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KERBEROS – CLIENT SERVER
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
APPLICATION
1
~ S. Janani, AP/CSE, KCET
Authentication Applications
2
 will consider authentication functions
 developed to support application-level
authentication & digital signatures
 will consider Kerberos – a private-key
authentication service
 then X.509 directory authentication service
Kerberos
3
 trusted key server system from MIT
 provides centralised private-key third-party
authentication in a distributed network
 allows users access to services distributed
through out the network
 without needing to trust all workstations
 rather all trust a central authentication server
 two versions in use: 4 & 5
Kerberos Requirements
4
 first published report identified its requirements
as:
 security
 reliability
 transparency
 scalability
 implemented using an authentication protocol
based on Needham-Schroeder
Kerberos 4 Overview
5
 a basic third-party authentication scheme
 have an Authentication Server (AS)
 users initially negotiate with AS to identify
themselves
 AS provides a non-corruptible authentication
credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)
 have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
 users subsequently request access to other
services from TGS on basis of users TGT
A Simple Authentication
Dialogue
6
 (1) C -> AS : IDC || PC || IDV
 C = client
 AS = authentication server
 IDC = identifier of user on C
 PC = password of user on C
 IDV = identifier of server V
 C asks user for the password
 AS checks that user supplied the right password
Message 2
7
 (2) AS -> C : Ticket
 Ticket = E K(V) [IDC || ADC || IDV]
 K(V) = secret encryption key shared by AS and V
 ADC = network address of C
 Ticket cannot be altered by C or an adversary
Message 3
8
 (3) C -> V: IDC || Ticket
 Server V decrypts the ticket and checks various
fields
 ADC in the ticket binds the ticket to the network
address of C
 However this authentication scheme has
problems
Problems
9
 Each time a user needs to access a different
service he/she needs to enter their password
 Read email several times
 Print, mail, or file server
 Assume that each ticket can be used only once
(otherwise open to replay attacks)
 Password sent in the clear
Authentication Dialogue II
10
 Once per user logon session
 (1) C -> AS: IDC || IDTGS
 (2) AS -> C: E K(C) [TicketTGS]
 TicketTGS is equal to
 E K(TGS) [IDC || ADC || IDTGS
|| TS1 || Lifetime1 ]
Explaining the fields
11
 TGS = Ticket-granting server
 IDTGS = Identifier of the TGS
 TicketTGS = Ticket-granting ticket or TGT
 TS1 = timestamp
 Lifetime1 = lifetime for the TGT
 K (C) = key derived from user’s password
Messages (3) and (4)
12
 Once per type of service
 (3) C -> TGS: IDC || IDV || TicketTGS
 (4) TGS -> C : TicketV
 TicketV is equal to
 E K(V) [ IDC || ADC || IDV ||
TS2 || Lifetime2 ]
K(V): key shared between V and TGS
Is called the service-granting ticket (SGT)
Message 5
13
 Once per service session
 (5) C -> V: IDC || TicketV
 C says to V “I am IDC and have a ticket from
the TGS” . Let me in!
 Seems secure, but..
 There are problems
Problems
14
 Lifetime of the TGT
 Short : user is repeatedly asked for their
password
 Long : open to replay attack
 Oscar captures TGT and waits for the user to
logoff
 Sends message (3) with network address IDC
(network address is easy to forge)
 Same problem with SGT
What should we do?
15
 A network service (TGS or server) should be able
to verify that
 person using the ticket is the same as the person that the
ticket was issued to
 Remedy : use an authenticator
 Server should also authenticate to user
 Otherwise can setup a “fake” server
 A “fake” tuition payment server and capture the student’s
credit card
 Remedy : use a challenge-response protocol
Kerberos Version 4
 Uses DES, in a rather elaborate protocol, to
provide authentication
 Uses an Authentication Server (AS)
 Knows all user passwords, and stores in a DB
 Shares a unique secret key with each server
 Send an encrypted ticket granting ticket
 TGT contains a lifetime and timestamp
Kerberos Version 4
 Uses a Ticket Granting Server (TGS)
 Issues tickets to users authenticated by AS
 Encrypted with a key only known by AS and TGS
 Returns a service granting ticket
 Service granting ticket contains timestamp and
lifetime
18
Kerberos Realms
20
 a Kerberos environment consists of:
 a Kerberos server
 a number of clients, all registered with server
 application servers, sharing keys with server
 this is termed a realm
 typically a single administrative domain
 if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers
must share keys and trust
Kerberos Version 5
21
 developed in mid 1990’s
 provides improvements over v4
 addresses environmental shortcomings
 encryption algorithm, network protocol, byte order,
ticket lifetime, authentication forwarding, inter-realm
authentication
 and technical deficiencies
 double encryption, non-standard mode of use, session
keys, password attacks
 specified as Internet standard RFC 1510

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Kerberos

