What engagement of the Civil War was so resoundingly successful for the Army of the Potomac, that it sent the Confederates on a 50-mile retreat back to Richmond ? Col. Seidule's "Official West Point History of the Civil War" doesn't even mention the Battle of Williasmburg, much less that Gen. Hancock's brilliant penetration of Rebel defensive lines at Fort Magruder, and his surreptitious occupation of a series of redoubts behind the lines, enabled him to take Gen Early's Army totally by surprise, and ROUT them Rebs, sending them on a midnight retreat, and earning Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock the nickname "the Superb." Here's the story you've never heard before -- Hancock's Charge

2. C.S.A. Gen. Joe Johnston
General Geo. B. McClellan’s master-plan for attacking the Confederate positions on the Lower Peninsula, initially
involves an amphibious assault of his forces, first landing up the Rappahannock River, at a small docks at Urbanna,
whence to cross the Middle Peninsula to the York River behind the Confederate defenses, and land again behind
Confederate lines, at a point where the Lower Peninsula is only seven miles wide: such a position will afford him
the chance to quickly and completely cut off a Confederate supply lines and intercept any retreat to Richmond!
This ingenious plan to close the Peninsular “bottleneck” around the Rebel
army is thus called “the Urbanna Plan.” But President Abraham Lincoln
disagrees with McClellan’s proposal: Lincoln has a plan for a similar marine
landing, up the Occuquan – which would confront the Rebels at Manassas.
McClellan – to save the Urbanna plan – suggests that it be vetted before a
War commission of twelve Union Army generals. Lincoln consents to this,
and the generals, in an 8-4 vote, endorse the Urbanna plan. However, shortly
after the vetting process, C.S.A. Gen. Johnston suddenly withdraws his Army
from its forward positions near Manassas, Falls Church and Centerville!!!
Learning of this, McClellan believes that Johnston has somehow obtained
knowledge of “Urbanna,”and that he is pulling his army back as a
countermeasure!! Not so !! See YANEE SCOUT -- Monitor vs. Merrimac !!
McClellan thinks that during the vetting process of Urbanna, key details of the plan must have been leaked to
Confederate intelligence operatives. …. and he blames this imaginary leak on Lincoln, and his failure to appreciate
the “brilliant” merits of “Urbanna. ” Right or wrong, the Rebs are moving in advance of the plan, and so a new
plan must be adopted. Now, McClellan proposes to launch a land-based assault, to move up the length of the
Middle Peninsula, from Fort Monroe & Newport News toward Richmond: “the Peninsular Campaign” it is called,
and President Lincoln agrees. But then, suddenly, on March 13, 1862, McClellan himself is removed as General-
in-Chief of the Grand Army of the Potomac, and given a division command – as meanwhile President Lincoln
brings the Army under total Executive Office control with the help of his new Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton.
Lincoln parts up the Army command between four generals, leaving McClellan with command of only this area of
the Middle Peninsula lying between the York and James rivers. The President is expressing a full vote of no-
confidence in McClellan, in front of the entire Union Army, and it seems now that General McClellan fully intends
to live up to Lincoln’s expectation: even if it means accomplishing nothing. In fact, McClellan has become virtually
paralyzed by the political machinations in Washington, and radical string-pulling on the new President.

3. Hence, in real terms: as early as the first week of March, 1862 – and Pvt.
Drew says, even before March 1 -- C.S.A. Gen. Johnston had abandoned
forward Rebel positions at Manassas Junction near Bull Run creek – the
result of a miscommunication? As noted, McClellan had responded rapidly
with his “Plan D” “Peninsular Campaign” plan, which required him to move
his Army rapidly from Alexandria, down to the tip of the Peninsula at
Newport News, Va., where it will initiate the ground assault towards
Richmond, the Rebel Seat !! But McClellan cannot be “brilliant” this way.
In response to this new Union initiative, in the first weeks of March, the
Confederate Army retreats to fortified positions at Yorktown and along the
Warwick River, where the Union Army finds them on April 5. On April
6th
, the 6th
Maine Infantry on a reconnaissance under Army Engineer Lt. C.B.
Comstock overcomes Confederate works at Yorktown, and engages the 17th
Alabama – but lacking permission to attack from Division Gen. Smith, or
even from Hancock, they are obliged to withdraw!! A month passes ….
From there, the next phase of the Rebel retreat up the peninsula toward Richmond, begins on the night of May 3,
under a heavy diversionary bombardment from along their Warwick river defenses. The next morning,
McClellan’s army marches into the Confederate defensive works around Yorktown to “lay the siege” thereto, and
the place is pretty much empty!! See the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT -- Siege of Yorktown!!
Now, as this cat-and-mouse
game between the armies
proceeds up the peninsula,
the Confederates have beat a
hasty retreat to their fortified
command post at earthen
Fort Magruder in front of the
old city of Williamsburg,
Virginia. By the time Gen.
McClellan’s Army reaches
them on the evening of May
4, 1862, the Confederates are
encamped behind the fort,
on the grounds of William
and Mary College, and the
Rebel Army command
under Gen. Joseph Johnston
appear supremely confident!
And with good reason: as the
fight opens on the morning
of May 5, Gen. Joe Hooker,
who is later joined by Gen.
Phil Kearney, soon appears
stymied: the Union attack on
defenses of the seemingly
impregnable Fort Magruder,
is accomplishing nothing to
resolve …

