This webinar will review various incentives globally that have been adopted to attract clean and renewable energy projects and make them financially viable and attractive to private sector investors. The program will include a review of different mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs, RFP and procurement strategies, investment tax credits, priority dispatch, and other strategies adopted in various countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Morocco to induce desired and target levels of renewable energy resources.

1. John W. Gulliver
Pierce Atwood LLP
CLEAN ENERGY
REGULATOR
INITIATIVE
25 March 2014

2. “Incentives to Attract
Clean Energy Projects”

3. Incentives for Renewable Energy (RE) Growth
• Why is this important?
• European Commission:
The RES Directive is based on the rationale that a positive
framework for renewable energy development is necessary due
to a number of market and regulatory failures or imperfections.
These include non-internalisation of negative externalities of
conventional energy forms, the presence of subsidies for other
energy forms, imperfect market structures, regulatory barriers,
the status of many renewable technologies as “infant industries”
together with significant inertia of the system, and barriers
related to information and public perception.*
* Commission Staff Working Paper SWD (2012) 149 Final; Impact Assessment accompanying
the document Renewable energy: a major player in the European energy market; p. 12.
3

4. New Investment in RE by Region, 2004-2012
4
(Source: REN21, 2013 Renewables Global Status Report, 58-59)

5. Key Topics for Discussion
• Review of incentives utilized to encourage RE
development in various countries
• Discussion of which have worked best to
achieve policymakers’ desired results
• Type
• Amount
• Location
• Timing
• What has worked? What hasn’t? What can
we learn?
5

6. Principal Incentive Mechanisms
• Feed-In Tariffs (FITs)
• Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)/
Tradable Certificates
• Tax Credits
• Loan Guarantees
• Priority Dispatch, Priority Grid Access
• Net Metering
• Competitive Tender
• Contracts for Differences
• All of the above!
6

7. FITs
• Establishes fixed price for all electricity
generated by eligible RE facility and
provided to grid
• Typically based on assumed cost of RE
generation
• Most widely used tool – simple to
administer
• Sometimes differentiated by RE type,
size; sometimes single rate for all
• Mixed results
7

8. The U.K. Experience
• FIT:
• Commenced April 2010
• Applicable only to small-scale RE
• FIT-CfD Structure:
• FIT insufficient, need to supplement to achieve targets
• Creation of long-term “Contract for Differences” (CfD)
to encourage investment in RE
• Generators receive “top-up” payment when agreed
contract strike price exceeds electricity market price
• Long term revenue stability
8

9. The German Experience
• Global leader in renewable energy support and development
• FITs key to success with 20-year term, differentiated by
project size and technology
• Grid operators required to purchase RE output at FIT
• FIT reset over time
• Key role of public financing
• Critical role played by Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (kfW)
• Provides additional support, analogous to U.S. investment tax
credits
• Low-interest loans, up to 100% of project costs, to residential
households for PV installations, support for offshore wind
projects, etc.
9

10. The Turkish Experience
• Increased FITs included as part of 2010 law to
provide more comprehensive RE support mechanism
• Prior FIT levels insufficient to achieve targets
• Differentiated by type
• Wind and hydro: USD Cent 7.3/kWh
• Solar and biomass: USD Cent 13.3/kWh
• Geothermal: USD Cent 10.5/kWh
• Incentive tariffs apply for first ten years of
commercial operation of plants commissioned by
December 2015
• Subsequent FIT levels will be established by Cabinet
of Ministers
10

11. The California Experience
• FIT levels initially based on assumed cost of
generation from a new fossil plant, not the
cost of production for the renewable resource
• Insufficient to meet initial target of 20%
• Reset targets and mechanisms
• Tied FIT to other incentives, including
Renewable Auction Mechanism, creation of
traded Renewable Energy Credits (RECs),
and long term contracts
• New target of 33% by 2020 likely to be
exceeded
11

12. The Spanish Experience
• RE projects up to 100 MW chose either FIT with
purchase obligation or market premium incentive
without purchase obligation
• Massive over subscriptions, large “tariff deficit”
• Incentive mechanisms for new projects
suspended January 2012
• Retroactive cuts to FITs and market premiums
• FIT set too high, produced too much RE, too
expensive, too quickly
• Drag on overall economy
12

13. Spain: Annual Electricity Tariff Deficit, 2000-2012
13
(Source: Comicion Nacional de Energia (CNE), “Nota Resumen Del Saldo De La Deuda Del Sistemas Electrico” 10/5/2013)

14. Successes, Setbacks and Lessons:
Learned FIT Regimes
United Kingdom
• Significance of RE CfD approach:
• Aggressive RE development not achievable without financial
stability through long-term agreements with creditworthy
counterparty
• FITs alone insufficient to procedure desired levels of generation
• Better coordination and clarity of regulatory roles critical
California
• Due to misalignment between original FIT and cost of production
from RE, FIT program failed to attract desired investment levels
• California adopted supplemental incentives, with greater revenue
certainty, longer term contracts
14

