The document discusses the politics of Zambia and the issue of Barotseland. It argues that Zambia's multi-party politics since 1991 have merely been an extension of the one-party state dictatorship under Kenneth Kaunda, as tendencies from that era have been reinvigorated. Additionally, it summarizes the nationalist struggle for autonomy or independence being waged by groups in Barotseland, a region that had previously been an independent kingdom before merging with Northern Rhodesia to form Zambia. The youth and intelligentsia in Barotseland are now taking leading roles in this nationalist movement.

1. Zambia’s Faltering Multi-Party Politics: New
Wine in Old Wineskins?
Presented by Ndangwa Noyoo (Ph.D)
Associate Professor, Department of Social Work, University of Johannesburg,
At the Workshop on Contemporary Zambian Politics,
Centre for Social Science Research, 29-30 September, 2016
University of Cape Town

2. Disclaimer and Background
 I was part of the 32 University of Zambia (UNZA) students who were
detained by the One-party state Dictatorship of Zambia’s founding
president, Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party
(UNIP)-led government, in June 1990, for calling for Multi-party politics in
the country.
 We were the first group of students to ever call for regime change in
Zambia (and most probably the last). To effect this, almost all UNZA
students inspired a country-wide uprising against Kaunda and UNIP. Our
weapons against Kaunda and UNIP were the high cost of living and the
mismanaged economy, and political repression.
 Subsequent to this, there was an attempted coup and the formation of a
pro-democracy movement known as the Movement for Multi-party
Democracy (MMD).
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3.  The UNZA students worked hand-in-hand with the MMD until the
polls of 1991, which saw the MMD and its leader the late Frederick
Jacob Titus Chiluba defeat Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP after ruling
Zambia for 27 years.
 If it were not for the UNZA students, Zambia may not have reverted
back to multi-party politics in the time it did. It is more than likely
that the MMD would not have scored the success it had if it were
not for the UNZA students. Probably, Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP
would still be in power as is the case in Zimbabwe, where Robert
Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) PF party
are still in-charge of that country’s affairs.
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4. Arguments of the Presentation
 There are too many continuities between the One-party state
Dictatorship of Kaunda and the current politics in Zambia today.
These are the main impediments to the consolidation of democracy
in Zambia. The elections of 2016 are merely an extension of the
foregoing.
 The main reason for this is the reinvigoration of One-party state
politics, tendencies and Kaunda by the Patriotic Front (PF)
Government of first, the late and former president of Zambia, Michael
Chilufya Sata, and current president, Edgar Chagwa Lungu.
 In fact, the last MMD Government of Rupiah Banda (2008-2011)
was responsible for bringing back one-party state political
tendencies. 4

5.  Suffice it to say, the MMD of Frederick Chiluba, lost a window of
opportunity to wipe the slate clean and create a new Zambian society,
rather Chiluba had invested almost all his energies in ‘Bembanising’
Zambia and engaging in wanton and blatant acts of corruption whilst
championing a chaotic ‘liberalisation’ agenda and privatization
programme (Noyoo, 2010).
 Arguably, the whole period of multi-party politics from 1991 to
2016, was and continues to be tainted by the politics of the One-
party state Dictatorship of Kaunda.
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6.  With Zambia’s population mainly concentrated in rural areas at 58.2%
compared to 41.8% in urban areas, regional politics and ethnic-based
politics cannot be discounted or glossed over (Central Statistical
Office, 2016).
 Following Raynolds and Sisk (1998), I also contend that there is good
reason to be skeptical about the value of elections in African societies
such as Zambia as they can exacerbate social tensions and further
polarize such societies. This is true particularly when incumbent
regimes manipulate election rules to their own advantage.
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7. The hallmarks of the One-party state
Dictatorship
 These were:
Clientelism or patron-client relations politics - with Kenneth Kaunda being
the Chief Patron, akin to the Politics of the Belly, a Cameroonian phrase
which Jean-François Bayart (1993) borrowed and popularised; in French:
politique du ventre. Since 1991, all Zambian presidents have been Chief
Patrons.