4. And then something incredible happens …!!!
Right …!!! But find out exactly how, below !!
In the presentation of the Pvt. Calif Newton Drew’s tale of the battle
of Williamsburg, the Editor here has sought to corroborate, clarify,
amplify or correct Drew’s own first-person account, with more
comprehensive sources, such as Alexander Webb’s 1881 volume,
The Peninsula; Stephen Sears’ 1992 history, To the Gates of
Richmond; and the Junkin & Norton Life of Hancock (1880), and
various other sources discussed below. A few key pieces of military
cartography are also consulted.
Indeed, the YANKEE SCOUT series is only the memoir of a single
private in the Union Army infantry! As Pvt. Drew said, it is not a
regimental or brigade history, much less a history of the Peninsular
Campaign, still less of the war; and it cannot even pretend to do
real historiographical justice to the military battles of the Civil War,
so vast were so many of these engagements.
Nevertheless, in this instance, in his shorthand narrative of the
battle of Williamsburg, Pvt. Drew gives a few more details than he
ordinarily does: and so -- as we did in the Siege of Yorktown issue
-- as the Editor, I’m carefully cross-referencing the Drew account
with passages of General Winfield Scott Hancock’s Official
Report of the battle. Gen Hancock was the commander of Smith’s
First Brigade at the battle of Williamsburg, and thus he was Drew’s commanding officer,
leading Drew’s 6th
Maine regiment in the “famous” Hancock’s Charge. Finally, there appears to be a good possibility
that Pvt. Drew was serving as Gen. Hancock’s own general orderly during this battle, in particular.
Gen. Hancock’s Official Report recounts in exact professional detail the movements of his First Brigade of the
Army of the Potomac on May 5, 1862 … and makes for authoritative illumination of Pvt. Drew’s Memoir record.
Together, they make for some interesting reading! However because Hancock’s generalship at Williamsburg was
literally “superb,” and because his Report is equally comprehensive, it’s nearly impossible to provide a parallel or
“binocular” account of these events: for Pvt. Drew often sees only what he is shooting at, and knows only a few
events in his vicinity, from direct observation. Gen. Hancock’s official report should be read in its entirety,
therefore. It is accessible (at this writing) on a cached or archived internet pages starting at the following URL:
http://www.oocities.org/superbhancock/williamsburg01.html .

5. 3 or 4 Regiments make 1 Brigade
3 or 4 Brigades a Division
3 Divisions a Corps.
The Composition of Gen. Hancock’s Brigade at the Battle of Williamsburg
As outlined, earlier,1
in September of 1861 there was a shuffling of troops, resulting in the creation of four Corps in
the U.S. Army. The Four corps were as follows:
I Corps -- Gen. Irvin McDowell
II Corps -- Gen. Edwin V. Sumner
III Corps -- Gen Samuel P. Heintzelman
IV Corps -- Gen. E. D. Keyes
Within these Corps, there are continual shufflings of Divisions. For our purposes though, Gen. Winfield Scott
Hancock is now in command of the 1st
Brigade of Gen. “Baldy” Smith’s 2nd
Division of Gen. E. D. Keyes’ IV Corps
of the Grand Army of the Potomac. Army Divisions of Gen Hooker and Gen. Kearney have already settled into
a standoff through a direct frontal assault on the impregnable Fort Magruder; meanwhile, Division Commander
Gen. Smith, including his 1st
Brigade under Hancock has been sent to the right of the Union line – to the far left of
the Confederate defenses -- eastward towards the York River. So Gen. Hancock’s First Brigade is not seeing any
action. The brigade consists of these regiments:
Fifth Wisconsin, Col. Amassa Cobb
Sixth Maine, Col. Hiram Burnham
Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, Col. William W. Irwin
Fourth New York, Col. Franics L. Yinson [Drew has down the 43rd
New York – Ed.]
In addition to his own brigade, beginning with the march from Yorktown to Williamsburg, May 4th
, 1862 and
continuing through the battle of Williamsburg, Gen Hancock was also in command of Davidson’s brigade of Smith’s
Division, consisting of: Seventh Maine, Thirty-third New York ( a portion thereof ) as well as: Wheeler’s and
Cowan’s batteries, both from New York ….
1
See, YANKEE SCOUT – Death on the Picket Line !!

6. [P. 41] Big Fight Ft. Magruder
“A battle opened on the right. Gen’l” Hooker’s men had run against a big Fort and was hard at it. It was Fort
Magruder in front of the City of Williamsburg. Gen’l Kearney rushed his division up to help Hooker. We got in
line away out on the right, found nothing to fight. Hancock wanted scouts.
“Burnham called for scouts from Co. K. 10 of [us] started but found the land covered with water.”
NOTE: R.K. Sneden, Plan of Fort Magruder, Battlefield of Williamsburg, shows at left, Gen. Kearney’s Division
coming up to support Gen Hooker’s Division. The location of General HANCOCK’s troops is identified on the
far right: written in PURPLE. These include the 5th
Wisc. and Pvt. Drew’s 6th
Maine … SO READ ON !!