15. Successes, Setbacks and Lessons:
Learned FIT Regimes
Germany
• Combine FIT with other financial support
• FIT differentiated by RE type
• Reset rates periodically
• Overall German power rates declining – due to coal
Spain
• FIT set too high
• Achieved much more capacity than expected, and
faster: 3000 MW vs. 400 MW
• Contributed to substantial tariff deficits
15

16. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)
• Incentive mechanism that mandates percentage
of energy portfolio to come from RE
• How basic RPS works:
• RECs (Green Certificates) issued to certified RE
generators for every unit of electricity produced
• Both kWh and RES sold
• Purchasers of RECs use them as evidence of regulatory
compliance
• Creates two income streams:
• kWh sales
• REC sales
16

17. The U.K. Experience
• RPS equivalent (Renewable Obligation, RO)
instituted in 2002
• Suppliers required to source increasing proportion of
electricity from RE sources
• Operators of receive Renewable Obligation Certificates
(ROCs)
– Tradable with other parties
– Used by suppliers to demonstrate they have met their
obligations
• If suppliers lack sufficient ROCs, must pay financial
penalty
• Program administered by Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets – regulator
17

18. The ROC Certificate Cycle
18

19. The U.K. Experience
• Impending transition from ROCs to CfD as
primary incentive mechanism to develop low-
carbon electricity generation
• CfDs will be offered as parallel option
alongside ROCs beginning in 2014
• Possible that CfDs will be only choice
available by 2017, RO program closed to new
entrants
• CfDs perceived to be more flexible, easier to
administer than ROC system
19

20. The U.S. Experience
• California
• Most aggressive RPS program in U.S.
• Requires utilities to obtain 33% of total
electricity supply from RE by 2020
• Target likely to be exceeded
• Massachusetts
• Instituted in 1997; target 15% by 2020
• Statutory obligation imposed on both
regulated utilities and competitive suppliers
• RPS in 29 states
20

21. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies
21

22. Successes, Setbacks and Lessons:
RPS/Certificate Regimes
California
• Failure to achieve initial goals
• Lack of clear responsibilities between state agencies
• Weak enforcement mechanisms for utilities’ failure to
reach goals
• Fixed shortcomings, expanded RPS
• Stronger enforcement mechanisms,
clearer agency responsibilities
22

23. Successes, Setbacks and Lessons:
RPS/Certificate Regimes
Massachusetts
• Desired targets under RPS initially unmet;
• Uncertain revenues from sale of RECs limited ability to finance
• Regulatory risk – perception that legislature or government could
repeal program at anytime
• Solutions:
• Massachusetts offered to purchase RECs under ten-year contracts
• Green Communities Act: formal requirement that regulated
utilities purchase RE under long-term contract to meet RPS
Lessons:
• Enforceable procurement requirements, regulatory
certainty and long term contracts essential
23

24. What is Priority Dispatch, Priority Grid Access
• Incentive mechanism whereby electricity
from RE sources is given priority dispatch,
priority access to grid, despite higher
costs
• Frequently combined with other
mechanisms, such as FIT
24

25. Priority Dispatch: Selected Experiences
• Priority dispatch and access must be coupled with other
mechanisms to assure financial stability (FIT, long term
contract)
• Numerous countries and regulatory regimes allow priority
dispatch/access, e.g., Germany, Spain, Greece, U.S., Albania
• System operator must assure safe, adequate, reliable and
uninterrupted supply
• RE can be intermittent and variable
• Priority dispatch of intermittent and variable resources can
upset system stability
• Balancing policy goals of RE vs. legitimate system stability
concerns
25

26. Tax Credits
• National policymakers in U.S. prefer federal tax
credits over FITS to encourage RE development
• Investment Tax Credits (ITC): Tax credit for
qualified RE projects based on capital
investment, up to 30% of investment
• Production Tax Credits (PTC): Per kWh tax credit
for ten-year period for kWh generated and sold
by qualified RE
• Additional Tax Mechanisms: Accelerated
depreciation available under federal tax code,
tax exempt bonds
26

27. Tax Credits
• Proponents believe
• Up front tax benefits facilitate RE finance
• Subsidy up front places less risk on future contract
performance, since contracts based on market rates,
not FITs
• Proponents of FITs respond
• Incentives up front place risks on ratepayers/taxpayers
if plant fails or shuts down prior to contract termination
• FIT, “pay as you go”, reduces these risks
• NB – so does PTC
• But, PTC may not provide sufficient revenue, since
underlying tariff is usually market-based
27