Authoritarian and malevolent leadership.
Personality cults.
Blurring of lines between party and the government bureaucracy.
Policy inconsistencies and incoherence.
Political intolerance, violence (with vigilantes at the forefront), ethnic
mobilisation, corruption, political myopia, and so forth.
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8. Closing off of the spaces for contestation and civil society engagement.
Manipulation and muzzling of the media.
Reducing national policy developments and decision-making to one man,
Kaunda as Sandbrook (1993) rightly notes:
“Kaunda was chiefly responsible for the country’s erratic and sometime
wrong-headed policy directions until the multiparty elections of 1991. He
made major policy decisions himself and appointed and fired all economic
decision-makers. Further, the one party stifled open debate of policy
alternatives” (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 32).
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9. Multi-Party Politics in Zambia: New
Wine in Old Wineskins!
 In this section, I contend that indeed politics in Zambia is a carry-over
from the One-party state Dictatorship era due to the following
reasons:
There was no total severance with the Dictatorship tendencies of the
One party system, as many functionaries of this system who I will
refer to as “political turn-coats” simply “jumped ship”, left UNIP and
hijacked our revolution.
 One thing that the UNZA students wanted and were very clear about
was the total transformation of the Zambian society – to date, I
contend this ideal has not been realised. Due to this, two
champions of the One-party state Dictatorship became presidents.
These were Rupiah Banda and Michael Sata.
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10. ‘Defections’ by people - from one political party to another or even
another - not on principles and ideologies but mainly because of
‘politics of the belly’.
An ill-informed political and politically ‘illiterate’ voting population
that does not focus on policies but on personalities and instant
gratification.
Since 1991, more often than Political, institutional and
constitutional reforms have always been effected from the position
of entrenching the incumbent president or ruling party and not for
genuine democratic consolidation.
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11. Democracy in Zambia: A dream deferred?
 For Zambia to move forward, there must be a strong historical
narrative and analysis in relation to its political space, otherwise
questionable individuals and practices will keep on reproducing and
re-hashing themselves.
 Following Rustow (1970) who aptly paraphrases Georges Clemenceau
“History is far too important a topic to be left just to historians.”
 Echoing Rustow (1970) the following ingredients are crucial for
Zambia to move from Faltering Multi-party politics to perhaps a
consolidation of democracy:
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12. There must be a sense of genuine national unity in Zambia not
sloganeering i.e. ‘One Zambia, One Nation’.
There must be entrenched and serious contestations in Zambia
(based on policies and issues).
There must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules.
 Both politicians and electorate must be habituated to these rules.
 These ingredients must be assembled one at a time.
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13. Barotseland and calls for total independence
 I argue in my latest book: Barotseland’s amalgamation with Zambia: A
political conundrum, I argue that the Barotseland question was a
conundrum that was solely created by the founding Zambian president
Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP and then cemented by successive Zambian
political administrations from 1991 to date.
This issue cannot be crushed or wished away. It is actually going to
reconstitute Zambia in one way or another…Even if the Zambian
Government and Zambians in general do not want this to happen…it will
happen.
 Zambia is an amalgamation of two former British colonial territories viz:
Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia.
 Zambia was consummated in May 1964 (before Zambia’s independence on
24 October 1964) when Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia merged after
the signing of the now defunct Barotseland Agreement 1964.
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14.  Despite this, the Constitution Amendment Act 3 of 1969 - a so-called
Constitutional Referendum reform of Kaunda and UNIP abrogated this treaty and
henceforth criminalized the Barotseland question.
 Whilst relying on draconian legislation and other instruments such as the State of
Emergency, Barotse nationalists were detained at will by the Kaunda regime
throughout the One party state era. The largest number of Barotse nationalists
detained to date was 160 in 1973, including the first democratically elected Prime
Minister of the Barotse Government or Katengo, the late Hastings Ndangwa
Noyoo (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1995).
 For many Zambians, this issue only ‘came to light’ after 1991, when the political
space was opened – much to the irritation and consternation of many Zambians.
