault was informed that Gerald had been
taken to the juvenile detention home. There, she was informed
that a legal hearing would take place in juvenile court the
following day. A petition for delinquency was filed with the
court the next day; however, the Gaults were never served with
a copy of the petition, which further failed to allege facts to
support an allegation of delinquency. Mrs. Gault, her eldest
son, and two probation officers appeared before the Judge in
chambers. The victim that claimed Gerald had made lewd
phone calls to her home was not present at the hearing. “No one
was sown in. No transcript was made. No memorandum or
record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared.”
Ultimately, the Judge sentenced Gerald to the State Industrial
School until the age of majority for allegedly making lewd
phone calls to a neighbor. No appeal was permitted under
Arizona state law. Gerald’s father filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus requesting the release of his son; however, the
state appellate courts denied the petition. The Supreme Court
held that due process requires that several basic rights under the
Constitution be afforded to juvenile offenders. First, adequate
written notice of the charges must be afforded with adequate

preparation time prior to court appearances. Second, the child
and his parents must be advised of their right to be represented
by counsel, and if they are unable to afford counsel, that
counsel will be appointed to represent the child. Third, the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is also
applicable in juvenile criminal cases. Fourth, juveniles are also
afforded the rights of confrontation and sworn testimony of
witnesses available for cross-examination.
Chapter 3
Chimel v. California (1969). Police officers obtained a warrant
for the Chimel’s arrest for allegedly committing various
burglaries. Law enforcement went to Chimel’s home to execute
the arrest warrant; however, he was not home. Chimel’s wife
allowed the police to wait until he returned. When Chimel
arrived, the police arrested him. The police asked for Chimel’s
consent to search the premises, but he refused. Although
Chimel denied their request, the police “conducted a search of
the entire house ‘on the basis of the lawful arrest’.” Items were
seized and subsequently used to convict Chimel of burglary
over his objection that the items were unconstitutionally seized.
The Supreme Court held the “warrantless search of petitioner’s
house cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that
arrest.” The Court futher specified that “an arresting officer
may search the arrestee’s person to discover and remove
weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or
destruction, and may search the area ‘within the immediate
control’ of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. On
this basis, the Court held the serach unconstitutional under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000). In August 1998, the
City of Indianapolis began to a operate vehicle checkpoints in
an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The overall ‘hit rate’ of
the program was approximately nine percent. The checkpoint
locations were predetermined weeks in advance based on area

crime statistics and traffic flow. The checkpoints were
conducted during daylight hours and were identified with
lighted signs reading, “NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT ___ MILE
AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO
STOP.” Respondent James Edmonds was stopped at a
checkpoint and later filed a motion for injunctive relief
claiming that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution. The US District Court denied the motion for
injunctive relief; however, the US Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints
contravened the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
affirmed holding the checkpoints in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because their primary purpose was
indistinguishable from general interest crime control. The
Court refused to validate suspicionless stops.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2000). In the fall of 1988, staff
members at the Charleston public hospital operated by the
Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) became
concerned about an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by
pregnant women. MUSC offered to cooperate with City
prosecutors when women delivered babies that tested postive for
illegal drugs at birth. A joint task force was created, which
developed “a policy which set forth procedures for identifying
and testing pregnant patients suspected of drug use; required
that a chain of custody be followed when obtaining and testing
patients’ urine samples; provided for education and treatment
referrals for patients testing positive; contained police
procedures and criteria for arresting patients who tested
positive; and prescribed prosecutions for drug offenses and/or
child neglect, depending on the stage of the defendant’s
pregnancy.” Women that were subsequently arrested under this
policy filed suit claiming that it violated their Fourth
Amendment rights on “the theory that warrantless and
nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory
purposes were unconstitutional searches.” The Supreme Court

agreed, holding that “a state hospital’s performance of a
diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient’s criminal
conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search
if the patient has not consented to the procedure.”
Florida v. J.L.
(2000). An anonymous informant called the Miami-Dade Police
to report that “a young black male standing at a particular bus
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” Two police
officers responded to the call and went to the particular bus stop
mentioned by the anonymous informant. The officers saw
“three black males ‘just hanging out’.” J.L., a juvenile, was
wearing a plaid shirt. The officers did not see a firearm in plain
view and “apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to
suspect any of the three of illegal conduct.” The officers
approached J.L., “told him to put his hands up on the bus stop,
frisked him, and seized a gun” from his pocket. The other two
males were frisked, but nothing was found. While the trial
court held the search invalid, the intermediate appellate court
reversed holding the search within constitutional limits. The
Florida Supreme Court reversed holding that “anonymous tips
… are generally less reliable than tips from known informants
and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion only if
accompanied by specific indicia of reliability. The Supreme
Court affirmed. Justice Ginsburg, speaking for the Court, held
“the anonymous call concerning J. L. provided no predictive
information and therefore left the police without means to test
the informant’s knowledge or credibility. That the allegation
about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the
officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for
suspecting J. L. of engaging in unlawful conduct.” She went on
to stated that “the reasonableness of official suspicion must be
measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their
search.” Because the officers only had information from an
“unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how
he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he
had inside information about J. L., there was a lack of

reasonable suspicion to justify the search.
Hester v. United States (1924). The defendant was convicted of
“concealing distilled spirits; however, the judge admitted
testimony of witnesses over the defendant’s objections and he
appealed. The two witnesses at issue were revenue officers
who, based on information they obtained during an
investigation, went speak to the defendant. As the officers
approached the house, they saw the defendant hand “a quart
bottle” to another individual. The officers attempted to
apprehend both individuals, but they fled with jugs in hand.
The officer fired a single shot and the defendant halted,
throwing his jug away in the process. While the jug the
defendant was carrying broke, there was enough left for the
officers to determine it had contained whisky. The officer did
not have an arrest or search warrant, and as a result, the
defendant argued the evidence was inadmissible. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction holding that the evidence was
admissible because when evidence is abandoned, as when the
defendant dropped the jug, there is no seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
Illinois v. Gates (1983). The police received an anonymous
letter that stated the Respondents, husband and wife, were
engaged in selling drugs. The letter claimed specific days and
times where the wife would drive their automoble to Florida “to
be loaded with drugs, and the husband would fly down” a few
days later “to drive the car back.” The letter claimed that car
“would be loaded with drugs, and that Respondents presently
had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.” The
police acted on the tip, determined respondents’ address,
learned that the husband made a reservation to fly to Florida,
made arrangements for surveillance of the flight with an agent
of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The surveillance
revealed “that the husband took the flight, stayed overnight in a
motel room registered in the wife’s name, and left the following
morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois license plate
issued to the husband, heading north on an interstate highway

used by travelers to the Bloomingdale area. A search warrant
for respondents’ residence and automobile were obtained, which
lead to the discovery of marijuana and other contraband in
respondents’ car trunk and home. The trial judge orderd all the
items seized suppressed because “the letter and affidavit were
inadequate to sustain a determination of probable cause for
issuance of the search warrant under Aguilar v. Texas and
Spinelli v. United States since they failed to satisfy the ‘two-
pronged test’ of (1) revealing the informant’s ‘basis of
knowledge’ and (2) providing sufficient facts to establish either
the informant’s ‘veracity’ or the ‘reliability’ of the informant's
report. The Supreme Court abandoned the Aguliar-Spinelli test
for a “totality of the circumstances” test. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, stated that the Aguilar-Spinelli test
“should be understood simply as closley intertwined issues that
may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question
whether there is ‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or
evidence is located in a particular place.” The Court went on to
state that “the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
pratical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.”
Katz v. United States (1967). In this landmark 1967 decision,
the Supreme Court overturned Olmstead v. United States
(1928). The Court reversed a conviction in which government
agents, acting without a warrant, attached a “bug,” or listening
device, to the outside of a public telephone booth from which
Charles Katz, a suspected bookie, often placed calls. Writing
for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people--not places.” According to Justice
Harlan’s concurrence, which has come to be regarded as the
most important opinion in Katz, the Fourth Amendment extends
to any place or any thing in which an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.