28. Successes, Setbacks and Lessons:
Tax Incentives
• Tax mechanism typically do not require
compulsory prices paid to RE generators
• To establish price certainty for investors and
generators, further incentives required
• PTC, ITC, and related programs typically
adopted for limited number of years
• RE projects in U.S. follow distinctive pattern
• Closer to end of tax credits, fewer projects started
• “See-saw” or “yo­yo” effect
28

29. Competitive Tenders
• Process that awards long term PPAs to qualified RE
projects in competitive tender
• Different than FIT – instead of trying to “guesstimate”
target price to incentivize development, tender “tests the
market”
• Tenders can be restricted by technology (e.g., only solar,
only wind)
• Tenders can be allocated by geographic region or location,
so as to reduce system costs, improve reliability
• Tenders have risks, too – despite financial stability, if bid
price is too low, project won’t be built; if too high,
stranded costs
29

30. The Moroccan Experience
• Primarily single buyer system: government agency
responsible for buying all RE from privately-owned
distribution and selling to end-users
• Seeks development of RE sources, particularly solar
energy
• Competitive Tender Procedure
• Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) off-taker
• Until RE prices fall, full purchase price in first phase of
bidding will not be passed through directly to consumers
• Government absorbs difference
• Morocco evolving sophisticated tender process as key part
of its effort to diversify from oil-fired generation
30

31. MASEN-Identified Solar Power Sites in Morocco
31

32. The Moroccan Experience
• Benefits of Government off-taker
• Protects end users from higher cost of
generated renewable energy
• Provides creditworthy counterparty for
contract
• Increases revenue stability, project
financeability
• But, can lead to sovereign debt problems
32

33. Competitive Tenders for PPAs:
An Assessment
• Create revenue stability, but
• Experience shows that fixed price, long-term
power contracts persistently above market
face enormous political pressure for
rescission, revocation or renegotiation
• USA
• EU
• Tenders need to be conducted on periodic
basis to reflect price changes
33

34. Net Metering
• Incentive mechanism that allows
customers to sell electricity to utilities
generated by customer-owned distributed
generation, such as PV
• kWh sold netted against kWh consumed
• Typically for smaller systems
• Payment (credit) at retail price per kWh
• Price (credit) thus includes T&D
34

35. The U.S. Experience
• California
• Approximately 120,000 customer accounts registered
for net metering;
• Program limited to customers who install solar, wind,
other RE < 1 MW
• Massachusetts
• Mandatory for investor-owned utilities to offer net
metering (voluntarily for municipal utilities)
• Individual customers, community groups (10+
residential customers), and governmental entities
• Widespread deployment
• 43 U.S. states have adopted net metering
35

36. 36

37. Net Metering: Lessons Learned
• Provides simple and certain method by
which customers paid for RE generation
• May cause cost shift from customers who
own distributed RE generation to those
who do not
• Retail price may be too high – includes
T&D that customer is not necessarily
displacing
• Night and seasonal production variations
• Standby demand costs
37

38. Discussion
• Is one RE incentive system superior to others?
• Probably not
• No “one size fits all” approach to encouraging RE
development
• Underperformance (or over performance) can
occur under any system
• Important that policy makers and regulators:
• Carefully analyze markets and desired targets
• Be flexible in responding to cost and price changes and
investment climate
38

39. Discussion
• Recalibrate incentives periodically, but
prospectively
• Retrospective change in rates very
challenging to market development
• Benchmark and change programs as needed,
but not too frequently
• “Goldilocks”
• Policymakers can construct multiple kinds of
incentives (FIT, tax credit, carbon trade) that
can be used simultaneously
39

40. Parting Thoughts
• Stable, predictable legal and regulatory
environment fundamental
• Well-defined roles for regulators and
enforcement mechanisms for renewable energy
are important
• Different technologies require different
mechanisms
• Setting and subsequent evaluation of policy
targets crucial to long-term success
• Incentive mechanisms that provide investors
with long term revenue stability critical
40

41. First Principles
“The Overriding Criterion: A legal and
regulatory framework that is far, consistent,
predictable where contracts and agreements
are reasonably enforceable.”
World Bank Energy and Mining Sector
Board Discussion Paper 6, May 2003
41

42. Many thanks to Leonardo ENERGY
for sponsoring this webinar

43. Merrill’s Wharf
254 Commercial Street
Portland, ME 04101 USA
John W. Gulliver
jgulliver@pierceatwood.com
PH / +1.207.791.1296
CELL / +1.207.415.3400
/Preparers
Merrill’s Wharf
254 Commercial Street
Portland, ME 04101 USA
Liam J. Paskvan
lpaskvan@pierceatwood.com
PH / +1.207.791.1306