Thesis for Masters - Boatner

HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Costs and Benefits of WMATA
Metrorail for D.C. and Suburban Residents
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School
Of
HOWARD UNIVERSITY
in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the
degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Economics
by
Jasmine Simone Boatner
Washington, D.C.
May 2016

ii
HOWARD UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
THESIS COMMITTEE
____________________________
Rodney D. Green, Ph.D.
Chairperson
____________________________
Haydar Kurban, Ph.D.
____________________________
Benoit Schmutz, Ph.D.
_______________________
Haydar Kurban, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor
Candidate: Jasmine Simone Boatner
Date of Thesis Defense: March 31, 2016

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Haydar Kurban, my thesis advisor, for invaluable support
throughout the thesis process and for always being available to answer any questions that I have.
I would like to thank Dr. Benoit Schmutz, a thesis committee member, for assistance with
some of the statistical analysis and suggestions/feedback on earlier drafts.
I would like to thank Dr. Omari Swinton for helping me to refine my research question
and for providing me with valuable comments and contacts that provided me with additional
research assistance.
I would like to thank Dr. Tom Zimmermann for always being willing to meet with me to
discuss my research and for helping me find appropriate STATA models for the data.
I would like to thank Dr. Rodney Green, a thesis committee member, for serving on my
thesis committee.
I would like to thank the WMATA Bus Planning Division for providing me with annual
bus ridership counts.
Lastly, I would like to thank the Economics Faculty at Howard University and the
Economics Faculty at Duke University for the outstanding education I have received. I would
also like to thank my Howard Cohort for support throughout the Masters process.

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ABSTRACT
WMATA Metrorail ridership has been steadily declining in recent years. Although ridership has
decreased, operating costs have not. This budget imbalance has led to increased jurisdictional
subsidy support, with Washington D.C. paying the brunt. With D.C. Residents paying more taxes
for the Metrorail, do they also receive more benefits from the Metrorail system? The data reveals
WMATA Metrorail demand does not exhibit perfect price inelasticity, indicating Metrorail rides
are not essential goods. Furthermore, Metrorail ride time data reveals significant deviations
between expected ride time and actual ride time, with the percent deviation decreasing with
miles. This indicates Metrorail time savings could be overstated for short trips. For District
residents who commute short distances, alternative modes of transportation could be more cost
effective and faster than WMATA Metrorail.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
THESIS COMMITTEE ............................................................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................ iv
LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................. vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
1.1. Overview............................................................................................................................................2
1.2. Results ...............................................................................................................................................3
1.3. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ...................................................................4
CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS...........................................9
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICE ELASTICITY.......15
3.1. Data Collection................................................................................................................................15
3.2. Elasticity Results..............................................................................................................................19
3.3. Fixed Effects.....................................................................................................................................25
3.4. Government Subsidy.......................................................................................................................27
3.5. Metrorail Ride Time Data................................................................................................................28
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................32
4.1 Possible Problems with Approach...................................................................................................32
APPENDIX................................................................................................................................................35
REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................................40

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LIST OF TABLES
Tables Page
3.1. Correlation……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………18
3.2. Whole System Results…………………………………………………………………………………………………..19
3.3. Whole Systems Results with Weighted Demographic Data…….……………………………………..21
3.4. D.C. Regression Results…..…………………………………………………………………………………………….23
3.5. MD Metro Regression Results...........................................................................................24
3.6. VA Metro Regression Results..………………………………………………………………………………………25
3.7. Fixed Effects Absorbing Region……………………………………………………………………………………..26
3.8. Fixed Effect Absorbing Year….……………………………………………………………………………………….27
3.9. Metrorail Ride Time Data Regression……………………………………………………………………………30
5.1. Whole System Results Basing Fares on Boarding Fares………………………………….……………..39
5.2. Whole System Results Basing Fares on Boarding Fares (Dropped Variables)………….……..39

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LIST OF FIGURES
Figures Page
1.1. Metrorail Map…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………4
1.2. Subsidy Allocation…………………………………………….………………………..………………………....7
3.1. Regional Subsidy Breakdown, 2005……….……………………………………………………………….22
3.2. Hausman Test………..…………………………………..………………………………….………………………25
5.1. Google Map Estimation 1……………………………….………………………………………………………35
5.2. Google Map Estimation 2………………………………….……………………………………………………36
5.3. Google Map Estimation 3……………………………….………………………………………………………37
5.4. Google Map Estimation 4…………………………………….…………………………………………………38

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
An essential good is an item required by a consumer in order to sustain health or life. In
many cases, public transportation qualifies as an essential good. Despite alternatives “the opinion
is that the demand for services of different modes of transportation is typically inelastic,
[because] transportation costs are relatively small in comparison with the value or utility of these
services” (Bekő 2004, 64). Many residents of large cities with robust public transportation
systems do not own cars. “Between 2010 and 2012, the number of car-free households in in the
District of Columbia grew by 12,612—fully 88% of new households citywide” (Chung 2014).
Of all D.C. households, 37.9% are car free (Chung 2014). These car-free residents are largely
dependent on the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) public
transportation system. Despite this large market of potential consumers, it appears many District
residents do not consistently utilize WMATA Metrorail. This aversion to Metrorail could be a
consequence of high fares and inefficient service that make alternative transportation methods,
like buses, bikes, and car shares, more attractive to someone with a short commute.
An efficient public transportation system is a very important element of a city’s economic
well-being. “The exchange of goods and services entails the movement of goods and people.
Thus, the size, structure, and efficiency of an urban area are influenced by the transportation
system on which goods and people are moved” (Mills and Hamilton 1994, 278). WMATA
Metrorail appears to be economically inefficient and unreliable, demonstrated by its record of
82% on time rail performance, which is well below its own goal (“Scorecard”). If Washington
D.C.’s public transportation system is inefficient, by extension Washington D.C. itself is not as
functional as it could be. One of the main advantages to living in or near a city is that there
should be a reduction in transportation costs, both in monetary terms and in time savings.

