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Concinnity	
  Risks	
  
Unpatchable	
  	
  
Living	
  with	
  a	
  vulnerable	
  implanted	
  device	
  
@MarieGMoe	
  
@blackswanburst	
  
Marie	
  Moe,	
  PhD,	
  Research	
  Scien?st	
  at	
  SINTEF	
  
Eireann	
  LevereE,	
  Founder	
  and	
  CEO	
  of	
  Concinnity	
  Risks	
  
Hack	
  to	
  save	
  lives!	
  
 
A	
  brief	
  history	
  of	
  my	
  heart…	
  
How	
  the	
  heart	
  works	
  
Electrical	
  system	
  of	
  the	
  heart	
  
Pacemaker	
  
 
The	
  Internet	
  of	
  Medical	
  ”Things”	
  is	
  real,	
  
	
  
and	
  Marie’s	
  heart	
  is	
  wired	
  into	
  it…	
  
①  Implantable	
  medical	
  device	
  
–  ICD/Pacemaker/other	
  devices	
  
–  MICS	
  (Medical	
  Implant	
  
Communica?on	
  Service)	
  
–  Bluetooth	
  
②  Access	
  point	
  
–  POTS/GSM/SMS/email	
  
③  GSM/Telephone/Internet	
  
④  Telemetry	
  store	
  
–  Programmers	
  
–  Doctor’s	
  worksta?on	
  
–  Telemetry	
  server	
  at	
  vendor	
  
⑤  Medical	
  staff	
  
–  Social	
  engineering	
  
With	
  connec?vity	
  comes	
  vulnerability…	
  
Poten?al	
  impact	
  
Pa?ent	
  privacy	
  issues	
  
BaEery	
  exhaus?on	
  
Device	
  malfunc?on	
  
Death	
  threats	
  and	
  extor?on	
  
Remote	
  assassina?on	
  scenario…	
  
 
”We	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  verify	
  the	
  soware	
  that	
  
controls	
  our	
  lives”	
  
Bruce	
  Schneier	
  on	
  “Volkswagen	
  and	
  Chea?ng	
  Soware”	
  
Previous	
  work	
  
•  Kevin	
  Fu	
  et	
  al:	
  
–  Pacemakers	
  and	
  implantable	
  cardiac	
  defibrillators:	
  Soware	
  radio	
  aEacks	
  and	
  
zero-­‐power	
  defenses	
  (2008)	
  
–  Mi?ga?ng	
  EMI	
  signal	
  injec?on	
  aEacks	
  against	
  analog	
  sensors	
  (2013)	
  
•  Barnaby	
  Jack	
  
•  Hardcoded	
  creden?als	
  
•  Medical	
  device	
  honeypots	
  
•  Drug	
  infusion	
  pumps	
  
Hacking	
  can	
  save	
  lives	
  
Source:	
  h*p://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNo>ces/ucm456815.htm	
  
Medical	
  devices	
  do	
  get	
  infected	
  	
  
Source:	
  h*ps://securityledger.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/06/AOA_MEDJACK_LAYOUT_6-­‐0_6-­‐3-­‐2015-­‐1.pdf	
  
WTF	
  are	
  you	
  doing	
  with	
  my	
  data?	
  
The	
  stairs	
  that	
  almost	
  killed	
  me	
  
Debugging	
  me	
  
	
  
	
  
Leadless	
  pacemaker	
  
The	
  future?	
  
Reflec?ons	
  on	
  trus?ng	
  machines	
  
Why?	
  
Legacy	
  
technology	
  
No	
  soware	
  updates	
  
Long	
  life?me	
  of	
  
devices	
  
No	
  security	
  
tes?ng	
  or	
  
monitoring	
  
Medical	
  devices	
  are	
  
”black	
  boxes”	
  
Proprietary	
  
soware	
  
More	
  
connec?vity	
  
Lack	
  of	
  regula?ons	
  
Increased	
  aEack	
  
surface	
  
How	
  to	
  solve	
  it?	
  
Security	
  
research	
  
Informa?on	
  sharing	
  
Third	
  party	
  
collabora?on	
  
Coordinated	
  
disclosure	
  
Vendor	
  
awareness	
  
Regula?on	
  
Procurement	
  
Safety	
  by	
  design	
  
Security	
  tes?ng	
  
Security	
  
risk	
  
monitoring	
  
Security	
  updates	
  
Incident	
  response	
  
Cyber	
  insurance	
  
Resilience	
  
 
What	
  is	
  the	
  social	
  contract	
  for	
  the	
  
code	
  in	
  our	
  bodies?	
  
