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Contents
 Cloud Computing has been widely adopted thanks to its many advantages
• Deployment cost reduction
• Physical resource sharing between VM using virtualization
 But, cloud computing has opened the door for many additional threats as customers share the same physical resources
 Two main families: Software-based solutions, Hardware-based solutions
 Software-based solutions
• The first cloud security solutions to show up in the market
 Easy to implement, inexpensive and offer the ability to review and upgrade implementations.
• But, Insufficient to protect VM
 Because, VM require a trusted hypervisor with millions of lines of code (LOC) in TCB*
 code injection, code reuses, fork, roll-back, rootkit attack.. etc
* TCB: Trust Computing Base
 Hardware-based solutions
• Use dedicated Integrated Circuits (IC) or separate processor designed specifically to provide security operations
• Industrial-scale
1. TPM: Trust Processor Module
2. Intel TXT: Trust eXecution Technology
3. ARM TrustZone
4. AMD SEV: Secure Execution Virtualization
5. Intel SGX: Software Guard eXtention
• Theses solution can be leveraged by CSP* to offer a TEE** for end-users to execute their application in cloud
* CSP: Cloud Service Provider
* TEE: Trusted Execution Environment
 Compare four industrial-scale hardware-based security solutions
• Four Industrial-scale
1. Intel TXT ( include Intel TPM )
2. ARM TrustZone
3. AMD SEV
4. Intel SGX
* TEE: Trusted Execution Environment
Fig.1 Intel TXT components
* VT-d: VMDirectPath (Direct input/output from vm to pcie host os (esxi, xen, etc.) device)
** ACM: Authenticated Code Module
Trust eXecution Technology)
• IOH/PCH ( leveraging Intel VT-d* tech.)
Fig.3 Hardware components interation in ARM TrustZone
* SMC: System Monitor Call
Fig.2 Processor modes in ARM TrustZone
• Provides a secure execution environment by splitting
computer resources into execution worlds
: Normal World, Secure World, (Moniter Mode)
• NS bit is triggered by SMC* on Moniter Mode
• Secure World --> Normal World (o)
• Secure World <-- Normal World (x)
Secure Execution Virtualization)
• Encrpyts transparently the memory contents of a VM
with a unique key for each guest VM.
• The management of these keys and the secure data
transfer is handled by the SEV firmware.
• Encypting VMs can help protecting them from physical
threats, other VMs threats or even the VMM itself.
• AMD SME* encrypts all the system memory with a
single key that is generated by the AMD Secure
Processor at boot.
• It does not require any application s/w changes,
vm's encrpytion is performed by hardware engines.
Fig.4 AMD SEV architecute
* SME: Secure Memory Encryption
 Intel SGX
• Protect a portion of their address spaces and secure their
code and data within containers called enclaves.
• A new set of CPU instructions allowing a user application to
create enclaves as a hardware-assisted TEE.
• The untrusted section and the trusted section
• Secret data/code are located in the trusted section, and are
accessed from the untrusted section through SGX call gates.
• With the upcoming version SGX v2, a new feature called
oversubscribing will allow multiple VMs to share the EPC *.
* EPC: Enclave Page Cache
Fig.5 Intel SGX trusted execution path
1) Secuirty Criteria (10)
• Isolation level
• Memory confidentiality and integrity protection
• Protrection against compromised OS/VMM/BIOS/SMM
• Protection agianst physical attacks
• Protection against memory snooping
• Secure storage
• Secure boot
• Cache memory protection
• Memory access protection
2) Functional Criteria (5)
• TCB Size
• Debugging
• Attestation
• Sealing
• Execution privilege level
3) Deployability criteria (6)
• TEE features
• Application modification
• Performance
• VM migration
• License agreement
• Ecosystem
1) Secuirty Criteria (10)
• Isolation level
• Memory confidentiality and integrity protection
• Protrection against compromised OS/VMM/BIOS/SMM
• Protection agianst physical attacks
• Protection against memory snooping
• Secure storage
• Secure boot
• Cache memory protection
• Memory access protection
2) Functional Criteria (5)
• TCB Size
• Debugging
• Attestation
• Sealing
• Execution privilege level
3) Deployability criteria (6)
• TEE features
• Application modification
• Performance
• VM migration
• License agreement
• Ecosystem
x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
• Hardware-based security solutions are a promising way toward a trusted cloud computing enviroment
• We presented four industrial-scale hardware-based trust solutions: Intel TXT, ARM TrustZone, AMD SEV, Intel SGX
• According to our comparison with respect to three criteria categories.
• Intel SGX is a better chocie, but still not the best.
• Requires code modification of legacy application
• Puts the responsibility on the application developers to write code that resists to side channel attacks
Q & A
Thank you :-)

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Review of Hardware based solutions for trusted cloud computing.pptx

  • 1.