Knowles v. Iowa (1998). An Iowa policeman stopped Knowles
for speeding and issued him a citation rather than arresting him.
The officer conducted a full search of his car, without either
Knowles’s consent or probable cause, and found marijuana and
other contraband. Knowles was arrested and prior to trial
moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that since he had
not been arrested, the search could not be sustained under the
“search incident to arrest” exception recognized in United
States v. Robinson. The trial court denied the motion and found
Knowles guilty, based on state law giving officers authority to
conduct a full-blown search of an automobile and driver where
they issue a citation instead of making a custodial arrest.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, held
that the serach violated the Fourth Amendment for two reasons.
First, “the threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation
is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. While
concern for safety during a routine traffic stop may justify the
‘minimal’ additional intrusion of ordering a driver and
passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search.”
Additionally, Rehnquist asserted that “the need to discover and
preserve evidence does not exist in a traffic stop, for once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been
obtained.” The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
remanded for further proceedings.
Kyllo v. United States (2001). Here the Court considered
whether the use of a “thermal imager” by law enforcement
agents constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. In this case, police had used the device without
first obtaining a warrant to scan a home they suspected to be
housing an indoor marijuana growing operation. Having
discerned the telltale infrared radiation associated with the use
of indoor growing lights, and having obtained corroborating
information, the police obtained a warrant to search the
premises, where they found more than 100 cannabis plants. The

procedure used by police in the Kyllo case has been in wide use
around the country as part of the national war on drugs. Police
and prosecutors typically take the view that the thermal scan is
not a search within the meaning of the 4th Amendment, since it
only collects data on heat that is being released into the public
space. In a close decision (5-4), the Supreme Court disagreed
with this perspective. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
opined that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.” In dissent, Justice Stevens
noted that “[a]ll that the infrared camera did … was passively
measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of petitioners
home; all that those measurements showed were relative
differences in emission levels, vaguely indicating that some
areas of the roof and outside walls were warmer than others.” In
Stevens’s view, the police did not significantly intrude on the
privacy of the occupants. The Kyllo case is interesting because
it shows how changing technology creates new and difficult
Fourth Amendment problems. As technology in this area
advances, courts will continue to confront such problems.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Cleveland, Ohio police arrived at Dollree
Mapp’s home pursuant to information that a bombing suspect
was hiding there. They demanded access, but failing to produce
a search warrant, were denied. Police returned some four hours
later and forced their way into the home. Mapp, who protested
the entry was forcibly detained while officers searched the
home. Although police failed to locate the bombing suspect,
they did find in a trunk in the basement some sexually explicit
materials. Mapp was arrested, tried and convicted under the
Ohio statute proscribing possession of obscene materials.
Dividing 7-2, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed her conviction,
holding that the evidence had been improperly admitted against
her since it had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. In this landmark decision, the

Court overruled its precedent in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) and
applied the exclusionary rule to the state courts via the 14th
Amendment. Dissenting, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court
had “forgotten the sense of judicial restraint which, with due
regard for stare decisis, is one element that should enter into
deciding whether a past decision of this Court should be
overruled.” The majority, however, concluded that its decision
“gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice.”
Nix v. Williams (1984). The Respondent was arrested in
Davenport, Iowa for the disappearance of a 10-year-old girl in
Des Moines, Iowa. While the Respondent was being transported
to Des Moines, the police illegally interrogated him. During the
course of the “conversation,” the Respondent made
incriminating statements and directed the officers to the missing
child’s body. Prior to the beginning of the conversation
between the Respondent and the police, a “systematic search of
the area was being conducted with the aid of 200 volunteers.”
The search was terminated when the Respondent guided police
to the child’s body. The Respondent moved to suppress all
evidence at trial. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Burger, adopted the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule. Under this exception, illegally obtained
evidence, such as the Respondent’s confession, may be deemed
admissible when the prosecution can establish that the
information sought would have been ultimately or inevitably
discovered by lawful means. The Court held that the “search
party ultimately or inevitably would have discovered the
victim’s body” because the evidence revealed that the
volunteers “were approaching the actual location of the body,
that the search would have been resumed had respondent not led
the police to the body, and that the body inevitably would have

been found.”
Olmstead v. United States (1928). Olmstead, a suspected
bootlegger, was charged with conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act. The government’s evidence consisted of
transcripts of Olmstead’s telephone conversations obtained
through a wiretap placed outside his property. The agents had
obtained no warrant authorizing the wiretap. Although there was
no search or seizure of his person or physical property,
Olmstead maintained that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated. The term “effects,” as used in the Fourth Amendment,
could have been interpreted to include telephone conversations,
but the Court opted for a narrower construction. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Taft stated: “The reasonable view is that
one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with
connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite
outside, and that the wires beyond his house, and messages
passing over them, are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.” Justice Brandeis, along with three of his
colleagues, dissented. He asserted the need to keep the
Constitution relevant to changing technological conditions:
“The progress of science in furnishing the government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.... Can it be that
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security?”
Rochin v. California (1952). Rochin was convicted for
possession of narcotics after the police had his stomach pumped
to retrieve capsules he had swallowed to avoid arrest. Having
granted cert, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed Rochin’s
conviction. Writing for the Court, Felix Frankfurter concluded
that the officers’ conduct in the case “shocked the conscience”
and was therefore invalid under the Due Process Clause of the

14th Amendment. In concurring opinions, Justices Black and
Douglas objected to the broad due process approach and argued
that the case should be governed by the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which should be enforceable
against the state via the 14th Amendment. Arguing for “total
incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the 14th Amendment,
Douglas wrote: “If it is a requirement of due process for a trial
in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say that it is
not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state
courthouse.”
Smith v. Maryland (1979). At the request of law enforcement,
and without a warrant, a telephone company installed a pen
register at its central office to record the phone numbers dialed
from the telephone at Smith’s home. As a partial result of the
phone numbers obtained, Smith was indicted for robbery. At
trial, Smith moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds for the warrantless installation of the pen
register. The trial court denied the motion and the Maryland
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held “the
installation and use of the pen register was not a ‘search’ within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and hence no warrant
was required.” The Court went on to state that the “application
of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
invoking its protection can claim a ‘legitimate expectation of
privacy’.” The Court held when Smith “voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the phone company and ‘exposed’ that
information to its equipment in the normal course of business,
he assumed the risk that the company would reveal the
information.”
Terry v. Ohio (1968). A police officer on routine patrol
observed two men repeatedly walking up and down a street
while stopping to stare into a store window. Each time one of
the men walked up the street and stopped to look into the store
window and returned, a conference was held between the two