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Transportation cost savings are an example of a pecuniary agglomeration effect. Pecuniary
agglomeration effects are what drive firms to large cities when both its market and suppliers are
located there (Brueckner 2011, 5-7). However, if WMATA cannot effectively move people then
this pecuniary agglomeration effect will be diminished. After years of Metrorail delays, fatalities,
and price hikes, it appears that many D.C. residents have switched to alternative modes of
transportation based on the steady decline in ridership (Duggan 2015a). Suburban commuters do
not have as many alternatives to Metrorail as District riders, but data points to decreasing
suburban ridership as well.
1.1. Overview
The central research question of this thesis is: Do Washington D.C. residents receive
fewer WMATA Metrorail benefits while paying more of the costs for the system? This thesis
assumes benefits can be measured from price elasticity of demand for Metrorail rides. Using
OLS regressions, average price elasticities for the period ranging from 1981-2015 are calculated
for the entire Metrorail system, Washington D.C., the Maryland Washington area suburbs, and
the Virginia Washington area suburbs. Fixed effect regressions are also run. This thesis also aims
to explain why Washington D.C. has higher price elasticity based on Metrorail performance data
collected over a six month period.
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to this thesis, covering the highlights of my results
and a brief history of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Chapter 2
summarizes some of the previous economic literature relevant to price elasticity of public
transportation. Chapter 3 contains the economic analysis, with explanations of data collection
methods, OLS regressions, fixed effect regressions, the impact government subsidy could play in

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the results, and Metrorail ride time data results. Chapter 4 concludes the thesis, and lists possible
problems with the approach that could bias my results.
1.2. Results
When regressions are run using Metrorail ridership as the response variable and Metrorail
real fare as a predictor (along with controlling variables such as real gas prices) the coefficients
indicate fare does have an effect on ridership. On average, from 1981-2015 Metrorail demand
exhibits price inelasticity, but recent years have higher elasticity. The elasticity coefficient shows
the impact the natural log of Metrorail real fare has on the natural log of Metrorail ridership.
Washington D.C. exhibits a higher elasticity coefficient than Maryland or Virginia in
regressions, indicating D.C. residents are not as dependent on the Metrorail. This reduced
dependence on the system indicates D.C. residents might not benefit from the Metrorail as much
as their more dependent suburban counterparts. Six months of data on WMATA Metrorail rides
reveals significant timeliness issues that might have an impact on Metrorail demand in the
District. From June 1st
, 2015 to December 15th
, 2015, I visited twenty-nine Metrorail stations in
the D.C. Metropolitan area and covered a large portion of the Metrorail track (see Figure 1.1.). In
total, I spent 4,256 minutes (70.9 hours) to travel 922.4 miles. My average fare was $3.06, which
is slightly higher than the $2.48 2015 average fare for commuters entering the Metrorail system
at D.C. stations. My average trip was 7.62 miles. Most importantly, the average percent deviation
between expected, or WMATA quoted, ride time and actual ride time was 49.04%. Intriguingly,
it appears shorter commutes have higher deviations than longer commutes, indicating those who
live in the suburbs and commute into the city using Metrorail likely save more commuting time
than those close to the core. If suburban commuters benefit more from the Metrorail, their
jurisdictions should be covering a larger portion of the WMATA Metrorail subsidy.

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Figure 1.1. Metrorail Map
1.3. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Washington D.C. was not designed for heavy automobile use, so by the 1950s
commuters were plagued by the city’s inability to handle the heavy traffic.
All could agree that the spread of automobiles threatened the health of a city
designed for pedestrians and carriages. Traffic engineers watched streets become
even more congested, politicians fretted, and commuters cursed. The Sunday Star
complained that “motorists today spend from one to three hours of their off-job
time in cars…the 189,000 metro residents who enter the core of the city daily by
public transit…are plagued by slow movement and transfers. (Schrag 2006, 32)

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By 1955, plans were being laid out for what would become Metrorail. However, it would take
more than 20 years, and billions of dollars, for Metrorail to actually start running. (Schrag 2006).
The total cost… [for] the 103 mile system [of] January 2001 was around $10
billion in nominal dollars. This enormous sum has earned Metro its most enduring
criticism, as well as such epithets as ‘the Solid-Gold Cadillac of Mass Transit’
and ‘the biggest boondoggle in the history of all mankind’. (Schrag 2006, 172)
Part of the reason WMATA Metrorail was so timely and expensive to build is because of the
jurisdictional nature of the system. Washington D.C., Virginia, Maryland, and the federal
government are all involved with Metrorail and all have their own agenda. “Suburbanization
made mass transit a matter of interstate concern” (Schrag 2006, 96). Suburbanization raises
complex question for an interstate mass transit system like WMATA Metrorail. The main
question being, who ultimately should shoulder the financial responsibility for the system?
Washington Metropolitan population trends reveal years of District of Columbia population
declines as public transit makes suburban living more attractive. Consequently, D.C.’s tax base
was shrinking while Metrorail needed more and more funding.
“The erosion of city tax bases occasioned by departure of commerce and industry has
intensified urban problems; ironically, at the very time suburban growth has sapped much
of the financial strength of the central cities, the rapid growth of suburbs is increasing the
demands for certain urban amenities normally furnished by central cities.” (Meyer, Kain,
and Wohl 1965, 2)
Recently, D.C. has seen population increases for the first time in many years, largely as an effect
of the attractiveness of federal jobs during the recession. However, growth has slowed in more
recent years. Generally, Metrorail seems to benefit suburban commuters more, but because
Metrorail funding is based on a complicated 33/33/33 formula partly weighted by number of
stations in a jurisdiction, The District of Columbia pays more than any other (see Figure 1.2.). It
seems inequitable that D.C. has to devote more of its tax revenue to Metrorail, considering

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WMATA’s main function is to bring people from the suburbs into the District of Columbia, both
for work and for pleasure. According to Mills and Hamilton,
Commuting constitutes about 25 percent of personal urban travel… [but]
commuting is [probably the most] important [aspect of urban
transportation]…because it is concentrated during the morning and evening rush
hours. It is commuting that strains the capacity of the transport network, and in
part, it is commuting needs that dictate the extent of road and public-transit
capacity. (279)
Peak commuting hours do strain the Metrorail system, which led WMATA to adopt peak pricing.
During peak commuting hours, which WMATA has defined to be 5:00 AM – 9:30 AM; 3:00 to
7:00 PM on weekdays, and from midnight until 3:00 AM on Friday and Saturday nights
(“Metrorail Fares”), riders are charged a premium fare ranging from $2.15 to $5.90. Off peak,
fares range from $1.75 to $3.60 (“Metrorail Fares”). However, even surcharging peak
commuting hours has not resulted in WMATA Metrorail covering its operating costs so
Washington area taxpayers end up subsidizing WMATA Metrorail’s deficit. The subsidization
is based on the following formula:
The base subsidy allocation for Metrorail service is based on three elements in equal
proportions:
1. Density weighted population 33.3%
2. Number of rail stations 33.3%
3. Average weekly ridership 33.3%
Density weighted population is determined by taking the urbanized area population
distribution for the compact area (50 percent weighted) and combining that with the
weighted population density (urbanized population divided by area). The rail stations
factor is calculated by taking the number of stations, or portions of stations, assigned to
each jurisdiction, divided by the total number of stations in the system. Ridership is
calculated by taking the system average weekday ridership (month of May sample) times
the jurisdictional ridership distribution, as determined by the rail passenger survey. Only
persons who reside in the compact area are included in the distribution. (WMATA 2012a)