 But the quest for an autonomous Barotseland had always been sought by the
Barotse or Lozi as they had negotiated for this status in Zambia via the
Barotseland Agreement.
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15.  The continuities of the past, as regards Barotseland are exemplified by,
inter alia, the continuous criminalization of the Barotseland question by
Zambian Governments for five decades.
 But the tactics of UNIP cannot hold sway anymore as the world has
changed.
 Information is readily available due to the Internet etc. The tactics of UNIP
of distorting and hiding information regarding the Barotseland question are
obsolete.
 Massive troop deployment, mass arrests and intimidation have not cowed
the Barotse.
 The Barotseland question can no longer be caricatured as ‘secession’ as it is
a national question which Zambia has failed to answer in five decades.
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16.  Curiously, successive Zambian governments after 1991 had employed
Kaunda’s and UNIP’s tactics to crush the Barotseland issue (in a so-called
democratic dispensation) with thousands of Barotse or Lozi being killed,
maimed, arrested at will, on mostly trumped up charges.
 The following key issues will define the Barotseland issue going forward:
The MMD government of Rupiah Banda (2008-2011) will go down in
Zambia’s history as one political administration that had perpetrated the
most gruesome acts of state-led violence against the people of
Barotseland. The Zambian Government’s brutality had resulted in the
deaths of many Barotse nationals. These acts of violence were precipitated
by what are now referred to as the ‘Mongu riots’ of 14 January 2011. This
massacre had resulted in the deaths of about 18 individuals even though
the Zambian Government claimed that there were only two people who
died.
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17. The Barotseland issue is no longer a ‘traditional affair’ but a nationalist
struggle waged by various Barotse liberation movements whilst the current
Litunga (King) of Barotseland and the so-called Barotse Royal Establishment
(BRE) have effectively become moribund after allegedly being bribed by the
Zambian Government and taking highly puzzling stances which directly
violate Barotse governance, laws, customs and traditions.
On 14 August 2013, a Transitional Government of Barotseland was set up
and an ‘Administrator General,’ Afumba Mombotwa. Mombotwa, who was
also the Chairperson of Linyungandambo (a Barotse nationalist movement)
was ‘sworn in’ as the ‘Administrator General’ of Barotseland by the ‘Chief
Justice’ in Mongu.
After this Barotseland declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI) along the lines of Kosovo.
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18.  On 27 March 2012, the people of Barotseland convened a Pizo or
Barotse National Council (BNC), where they all unequivocally
expressed their desire to reconstitute Barotseland into a sovereign
nation (Barotseland’s ‘Brexit’ or Referendum). The BNC is the highest
policy-making body in the indigenous Barotse political and
governance systems. All seven districts of Barotseland were
represented at the BNC through their traditional rulers with some
people from the Barotse Diaspora in attendance. There were also
some Zambian Government officials of Lozi origin who witnessed
this occasion. Among other issues, the BNC gave notice in this
manner:
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19.  “We now inform Zambia and the international community that we
finally accept the unilateral nullification and the abrogation of the
Barotseland Agreement 1964 by the Zambian Government, which
action has freed Barotseland from being part of Zambia. In line with
the Postliminium doctrine we can no longer be obliged to honour an
international Agreement that the other party has nullified and
abrogated, which has reverted us to our original status.”
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20.  Afumba Mombotwa, Likando Pelekelo and Sylvester Inambao Kalima
were arrested on ‘treason’ charges and subsequently sentenced to 10
years.
 The Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) another Barotse
nationalist movement recruited international Lawyers at the Dugué &
Kirtley International Law Firm to take this matter to the International
Court of Justice at the Hague.
 It also launched an online petition for all nationals of Barotseland and
those in the Diaspora to electronically sign a Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) which would allow for Barotseland’s legal status to
be determined peacefully and in accordance with international law.
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21.  The late and immediate past president of Zambia, Michael Sata refused to
sign the submission. More than 10, 000 Barotse signed the petition and
more are still signing it. The international lawyers also sent through the
PCA to the new Zambian president Edgar Chagwa Lungu. Thus far Lungu
has not signed the PCA.