men and a third individual. The officer believed the men were
“casing a job, a stick up.” The officer approached the men,
“identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names;”
however, the men were less than forthcoming and mumbled
something under their breaths. The officeer “spun [Terry]
around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his
overcoat pocket … a pistol.” The officer then removed the
overcoat from Terry, removed the pistol, and ordered the men
“to face the wall with their hands raised.” The officer repeated
the same procedure with the other two men, finding a pistol
during the patdown on one, but nothing on the other. Terry and
the second man with a pistol were charged with carrying a
conceaned weapon. The trial court denied defense’s motion to
supress the evidence “on the ground that the officer had cause
to believe the mem were acting suspiciously, their interrogation
was warranted, and the officer, for his own protection, had the
right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause
to believe that they might be armed.” The Supreme Court held
the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and applies
to citizens on the street as well as in their home. However, the
Court also held that the “exclusionary rule cannot properly be
invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and restrained
police investigative techniques.” The officer’s actions to detain
and patdown the men were held to be a seizure and serach under
the Fourth Amendment, but the serach and seziure were held
reasonable. The Court expressly held “where a reasonably
prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given
case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered,
he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person
believed by him to be armed and dangerous.”
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989). The United
States Customs Service implemented a drug-screening program
requiring “urinalysis tests of Service employees seeking transfer
or promotion to positions having a direct involvement in drug
interdiction or requiring the individual to carry firearms or to

handle ‘classified’ material.” The Treasury Employees’s Union
filed a lawsuit on behalf of Custon Service employees seeking
relevant positions alleging that the drug testing program
violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court agreed, and
enjoined the program. However, the Court of Appeals reversed,
vacating the injunction. While the Supreme Court held the
production of urine samples by employees for analysis is a
serach within the Fourth Amendment, the Court also held that
“a warrant is not required by the balance of privacy and
governmental interests in the context of this case.” Justice
Kennedy, speaking for the majority, stated that a warrant
requirement “would serve only to divert valuable agency
resources from the Service’s primary mission, which would be
compromised if warrants were necessary in connection with
routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions.” Kennedy went
on to state that “a warrant would provide little or no additional
protection of personal privacy, since the Service’s program
defines narrowly and specifically the circumstances justifying
testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions.”
Additionally, the “affected employees know that they must be
tested, are aware of the testing procedures that the Service must
follow, and are not subject to the discretion of officials in the
field.” Lastly the Court noted that “there are no special facts
for a neutral magistrate to evaluate, in that implementation of
the testing process becomes automatic when an employee
pursues a covered position.” As a result, the drug testing of
Service employees that apply for “promotion to positions
direclty involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to
positions that require the incumbent to carry firearms, is
reasonable despite the absence of a requirement of probable
cause or of some level of individualized suspicion.”
United States v. Calandra (1974). Calandra’s place of business
was searched pursuant to a warrant for the specific purpose of
seizing bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia for a
gambling investigation. During the course of the search, an
agent, knowledgeable of a pending investigation regarding

loanskarking activities, discovered and seized a loansharking
record. As a result, a grand jury was convened to investigate
loanskarking, which subpoenaed Calandra to appear before it
for the purposes of questioning him on the seized evidence.
Calandra refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds against
self-incrimination. Calandra then moved to suppress the
loansharking evidence seized during the search of his office on
the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was
insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the
warrant. The trial court granted the motion and futher ordered
that Calandra did not have to answer any questions posed by the
grand jury related to the loanskarking evidence. However, the
Supreme Court held that “a witness summoned to appear and
testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions
on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizure.” The Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, reinforced the notion that the exclusionary rule
is a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect on
future unlawful police conduct, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” As a result of this
purpose, the Court held that “allowing a grand jury witness to
invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the
effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury’s duties,
and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve
only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police
misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand
jury’s role.” As a result, the exclusionary rule does not apply in
grand jury proceedings.
United States v. Fregoso (1995). The Nebraska Police
Department obtained information that Dixie Buck and Peter
Lopez were engaged in elicit drug activities. As a result,
officers obtained a warrant to install pen registers on their
respective phone lines. The state court also authorized the
telephone company to “supply subscriber information and caller
identification service for the phones to which the pen registers

were attached.” The police were also authorized to “to intercept
conversations over Buck’s and Lopez’s home telephones.” As a
result of the investigation, police officers obtained search
warrants for the homes of Buck, the Fregosos, Soria, and
Brown. In conducting the search of the Fregosos’ residence, the
police saw David Fregoso “drop a towel and plastic baggie from
his hand,” which was later determined to be cocaine. Eleven
defendants, including the Fregosos, Soria and Brown were
indicted and convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine in
furtherance of the conspiracy … based upon the quantity of
cocaine David Fregoso dropped on the day the search warrants
were executed.” In upholding the use of the pen registers and
caller identification service, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed the federal statute pertaining to trap and trace
devices. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) defines a trap and trace device as
“a device which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument
or device from which a wire or electronic communication was
transmitted.” The court refused to hold the caller identification
service as a wiretap and instead held that the service was a trap
and trace device as it “decode[s] the electronic impulses the
telephone is receiving and display[s] them as a telephone
number at the same time that the telephone is receiving the
ringing impulses.” The procedural component of the federal
statute requires a magistrate approving the use of trap and trace
devices to “enter and ex parte order authorizing the installation”
of the device “upon proper application” by law enforcement.
The Fregosos failed to present any evidence that the procedures
delineated in the statute were not properly followed, and as a
result, the Eighth Circuit upheld the use of the caller
identification service.
United States v. Leon (1984). Police officers obtained a search
warrant acting on a tip from a confidential informant of
unproven reliability. A subsequent search of a residence turned
up a substantial amount of illegal drugs. At an evidentiary

hearing prior to trial, a judge ruled that the warrant had been
wrongly issued; that there was insufficient information to
constitute probable cause. The Supreme Court ultimately held
that the evidence could nevertheless be admitted against the
defendants, because to exclude such evidence would have no
deterrent effect on police misconduct. The error was made by
the magistrate who issued the warrant, not by the police who
were deemed to be acting in good faith. Dissenting, Justice
Brennan asserted that “it is clear that we have not been treated
to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary rule
but have instead been drawn into a curious world where the
‘costs’ of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to
exaggerated heights and where the ‘benefits’ of such exclusion
are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand.”
United States v. Ross (1982). District of Columbia Police
responded to a tip provided by an informant that Ross was
selling narcotics from his car. The informant provided the
location of the vehicle and the police immediately drove to
where Ross’s vehicle was allegedly located. When Ross entered
the vehicle and began to drive, the police stopped the vehicle
and made an arrest. The police opened the “trunk, found a
closed brown paper bag, and after opening the bag, discovered
glassine bags containing white powder,” which later tested
positive for heroin. The vehicle was driven to police
headquarters where a second warantless search was performed,
which “revealed a zippered leather pouch containing cash.” As
a result of the two searches, Ross was tried and convicted of
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, his objection to
the admission of the seized evidence notwithstanding. The
Supreme Court held where police officiers have “legitimately
stopped an automobile and have probable cause to believe that
contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a
warrantless search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a
magistrate could authorize by warrant.” The Court applied the
“automobile exception” articulated in Carroll v. United States to