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Based on this formula, Washington D.C.’s share of the subsidy in 2016 will be 33.4%, compared
to 19.1% for Montgomery County, 16.4% for Prince George’s County, 4.7% for the City of
Alexandria, 9.6% for Arlington County, .3% for the City of Fairfax, 16.1% for Fairfax County,
and .3% for the City of Falls Church (WMATA 2015a). If WMATA is able to reach forecasted
fares and doesn’t require additional subsidy, Washington D.C. taxpayers will be responsible for
Figure 1.2. Subsidy Allocation. Source: WMATA

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$96,957,323 in Metrorail subsidy this year. The subsidization formula has changed slightly over
the years, but from the very beginning it has ensured that the District of Columbia will pay more
than any other jurisdiction.
In the fall of 1967 WMATA’s consultants proposed the 40/30/15/15 formula. Each
jurisdiction’s capital contribution would be based 40 percent on the construction cost of
the lines in its territory, 30 percent on the operating cost of those lines, 15 percent on the
number of its citizens projected to ride the system in 1990, and 15 percent on its
projected 1990 population. A strict application of this formula would have swamped the
District of Columbia, so the consultants designated downtown – with the most stations,
the most underground construction, and the most suburbanites getting off their trains in
the morning as “Sector Zero,” removed from D.C.’s responsibility and instead blended
into general system costs. As one critic later pointed out, neither this scheme not the
financing formula fully apportioned costs according to benefits; both Maryland and
Virginia, whose citizens would save the most time and whose developers would get the
largest windfall, would pay less than their share…The 40/30/15/15 formula passed the
board with little discussion. (Schrag 2006, 114)
WMATA depends on the jurisdictions to find funding to keep the Metrorail running, but public
funding is limited and therefore WMATA Metrorail often has to increase the already high fares.
In its current form, the Washington Metrorail system does not seem economically viable.
With steadily declining ridership, continuing fare hikes to address the budget deficit is bad
economic policy. The fare hikes could simply push more riders to alternative modes of
transportation. The declining ridership shows demand is not perfectly inelastic. Depending on
just how elastic demand becomes, WMATA needs to find a way to lower its’ costs, not raise
fares, to address profitability.

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CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a brief overview of the literature in the economics field
about public transportation. When possible, the literature is connected to the current situation
facing the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
Public transportation is an extremely relevant topic in urban economics, and there is a
plethora of literature about the economic efficiency of public transportation. Currently, much of
the debate has turned to whether privatization is feasible and more economically efficient.
Outcomes in privatized and deregulated venues seem to demonstrate economic and social
benefits of privatization, but there are political and institutional constraints that prevent
privatization from becoming widespread (Castleman 2011, 939). It is important to note that most
transportation systems were first delivered by private firms, underscoring that “the … case for
[the twentieth-century] public takeover of [infrastructure and systems] was weak and …
evidence of government failure has been overwhelming” (Winston 2010, 125). Winston asserts
government failure is worse than market failure. WMATA Metrorail’s failure to turn a profit, as
well as its failure to provide reliable, safe, and affordable transportation illustrates Winston’s
point. Additionally, Winston opposes public private partnerships, similar to the relationship
WMATA has with D.C. Circulator buses. Winston’s “pure privatization policy” allows “no
economic role for the public sector other than to enforce antitrust, antifraud, and other general
business laws and to set standards for safety and environmental regulations” (2010, 126). Public
private partnerships (PPPs) have been shown to be more efficient than public systems, but they
do not “showcase the benefits of a full-fledged privatization program” (Winston 2010, 146).
Although complete privatization is not feasible for WMATA, some private oversight might

10
increase economic efficiency. Specifically, there should be WMATA board members who
represent private industry. Currently, there are eight voting board members representing the
District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and the Federal Government (“Board of Directors”).
Considering how much private development is spurred by the Metrorail system, adding two more
voting board members from private industry in the Washington Metropolitan area seems
beneficial for both private industry in the area and for WMATA. These private sector
representative board members could offer new perspectives and private sector experience that
prove invaluable to increasing WMATA’s profitability. In the long run, subsidization could cost
more than implementing necessary changes now. Castleman acknowledges that
[Winston’s] privatization proposal is a massive enterprise, but nonetheless it is the
book’s universe. Arguing that economic efficiency is the unifying justification,
Winston pegs the current cost of inefficient public ownership at more than $100
billion in welfare losses (in 2005 dollars), plus, importantly, a circumvention of
innovation. (940)
Private oversight might be able to help reduce this circumvention of innovation.
There are many economists who are completely against privatizing public transportation.
Public transportation is a public good, and the provision of public goods is not necessarily meant
to be economically efficient. However, public goods are supposed to be socially beneficial. “At
the national level, fewer than 5 percent of commuters use mass transit, but…ridership…is
relatively high among low-income commuters” (O’Sullivan 2007, 235). WMATA Metrorail is so
expensive that many of the low income commuters who heavily depend on public transportation
don’t seem to use it. 51% of Metrobus riders are low income, compared to only 12% of Metrorail
riders (WMATA 2015b). Many low income commuters are being pushed toward the more
affordable Metrobuses, raising concerns of a classist system where only the wealthy get to ride
the partly tax funded Metrorail system. In order for WMATA Metrorail to fulfill its role as a

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public good, it must find a way to be accessible for the public at large. This means finding a way
to address the deficit without raising already high fares and further alienating the low income
community.
Public transportation is important, so important that “it tends to be heavily subsidized
generally by a combination of local, state, and federal government” (Johnson 1995, 1010). The
subsidization also helps correct for externalities of private car usage. According to the third
axiom of urban economics, externalities cause inefficiency. (O’Sullivan 2007, 207). Private car
usage leads to increased pollution, added congestion, and more wear and tear on roads. Drivers
do not necessarily pay these societal costs. “The basic idea is to match the underpricing of car
travel with equivalent underpricing of buses, subways, commuter trains, and light rail”
(O’Sullivan 2007, 220). WMATA Metrorail needs to be subsidized, but because WMATA
covers two different states, the District, and has a federal component, it becomes a political issue.
D.C. taxpayers seem to bear an unfair portion of the tax burden considering that D.C. residents
depend on Metrorail the least. The subsidization formula places an unfair amount of the tax
burden on District residents (see Figure 1.2.). A D.C. resident can usually easily substitute
Metrobus for Metrorail. Johnson concludes that “public transportation links Americans to those
things we universally value - economic opportunity, environmental protection, social services,
education, health care, recreation, and time savings through reduced traffic congestion” (1014).
All these things are true. At its core, public transportation is supposed to be socially beneficial.
However, when Metrorail prices are so high that lower income communities cannot afford to use
it and the jurisdiction with the highest poverty level bears more cost than the others, social utility
is not being optimized.