 To its credit the BRE through the Ngambela or Prime Minister, launched a
case against the Zambian Government at the African Union’s (AU’s) African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). After months of delay,
the Zambian Government had responded and requested the case to be
thrown out. However, the people of Barotseland through the Office of the
Ngambela countered and added more evidence to their case. This process
has not been concluded.
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22.  The Youth Factor: The struggle for Barotseland’s sovereignty has been
taken up by the youth and in my opinion, they will decide the conclusion of
this saga. They are more radical, many are incorruptible and resolute.
 A case-in-point is that of the Barotse Youth League (BYL) leaders namely,
Nayoto Mwenda, Boris Muziba and Sikwibele ‘Skwiz’ Wasilota who were
arrested on trumped up charges. They were subsequently each sentenced
to three years in prison with hard labour by Magistrate Malata of Kaoma
Magistrate Court for “publication of false news with intent to cause fear or
alarm to the public contrary to the laws of Zambia.”
 The Magistrate also noted when passing sentence, that the trio’s “conduct
during the court process was not good.” The young militants had
contended throughout the trial that they could not be tried by a Zambian
court as they were citizens of Barotseland.
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23.  The trio argue that Zambian courts were partial when it came to cases involving
people from Barotseland. Incidentally, one of the accused, Mwenda, is a qualified
lawyer. They then asked that their case be transferred to the Commonwealth
Court which they said would impartially adjudicate the matter.
 They defiantly went on to serve their three-year jail terms unshaken and not
compromising on this held position. They were later released by Edgar Lungu
through a presidential pardon.
 As we speak five Barotse youth freedom fighters who were freed on 28 June 2016
by Kaoma Magistrate Chingumbe, who found them not guilty, over ‘seditious
practices’ will be back on trial in Zambia’s higher court after the Zambia
Government appealed the verdict. These youths were arrested for merely
carrying and displaying an Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
(UNPO) Flag. Barotseland is now registered with this organisation.
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24.  The Barotse intelligentsia factor: Previously this group was
instrumental in propelling the UNIP nationalist struggle against
colonial rule and ironically undermining Barotseland.
 These were notably the Wina brothers Sikota and the Arthur
(deceased), Kabeleke Konoso and Munukayumbwa Sipalo (who the
Barotse Youths refer to as ‘sell-outs’).
 Other Barotse intellectuals were more pro-Zambia or simply
disinterested. However, things are now different as the Barotse
intelligentsia is playing a critical role in this struggle.
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25. Concluding Points
 Elections – if sequenced, structured, and conducted properly – are
appropriate instruments of conflict management through democratisation
(Raynolds & Sisk, 1998).
 Zambia can benefit from such a dividend if genuine and progressive
institutional political reforms are undertaken in the country.
 Civic education is an important factor and should be institutionalised in
Zambia for democracy to be consolidated.
 Old bad habits of the One-party state Dictatorship have been maintained,
sustained and replicated after the fall of Kaunda by successive
governments since 1991 by the former functionaries of the One-party state
era. These same people have ‘schooled’ the younger generation in such
retrogressive politics.
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26.  Until the time when Zambians realise that politics is about public
service and not about self-interest, the prevailing political scenario in
Zambia will not change.
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27. References
 Bayart, J-F. (1993). The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. New York, NY: Longman Publishing.
 Central Statistical Office (COS). (2016). 2015 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Key Findings.
Lusaka: COS.
 Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). (1995). Report of the Human Rights Commission of
Inquiry. Lusaka: GRZ.
 Noyoo, N. (2010). Social Policy and Human Development in Zambia. London: Adonis and Abbey.
 Noyoo, N. (2016). Barotseland’s amalgamation with Zambia: A political conundrum. Pretoria:
Kwarts.
 Raynolds, A., & Sisk, T. D. (1998). Introduction. In A. Raynolds, & T. D. Sisk (Eds.), Elections and
Conflict Management in Africa. (pp. 1-9). Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace.
 Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics,
2(3), 337-363.
 Sandbrook, R. (1993). The Politics of Africa’s Economic Recovery. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
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