searches “of vehicles that are supported by probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” As a result, the
serach was not unreasonable as it was based on “objective facts
that would justify the issuance of a warrant,” even though a
warrant was not actually obtained.
United States v. Sokolow (1989). WhenDrug Enforcement
Agents stopped Sokolow at the Honolulu International Airport,
agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage.
Prior to apprehending Sokolow, agents discovered during the
course of an ininvesigation that he paid cash for two round-trip
plane tickes, traveled under a name that did not match the name
under which his telephone number was listed, travelled to
Miami, a city kknown for illicit drugs, stayed in Miami for only
48 hours when a trip from Hawaii takes 20 hours, appeared
nervous during the flight, and failed to check any luggage.
Sokolow was subsequently indicted for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. Sokolow moved to suppress the evidence;
however, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that
the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was
engaged in criminal activity, as required by the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed that there was
sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe Sokolow was
transporting illegal drugs when they detained him; thus, the stop
was justified under the premise of Terry v. Ohio. The
reasonableness of the stop does not turn on whether the police
used the least restrictive means, but rather whether the stop was
reasonable under the circumstances.
United States v. United States District Court (1972). Three
defendants were charged with conspiracy to destroy government
property. One of them, Plamondon, was also charged with the
bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Defendants
filed a pretrial motion to compel disclosure of information the
government had obtained through electronic surveillance that
had not been judicially approved. The government asserted that

the surveillance was lawful as a reasonable exercise of the
president’s power to protect national security. The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the
government’s surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed. The
Supreme Court held that these activities offended the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Whren v. United States (1996). Police were traveling in an
unmarked police vehicle through a “high drug area” when they
observed a truck waiting at a stop sign for an unusually long
time. After some time, “the truck turned without signaling and
sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” The officers stopped the
truck with the intention of giving the driver a warning;
however, when they approached the truck, they saw “plastic
bags of crack cocaine in Whren’s hands and arrested him.
Whren moved to suppress the drugs on the grounds that the
officers did not have “reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
believe” Whren was “engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity,
and that the officers’ traffic-violation ground for stopping the
truck was pretextual.” The trial court denied the motion to
suppress. The Supreme Court held that the “temporary
detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he
has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if
a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent
some additional law enforcement objective.” As long as the
officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law has been
violated, the detention of the motorist is reasonable.
Furthermore, the Court held that “ulterior motives” will not
invalidate police conduct on their own because “subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”
Wilson v. Arkansas (1995). In executing a search warrant of

Wilson’s home, the police failed to “knock and announce” their
presence and authority as they entered the home. As a result of
the police violating this common law “knock and announce”
principle, Wilson moved to suppress the evidence seized during
the search. The trial court denied the motion, and the Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed holding that the “knock and announce”
rule is not required under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme
Court held however that the “ ‘knock and announce principle’
forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.”
The Court stated that in some circumstances, failure to knock
and announce while entering a home could be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. The Court suggested that when
there is a “threat of physical harm to police,” or “reason to
believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance
notice were given,” failure to knock and announce could be
reasonable. Additionally, when the police are pursuing a
fugitive from justice, it could be reasonable to fail to comply
with the common law knock and announce principle. The Court
ultimately left it to the lower courts to “determine such relevant
countervailing factors.” The police asserted in this case that
they “would have been placed in peril” and would have
increased the likelihood that narcotics would have been
destroyed had they complied with the rule. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court to make a determination of
the reasonableness of the conduct.
Chapter 4
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991). Fulminante’s 11-year-old
daughter was murdered in Arizona. After the murder, he left
Arizona for New York, where he was convicted of an unrelated
crime and sentenced to prison. While in prison, Fulminate
became friends with a fellow inmate named Anthony Sarivola,
who was a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. In the course of conversation, Sarivola told
Fulminante that the reason for the harsh treatment by other
inmates was a rumor circulating that he had murdered a child.

Sarivola told him that he would provide protection in exchange
for the truth. Fulminante disclosed that he had killed his
daughter in Arizona and gave details about the crime. After
being released from prison in New York, Fulminante was
indicted for first-degree murder in Arizona. The confession to
Sarivola was the key piece of evidence, and Fulminate sought to
have it suppressed. The trial court rejected the notion that the
confession was coerced and barred by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed holding
that “the confession was coerced” and ordered a new trial
without the use of the confession. The Supreme Court affirmed
holding the confession was coerced because Fulminante’s
primary motivation to confess was to prevent physical violence.
Thus, the confession could not be used against him under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Chimel v. California (1969). Police officers obtained a warrant
for the Chimel’s arrest for allegedly committing various
burglaries. Law enforcement went to Chimel’s home to execute
the arrest warrant; however, he was not home. Chimel’s wife
allowed the police to wait until he returned. When Chimel
arrived, the police arrested him. The police asked for Chimel’s
consent to search the premises, but he refused. Although
Chimel denied their request, the police “conducted a search of
the entire house ‘on the basis of the lawful arrest’.” Items were
seized and subsequently used to convict Chimel of burglary
over his objection that the items were unconstitutionally seized.
The Supreme Court held the “warrantless search of petitioner’s
house cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that
arrest.” The Court futher specified that “an arresting officer
may search the arrestee’s person to discover and remove
weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or
destruction, and may search the area ‘within the immediate
control’ of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. On
this basis, the Court held the serach unconstitutional under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000). In August 1998, the
City of Indianapolis began to a operate vehicle checkpoints in
an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The overall ‘hit rate’ of
the program was approximately nine percent. The checkpoint
locations were predetermined weeks in advance based on area
crime statistics and traffic flow. The checkpoints were
conducted during daylight hours and were identified with
lighted signs reading, “NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT ___ MILE
AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO
STOP.” Respondent James Edmonds was stopped at a
checkpoint and later filed a motion for injunctive relief
claiming that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution. The US District Court denied the motion for
injunctive relief; however, the US Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints
contravened the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court Court
affirmed holding the checkpoints in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because their primary purpose was
indistinguishable from general interest crime control. The
Court refused to validate suspicionless stops.
Koon v. United States(1996). In the wake of the Rodney King
beating, the police officers involved were acquitted on state
charges of assault and excessive use of force, but were
convicted in federal court for violating King’s “constitutional
rights under color of law.” Under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, each defendant
was eligible for a sentence ranging from 70 to 87 months;
however, the judge sentenced them “two downward departures
from that range” based on King’s misconduct. Additionally the
judge based the departure on four factors, including “the
petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison, they
would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law
enforcement, they had been subject to successive state and
federal prosecutions, and that they posed a low risk of
recidivism.” The sentencing range after the departures was 30

to 37 months, and the court sentenced each
to 30 months. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected each
departure cited by the District Court. The Supreme Court held
that the federal Sentencing Guidelines do not remove judicial
discretion in a sentencing determination, but rather “allows a
departure from the range if the court finds ‘there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration’ by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the Guidelines.” The Court held the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering “the
susceptibility to abuse in prison and the burdens of successive
prosecutions.” However, the Court also found that the District
Court did abuse its discretion in relying on “collateral
employment consequences” and “the low likelihood of
recidivism” as support for its departure.
Miller v. Clark County (2003). A Clark County Sheriff’s
Deputy was on routine patrol when he became suspicious of the
driver of a silver Pontiac Fiero. The deputy conducted a
“computerized check” and discovered that the vehicle displayed
a license plate belonging to a different vehicle, and as a result,
attempted to stop the vehicle. Miller, the driver of the vehicle,
refused and gave chase. At one point in the chase, the
passenger exited the vehicle and the Deputy pursued. The
driver entered a driveway and was pursued by another officer
traveling with his police dog “Kimon.” Once the officer and the
police dog reached the vehicle, Miller was no longer in the
vehicle and traveling on foot. After unsuccessfully searching
for Miller, the Deputy yelled out, “This is the Sheriff’s Office.
You have five seconds to make yourself known, or a police dog
will be sent to find you.” Miller gave no response. The Deputy
let “Kimon” off his leash and “gave a command that directed
the dog to search for [Miller] and detain him by biting his arm
or leg.” Approximately one minute later, Miller was heard
screaming in the nearby woods. It took sixty seconds for the
Deputy to find Miller and saw “Kimon