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This thesis aims to determine whether Metrorail rides are an essential good by seeing if
demand is responsive to price changes. Demand for WMATA Metrorail rides is determined by
several factors. “Transportation studies indicate that travel time is a more significant demand
determinant than out-of-pocket costs, so that many transportation demand curves have travel
time as the independent variable” (Dodson 1975, 139). WMATA Metrorail consistently runs
late. Its website claims 82% on time performance, well below WMATA’s own goal of 91%
(“Scorecard). If WMATA is consistently late and travel time helps determine demand, this will
impact the demand for the service unless Metrorail rides are an essential good. Essentially, the
demand function or model is a behavioral description so “selection of the independent variables
(i.e., the demand determinants) is the heart of the problem for the behavioral scientist” (Dodson
1975, 145-146). In the case of WMATA, this thesis assumes the principal independent variable
is price, but the regressions also control for other macroeconomic conditions.
It is interesting to note that much of the economic literature on public transportation dates
from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. Economists’ interest likely stemmed from all the new
mass transit systems being built in U.S. cities during this time, including Washington’s rail
transit system. There has been less interest in subsequent years. Recently, an article about
elasticity of railway transport demand in Slovenia was added to the economic literature. In
Slovenia, “according to the aggregate values of demand elasticities, the railway passenger
demand is price and income inelastic…For the average consumer, the services of railway
passenger transportation in Slovenia can be classified among essential consumer expenditures”
(Bekő 2004, 63). WMATA Metrorail rides are less likely to be essential goods. Consumers have
many alternatives, including Metrobus, car sharing services like Uber, biking, walking, and

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countless others. Bekő concludes that “recorded price inelasticity of demand [means] that
revenues…increase when the average real fare increases” (83).
Based on a simplistic price elasticity model based on maximum fare nominal values,
WMATA’s 2014 price hike resulted in a larger drop in ridership than increased fare revenue
among existing stations. According to WMATA,
Metro’s most recent system-wide fare changes were implemented in July 2014. The
changes included a $0.15 (9 percent) increase in bus fares; a $0.05 (2.3 percent)
increase in the base rail fare and a $0.15 (2.6 percent) increase in the maximum rail
fare; a $0.10 base parking fee increase; and other minor changes. As a result of the
fare changes, passenger revenues increased in FY2015 by approximately $39 million or
5 percent. However, revenues fell short of projections due to a decline in Metrorail and
Metrobus ridership from their forecasted levels. (2015b)
Five new stations were opened in July 2014, which increased ridership by making Metrorail
accessible to new markets. Subtracting ridership from new stations in 2015 and then calculating
elasticity for the entire Metrorail system shows price elastic demand, which is consistent with
WMATA’s claim of lower than forecasted ridership levels.
Many dismiss WMATA’s budget deficits as an unavoidable consequence of public
transportation being a public good. However, public goods do not necessarily have to be
unprofitable. This economic inefficiency could be a consequence of government having no real
incentive to make WMATA Metrorail more profitable. “Governments are not primarily
interested in maximizing a social welfare function, or the common good, or the public interest-
whatever these may be- but that instead they seek to maximize their own interest” (Breton 1966,
455). This hypothesis about government behavior was initially put forward by Schumpeter and
Downs and Breton tries to tie it together with the theory of public goods as formulated by
Lindahl, Bowen, Samuelson, and Musgrave (456). Breton feels it is “necessary to devise another

14
system of taxation to pay for public goods” (456) in order to actually reach a social Pareto
optimum.
Niskanen’s theory of government budgeting claims powerful agencies are largely
interested in maximizing their budgets through bargaining with a weak, poorly informed
governmental ‘sponsor’ (McGuire 1981, 313). McGuire performed empirical tests in order to test
Niskanen’s ideas. McGuire found that the behavior of state and local governments is inconsistent
with Niskanen’s model of supply by government agencies (318).
Bureaucrats in general have no reason to actively try to maximize their agency’s budget.
However, they also don’t have any reason to cost minimize. WMATA Metrorail could do several
things to reduce its costs. WMATA could fix elevators in a timely manner so expensive shuttles
for handicapped passengers do not have to run. WMATA could better plan and supervise
maintenance work so escalators and tracks get permanent repairs, not temporary fixes which
ultimately require more maintenance work. WMATA could base their pay on performance so
executives have incentive to ensure Metrorail runs properly. With no incentive to minimize
costs, WMATA Metrorail does not operate in an economically efficient fashion.

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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICE
ELASTICITY
Chapter 3 of this thesis contains the economic analysis of price elasticity for WMATA
Metrorail. Data collection, methodology, and possible explanations for elastic demand are
discussed.
WMATA Metrorail officially opened in 1976, but these early years were characterized by
frequent price increases and decreases, as well as extensive track building. With all this change,
it is difficult to isolate the effect price has on ridership. Furthermore, Washingtonians and their
suburban counterparts needed time to become accustomed to public transportation. WMATA
Metrorail is one of the few post war systems, created “in an era when Americans passionately
embraced the automobile” (Schrag 2006, 1). For these reasons this thesis only looks at ridership
from 1981 onward, when prices had stabilized and the novelty of Washington rail transit had
likely run its course.
3.1. Data Collection
WMATA’s website provides ‘History of Fare Increases’ which documents all its price
changes and dates these changes went into effect. Metrorail has two different pricing systems,
peak and non-peak. This thesis uses peak pricing because most Metrorail usage occurs during
peak commuting hours. Fare is determined based on the peak boarding fare and distance
traveled, up to the maximum fare distance of 15.7 miles. The longest possible trip one can make
is 29.6 miles. The $2.15 boarding charge covers 0 to 3 miles of travel. 1st
tier miles (3-6 miles)
are charged at $.326 per mile. 2nd
tier miles (6 plus) are charged at $.288 per mile (WMATA
2015c). When prices are adjusted, WMATA might increase or decrease boarding fare, 1st
tier

