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Secure Software Supply
chain for OCI Artifacts on
Kubernetes
Who we are
Paolo Mainardi
@paolomainardi
➔ Co-founder and CTO @ Sparkfabrik
➔ Linux Foundation Europe Advisory Member
➔ Blog: paolomainardi.com
➔ linkedin.com/in/paolomainardi
continuousdelivery.social/@paolomainardi
➔ Co-host of Continuous Delivery podcast
Who we are
Andrea Panisson
@andypanix
➔ Platform Engineer @ Sparkfabrik
➔ GitHub: https://github.com/andypanix
➔ Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/andreapanisson
The session
● What is a (Software) Supply Chain
● OCI Containers and threats
● Digital signatures, attestations and SBOM
● DEMO
(a prayer to the Demo Gods 󰚥)
“A supply chain is a network of individuals and companies who
are involved in creating a product and delivering it to the
consumer”
https://slsa.dev/spec/v0.1/#supply-chain-threats
About 18,000 customers of SolarWinds installed the infected updates,
including firms like Microsoft (Cisco, Intel, Deloitte) and top government
US agencies like Pentagon, Homeland security, National Nuclear Security
etc.
2020
https://www.sonatype.com/state-of-the-software-supply-chain/introduction
● Dependency confusion
● Malicious code injection
● Typosquatting
● Protestware
○ Jan 2022 - Colors and Faker
○ March 2022 - node-ipc
Keynote: The Next Steps in Software Supply Chain Security - Brandon Lum, Software Engineer, Google
https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf
1984
DOCKER OCI IMAGES
DEEP-DIVE
OCI stands for Open Container Initiative.
OCI defines the specifications and standards
for container technologies
(Runtime, Image and Distribution spec).
They can be also used to store
other kind of artifacts (like Helm charts)
or just any arbitrary files (like oras.land).
What is the trusting model behind a Container Image,
or in general, a digital artifact ?
How can i be sure that what i’m running is coming
from a trusted source ?
Secure software supply chain checklist
● Who built it, when and how (Signatures and Provenance
Attestations)
● The list of things who made the artifact (SBOM)
Digital signatures 101
Integrity
Ensure the data
signed was not
altered.
Authenticity
Attest that the data
was sent by the
signer.
Non-repudiation
Ensure that the
signer cannot deny
signing the content.
Digital signatures 101
Managing keys is hard
Distribution, Storage, Compromise
Digital signatures - Sigstore
● Sigstore is an OSS project under the umbrella of OpenSSF
foundation.
● Fast growing community and mainstream adopted
● Used in Kubernetes and many other big vendors (Github,
Rubygems, Arch Linux etc..)
Digital signatures - Sigstore
● Signatures are stored alongside images in OCI registry
● It can sign any software artifact (Cosign) and signs are
stored in a public tamper-resistant public log (Rekor)
● Keyless signing
Secure software supply chain checklist
● Who built it, when and how (Signatures and Provenance
Attestations)
● The list of things who made the artifact (SBOM)
Provenance Attestations
https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1
https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/slsa-provenance-blog-series-part-1-what-is-software-attestation
● Software Attestation: just a signed
bundle of a software artifact(s) and
its metadata.
● The provenance attestation refers to the ability to trust the
authenticity of artifacts
● Provenance is metadata about how a software artifact was
created and how we can rebuild (SLSA).
ATTESTATION
SBOM - Software Bill of Materials
● A list of “ingredients” for a
software artifact
● Can be used for:
○ Vulnerability scanning
(supply chain security)
○ Software transparency
○ License policy
○ Find abandoned
dependencies
SBOM - For containers
Creating a SBOM for a Container is a complex problem, dependencies live at
different levels:
● Operating system (Debian, Alpine etc…)
● Operating system dependencies (RPM, DEB, APK, PKG…)
● Manually installed dependencies (curl)
● Application dependencies (NPM, Rubygems, Pypi, Composer etc…)
● Static binaries and their dependencies (Go, Rust etc…)
Some tools can also measure the SBOM “quality”: SBOM Scorecard and NTIA
Conformance Checker.
SBOM - Tools
$ docker sbom
kubernetes-sigs/bom
DEMO
Software Supply Chain security must
be taken very seriously
What can we do?
● Sign your artifacts - Sigstore is easy and nice!
● Generate SBOM and scan for vulnerabilities
THANKS
https://slsa.dev
It’s a security framework, a check-list of
standards and controls to prevent tampering,
improve integrity, and secure packages and
infrastructure in your projects, businesses or
enterprises. It’s how you get from safe enough
to being as resilient as possible, at any link
in the chain.
https://openssf.or
g
The OpenSSF is a cross-industry organization
that brings together the industry’s most
important open source security initiatives and
the individuals and companies that support them.