biting his upper arm. The Deputy gave the command for
“Kimon” to release Miller, who complied immediately. Miller
was then transported to the hospital for treatment. Miller
alleged the “deputy’s use of the police dog constituted
excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable seizures. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the of the police dog to “bite and hold”
Miller’s arm for up to one minute did not constitute the use of
deadly force nor did it “constitute excessive force in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.”
Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993). Police officers observed
Dickerson leaving a building known for selling and trafficking
cocaine. When the officers approached Dickerson, he seemed to
make “evasive actions.” Therefore, the police decided to
investigate further and told Dickerson to submit to a “patdown”
Terry search. The search resulting in finding no weapons, but
the officer “felt a small lump felt a small lump” in Dickerson’s
pocket, “believed it to be a lump of crack cocaine upon
examining it with his fingers.” The officer “then reached into
the pocket and retrieved a small bag of cocaine.” Dickerson
moved to suppress the evidence at his trial for possession of a
controlled substance, but the trial court denied the motion. The
Supreme Court reversed the trial court stating that the “police
may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through the sense
of touch during a protective patdown search of the sort
permitted by Terry, so long as the search stays within the
bounds marked by Terry.” The Court refused to accept a “plain
feel exception” to Terry. According to the Supreme Court,
Terry “permits a brief stop of a person whose suspicious
conduct leads an officer to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot, and a patdown search of the
person for weapons when the officer is justified in believing
that the person may be armed and
presently dangerous.” This is a “protective search” that is “not

meant to discover evidence of crime, [and] must be strictly
limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or others.” The
Supreme Court explicitly held that if “the protective search goes
beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it
is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.”
Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Police arrested Ernesto Miranda, a
23 year-old indigent with a ninth grade education, and charged
him with raping an 18 year-old girl. At the police station, the
victim picked Miranda out of a “lineup.” Two officers then took
Miranda to a room where they interrogated him. After first
denying his guilt, Miranda eventually confessed to the crime.
Following his conviction, Miranda appealed on the ground that
his confession had been coerced. The Supreme Court granted
review, consolidating Miranda’s appeal with three other cases
involving the admissibility of confessions. The Court reversed
Miranda’s conviction, holding that his confession had been
improperly admitted into evidence. Per Chief Justice Warren,
the Court held that, henceforth, police must advise suspects of
their right to remain silent and their right to have counsel
present during interrogation. Failure to provide these warnings
will result in the suppression of a confession, even if it is
deemed reliable. These new requirements were based on the
Court’s conclusion that “without proper safeguards the process
of in-custody interrogation ... contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely.” In a bitter dissent, Justice White complained that
“[i]n some unknown number of cases the Court’s rule will
return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets ... to
repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.”
New York v. Quarles (1984). Two New York City police
officers were approached by a woman who claimed she had just
been raped and that her assailant had gone into a nearby grocery
store. The police were informed that the assailant was carrying

a gun. The officers proceeded to the store and immediately
spotted Benjamin Quarles, who matched the description given
by the victim. Upon seeing the police, Quarles turned and ran.
One of the police officers drew his service revolver and ordered
Quarles to “freeze.” Quarles complied with the officer’s
request. The officer frisked Quarles and discovered an empty
shoulder holster. Before reading Quarles the Miranda warnings,
the officer asked where the gun was. Quarles nodded in the
direction of some empty boxes and said, “The gun is over
there.” He was then placed under arrest and “Mirandized.”
Later Quarles moved to have his statement suppressed from
evidence since it was made prior to the Miranda warnings. He
also moved for suppression of the gun under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. The Supreme Court allowed both
pieces of evidence to be used against Quarles, notwithstanding
the delay in the Miranda warnings. Obviously, the Court felt
that the officers were justified in locating a discarded weapon
prior to Mirandizing Quarles. In so holding, the Court created
the public safety exception.
Nix v. Williams (1984). The Respondent was arrested in
Davenport, Iowa for the disappearance of a 10-year-old girl in
Des Moines, Iowa. While the Respondent was being transported
to Des Moines, the police illegally interrogated him. During the
course of the “conversation,” the Respondent made
incriminating statements and directed the officers to the missing
child’s body. Prior to the beginning of the conversation
between the Respondent and the police officers, a “systematic
search of the area was being conducted with the aid of 200
volunteers.” The search was terminated when the Respondent
guided police to the child’s body. The Respondent moved to
suppress all evidence at trial. The Supreme Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Burger, adopted the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this exception,
illegally obtained evidence, such as the Respondent’s
confession, may be deemed admissible when the prosecution
can establish that the information sought would have been

ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. The Court
held that the “search party ultimately or inevitably would have
discovered the victim’s body” because the evidence revealed
that the volunteers “were approaching the actual location of the
body, that the search would have been resumed had respondent
not led the police to the body, and that the body inevitably
would have been found.”
Reid v. Georgia (1980). Two men were observed by federal
narcotic agents at the Atlanta Airport “occasionally” looking to
each other while in line to board a commercial flight early in
the morning hours. Both men were charring a “shoulder bag,”
but neither had any other luggage. As the two men left the
terminal, the agents asked both for identification. The two
consented to a search of their person and should bags; however,
Reid attempted to flee. Before Reid was apprehended, his
abandoned bag was serached and cocaine was found therein.
Reid successfully moved to supress the evidence at trial;
however, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, “holding that
the stop … was permissible, since he appeared to the agent to fit
the so-called ‘drug courier profile’.” The Supreme Court, in its
per curiam opinion, held “the agent could not, as a matter of
law, have reasonably suspected [Reid] of criminal activity on
the basis of the observed circumstances.” The Supreme Court
stated “the fact that the agent believed [Reid] and his
companion were attempting to conceal the fact that they were
traveling together is too slender a reed to support the seizure.”
The conviction for possession of a controlled substance was
vacated and the case remanded to the lower court.
Rhode Island v. Innis (1980). A taxicab driver who was robbed
“by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun,” identified Innis as the
guilty party. A police officer on patrol saw Innis, “arrested
him, and advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.”
Other officers arrived at the arrest sence, who also advised Innis
“of his Miranda rights.” Innis told the officers “he understood
his rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer.” Innis was
transported to the police station with three officers that “were