16
miles, or 2nd
tier miles, which means I had to decide which price to use in order to calculate price
elasticity. I used maximum fare instead of boarding fare because most riders are paying closer to
maximum fare than boarding fare. More about the calculation of prices will be discussed later in
this thesis. WMATA also annually publishes historical rail ridership, cataloging average
weekday daily passenger boardings for all WMATA Metrorail stations. The counts have been
taken annually in May every year since 1978, except in 1983. WMATA also keeps data on
historical bus ridership, which the Bus Planning Division provided when contacted. Non
WMATA data on macroeconomic conditions, like Mid Atlantic gas prices and population data,
were sourced from the Department of Labor, U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
and U.S. Energy Information Administration. All prices were converted from nominal to real
using 2015 as the base year with Department of Labor annual national CPI figures.
In order to determine optimal subsidy allocations, it is important to know whether or not
WMATA Metrorail benefits everyone equally. One way to try to determine this is to compare
price elasticities for different D.C. Metropolitan regions. Of course, price is not the only variable
that is going to impact Metrorail ridership. There are countless other macroeconomic factors that
will impact Metrorail ridership numbers. The regressions aim to control for as many external
macroeconomic conditions as possible without running into multicollinearity. Ultimately,
average real fare paid, weekday Metrorail ridership in May, population, number of stations,
miles of metro, real gas prices, real bus fares, weekday bus ridership in May, Black percentage of
D.C. population, and 25-34 year old percentage of D.C population were available predictors for
the regressions.
Instead of simply using real maximum fare for price, average fares from each station
were collected from PlanItMetro, WMATA’s Planning Blog site. These fares were then averaged

17
for regions and the entire system. Finally, because these average fares were from 2015 data, the
percentages of real maximum fare paid in the three regions for 2015 were found by dividing the
averages by $5.90, the current and 2015 maximum Metrorail fare. For the whole system, average
fare was 53% of maximum fare. In comparison, D.C. was 42%, Maryland 64%, and Virginia
59% of maximum fare. These respective percentages were then multiplied by the real maximum
fare of each year since 1981 for the whole system and each respective region. The averages were
not weighted by entries per station (with the exception of Arlington National Cemetery being
thrown out because of single digit entries) because the populations of neighborhoods has likely
changed significantly over 34 years. It is safer to assume commuting patterns have not changed
significantly. Using maximum fare should account for Metrorail system size, as the maximum
fare generally increases along with increasing miles of Metrorail track. Therefore, percentage of
maximum fare should control for the growing system and provide fairly accurate Metrorail fares
to calculate elasticity from.
After a test was run for correlation (see Table 3.1.), several variables had to be dropped
from the whole system regression because of high collinearity. We observe high correlation
between DC GDP and Population, Number of Stations and Miles of Metro, and Metro Real Fares
and Bus Real Fares. Essentially, these sets of variables are measuring the same thing.

18
Table 3.1. Correlation
Year Metro
Real Fare
Metro
Ridership
Population
DC Metro
DC GDP Number of
Stations
Miles of
Metro
Year 1.0000
Metro Real
Fare
-0.0989 1.0000
Metro
Ridership
0.9575 -0.2614 1.0000
Population DC
Metro
0.9931 -0.0704 0.9452 1.0000
DC GDP 0.9837 0.0218 0.9411 0.9741 1.0000
Number of
Stations
0.9441 -0.3307 0.9454 0.9414 0.8816 1.0000
Miles of
Metro
0.9403 -0.3415 0.9427 0.9374 0.8762 0.9985 1.0000
Gas Prices
Real
0.5160 0.4714 0.4575 0.4954 0.6371 0.2605 0.2427
Bus Fares Real -0.4644 0.6668 -0.6054 -0.4139 -0.4296 -0.5078 -0.5136
Bus Ridership 0.1666 -0.2418 0.2748 0.1759 0.1981 0.1777 0.1746
Gas Prices
Real
Bus Fares
Real
Bus
Ridership
Gas Prices
Real
1.0000
Bus Fares Real -0.1447 1.0000
Bus Ridership 0.1528 -0.3466 1.0000

19
Total 2.38217109 33 .072187003 Root MSE = .06551
Adj R-squared = 0.9405
Residual .12016507 28 .00429161 R-squared = 0.9496
Model 2.26200602 5 .452401204 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 5, 28) = 105.42
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 34
3.2. Elasticity Results
After dropping DC GDP, Number of Stations, and Bus Real Fares, a regression was run
on the whole Metrorail system data (see Table 3.2.).
Table 3.2. Whole System Results
According to this linear regression, on average from 1981-2015 demand for WMATA
Metrorail rides throughout the system is inelastic. For every one percent increase in price, we
would only expect ridership to decrease by .4%, indicating that WMATA can safely increase
fares because rides appear to be essential goods. This result is largely consistent with the
Simpson-Curtin rule-of-thumb, which claims each 3 percent fare increase reduces ridership by 1
percent (Litman 2004, 43). However, many sources seem to believe that demand in more recent
years has been more elastic. Despite the warnings against a price hike, with flat ridership
WMATA officials might consider a fare hike the only viable option to cover costs. WMATA
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro
Real Fare
-.401 0.056
Miles of
Metro
.00767 0.027
Log
Population DC
Metro
.695 .289
Gas Prices
Real
.0356 .094
Log Bus
Ridership
.159 0.244
Constant .337 0.971

20
could avoid fare hikes by reducing service or with increased jurisdictional support, but the
jurisdictions are balking at increasing support from FY 2015 levels and reduced service is just as
unpopular. For 2016 “Metro wants Maryland, D.C. and Virginia to pay $882.8 million in
subsidies, or about $105 million more than in Fiscal Year 2015” (Ashe 2015). Montgomery
County officials do not want to pay $147.2 million in subsidy, but they also do not want service
cuts or price hikes (Ashe 2015). Council members sent a letter to WMATA that read:
Regrettably, we believe that the staff budget proposal threatens to create a ‘death spiral.’
If fares increase even further and service deteriorates, fewer people will opt to ride Metro.
Lower ridership in turn will inevitably translate into further service cuts, fare increases
and even lower ridership. This is most assuredly not a sustainable path forward. (Ashe
2015)
The empirical evidence seems to collaborate this idea that ridership is fairly sensitive to price.
Controlling for demographics, specifically percentage of young and black people in Washington
D.C. because they are the heaviest users of public transportation (Mckenzie 2015, Neff and
Pham 2007), shows stronger price sensitivity. Historical demographic data is only available for
census years, meaning 1980 (which was used with 1981 ridership data), 1990, and 2000. More
recent data is available for every year, so 2007-2014 data is also included. Ideally, it would have
been preferable to run a regression on just 2007-2014 data, but with this small sample size the
regression results were insignificant. In order to avoid this regression being weighted heavily by
more recent data, the 1980 and 1990 observations were included 8 times to serve as
representation for the entirety of the 80s and 90s. The 2000 data was weighted 5 times to be
representative of the early 2000s (see Table 3.3.). For every one percent increase in real price,
this regression estimates that ridership will decline by 1.52%, offsetting the increased revenue
from higher fares. Additionally, this regression provides empirical evidence to what one would
expect. More millennials moving into Washington D.C. increases Metrorail ridership, and the