Research	
  needed	
  
•  Open	
  source	
  medical	
  devices	
  
•  Medical	
  device	
  cryptography	
  
•  Personal	
  area	
  network	
  monitoring	
  
•  Jamming	
  protec?on	
  
•  Forensics	
  evidence	
  capture	
  
Credits	
  
Tony	
  Naggs	
  (@xa329)	
  
Gunnar	
  Alendal	
  (@gradoisageek)	
  
Alexandre	
  Dulaunoy	
  (@adulau)	
  
Joshua	
  Corman	
  (@joshcorman)	
  
Claus	
  Cramon	
  Houmann	
  (@ClausHoumann)	
  
ScoE	
  Erven	
  (@scoEerven)	
  
Beau	
  Woods	
  (@beauwoods)	
  
Suzanne	
  Schwartz	
  (US	
  FDA)	
  
Family	
  &	
  Friends	
  	
  
Concinnity	
  Risks	
  
Thank	
  you!	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
www.infosec.sintef.no	
  
www.iamthecavalry.org	
  
www.concinnity-­‐risks.com	
  
@MarieGMoe	
  
@blackswanburst	
  

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Unpatchable: 32C3 edition

  • 1. Concinnity  Risks   Unpatchable     Living  with  a  vulnerable  implanted  device   @MarieGMoe   @blackswanburst   Marie  Moe,  PhD,  Research  Scien?st  at  SINTEF   Eireann  LevereE,  Founder  and  CEO  of  Concinnity  Risks  
  • 2. Hack  to  save  lives!  
  • 3.   A  brief  history  of  my  heart…  
  • 4. How  the  heart  works  
  • 5. Electrical  system  of  the  heart  
  • 7.   The  Internet  of  Medical  ”Things”  is  real,     and  Marie’s  heart  is  wired  into  it…  
  • 8. ①  Implantable  medical  device   –  ICD/Pacemaker/other  devices   –  MICS  (Medical  Implant   Communica?on  Service)   –  Bluetooth   ②  Access  point   –  POTS/GSM/SMS/email   ③  GSM/Telephone/Internet   ④  Telemetry  store   –  Programmers   –  Doctor’s  worksta?on   –  Telemetry  server  at  vendor   ⑤  Medical  staff   –  Social  engineering  
  • 9. With  connec?vity  comes  vulnerability…  
  • 10. Poten?al  impact   Pa?ent  privacy  issues   BaEery  exhaus?on   Device  malfunc?on   Death  threats  and  extor?on   Remote  assassina?on  scenario…  
  • 11.   ”We  need  to  be  able  to  verify  the  soware  that   controls  our  lives”   Bruce  Schneier  on  “Volkswagen  and  Chea?ng  Soware”  
  • 12. Previous  work   •  Kevin  Fu  et  al:   –  Pacemakers  and  implantable  cardiac  defibrillators:  Soware  radio  aEacks  and   zero-­‐power  defenses  (2008)   –  Mi?ga?ng  EMI  signal  injec?on  aEacks  against  analog  sensors  (2013)   •  Barnaby  Jack   •  Hardcoded  creden?als   •  Medical  device  honeypots   •  Drug  infusion  pumps  
  • 13. Hacking  can  save  lives   Source:  h*p://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNo>ces/ucm456815.htm  
  • 14. Medical  devices  do  get  infected     Source:  h*ps://securityledger.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/06/AOA_MEDJACK_LAYOUT_6-­‐0_6-­‐3-­‐2015-­‐1.pdf  
  • 15. WTF  are  you  doing  with  my  data?  
  • 16. The  stairs  that  almost  killed  me  
  • 20. Reflec?ons  on  trus?ng  machines  
  • 21. Why?   Legacy   technology   No  soware  updates   Long  life?me  of   devices   No  security   tes?ng  or   monitoring   Medical  devices  are   ”black  boxes”   Proprietary   soware   More   connec?vity   Lack  of  regula?ons   Increased  aEack   surface  
  • 22. How  to  solve  it?   Security   research   Informa?on  sharing   Third  party   collabora?on   Coordinated   disclosure   Vendor   awareness   Regula?on   Procurement   Safety  by  design   Security  tes?ng   Security   risk   monitoring   Security  updates   Incident  response   Cyber  insurance   Resilience  
  • 23.
  • 24.   What  is  the  social  contract  for  the   code  in  our  bodies?  
  • 25. Research  needed   •  Open  source  medical  devices   •  Medical  device  cryptography   •  Personal  area  network  monitoring   •  Jamming  protec?on   •  Forensics  evidence  capture  
  • 26. Credits   Tony  Naggs  (@xa329)   Gunnar  Alendal  (@gradoisageek)   Alexandre  Dulaunoy  (@adulau)   Joshua  Corman  (@joshcorman)   Claus  Cramon  Houmann  (@ClausHoumann)   ScoE  Erven  (@scoEerven)   Beau  Woods  (@beauwoods)   Suzanne  Schwartz  (US  FDA)   Family  &  Friends    
  • 27. Concinnity  Risks   Thank  you!         www.infosec.sintef.no   www.iamthecavalry.org   www.concinnity-­‐risks.com   @MarieGMoe   @blackswanburst