7. Detail of Sneden, Official Plan of the Battle of Williamsburg, Va. May 5, 1862
“We cruised away from the fighting, found a place + got across the overflow into a lot of fallen timber, found open
land with timber standings on the other side, midway of the opening was a small square earthwork. We could see
the large Fort where the fighting was going on; there was another smaller Fort quite a ways on our Right: we went
for it, found it vacant and we found a road crossing on a dam [dike or levee ] that made the pond we had waded.
“Leaving the boys to hold the last [little] fort, I started back. I don’t think I ever traveled much faster and got back
to Gen’l Hancock and reported: he was off on a gallop before I was half done – he had to get permission from the
corps commander to take his Brigade on a cruise by its self.”
EDITOR’S NOTE
Pvt. Drew and his scouting party –
moving out in front of Hancock’s
forces, are far out on the right of the
main fighting at Fort Magruder.
They have waded forward through
overflown lands and slash timber,
and spied a small fort “quite a ways
on the Right.” –presumably the one
marked by Sneden on his map, as
“Redoubt No. 13 “
The Yankees press on through the
slash, and find that Redoubt No. 13
is unoccupied by the Rebels. In
fact this would seem to confirm
reports of two “contraband”
Negroes: fugitive slaves with new
protected status in the North, who
had made their way into the Union
Army camp at Lee’s Mill on the
preceding morning of April 4. [See
Gen. Hancock’s Official Report.]
NOW -- unbeknownst to the Rebs,
an adventurous gang of Hancock’s
Yankees has already posted in the
vacant Redoubt No. 13!! Now,
after locating a road and dam back
over the creek, Pvt. Drew returns
along this easier – drier -- route, to
report to Gen. Hancock! Note,
that Pvt. Drew reports his findings
directly back to General Hancock,
and not to his immediate superior
Col. Hiram Burnham: this might
indicate he is in service to Gen.
Hancock. Note the position of
Hancock’s forces is indicated by
Sneden, with “Hancock + Smith”
here circled in blue.

8. Detail: Sneden, Official Plan of the Battle of Williamsburg, Va., May 5th
, 1862.
For this reconstruction of the Battle of Williamsburg, the Editor of YANKEE SCOUT has chosen to rely on the
official battlefield sketch cartography of Union mapmaker Pvt. R. K. Sneden. Pvt. Sneden’s work-product when
considered as a real-time accomplishment, is remarkable; but in certain instances it borders on the preternatural.
This is so with his mapping of the battle of Williamsburg, in particular, his “Official Battle Map,” detailed above.
Note that he shows numerous small forts to the east of Fort Magruder, including four Redoubts, Nos. 9-13 –
specifically labelled as such – lying below the country road, except No. 10, which is north of the road, to the left ….
Detail: McAlester, Sketch of the Battlefield and Confederate Works in Front of Williamsburg, May 5, 1862.
The detail of the second map, above, corresponds exactly with the Sneden sketch map, in the layout and sequencing
of the Confederate redoubts to the left of Ft. Magruder. Redoubt No. 13, just occupied by Drew’s scouting party,
is again circled in blue. Note the single dotted line leading directly to Redoubt No. 13: in all probability, this map
was prepared from Sneden’s own map, or his sketches. Regardless, it was published in 1876, “under authority of
the Hon. Secretary of War” [ Wm. P. Belknap ] – and so this map presumably enjoys the benefit of 25 years official
U.S. Army review of the reports and mapping of the engagement at Williamsburg. Meanwhile …..

9. Detail: Humphreys, Campaign Maps of the Army of the Potomac, No. 1: Yorktown to Williamsburg (Apr 1862)
The detail above is from a map prepared by the Army Corps of Topo Engineer, Brig.-Gen. Andrew Humphreys,
for Gen. McClellan, during the Peninsular Campaign. This map shows a layout of the redoubts that in some ways
is similar to Sneden’s – including, probably, Redoubt No. 13, just occupied by Drew’s scouting party and circled in
blue. However, other locations and the numbers of redoubts relative to each other and the road, do not reconcile
with Sneden, nor with McAlester’s Sketch map. Note in particular, a large redoubt about due north of “Redoubt
No. 13” and across the country road to leading to the York River -- marked in red. This odd-shaped fort is not on
Sneden or McAlester – and so I have my doubts about this map. Union cartographers with field-recon expertise,
such as John Babcock, derided Humphrey’s maps as “worthless.” See, Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union,
p. 154. And this map itself, is dated April 1862, and thus before the battle of Williamsburg, so there was no field-
reconnaissance to support this map. Nevertheless it appears that Humphrey’s map is a better match for the
reconstruction of Hancock’s charge done by Stephen Sears, in his excellent book, To the Gates of Richmond: the
Peninsular Campaign, (1992) at pp. 74-82, and Sears refers to it as a source in his notes, p. 405, n. 5.
The Humphrey’s map is also lacking in another
respect: namely that it shows “Redoubt No. 13’ not as
a true redoubt, but as a “lunette” – a “V”-shaped
fortification open on the back end. All sources I have
encountered agree that the first two or three forts
taken by Hancock were rectangular “redoubts” – that
is, they were completely enclosed mini-forts, ditched
all around, and having a protected “gorge” entrance.
Thus, R. K. Sneden has Nos. 9-13 all labelled as
“redoubts,” on his Official Map of …. Williamsburg.
The drawings here, of two distinctive types of forts, are
by Sneden himself (See, Sneden, Some Engineering
Terms Explained, 1862 ) during this campaign: they
establish that Pvt. Sneden knew to differentiate
between types of fort – as indeed he did on his Official
Map of Williamsburg. See also his work at Yorktown.
In Pvt. Drew’s account, he and his scouting party find “a small square earthwork” and they occupy this first vacant
redoubt overlooking Cub Creek dam: Redoubt No. 13. Leaving a contingent of his scouting party behind, Drew
himself races back to Hancock to advise that Confederate left is completely exposed and vulnerable, behind their
own line of defense. But General Hancock’s account will mention nothing of any role played by a scouting party …
THIS MAP IS NOT BEING USED …