21
Total 3.52834275 28 .126012241 Root MSE = .04094
Model 3.48644469 3 1.16214823 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 3, 25) = 693.44
significant negative coefficient in front of black percentage of the population indicates that the
gentrification of D.C. increases Metrorail ridership. This is likely due to the socioeconomic
differences between those leaving D.C. and those moving into the city now as the cost of living
increases. The new residents tend to be much wealthier, and are more likely to ride Metrorail
than Metrobus. Nationally, black people are the racial group most likely to utilize public
transportation, but the regression results indicate that Metrorail’s high prices might have isolated
these potential users. The relatively small sample and high r squared value indicates these
regression results should be accepted with caution. However, because this thesis is mostly
concerned with the sign of the coefficients, not the actual values, these regression results should
suffice.
Table 3.3. Whole System Results with Weighted Demographic Data
In addition to looking at demand for the entire system, this thesis also looks at demand on
a regional basis. Ideally, miles of metro would be available annually for every region, but
unfortunately the only available data on WMATA’s website was total miles of Metro track
currently in each region. As of 2016, there are 38.3 miles of track in Washington D.C., 38.29
miles of track in Maryland, and 41.17 miles of track in Virginia, which WMATA rounds to a
system wide total of 117.7 miles. Because of the lack of annual data on miles, number of stations
Log Metro Ridership Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro Real Fare -1.523964 0.000
25 to 34 years old %
of D.C. Population
6.47906 0.000
Black % of D.C.
population
-3.432161 0.000
Constant 15.47877 0.000

22
was used instead in regional analyses. Number of stations and miles of metro are correlated at
.9985, so they are essentially interchangeable in terms of their impact on ridership. Based on this
high correlation, it raises questions as to why WMATA uses number of stations instead of miles
of metro as the third weight in the subsidy formula. Washington D.C. is home to 39 out of 91
stations, (WMATA assigns D.C. 40 stations, splitting responsibility with Prince George’s and
Montgomery for two Maryland stations located very close to the D.C. border) or 43% of stations,
but D.C. only accounts for 32.5% of Metrorail track. The station weight is why D.C. ends up
paying so much of the subsidy. In the other two weights, population weighted by density and
average weekday ridership, which are probably much better indicators of the value of Metrorail
to a region, D.C. has the smallest share of the allocation (see Figure 3.1.).
Figure 3.1. Regional Subsidy Breakdown 2005, Source: WMATA

23
Total 1.42655439 33 .043228921 Root MSE = .06578
sidual .121142982 28 .004326535 R-squared = 0.9151
Model 1.30541141 5 .261082281 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 5, 28) = 60.34
The regression results collaborate that D.C. should not be paying such a large share of the
subsidy. D.C. is the only region that exhibits price elastic demand for 1981 to 2015, with a
significant elasticity coefficient of 1.214 (see Table 3.4.). The regression estimates that every 1%
increase in price will result in a 1.214% decline in ridership in Washington D.C. Additionally,
the D.C. regression has a negative coefficient in front of log bus ridership, indicating D.C.
residents substitute Metrobus for Metrorail. This coefficient is not significant, but these results
are what one would expect. Within the District, it is relatively easy to ride the buses instead of
the Metrorail. In the suburbs, we do not see this same Metrobus effect.
Table 3.4. D.C. Regression Results
For the Maryland Metro region, Prince George’s County and Montgomery County,
demand for Metrorail exhibits price inelasticity from 1981 to 2015. For every 1% increase in
fare, ridership is only expected to drop by .45% (see Table 3.5.). Also, there is a positive
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro Real
Fare
-1.214 0.000
Log D.C.
Population
2.266 0.000
Number of
Stations
.0432 0.000
Gas Prices Real .0266 0.142
Log Bus
Ridership
-.205 0.210
Constant -15.453 0.017

24
Total 7.60906986 33 .230577875 Root MSE = .11685
Model 7.22677321 5 1.44535464 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 5, 28) = 105.86
relationship between bus and Metrorail ridership, indicating that Maryland Metro residents might
use the bus as a complementary good instead of as a substitute good.
Table 3.5. MD Metro Regression Results
For the Virginia Metro region, we see similar results. For every 1% increase in fare, it is
expected that Metrorail ridership will decrease by .77% (see Table 3.6.). Like the Maryland
Metro suburbs, the Virginia Metro suburbs also exhibit price inelastic demand. The higher
elasticity coefficient than Maryland could be because of the higher income level in the Virginia
suburbs. It is possible Virginia residents substitute with cars more than Maryland residents do.
Additionally, Virginia also has a positive relationship between bus ridership and Metrorail
ridership, indicating complementary goods. The data suggests Maryland and Virginia residents
are more dependent on Metrorail and less sensitive to price changes. Therefore, it makes
economic sense for the subsidization formula to reflect this dependence by increasing the
financial support coming from Virginia and Maryland.
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro
Real Fare
-.450 0.163
Log MD
Metro
Population
.812 0.269
Number of
Stations
.0540 0.001
Gas Prices
Real
-.0179 0.583
Log Bus
Ridership
.279 0.250
Constant -4.269 0.690

25
Total 2.83536931 33 .085920282 Root MSE = .06478
Model 2.71786802 5 .543573604 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 5, 28) = 129.53
Table 3.6. VA Metro Regression Results
3.3. Fixed Effects
The fixed effect model controls for variations that do not change over time. Additionally,
a fixed effect model treats D.C., MD, and VA as separate panels instead of simply looking at the
Metrorail system as a whole year to year. After running a Hausman test on the data, the .0000
probability value confirms that the fixed effect model is appropriate (see Figure 3.2.).
Figure 3.2. Hausman Test.
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
= 80.45
chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
gaspricesr~l .027327 .0942566 -.0669296 .
numberofst~s .0401658 .0459631 -.0057972 .
population 8.57e-07 4.95e-08 8.07e-07 5.72e-08
logrealprice -.6663169 -1.099631 .4333142 .
fixed random Difference S.E.
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Coefficients
scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
test. Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and
being tested (4); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be proble
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (3) does not equal the number o
. hausman fixed random
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro
Real Fare
-.766 0.000
Log VA Metro
Population
.698 0.004
Number of
Stations
.0495 0.000
Gas Prices
Real
.0782 0.001
Log Bus
Ridership
.0555 0.677
Constant .999 0.786