The OpenSSF is committed to collaboration and
working both upstream and with existing
communities to advance open source security for
all

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KCD Italy 2023 - Secure Software Supply chain for OCI Artifact on Kubernetes

  • 1. Secure Software Supply chain for OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes
  • 2. Who we are Paolo Mainardi @paolomainardi ➔ Co-founder and CTO @ Sparkfabrik ➔ Linux Foundation Europe Advisory Member ➔ Blog: paolomainardi.com ➔ linkedin.com/in/paolomainardi continuousdelivery.social/@paolomainardi ➔ Co-host of Continuous Delivery podcast
  • 3. Who we are Andrea Panisson @andypanix ➔ Platform Engineer @ Sparkfabrik ➔ GitHub: https://github.com/andypanix ➔ Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/andreapanisson
  • 4. The session ● What is a (Software) Supply Chain ● OCI Containers and threats ● Digital signatures, attestations and SBOM ● DEMO (a prayer to the Demo Gods 󰚥)
  • 5. “A supply chain is a network of individuals and companies who are involved in creating a product and delivering it to the consumer”
  • 7. About 18,000 customers of SolarWinds installed the infected updates, including firms like Microsoft (Cisco, Intel, Deloitte) and top government US agencies like Pentagon, Homeland security, National Nuclear Security etc. 2020
  • 8. https://www.sonatype.com/state-of-the-software-supply-chain/introduction ● Dependency confusion ● Malicious code injection ● Typosquatting ● Protestware ○ Jan 2022 - Colors and Faker ○ March 2022 - node-ipc
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11. Keynote: The Next Steps in Software Supply Chain Security - Brandon Lum, Software Engineer, Google
  • 14. OCI stands for Open Container Initiative. OCI defines the specifications and standards for container technologies (Runtime, Image and Distribution spec). They can be also used to store other kind of artifacts (like Helm charts) or just any arbitrary files (like oras.land).
  • 15. What is the trusting model behind a Container Image, or in general, a digital artifact ? How can i be sure that what i’m running is coming from a trusted source ?
  • 16. Secure software supply chain checklist ● Who built it, when and how (Signatures and Provenance Attestations) ● The list of things who made the artifact (SBOM)
  • 17. Digital signatures 101 Integrity Ensure the data signed was not altered. Authenticity Attest that the data was sent by the signer. Non-repudiation Ensure that the signer cannot deny signing the content.
  • 18. Digital signatures 101 Managing keys is hard Distribution, Storage, Compromise
  • 19. Digital signatures - Sigstore ● Sigstore is an OSS project under the umbrella of OpenSSF foundation. ● Fast growing community and mainstream adopted ● Used in Kubernetes and many other big vendors (Github, Rubygems, Arch Linux etc..)
  • 20. Digital signatures - Sigstore ● Signatures are stored alongside images in OCI registry ● It can sign any software artifact (Cosign) and signs are stored in a public tamper-resistant public log (Rekor) ● Keyless signing
  • 21. Secure software supply chain checklist ● Who built it, when and how (Signatures and Provenance Attestations) ● The list of things who made the artifact (SBOM)
  • 22. Provenance Attestations https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/slsa-provenance-blog-series-part-1-what-is-software-attestation ● Software Attestation: just a signed bundle of a software artifact(s) and its metadata. ● The provenance attestation refers to the ability to trust the authenticity of artifacts ● Provenance is metadata about how a software artifact was created and how we can rebuild (SLSA). ATTESTATION
  • 23. SBOM - Software Bill of Materials ● A list of “ingredients” for a software artifact ● Can be used for: ○ Vulnerability scanning (supply chain security) ○ Software transparency ○ License policy ○ Find abandoned dependencies
  • 24. SBOM - For containers Creating a SBOM for a Container is a complex problem, dependencies live at different levels: ● Operating system (Debian, Alpine etc…) ● Operating system dependencies (RPM, DEB, APK, PKG…) ● Manually installed dependencies (curl) ● Application dependencies (NPM, Rubygems, Pypi, Composer etc…) ● Static binaries and their dependencies (Go, Rust etc…) Some tools can also measure the SBOM “quality”: SBOM Scorecard and NTIA Conformance Checker.
  • 25. SBOM - Tools $ docker sbom kubernetes-sigs/bom
  • 26. DEMO
  • 27. Software Supply Chain security must be taken very seriously
  • 28.
  • 29. What can we do? ● Sign your artifacts - Sigstore is easy and nice! ● Generate SBOM and scan for vulnerabilities
  • 30. THANKS https://slsa.dev It’s a security framework, a check-list of standards and controls to prevent tampering, improve integrity, and secure packages and infrastructure in your projects, businesses or enterprises. It’s how you get from safe enough to being as resilient as possible, at any link in the chain. https://openssf.or g The OpenSSF is a cross-industry organization that brings together the industry’s most important open source security initiatives and the individuals and companies that support them. The OpenSSF is committed to collaboration and working both upstream and with existing communities to advance open source security for all