  • 3.  Cloud Computing has been widely adopted thanks to its many advantages • Deployment cost reduction • Physical resource sharing between VM using virtualization  But, cloud computing has opened the door for many additional threats as customers share the same physical resources  Two main families: Software-based solutions, Hardware-based solutions
  • 4.  Software-based solutions • The first cloud security solutions to show up in the market  Easy to implement, inexpensive and offer the ability to review and upgrade implementations. • But, Insufficient to protect VM  Because, VM require a trusted hypervisor with millions of lines of code (LOC) in TCB*  code injection, code reuses, fork, roll-back, rootkit attack.. etc * TCB: Trust Computing Base
  • 5.  Hardware-based solutions • Use dedicated Integrated Circuits (IC) or separate processor designed specifically to provide security operations • Industrial-scale 1. TPM: Trust Processor Module 2. Intel TXT: Trust eXecution Technology 3. ARM TrustZone 4. AMD SEV: Secure Execution Virtualization 5. Intel SGX: Software Guard eXtention • Theses solution can be leveraged by CSP* to offer a TEE** for end-users to execute their application in cloud * CSP: Cloud Service Provider * TEE: Trusted Execution Environment
  • 6.  Compare four industrial-scale hardware-based security solutions • Four Industrial-scale 1. Intel TXT ( include Intel TPM ) 2. ARM TrustZone 3. AMD SEV 4. Intel SGX * TEE: Trusted Execution Environment
  • 7. Fig.1 Intel TXT components * VT-d: VMDirectPath (Direct input/output from vm to pcie host os (esxi, xen, etc.) device) ** ACM: Authenticated Code Module Trust eXecution Technology) • IOH/PCH ( leveraging Intel VT-d* tech.)
  • 8. Fig.3 Hardware components interation in ARM TrustZone * SMC: System Monitor Call Fig.2 Processor modes in ARM TrustZone • Provides a secure execution environment by splitting computer resources into execution worlds : Normal World, Secure World, (Moniter Mode) • NS bit is triggered by SMC* on Moniter Mode • Secure World --> Normal World (o) • Secure World <-- Normal World (x)
  • 9. Secure Execution Virtualization) • Encrpyts transparently the memory contents of a VM with a unique key for each guest VM. • The management of these keys and the secure data transfer is handled by the SEV firmware. • Encypting VMs can help protecting them from physical threats, other VMs threats or even the VMM itself. • AMD SME* encrypts all the system memory with a single key that is generated by the AMD Secure Processor at boot. • It does not require any application s/w changes, vm's encrpytion is performed by hardware engines. Fig.4 AMD SEV architecute * SME: Secure Memory Encryption
  • 10.  Intel SGX • Protect a portion of their address spaces and secure their code and data within containers called enclaves. • A new set of CPU instructions allowing a user application to create enclaves as a hardware-assisted TEE. • The untrusted section and the trusted section • Secret data/code are located in the trusted section, and are accessed from the untrusted section through SGX call gates. • With the upcoming version SGX v2, a new feature called oversubscribing will allow multiple VMs to share the EPC *. * EPC: Enclave Page Cache Fig.5 Intel SGX trusted execution path
  • 11. 1) Secuirty Criteria (10) • Isolation level • Memory confidentiality and integrity protection • Protrection against compromised OS/VMM/BIOS/SMM • Protection agianst physical attacks • Protection against memory snooping • Secure storage • Secure boot • Cache memory protection • Memory access protection 2) Functional Criteria (5) • TCB Size • Debugging • Attestation • Sealing • Execution privilege level 3) Deployability criteria (6) • TEE features • Application modification • Performance • VM migration • License agreement • Ecosystem
  • 12. 1) Secuirty Criteria (10) • Isolation level • Memory confidentiality and integrity protection • Protrection against compromised OS/VMM/BIOS/SMM • Protection agianst physical attacks • Protection against memory snooping • Secure storage • Secure boot • Cache memory protection • Memory access protection 2) Functional Criteria (5) • TCB Size • Debugging • Attestation • Sealing • Execution privilege level 3) Deployability criteria (6) • TEE features • Application modification • Performance • VM migration • License agreement • Ecosystem
  • 13. x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
  • 14. x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
  • 15. x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
  • 16. x: unsupported, √: supported, •: not applicable or not specified
  • 17. • Hardware-based security solutions are a promising way toward a trusted cloud computing enviroment • We presented four industrial-scale hardware-based trust solutions: Intel TXT, ARM TrustZone, AMD SEV, Intel SGX • According to our comparison with respect to three criteria categories. • Intel SGX is a better chocie, but still not the best. • Requires code modification of legacy application • Puts the responsibility on the application developers to write code that resists to side channel attacks
  • 18. Q & A