26
Root MSE = 0.0895
R-squared = 0.9807
Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 5, 94) = 277.80
Linear regression, absorbing indicators Number of obs = 102
The fixed-effect regression estimates elasticity at .616 (see Table 3.7.), making demand
inelastic on average from 1981-2015. The fixed effect regression is absorbing regional
differences, which indicates that Metrorail could be an essential good for the Washington
Metropolitan region as a whole. Metrorail definitely provides a valuable benefit to the
Washington Metropolitan region as a whole, but the data seems to suggest it benefits some
regions more than others.
Table 3.7. Fixed Effects Absorbing Region
If another fixed effects regression is run absorbing year instead of region, price seems to
have a much larger impact on demand. By absorbing year fixed effects, the regression can
control for national or region-wide trends that could have impacted demand and prices. For
example, the drop in government subsidy that occurred in 2014. This was not an actual 2014
price change, but for government employees who were completely subsidized and now only had
a portion of their commute being covered, it felt like a large price increase. The fixed effects
regression absorbing year drops gas prices because this thesis uses average mid-Atlantic real gas
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro Real
Fare
-.616 0.000
Log Population 1.060 0.000
Log Bus
Ridership
.120 .254
Number of
Stations
.0439 0.000
Constant -4.795 0.016

27
Root MSE = 0.1286
R-squared = 0.9724
Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 3, 65) = 551.70
Linear regression, absorbing indicators Number of obs = 102
prices, which are the same in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The regression
also drops log bus ridership because bus ridership data is for the entire system, not regional
subsets. This fixed effect regression finds over the years, demand has become more elastic. On
average, for every 1 percent increase in prices, the regression predicts a corresponding 3.589
percent decline in ridership (see Table 3.8.). This large coefficient indicates that when one
controls for year, Metrorail riders are fairly sensitive to price.
Table 3.8. Fixed Effects Absorbing Year
3.4. Government Subsidy
It is possible that part of the reason there now seems to be price elasticity in the Metrorail
system is attributable to the large drop in government Metrorail subsidy that occurred in 2014
(Duggan 2015b). Much lower 2014 numbers caused by the drop in subsidy could be biasing the
estimations. WMATA Metrorail is very dependent on government riders, which was evident
during the government shutdown. These government riders are heavily subsidized, so they do not
truly feel the effect of price hikes. This indicates that the fares are too high for ordinary riders.
“Metrorail’s farebox recovery rate of 66 percent is the highest in the nation. As a result of this
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro
Real Fare
-3.589 0.000
Log Population .532 .001
Log Bus
Ridership
(dropped)
Number of
Stations
.00993 0.050
Gas Prices
Real
(dropped)
Constant 7.937 0.000

28
farebox recovery rate, fares are already too high and budgets are extremely sensitive to
corresponding dips in ridership” (Ashe 2015). Recently, the subsidy has been brought back up to
$255 (Ross 2015). “A study by Metro estimated that the system lost 6,000 daily round trips as a
result of the January 2014 cut in the transit benefit from $230 to $130” (Ross 2015). This large
drop in ridership that resulted from the increase in commuting costs for federal workers shows
demand is in fact price elastic. Furthermore, having such a large portion of riders being heavily
subsidized is problematic for unsubsidized riders. The increase in revenue that will likely
accompany the restoration of federal Metrorail benefits to previous levels will make it appear
that Metrorail is economically sound, when in reality the deficit is simply being passed off to
federal tax payers. The fares are too high, and ultimately this needs to be addressed.
3.5. Metrorail Ride Time Data
WMATA recently released its third quarter ‘Vital Signs’, and Metrorail third quarter
2015 performance was disappointing. “On-Time Performance (OTP) fell below 80 percent…the
lowest rail OTP published in Vital Signs” (“Vital Signs”). Additionally, “the minimum car
requirement was only met 10 out of 64 weekdays…Average weekday service was run with a
shortage of about 50 cars” (“Vital Signs”) As a consequence of all the Metrorail issues, “[r]ail
customer satisfaction fell to the lowest since the reporting of the measure, 67 percent, attributable
almost entirely to the reliability of the service” (“Vital Signs”). With Metrorail satisfaction so
low, it seems likely that only those with few alternatives will continue to put up with the high
prices and unreliable service. As the Washington D.C. Metropolitan area grows, Metrorail has to
serve more and more riders in order to avoid the automobile congestion that plagued Washington
D.C. in the 1950s and 1960s. To do this, WMATA Metrorail must build new suburban lines and
add new stations. This requires a massive amount of capital, which is complicated by the fact

29
that city residents end up subsidizing the Metrorail system more than their suburban
counterparts. With Washington D.C. residents paying the brunt of Metrorail costs, it is important
to determine whether District residents are realizing significant time savings with Metrorail.
According to six months of Metrorail ride time data, actual Metrorail ride times deviate
significantly from WMATA estimated ride times, indicating that the Metrorail might not be
faster than alternative modes of transportation for D.C. residents.
The Metrorail ride time data OLS regression uses percent deviation as the response
variable. Independent variables include mileage (shortest route according to Google maps), and
dummy variables like on which Metrorail line the entry station is, Morning Peak, Evening Peak,
and Weekend (see Table 3.9.). When one runs the regression comparing the independent
variables to an orange line train ride during non-peak/non weekend, the formula is:
Percent Deviation = 106.73 – 13.96(Red Line) - 58.95(Green Line) - 62.09(Green/Yellow Line)
- 29.73(Orange/Silver Line) – 56.51(Orange/Silver/Blue) - 8.52(Morning Peak) + 9.55(Evening
Peak) + 46.51(Weekend) - 5.72(Mileage Shortest Route)
All the coefficients are significant, with the exception of Red Line, Morning Peak, and Evening
Peak. As expected, the stations with more Metro lines running through them experience less
deviation between quoted and realized ride time. Also unsurprisingly, Orange line trains seem to
perform the worst in terms of on-time trains. The addition of the Silver Line to the same track
from Stadium Armory to West Falls Church seems to be detrimental to those who live on the
Orange Line. One of the most interesting aspects of the formula is the significant -5.72 in front
of Mileage Shortest Route. This negative coefficient indicates there is less deviation as the miles
traveled increases. This means suburban commuters who travel further distances will on average