instructed not to question [him] or intimidate him in any way.”
However, during the commute, “two of the officers engaged in a
conversation between themselves concerning the missing
shotgun. One of the officers stated that there were ‘a lot of
hanicapped children running around in the area’ because a
school for such children was located nearby, and ‘God forbid
one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might
hurt themselves’.” Innis immediately interrupted the
conversation, “stating that the officers should turn the car
around so he could show them where the gun was located.”
Once the officers returned to the arrest sence, Innis was advised
of his Miranda rights for a third time. Innis stated he
“understood those rights, but that he ‘wanted to get the gun out
of the way because of the kids in the area in the school’.” Innis
then led the police to the shotgun. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Stewart, held Innis “was not
‘interrogated’ in violation of his rights under Miranda to remain
silent until he had consulted with a lawyer.” The Court stated
“there was no express questioning of [Innis]; the conversation
between the two officers was, at least in form, nothing more
than a dialogue between them to which no response from
respondent was invited.” The Court went on to state that Innis
was “was not subjected to the ‘functional equivalent’ of
questioning, since it cannot be said that the officers should have
known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.” Although Justice Stewart conceded
Innis was subjected to “subtle compulsion,” Stewart also noted
that “it must be established that a suspect’s incriminating
response was the product of words or actions on the part of the
police that they should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response, which was not established
here.”
Rochin v. California (1952). Rochin was convicted for
possession of narcotics after the police had his stomach pumped
to retrieve capsules he had swallowed to avoid arrest. Having
granted cert, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed Rochin’s

conviction. Writing for the Court, Felix Frankfurter concluded
that the officers’ conduct in the case “shocked the conscience”
and was therefore invalid under the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment. In concurring opinions, Justices Black and
Douglas objected to the broad due process approach and argued
that the case should be governed by the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which should be enforceable
against the state via the 14th Amendment. Arguing for “total
incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the 14th Amendment,
Douglas wrote: “If it is a requirement of due process for a trial
in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say that it is
not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state
courthouse.”
Tennessee v. Garner(1985). At the time this case reached the
Supreme Court, a Tennessee Statute provided that “if, after a
police officer has given notice of an intent to arrest a criminal
suspect, and the suspect flees or forcibly resists, ‘the officer
may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest’.” A
Memphis police officer, acting under this statute, shot and
killed the repondent’s son. Garner’s son was “told to halt” by
the officer, but instead he “fled over a fence at night in the
backyard of a house he was suspected of burglarizing.” The
officer “used deadly force despite being ‘reasonably sure’ the
suspect was unarmed, 17 or 18 years old, and of slight build”
As a result, the father filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violating his son’s constitutional rights. The District Court held
that the statute and the officer’s actions were constitutional;
however, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice White, held the Tennessee statute
unconstitutional “insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force
against … an apparently unarmed, nondangerous fleeing
suspect.” Under these circumstances, “force may not be used
unless necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others.

United States v. Arvizu (2002). Arvizu “was stopped by Border
Patrol Agent Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a
remote area of southeastern Arizona” believed to be a path
traveled by drug smugglers. The agent searched his vehicle and
found “more than 100 pounds of marijuana.” Arvizu was
arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute.
Agent Stoddard believed, based on his training as a board agent,
that Arvizu was transporting marijuana into the United States.
Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court, held under “the
totality of the circumstances and giving due weight to …
inferences drawn by Stoddard, … [there was] reasonable
suspicion to believe that [Arvizu] was engaged in illegal
activity.” Rehnquist went on to say that “because the ‘balance
between the public interest and the individual’s right to
personal security,’ tilts in favor of a standard less than probable
cause in brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles, the
Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is
supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity ‘may be afoot’.” Rehnquist gave lower courts direction
in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion by
instructing courts to look at the “totality of the circumstances”
to decide whether the officer has a “particularized and objective
basis” for suspecting criminal activity.
United States v. Wade (1967). Wade was indicted for
conspiracy and bank robbery. Several weeks afterwards, police
placed Wade in a “lineup in which each person wore strips of
tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on
direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had
used.” This was done without notice to Wade’s appointed
counsel. As a reuslt of the lineup, two bank employees
identified Wade as the robber. At Wade’s trial, the employees
identified Wade as the robber when asked whether the guilty
person was in the courtroom. However, Wade’s attorney arged
that the lineup “violated [Wade’s] Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, and filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or,

alternatively, to strike the courtroom identifications.” The trial
court denied the motions, and Wade was convicted. The
Supreme Court held “neither the lineup itself nor anything
required therein violated [Wade’s] Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person
for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an
identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of
the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against
himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. However, the
Court held the post-indictment lineup without the presence of
his attroney, violated Wade’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because such a right “guarantees an accused the right to counsel
not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the
prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might
determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might
derogate from his right to a fair trial.” The post-indictment
lineup was held to be a “critical prosecutive stage,” and
therefore Wade was entitled to have counsel present.
Whren v. United States (1996). Police were traveling in an
unmarked police vehicle through a “high drug area” when they
observed a truck waiting at a stop sign for an unusually long
time. After some time, “the truck turned without signaling and
sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” The officers stopped the
truck with the intention of giving the driver a warning;
however, when they approached the truck, they saw “plastic
bags of crack cocaine in Whren’s hands and arrested him.
Whren moved to suppress the drugs on the grounds that the
officers did not have “reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
believe” Whren was “engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity,
and that the officers’ traffic-violation ground for stopping the
truck was pretextual.” The trial court denied the motion to
suppress. The Supreme Court held that the “temporary
detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he
has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if
a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent

some additional law enforcement objective.” As long as the
officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law has been
violated, the detention of the motorist is reasonable.
Furthermore, the Court held that “ulterior motives” will not
invalidate police conduct on their own because “subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”
Chapter 5
Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978). Here the Supreme Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is
not violated when.a state prosecutor carries out a threat made
during plea negotiations to have the accused reindicted on more
serious charges on which he is plainly subject to prosecution if
he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was
originally charged.” Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
stated that the “the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea
bargain are important components of this country’s criminal
justice system; properly administered, they can benefit all
concerned.” Stewart went on to say “though to punish a person
because he has done what the law allows violates due process,
there is no such element of punishment in the ‘give-and-take’ of
plea bargaining as long as the accused is free to accept or reject
the prosecutor’s offer.Bruton v. United States(1968).Burton and
his co-defendant, Evans, were tried jointly and convicted for
armed postal robbery. While Evans did not testify, a postal
inspector testified that Evans confessed that he and Burton
committed the robbery. As a result of the testimony, “the trial
judge instructed the jury that, although Evans’s confession was
evidence against him it was inadmissible hearsay against
[Burton] and had to be disregarded in determining [Burton’s]
guilt or innocence.” The Court of Appeals affirmed Burton’s
conviction in view of the trial judge’s jury instructions. The
Supreme Court held that due to “the substantial risk that the
jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the
incriminating statements in determining [Burton’s] guilt, the

admission of Evans’s confession in the joint trial violated his
right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment.” Burton’s conviction was reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial.
Cook v. State (1977). Cook and three codefendants were jointly
tried and convicted for conspiracy to commit sexual battery and
sexual battery. Each defendant argued on appeal that they were
denied their Sixth Amendment right to confront their accusers
when incriminating statements of three of the codefendants were
introduced” when none of the defendant’s testified at trial. In
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burton, Florida
promulgated Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152, which gives the
State of Florida three options “when the trial court determines
that a defendant’s statement is not admissible against a
codefendant.” The State can choose to 1) severe the trials of
the defendants, 2) try the defendants jointly without admitting
the incriminating statement into evidence, or 3) try the
defendants jointly, admit the incriminating statements into
evidence, but remove the references to the defendant in which
the statements are inadmissible. The State proceeded under
option two; however, the Court examined whether a defendant
could nonetheless be prejudiced even though the references to
him are deleted from the incriminating statements of a
codefendant. The Court, speaking through Judge Scheb,
adopted the following standard: “if the jury was ‘highly likely’
to determine from a co-defendant’s statement that the defendant
was the nameless individual incriminated by the statement, a
Bruton violation has occurred, even if the inference drawn from
the codefendant’s statement is incriminating only when
considered in light of other evidence offered at trial.”
However, because of the overwhelming evidence against Cook,
even if there was a Burton violation, the Court held it was
harmless error.
Duncan v. Louisiana(1968). Here the Supreme Court made the
right of trial by jury applicable to defendants in state criminal