10. “In a short time he [ General Hancock ] was back and we were on. The 7th
Maine and one other Regmt. [ The 33rd
New York evidently – Ed.] was added to our Brigade. I acted as guide and was given a horse. We got to the dam
the boys in the fort waved their caps & we went over – 4 men abreast -- the Brigade were soon all over and advanced
to the second fort. Here we waited until a battery of artillery came up with the line. Skirmishers was put out on
each flank + in front….
Detail of Sneden, Official Map of the Battle of Williamsburg, showing Redoubts Nos. 12 & 13, highlighted
Pvt. Drew’s account moves pretty fast. Note that two additional regiments have been added to Hancock’s Brigade.
Let’s back up and review this hasty narrative, comparing it blow-by-blow, with General Hancock’s Official Report :
“General Smith subsequently authorized me to advance farther if I thought any advantage could be
obtained, and if I required them to send to him for re-enforcements. I accordingly detailed from Hancock's
and Davidson's brigades, then under my command, the Fifth Wisconsin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, and
Sixth Maine Volunteers, of my brigade, and the Seventh Maine and Thirty-third New York Volunteers, of
General Davidson's brigade, leaving the remaining regiments of both brigades in camp. At the same time
Lieutenant Cowan's New York battery of six guns was ordered to report to me.
“Proceeding toward the point in question, [Cub Creek Dam & vicinity – Ed.] I left three companies of the
Thirty-third New York Volunteers at the junction of a road leading to my right, not knowing its terminus,
and proceeded until we came out of the woods into an open country, with York River in view, about 1
mile to our right. From this point I turned to the left and soon came in sight of the work overlooking the
dam. [ Redoubt No. 13 ] The dam at this work was about 75 yards in length, the breast of it forming the
roadway across the creek, there being no practicable way of getting into the work either to the right or left
unless by this narrow passage, owing to the depth of the water and the flood above and below it. It was
learned from some contrabands that the enemy had occupied this work the previous night in force, but
for some unexplained cause it was now believed to be evacuated. However, to meet any emergency, I
made my dispositions for an assault under the supposition that the enemy might be present.”

11. EDITOR’S NOTE
In Hancock’s Official Report, Hancock leaves three companies of the 33rd
New York back at the crossroads and,
after crossing Cub Creek dam, moves off the road and advances by a circuitous route, towards the redoubt!
Hancock doubts the redoubt is abandoned – it might still be manned by Rebs!! Sadly, the Official Report mentions
nothing of the facts related by Drew, that there is already a band of Yankees holding this fort, waving their caps!!
This throws a little shadow on the Drew
account … Nevertheless, Sneden confirms
the topographical details of both stories --
showing at the extreme right of the Union
lines, a road over a dam across King’s
Creek, near its mouth, and two regiments
marked “Hancock’s flank” maneuver
marching over the dam, and moving to
Redoubt No. 13. Note, esp. the dotted
blue line with arrowhead towards Redoubt
No. 13, in Sneden’s hand. Sneden shows
that Hancock’s forces crossed the bridge
on the dam, but then moved east off the
road as it advanced. Pvt. Drew says that
the brigade “advanced to the second fort”
meaning, the second in the series: so the
Brigade now occupies Redoubts No. 13
and No. 12 and is still undetected as it
continued this flanking maneuver …!!!