  • 1. KERBEROS – CLIENT SERVER MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION APPLICATION 1 ~ S. Janani, AP/CSE, KCET
  • 2. Authentication Applications 2  will consider authentication functions  developed to support application-level authentication & digital signatures  will consider Kerberos – a private-key authentication service  then X.509 directory authentication service
  • 3. Kerberos 3  trusted key server system from MIT  provides centralised private-key third-party authentication in a distributed network  allows users access to services distributed through out the network  without needing to trust all workstations  rather all trust a central authentication server  two versions in use: 4 & 5
  • 4. Kerberos Requirements 4  first published report identified its requirements as:  security  reliability  transparency  scalability  implemented using an authentication protocol based on Needham-Schroeder
  • 5. Kerberos 4 Overview 5  a basic third-party authentication scheme  have an Authentication Server (AS)  users initially negotiate with AS to identify themselves  AS provides a non-corruptible authentication credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)  have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)  users subsequently request access to other services from TGS on basis of users TGT
  • 6. A Simple Authentication Dialogue 6  (1) C -> AS : IDC || PC || IDV  C = client  AS = authentication server  IDC = identifier of user on C  PC = password of user on C  IDV = identifier of server V  C asks user for the password  AS checks that user supplied the right password
  • 7. Message 2 7  (2) AS -> C : Ticket  Ticket = E K(V) [IDC || ADC || IDV]  K(V) = secret encryption key shared by AS and V  ADC = network address of C  Ticket cannot be altered by C or an adversary
  • 8. Message 3 8  (3) C -> V: IDC || Ticket  Server V decrypts the ticket and checks various fields  ADC in the ticket binds the ticket to the network address of C  However this authentication scheme has problems
  • 9. Problems 9  Each time a user needs to access a different service he/she needs to enter their password  Read email several times  Print, mail, or file server  Assume that each ticket can be used only once (otherwise open to replay attacks)  Password sent in the clear
  • 10. Authentication Dialogue II 10  Once per user logon session  (1) C -> AS: IDC || IDTGS  (2) AS -> C: E K(C) [TicketTGS]  TicketTGS is equal to  E K(TGS) [IDC || ADC || IDTGS || TS1 || Lifetime1 ]
  • 11. Explaining the fields 11  TGS = Ticket-granting server  IDTGS = Identifier of the TGS  TicketTGS = Ticket-granting ticket or TGT  TS1 = timestamp  Lifetime1 = lifetime for the TGT  K (C) = key derived from user’s password
  • 12. Messages (3) and (4) 12  Once per type of service  (3) C -> TGS: IDC || IDV || TicketTGS  (4) TGS -> C : TicketV  TicketV is equal to  E K(V) [ IDC || ADC || IDV || TS2 || Lifetime2 ] K(V): key shared between V and TGS Is called the service-granting ticket (SGT)
  • 13. Message 5 13  Once per service session  (5) C -> V: IDC || TicketV  C says to V “I am IDC and have a ticket from the TGS” . Let me in!  Seems secure, but..  There are problems
  • 14. Problems 14  Lifetime of the TGT  Short : user is repeatedly asked for their password  Long : open to replay attack  Oscar captures TGT and waits for the user to logoff  Sends message (3) with network address IDC (network address is easy to forge)  Same problem with SGT
  • 15. What should we do? 15  A network service (TGS or server) should be able to verify that  person using the ticket is the same as the person that the ticket was issued to  Remedy : use an authenticator  Server should also authenticate to user  Otherwise can setup a “fake” server  A “fake” tuition payment server and capture the student’s credit card  Remedy : use a challenge-response protocol
  • 16. Kerberos Version 4  Uses DES, in a rather elaborate protocol, to provide authentication  Uses an Authentication Server (AS)  Knows all user passwords, and stores in a DB  Shares a unique secret key with each server  Send an encrypted ticket granting ticket  TGT contains a lifetime and timestamp
  • 17. Kerberos Version 4  Uses a Ticket Granting Server (TGS)  Issues tickets to users authenticated by AS  Encrypted with a key only known by AS and TGS  Returns a service granting ticket  Service granting ticket contains timestamp and lifetime
  • 18. 18
  • 19.
  • 20. Kerberos Realms 20  a Kerberos environment consists of:  a Kerberos server  a number of clients, all registered with server  application servers, sharing keys with server  this is termed a realm  typically a single administrative domain  if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers must share keys and trust
  • 21. Kerberos Version 5 21  developed in mid 1990’s  provides improvements over v4  addresses environmental shortcomings  encryption algorithm, network protocol, byte order, ticket lifetime, authentication forwarding, inter-realm authentication  and technical deficiencies  double encryption, non-standard mode of use, session keys, password attacks  specified as Internet standard RFC 1510