cases. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas,
Justice Black expressed his satisfaction with what the Court had
done under the mantle of selective incorporation: “I believe as
strongly as ever that the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. I have been
willing to support the selective incorporation doctrine, however,
as an alternative, although perhaps less historically supportable
than complete incorporation. ... [T]he selective incorporation
process has the virtue of having already worked to make most of
the Bill of Rights protections applicable to the States.”
Gideon v. Wainwright(1963). Clarence Earl Gideon, a 51 year-
old indigent “drifter” who had been in and out of jails all his
adult life, was charged with felonious breaking and entering. At
trial, he requested that the court appoint an attorney to represent
him. The court refused, citing the Florida law that required
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants only in capital
cases. While serving his sentence in the Florida State Prison,
Gideon unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in the Florida
Supreme Court on a writ of habeas corpus. He then obtained
review by the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. In a
unanimous decision, the Court reversed Gideon’s conviction.
Writing for the Court, Hugo Black opined that “[t]he right of
one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it
is in ours.” Gideon v. Wainwright overruled the Supreme
Court’s 1942 holding in Betts v. Brady. Because Gideon was
made retroactive, it allowed numerous persons serving time in
state prisons to win their freedom by seeking writ of habeas
corpus in the state and federal courts. Without question, Gideon
was one of the most important decisions of the Warren Court in
the field of criminal justice.
Hurtado v. California (1884). In this case the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the grand jury procedure required in
federal criminal cases by the Fifth Amendment was an essential
feature of “due process of law” and thus required in state

criminal cases by the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, the
Hurtado decision remains “good” law; states are not required by
the federal constitution to use grand juries to bring criminal
charges, although many still do.
Powell v. Alabama (1932). Ozie Powell and six other black
defendants were charged with raping two white girls. The
defendants, who were poor, young and uneducated, were tried
without assistance of counsel. An all-white jury found them
guilty and sentenced them to death. Dividing 7-2, the Supreme
Court reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants had
been denied due process of law. The Court stopped well short of
saying that all indigent defendants must be provided counsel in
all felony cases. Rather it limited its holding to the facts, saying
that “in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him a as a necessary requisite of due process...”
Scott v. Illinois(1979). Scott was arrested for and convicted of
shoplifting; however, Scott was unable to afford counsel to
represent him. The statute on point set the maximum penalty
for shoplifting at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail. Scott
requested the appointment of counsel; however, the trial court
denied his request. The Supreme Court held the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments require “that no indigent criminal
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the
State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense.” However, the Court also held that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “do not require a state trial
court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant, such as Scott,
who is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment
upon conviction is authorized but not imposed.” Therefore, the
Court explained that Argersinger v. Hamlin “limits the
constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal

proceedings to a case that actually leads to imprisonment.”
Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966). The defendant was convicted of
murdering his wife by “bludgeoning” her to death. The issue in
this case was the pretrial publicity. There was “virulent and
incriminating publicity” about the defendant. The murder case
was “notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges
and countercharges besides those for which defendant was
tried.” The defendant was examined “for more than five hours
without counsel in a televised three-day inquest conducted
before an audience of several hundred spectators in a
gymnasium.” Moreover, the “newspapers published the names
and addresses of prospective jurors causing them to receive
letters and telephone calls about the case.” Also, the trial took
place during a highly contested election, “at which the chief
prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates for judgeships.”
The media took over the courtroom, and they “hounded” the
defendant and witnesses. Members of the media inside the
courtroom often caused consfusion and disruptions. As a result,
the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition on the grounds that
he was denied a fair trial in the judge’s failure to take “effective
measures against massive publicity … or to take adequate steps
to control the conduct of the trial.” The Supreme Court held
that the “massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity”
prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court noted that while “freedom of discussion should be given
the widest range compatible with the fair and orderly
administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial
from its purpose of adjudicating controversies according to
legal procedures based on evidence received only in open court.
The Court gave orders to release the defendant unless tried
again “within a reasonable time.”
Stack v. Boyle(1951). Twelve individuals were arrested and
convicted of conspiring to violate the Smith Act. Their bail was

initially set at different amounts ranging from $2,500 to
$100,000; but later was fixed “pending trial in the uniform
amount of $50,000.” Each defendant moved for a reduction in
bail under the theory that the $50,000 was “excessive under the
Eighth Amendment.” The Government’s only argument against
lowering the bail was that four other individuals previously
convicted under the Smith Act “had forfeited bail.” While the
Government presented no evidence relating specifically to the
twelve individuals in the present prosecution, the US District
Court denied the motion to reduce bond. The Supreme Court
held that the bail was not “fixed by proper methods.” The Court
stated that bail “set before trial at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill the purpose of assuring
the presence of the defendant is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth
Amendment.” The Court went on to establish the standards for
setting bail by stating that the amount of bail “must be based
upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence
of that defendant.”
United States v. Calandra(1974). Calandra’s place of business
was searched pursuant to a warrant for the specific purpose of
seizing bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia for a
gambling investigation. During the course of the search, an
agent, knowledgeable of a pending investigation regarding
loanskarking activities, discovered and seized a loansharking
record. As a result, a grand jury was convened to investigate
loansharking, which subpoenaed Calandra to appear before it
for the purposes of questioning him on the seized evidence.
Calandra refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds against
self-incrimination. Calandra then moved to suppress the
loansharking evidence seized during the search of his office on
the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was
insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the
warrant. The trial court granted the motion and futher ordered
that Calandra did not have to answer any questions posed by the
grand jury related to the loanskarking evidence. However, the

Supreme Court held that “a witness summoned to appear and
testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions
on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizure.” The Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, reinforced the notion that the exclusionary rule
is a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect on
future unlawful police conduct, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” As a result of this
purpose, the Court held that “allowing a grand jury witness to
invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the
effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury’s duties,
and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve
only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police
misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand
jury’s role.” As a result, the exclusionary rule does not apply in
grand jury proceedings.
United States v. Salerno(1987).Here the Supreme Court was
asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of
1984 (Act), which requies “courts to detain prior to trial
arrestees charged with certain serious felonies when the
Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure … the safety of
any other person and the community’.” At the hearing required
under the Act, the accused is affoard the “right to counsel, to
testify, to present witnesses, to proffer evidence, and [the right]
to cross-examine witnesses.” In making its determination
whether to grant bail, the Act specifies certain factors to be
considered by a court, including “the nature and seriousness of
the charges, the substantiality of the Government’s evidence,
the defendant’s background and characteristics, and the nature
and seriousness of the danger posed by his release.” The
Supreme Court ruled that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is not
unconstitutional “given the Act’s legitimate and compelling
regulatory purpose and the procedural protections it offers” to