12. [P. 42] “We advanced to the next Fort which was the largest. [ For Drew, this is already the third fort – it must be
the third redoubt on Sneden’s map, Redoubt No. 11—Ed. ] The battery stoped there and untimbered. The line
moved on a quarter of a mile and haulted. Hancock was everywhere – our left flank was covered with the fallen
timber + water. The Right by a strip of open woods + open land beyond that. Hancock had men in that woods,
our pickets in front advanced to an old log cabin about half-way between us and the big Fort.”
EDITOR’S NOTE:
The Detail shows Hancock’s brigade advancing to occupy the third redoubt, Redoubt No. 11. Pvt. Drew says it
was the largest fort, but Sneden’s mapping shows it as the smallest. McAlester’s map, however, tends to confirm
Drew, as to the size of this third fort. See p. 8. Either way, it is the third of three redoubts that are unoccupied.
Incredibly, not even a dog has been set to check the Yankees: so far the maneuver is entirely undetected …
In this illustration, to follow Drew, the regiments are moved forward ¼ mile so their left is protected by the rebel
defenses – abattis and flooded lands -- and their right lines up with “a strip of open wood” as Drew says, which
appears on Sneden’s map, just north of the road. The Union line is nearing and threatening Redoubt No. 9, and
No. 8 is close to their left flank. Forward positioned Confederate troops around Fort Magruder, that are engaged
against the forces of Gens. Hooker and Kearney, could soon become aware of the enemy infiltration of their lines,
and move to flank Hancock; but Hancock also hopes for this very prospect: to divert the Confederates from this
“main battle” and relieve his Union comrades. Fundamentally, Hancock’s real concern is the Confederate
encampment, on the grounds of William and Mary College, directly behind Fort Magruder proper: the Confederate
forces, commanded by Gen. Early and Gen. D. H. Hill, will soon mount their counter-attack from out of this area.
Now let’s back up and let the rest of the Army catch up with Pvt. Drew! General Hancock cannot move so fast, as
he is trying heroically to deploy his brigade, cover his rear, maintain communications with Gen. Smith, and resist
Gen. Sumner’s (ignorant) orders to retreat! Let’s check a few of his details from the Official Report:

13. “I now placed the artillery in battery on the crest of the hill in front of the enemy's fort at short range,
deployed skirmishers on the right and left of the road, and sent the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, preceded
by skirmishers, under command of Major Larabee, and followed by the Sixth Maine in column of assault,
across the dam and into the work, Lieutenant Custer, Fifth Regular Cavalry, volunteer aide, leading the
way on horseback.
“Finding the fort unoccupied, and being in possession of it, I left a garrison of three companies of the
Thirty-third New York to protect my rear. I immediately threw my skirmishers forward into the open field
in rear of the work, the remainder of my infantry in line of battle behind them, with the artillery in the
center. I now, at 12 m., sent a message to Generals Keyes and Smith that I had already occupied the
position at Cub Creek Dam.
Skipping a short paragraph, Hancock again:
“I was now anxiously awaiting the arrival of the cavalry to reconnoiter this last-mentioned redoubt and the
skirts of the timber in my front and on my right flank and rear. To my application to General Smith for
re-enforcements I received a reply that he would send me four regiments of infantry and a battery of
artillery immediately. I accordingly advanced in the order above mentioned and took quiet possession of
the next redoubt. Feeling that my rear and right flank would be protected by the re-enforcements, I
determined to advance my line sufficiently beyond the redoubt to drive the enemy out of the two nearest
works in my front now occupied by him, and also to make a diversion in favor of that portion of our forces
(understood to be under command of General Hooker) which were engaged with the enemy directly in
front of Fort Magruder.”
NOTE: Hancock’s Report indicates that he has so far occupied only two redoubts: Nos. 12 and 13. He is going
to drive the Rebs out of “the two nearest redoubts” by advancing his line. Does he mean Redoubts Nos 11 and 9?
Or has Hancock in fact also taken Redoubt No. 11 and will drive the enemy from Nos. 8 and 9? This would match
Drew’s account, where he had the battle line stretched across the field in front of Redoubts 8 & 9. See next page.

14. “Observing that our present position was a very important point, having a crest and natural glacis on either
flank extending to the woods on the right and left, giving me about sufficient space to develop my front
and entirely commanding the plain between me and Fort Magruder, I immediately threw three companies
of the Thirty-third New York into the redoubt and deployed my line on the crest, with the artillery on the
right and left of the redoubt, throwing my skirmishers 1,000 yards in advance, and covering the whole
breadth of the plain, which at that point was considerably wider than at my position, and continuing so to
Fort Magruder. I also threw flankers on my right and left, connecting with the skirmishers.”
“From my position here Fort Magruder with all its surroundings could be distinctly seen and all positions
of the enemy on the plain between us. The two redoubts were respectively distant from my skirmishers
300 and 400 yards, the one on the left being nearest. The plain, extending about one mile to the rear and
also to the front, was fringed by a dense mass of timber on my right as far as Fort Magruder, and was
traversed by a narrow road, which gave a practicable passage for troops to the rear of that fort and to
Williamsburg.”
EDITOR’S NOTE
The three redoubts – Nos. 11-13 – have naturally been built on a ridge or crest: Gen. Hancock uses the military
term for the slope they command: a “glacis.” The forts must be visible from Fort Magruder for signaling, but the
weather near Williamsburg on May 5, 1862, was very lowery: misty with rain. On that day, these redoubts were
indiscernible from Fort Magruder proper, and only this accounts for Hancock’s advance so far. Hancock clearly
says there is a mile behind him and a mile in front: he is halfway across the plain. His forces advance to within a
few hundred yards of two redoubts – I suggest Nos. 8 & 9 -- and drive out the Confederate guard. It can only be,
that it is these pickets, abandoning the closer redoubts, who flee from Hancock’s 1st Brigade back to Fort Magruder
and now sound the alarm!! Note that that the official U.S. Army map by McAlester (inset) confirms that three
redoubts have been occupied: each of these three redoubts is marked through with an “X”. See also p. 8, above.

15. What has happened? Well, there’s no room in this issue of YANKEE SCOUT to cover all the details of the
coming battle from the Confederate side… but on the question of surprise, Col. Richard L. Maury, in Battle of
Williamsburg and the Charge of the 24th
Virginia of Early’s Brigade,” (1880), writes, at p. 6:
“..The Confederate line of works, like that of the English at Preston, was undefended, and one of the few
passes across the swamps stretching along its front remained entirely open to the enemy. The redoubt
constructed expressly to guard this passage seems not to have been considered worth a thought in the
morning (of May 5) , when it could have been occupied without a loss, while in the eveningtime the lives
of hundreds of the best of soldiers were thrown away in a fruitless attempt to regain it.
“Why were these redoubts not occupied? They were constructed for just such an occasion; for it was well
known that Yorktown lines would have to be evacuated sooner or later. General Johnston, in his narrative,
page 122-4, says he knew nothing of them, and so does Longstreet, and Hill, and Anderson, although they
were all charged with their defense. Each is in sight from the other, and all are in a continuously open
space. McLaws, of Longstreet’s division, who occupied this part of the line the afternoon before with
Kershaw’s and Semmes’ brigades, knew of them, for Colonel Marigny, with his Tenth Louisiana … [etc.]”

16. “Then the Reb skirmish line made itself known + we began to retire. Then a [ Confederate ] line of battle shows
up – our skirmishers came into the main line on the run, Hancock had about-faced the line – it seems as if we
were to run away from that line of Johnneys.”
“The scouts in the timber on the Right had put up a fight and Colon [Amasa] Cobb of the 5th
[Wisconsin Vol.
Infantry – Ed.] had to call them. When we got to the Fort the right 5 companies was put in it + they 5 left
companys formed a line on the left of it [See Note—Ed.] + the Artillery we were down in a little hollow and when
we front-faced our heads was only above the level of the grown.”
“
EDITOR’S NOTE:
Now discovered and repulsed, Hancock’s lucky right operation, to infiltrate Confederate left defenses, is being
countered. The scouts of the 5th
Wisconsin Vol. Inf. have been aggressively engaged in the line of timber and now
must be called back by Col. Amassa Cobb. Drew is highlighting the role of the 5th
Wisconsin in this engagement --
the sister regiment of Drew’s own 6th
Maine Inf., throughout his service in the Army of the Potomac.
In this effort at reconstruction, after advancing his forces 1/4 mile in a line of battle beyond Redoubt No. 11,
Hancock now orders his five right companies to fall back and occupy a fort – shown here as Redoubt No. 11, while
the five left companies are positioned “to the left of it”– or so Drew describes them. Only Redoubt No. 11 appears
to have enough room “to the left of it” to line up a brigade: but positioning the defensive line here creates problems,
because the Union artillery appears very remote: Pvt. Drew does say the artillery were down in a little hollow – and
an arrangement of artillery is shown by Sneden near the very right-hand margin of his map – in the larger blue circle
above -- and behind it faint lines of purple/lavender, which Sneden uses to indicate Union troops. But this is two
miles from Fort Magruder: Hancock said he placed his cannon “in front of the enemy fort at short range.” P. 13.

17. “There was a line of Rebs coming down on our Right, behind the timber. When they got to where we had been,
they came through the timber and put the line in our front in some confusion, but they all came on shouting ….
“Bull Run!” and “Ball Bluff!”
“On their extreme right, they flew a black flag with the skull and
cross bones. Hancock riding along had ordered us not to fire a
shot until we could see the white of their eyes. When they [ ? ]
were fifty or less yards away, they began to shoot from the hip.
They were within twenty feet when the order came to fire. The
whole line with the artillery let drive + the next minute Hancock
dashed along behind our line and hollered ---
“Now, Gentlemen – Charge Bayonets !!”
P. 43 ] “We sprang forward with a cheer. There was none to
oppose us but the dead and wounded; the rebels that was getting
back were going faster than they can run.
NOTE: Pvt. Drew specifically says that the Confederates are coming down on Hancock’s right, first behind and
then through the timber: he is referring to the same strip of open woods which Hancock called “skirts of timber” –
and which is represented by Sneden, as lying north of the country road, which is itself northerly to the three redoubts.
The Rebs must first clear this strip of any Yankee skirmishers: only then can they advance in comparative safety …..

18. The Confederate’s defensive counter-offense strategy now brings the Rebel forces on –from their camp behind Fort
Magruder. They advance powerfully with the benefit of some cover from the same line of trees that were earlier
being used as cover by scouts and skirmishers of the 5th
Wisconsin; however, they have bene completely surprised,
and are disorganized, and in disarray: and so are easily repulsed:
The battlefield sketch of Harper’s Weekly “embedded journalist” Alfred R. Waud, is captioned “Hancock’s
Brigade Repulsing the Enemy – Battle of Williamsburg” and this detail [at top] – the right half of a long strip of
battlefield horizon, shows this precise moment. What is only faintly discerned in the sketch is clear in the final
engraving, published in Harper’s Weekly for May 24, 1862: namely that the Union Army is arrayed on a large field
to the left of a Confederate redoubt (as Drew reported) which is occupied, and now flies the Stars and Stripes.
Waud’s handwritten note reads: “In the distance forts. Next, enemies lines of infantry all broken and running.
Our lines in the foreground, many having thrown away their overcoats and all without knapsacks. Artillery getting
into action. Men running at the [?] of the guns – rainy and muddy. Enemies dead and wounded covering the field.”