the accused. The Court’s examination of the legistlative history
revealed the Act was not intended as pretrial punishment, but
rather “as a potential solution to the pressing societal problem
of crimes committed by persons on release” and to prevent
“danger to the community.” As a result, there is no
constitutional right to bail under the Eighth Amendment.
Weeks v. United States (1914). The Court held that evidence
obtained by federal agents in violation of the 4th Amendment
may not be used in a federal prosecution. Justice Day’s opinion
for the Court suggested that exclusion of tainted evidence was
implicit in the requirements of the Fourth Amendment: “If
letters and private documents can thus be [illegally] seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment ... is of no value
... and might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”
Chapter 6
Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Batson, an African-American man,
was on trial for burglary and receiving stolen goods. The
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four
blacks from the venire, which led to an all-white jury being
impaneled. The judge denied the defendant’s motion to
discharge the jury. Batson was convicted on both counts and the
state supreme court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Batson had been denied a fair trial due to the
purposeful exclusion of blacks from the jury. Under Batson, the
trial judge has the responsibility to scrutinize peremptory
challenges. If the judge determines that they are racially
motivated, they must be disallowed or the jury discharged.
In re Death of Eric Miller (2003). Eric Miller died as a result
of arsenic poisoning in 2000. The police investigation revealed
on the night of November 15, Eric Miller and his wife, Ann
Rene, went bowling with several of Ann Rene’s co-workers.
While bowling, Eric Miller consumed a portion of a beer given

to him by Derril Willard, upon which Miller commented that the
beer “had a bad or ‘funny’ taste.” The following day Eric
Miller was admitted to the hospital for arsenic poisoning, but
was discharged several days later. On December 1, 2000 Miller
became extremely ill, and the next day Miller died from arsenic
poisoning. After Miller’s death, Ann Rene claimed that she was
unaware of anyone that would want her husband dead. The
police interviewed everyone at the bowling alley in November,
with the exception of Willard, whom the police could not
locate. After Miller’s body was cremated, Ann Rene refused
further interviews with the police. After Miller died, Willard
sought legal advice from attorney Richard Gammon, and
Willard subsequently committed suicide. The State filed a
“Petition in the Nature of a Special Proceeding” requesting that
the trial court to “determine whether the attorney-client
privilege should be waived or whether compelled disclosure of
communications between [Gammon] and Willard was warranted
for the ‘proper administration of justice’.” The judge ordered
Gammon to “provide the trial court with a sealed affidavit
containing information relevant to the murder investigation …
that was obtained from his attorney-client relationship with
Willard.” The judge would then examine the affidavit in
camera to determine whether the information should be
disclosed to the State. The North Carolina Supreme Court held
“when a client is deceased, upon a non-frivolous assertion that
the privilege does not apply, with a proper, good-faith showing
by the party seeking disclosure of communications, the trial
court may conduct an in camera review of the substance of the
communications.” The court went on to state that when
communications “between the attorney and the deceased client
relate solely to a third party, such communications are not
within the purview of the attorney-client privilege.” The court
gave the trial court instructions in that should it find “that some
or all of the communications are outside the scope of the
attorney-client privilege, the trial court may compel the attorney
to provide the substance of the communications to the State for

its use in the criminal investigation.” However, the court
refused to determine whether “any information provided by any
attorney [in these circumstances] would be admissible in any
future criminal prosecution.”
Jackson v. State (1987). John William Jackson was charged and
convicted of first-degree murder and armed burglary. At the end
of the State’s proof, and again at the end of the defense’s proof,
Jackson moved for a judgment of acquittal, but the trial court
denied the motions and sentenced Jackson to life imprisonment
with a minimum mandatory term of twenty-five years. Jackson
appealed. The Florida Court of Appeals, speaking through
Acting Chief Judge Scheb, reversed the trial court’s denial of
the defendant’s motion and vacated his convictions and
sentence. The court held that when the state’s evidence is
primarily circumstantial, the appellate court’s role “is to
determine whether the jury might have reasonably concluded
that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis but that
of guilt.” The court went to say that “the weight of the
evidence is a matter for the trier of fact, and a jury verdict
should not be reversed when there is substantial, competent
evidence to support it.” However, when a “criminal conviction
… is based solely on circumstantial evidence, it is [the court’s]
duty to reverse the conviction when that evidence, although
strongly suggesting guilt, fails to eliminate any reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.” The evidence against Jackson did not
include “substantial, competent evidence to support the jury’s
verdict,” and as a result, the court vacated the convictions and
sentence.
Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd (2003). Joseph Rico was convicted by a
Philadelphia County jury of murder and criminal conspiracy,
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Rico filed several
post-trial motions, including a motion that “alleged … the
prosecutor exercised seven of twenty peremptory challenges
against Italian American prospective jurors in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial
court denied relief. On appeal, the Superior Court found that

“all but two of the stuck jurors” were dismissed in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky, reversed
Rico’s convictions and granted a new trial. However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding “that the
Superior Court erred in rejecting the trial court’s factual finding
of no purposeful discrimination.” Rico then sought habeas
corpus relief in the federal District Court, arguing Batson
violations and prosecutorial misconduct. The federal
Magistrate Judge held in the Report and Recommendation that
Rico’s petition should be dismissed, and the District Court
adopted the position of the Magistrate Judge. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held affirmed. The court stated that the trial
court’s denial of Rico’s Batson claim based on the mere fact
that jurors bore Italian American surnames, without any other
evidence to support the allegation of discrimination was not
“objectively unreasonable.” Additionally, the court held where
prosecutors have “mixed motives” for challenging a potential
juror, an action “partially motivated by an improper purpose is
nonetheless valid if the alleged offender would have taken the
same action in the absence of the improper motive.” While one
of the excused jurors was Italian American, he also displayed
fear of the mob when questioned during voir dire. The trial
court held that while the juror’s Italian American decent was a
motivation in striking the juror, it was nonetheless de minimus.
As a result, the Third Circuit held it was not “objectively
unreasonable” for the District Court to deny Rico’s petition for
habeas corpus relief.
Sheppard v. Maxwell(1966). The defendant was convicted of
murdering his wife by “bludgeoning” her to death. The issue in
this case was the pretrial publicity. There was “virulent and
incriminating publicity” about the defendant. The murder case
was “notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges
and countercharges besides those for which defendant was
tried.” The defendant was examined “for more than five hours
without counsel in a televised three-day inquest conducted

before an audience of several hundred spectators in a
gymnasium.” Moreover, the “newspapers published the names
and addresses of prospective jurors causing them to receive
letters and telephone calls about the case.” Also, the trial took
place during a highly contested election, “at which the chief
prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates for judgeships.”
The media took over the courtroom, and they “hounded” the
defendant and witnesses. Members of the media inside the
courtroom often caused consfusion and disruptions. As a result,
the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition on the grounds that
he was denied a fair trial in the judge’s failure to take “effective
measures against massive publicity … or to take adequate steps
to control the conduct of the trial.” The Supreme Court held
that the “massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity”
prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court noted that while “freedom of discussion should be given
the widest range compatible with the fair and orderly
administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial
from its purpose of adjudicating controversies according to
legal procedures based on evidence received only in open court.
The Court gave orders to release the defendant unless tried
again “within a reasonable time.”
United States v. Richardson (2000). Phyllis Richardson was
convicted in federal court of embezzlement, money laundering,
and mail fraud. During the trial, the judge “instructed the jury
that if they did not understand a part of a witness’s testimony
they could submit written questions to the court after the
lawyers ended the examination of that witness.” The court also
“explained to the jurors that some of their submitted questions
might not be asked because the question might be improper
under the rules of evidence and instructed them not to speculate
on what the answer to such questions might be or why the court
did not ask a particular question.” At the time of the judge’s
instruction, Richardson did not object. However, Richardson

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