19. In the magnificent 1893 Kurz & Allison print above,
The Battle of Williasmburg, the text reads “General
Hancock’s Charge, May 5, 1862”. Digital files of the
image are available from the Library of Congress here
-- http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/pga.01860/
With the perspective foreshortened for greater
dramatic effect, the large fort in the background is Fort
Magruder itself, still flying the Confederate flag, while
the small rectangular redoubt off to the left of it, may
correspond to Redoubt No. 9. In the Kurz & Allison
print, after a feigned retreat, the Union troops have
now reformed and are facing head-on, as the attacking
Confederates emerge from out of the tree line.
Following this reconstruction, we can now see that –
buried among the abundant details of his battlefield
map -- Pvt. Sneden has indicated the arrangement of
the First Brigade, as they position for the charge…...

20. In this detail of the Kurz & Allison print, General Hancock orders the charge, the infantry units advance, firing into
the oncoming rebel lines. To the right, a Confederate General advances on foot -- and his features and goatee
resemble those of the Confederate Army’s Commanding General Joe Johnston. But Johnston was not present on
the field of in this engagement, and the figure is intended to represent General Jubal Early.
But why is he on foot? ….
“Orders came to hand – Gen’l Jubal A. Early, the
Rebel commanding the foes was wounded, his
horse was shot and in falling pinned him to the
grown. Hancock dismounting called on some of
the men to help get this man’s leg from under the
horse. The two Generals shook hands they had
been at West Point togeather.
“I saw Dan [Brown] stop and look at a big rebel
shot through the right eye and Denbo looking at
one shot in the mouth. I think, every man in Co. K
had picked his victim; the loss on our side were less
than 90 men, the 7th
Me lost one killed an one
wounded, the Artillery the same – not a man of Co.
K was struck.”

21. Other details of the romantic presentation of the 1893 print, would probably have met with Pvt. Drew’s approval.
For instance, the artists were correct to show the regimental colors of the 5th
Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry leading
the charge (above), and shortly behind them, Drew’s own 6th
Maine Volunteer Infantry bearing their own standard
forward (below) in this, their first charge of the Civil War, and their first major victory. But hardly their last: for
they would meet General Early again: at Fredericksburg; at Rappahannock Station; at Washington D.C. …..
Of course, there’s much more to the battle than this. To get the complete story from the Union side, read
Hancock’s Report. For the Confederate command collapse at Williamsburg, and the heroic charge of brigades
under Early and Hill, to undo the disaster, read Richard L. Maury, The Battle of Williamsburg and the Charge of
the 24th
Virginia of Early’s Brigade, (1880) available here: https://archive.org/details/battleofwilliams00maur

22. “The loss which the enemy had
sustained was something marvelous.
During the fight the rain had came
down in torrents. I had never seen a
cloudburst but I think it was one.”
“This was called the Battle of
Williamsburg and it was nearly the
first victory of the Army of the
Potomac.
“At dark I was put on picket-guard
with two men from A Co.. Capt.
Furlong of Co. D was officer of the
Guard. We went out to the log cabin
and made it headquarters.
“Our line was from the fallen timber
to the [log cabin?]. Untill we joined
the 5th
Wisc. Line, about 2 o’cl.=
A.M.”
“Capt. Furlong called me and we took
a cruise forward to the big fort and
found it vacated, not a sole in it and a
note was sent to Genl.= Hancock.
Then our pickets laid down in the
cabin and got a little sleep in the dry.
“During the night the rest of our
Division came up. Two days after the
battle Gen’l McClelland at our dress
parade addressed our regiment and
thanked us with compliments of
highest terms also the rest of the force
engaged.”
 
Official Records such as the notes on
Pvt. Robert K. Sneden’s map, have
discounted Hancock’s role, and the
achieivement of the 1st Brigade at
Williamsburg

23. For his conduct during the battle of Williamsburg, Gen.
Hancock was to be commended by Gen. McClellan – who
himself arrived at Williamsburg late. More importantly,
Hancock was now celebrated as “Hancock the Superb,” so
dubbed by the men under his command, seconded throughout
the Army, and bruited nationwide by the press. The portrait at
left ran in Harper’s Weekly, for the week of May 24, 1862.
While McClellan apparently was satisfied being a legend in his
own mind, it was a little early for Hancock to be stealing thunder
from the likes of Hooker and Kearney -- so there were vociferous
jealous expressions sent Hancock’s way,2
and even to this day his
accomplishment in leading the first successful Union charge of
the Peninsular Campaign -- one of very few – is ignored.
As for Pvt. Drew, while he never mentions it in his Memoir, apparently he was wounded during the conflict at
Williamsburg. According to his biography in the Portrait and Biographical Record of Western Oregon, p. 458
(Chapman, 1904) “at the engagement at Williamsburg he received a buckshot wound in the right arm.” See this
book, at Google Book, or the Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/portraitbiographwo00inchap
Drew’s biographical entry goes on to note, that he also served for a time as general orderly to General Hancock,
and did scouting duty – holding a major’s commission:3
We have already seen Pvt. Drew invited to serve as orderly to Col. Hiram Burnham – see, YANKEE SCOUT –
Bull Run, p. 12 , where, after winning a shooting contest, Drew is appointed Col. Burnham’s orderly for the day,
but gets bored and returns to the ranks! And it’s also clear from the Memoir overall, that Drew was a “go-to-guy”
for scouting, under any circumstances. But if the biographical entry in “Portraits …. of Western Oregon” can be
trusted, he did also serve in this capacity, as orderly for General Hancock “and did scouting duty.” After reading
YANKEE SCOUT – Williasmburg!! the reader might agree that it’s a robust presumption that Pvt. Drew’s duty
and service under General Hancock, has just occurred around Fort Magruder, and at the battle of Williamsburg.
Remember, after reconnoitering the swamp and Redoubt No. 13, he reported directly back to General Hancock…
He was all of sixteen years old at the time.
2
Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, p. 83.
3
In battle, an infantry major led the regimental attack, positioning himself at the front with the color guard. His
rank was just below that of the Colonel and Lieutennat Colonel, and above captain. If the colonel and the lieutenant
colonel were killed or wounded, the major took command of the regiment. But Pvt. Drew’s rank as major was
short-lived, although he does appear in other circumstances to fulfill the role of a major on the battlefield – see, for
instance, YANKEE SCOUT – Rappahannock Station !!

24. Was it real? Can Drew’s Memoir really be trusted?
Probably, perhaps. However, some may be inclined to doubt the accuracy of his recollections, committed to a
Memoir that was drafted only many, many decades after his youthful battlefield service in the Union Army had
concluded, and done so, in the remote wilds of Oregon, with limited access to libraries and critical readers to check
a fervent imagination. Indeed, some parts of the Drew Memoir seem more than a little self-serving; and the fact is,
key details in Drew, cannot be entirely reconciled with accepted history!
The Drew account of the Battle of Williamsburg may be an example:
For instance, Calif Newton Drew’s Memoir of his scouting duty
at Williamsburg is contested by no less a figure than George
Armstrong Custer – who himself claims to have volunteered to
serve Gen. Hancock on that day, and who claims to have
personally reconnoitered the same redoubt, determined it to
be vacant, and reported back to Gen. Hancock!! He then lead
the cavalry back across Cub Creek dam, to begin the Union
occupation of the vacant Redoubt No. 13 !!! It’s true: check
it out for yourself/ves, for instance, Geoffrey Wert’s 1996 book
Custer: the Controversial Life, at p. 50, where 2nd
Lt. Custer
claims to have done everything that Drew did – and much,
much more !! See also, A. Webb, The Peninsula, at p. 78.
Furthermore, Gen. Hancock mentions Custer in his Official Report
– but never mentions Maj. Drew -- I mean, Pvt. Drew – although he
does mention the Sixth Maine Infy. Dellenbaugh’s biography of Custer,
records at p. 29:
So even the Editor may have to acknowledge, that Drew has cunningly dressed up and elaborated his tale to
accentuate the pitch of his personal contribution to the point where it would rival even the heroic record of that
modest military genius, Lt. George Armstrong Custer. Alas, the best we can hope for, is that Pvt. Drew did not just
overhear the entire episode, as it was later recounted by Custer -- back in camp -- and then plagiarize Custer’s
narrative for his own Memoir!! In fact, shortly after Williamsburg, around Fair Oaks, Lt. Custer went on to join
the personal staff of the Commanding General Geo B. McClellan – where he was directly engaged with McClellan,
in the planning of the rest of the famously failed Peninsular Campaign. And in making bad campaign maps, and so
forth. What greater recognition or commendation could a young officer in the Union Army ask, then to serve the
Commander McClellan in such capacity?
2nd
Lt. Custer at Fair Oaks, Va., 1862

25. The tendency of personal Civil War memoirs – like Pvt. Calif
Newton Drew’s – and maybe even Gen. Geo. Armstrong
Custer’s -- to evolve into highly “Egotistical Memoirs” like
this, will be discussed at greater length in YANKEE SCOUT
– Killing of General Sedgwick!!, where Pvt. Drew claims to be
the last one who spoke to Gen. John Sedgwick alive! Many,
many others made the same claim…….
“If the rebels had broken our lines there [ at Fort Magruder ]
it would have been a worse catastrophe than Ball’s Bluff. We
all knew and felt that right there we must, must give them a
whipping.4
“Hooker and Kerney had fought at Fort Magruder all day had
lost many men and gained nothing.
“From Williamsburg we moved to the roads, was muddy and
cut up, sun hot, water poor and the Army moved slowly….”
4
THANKS to JOHN H. STEINBACH for CONSULTING on ISSUES
of MILITARY HISTORY, BATTELFIELD OPERATIONS and ARMY TACTICS !!