30
Total 307802.281 119 2586.57379 Root MSE = 40.8
Residual 183113.539 110 1664.66854 R-squared = 0.4051
Model 124688.742 9 13854.3047 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 9, 110) = 8.32
face lesser percent deviations than commuters close to the core, the D.C. residents who are
paying higher taxes for the Metrorail. This seems to indicate that suburban residents do in fact
benefit more from Metrorail.
Table 3.9. Metrorail Ride Time Data Regression
For many suburban residents, their only options when commuting to the city are either
driving or taking the Metrorail. Because D.C. traffic is notoriously terrible, they are almost
always better off taking the Metrorail. Google map data estimated on February weekdays when
there was minimal snow (February 2nd
to February 5th
, 2016) confirms the benefits of Metrorail
for suburban commuters. When traveling into D.C. from the suburbs, or out of D.C. to the
suburbs, during peak commuting hours Metrorail is consistently faster than driving (see Figures
5.1. - 5.4. in appendix). Off peak when train service slows down, driving is usually faster for
Percent Deviation Coefficient P>t
Red Line -13.96136 0.199
Green Line -58.94761 0.015
Green/Yellow Line -62.09363 0.001
Orange/Silver Line -29.73228 0.044
Orange/Silver/Blue
Line
-56.50586 0.008
Morning Peak -8.524948 0.437
Evening Peak 9.54592 0.470
Weekend 46.50956 0.000
Mileage Shortest
Route
-5.715288 0.000
Constant 106.7284 0.000

31
suburban residents unless traveling a significant number of miles, like 29 miles from Shady
Grove to Farragut West (see Figure 5.4.). There are exceptions to this general rule. Orange line
suburban trips seem to take just as long, if not longer, than driving. A 7:15 AM trip from New
Carrolton to Farragut West was estimated at 44 minutes to drive, and 45 minutes on Metrorail
(see Figure 5.1.). At 6:19 PM, it was estimated to be a 33 minute drive and a 65 minute Metrorail
trip from Shaw-Howard Metrorail station to New Carrolton Metrorail Station (see Figure 5.2.).
For D.C. residents with the option of driving, Metrorail offers much less time savings than it
does for their suburban counterparts. A trip from Minnesota Avenue to Shaw-Howard at 9:35
AM is estimated to be a 21 minute drive but a 25 minute Metrorail trip (see Figure 5.3.). Off
peak, the time difference is even worse. Traveling from Friendship Heights to Minnesota Avenue
off peak is estimated at a 30 minute drive and a 52 minute Metrorail trip (see Figure 5.2.).
Intriguingly, although the Google Map Estimations almost always show that Metrorail will take
significantly longer than driving off peak, the true deviation might be larger if the Google
estimates are not accurate. For example, I actually made the off peak Metrorail trip from
Friendship Heights to Minnesota Avenue. Google Maps estimated the trip would take 52
minutes, or 73% longer than driving. In reality, it took 76 minutes for me to make this trip
because of train delays, 153% longer than Google Maps estimated the drive to be.

32
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, all the evidence seems to suggest that suburban commuters do benefit
more from the Metrorail than D.C. residents. With suburban residents benefitting more from
Metrorail, the subsidization formula should reflect this by decreasing the amount D.C. has to pay
every year. The very simple change of making the third weight miles of metro instead of number
of stations could correct the current imbalance. Looking at the 2005 Base Rail Formula (see
Figure 3.1.), using 2015 miles of Metrorail (because 2015 is the only year with known number of
miles in each region) instead of number of stations as the third weight would have resulted in
D.C. paying 28.9% of the subsidy instead of the 34% they paid that year. If population weighted
by density and weekly ridership are similarly distributed to 2005 this year, this miles of metro
change would result in D.C. paying $83,835,022 in subsidy, a savings of $13,122,301 compared
to the $96,957,323 it is currently projected to pay. Additionally, as Metrorail continues to
expand further and further into the suburbs, increasing the benefits for suburban commuters, this
miles of metro weight will substantially lessen the tax impact on D.C.
4.1 Possible Problems with Approach
Although this thesis concludes that D.C. residents do benefit less from the Metrorail and
should pay less of the subsidy, there could be problems with the approach that bias the
conclusion.
One possible problem resulting from WMATA’s lack of flat rate pricing is determining
how to measure price changes. As previously explained this thesis uses real maximum fare and
then multiplies by a fraction to determine average fare paid. This thesis assumes maximum fare
will be a better base for calculating average real fare paid than boarding fare. However, instead

33
of simply assuming tests should be run to confirm. If real boarding fare is used instead of real
maximum fares, the results change. Using boarding fare, the system wide average fare paid for
2015 is 1.465 times boarding fare. For D.C., it is 1.153, Virginia 1.633, and for Maryland 1.767.
When an OLS regression is run using all the same independent variables that are used in Table
3.2., almost all the coefficients are found to be insignificant, including the elasticity coefficient
(see Table 5.1. in appendix). In Table 3.2 using maximum fare as the basis, the coefficient found
is -.393 which is fairly close to the -.0071 found in Table 5.1. When most of the variables are
dropped in order to obtain a significant elasticity coefficient, the results seem to improve (see
Table 5.2. in appendix). Ultimately, the fact that so many variables have to be dropped in order
to get a significant elasticity coefficient shows that using maximum fare is preferable. Very few
riders on Metrorail are paying close to the boarding fare; the vast majority is paying close to the
maximum fare. Consequently, using maximum fare does seem to be a better measure for price
elasticity. Of course, ultimately it would have been preferable to be able to measure price
elasticity at every distance/price point, but with limited time and resources this is unfeasible.
This thesis uses boardings in each region to measure ridership, but these numbers do not
accurately reflect the benefit of Metrorail to a region because people can board in a jurisdiction
they do not live in. WMATA knows this, which is why they multiply the boardings by the
jurisdictional residence as determined by the Metrorail survey when determining the subsidy.
However, the accuracy of this measure is influenced by the precision of WMATA’s Metrorail
ridership survey. In 2007, WMATA found that 27% of Metrorail passengers lived in D.C., 40%
lived in Maryland, 29% lived in Virginia, and 4% lived elsewhere (WMATA, 2012b).
Considering that 56% of the boardings were at D.C. stations in contrast to the 27% of D.C.

34
residents using Metrorail, this shows that using boardings as the measure for jurisdictional
ridership could make Metrorail seem more valuable to the District than it is.
Another possible problem with the thesis’ approach is omitted variables. Several
variables had to be dropped because of multicollinearity, and there are conditions I would have
liked to control for that were difficult to find data for. For example, I would have liked to include
a variable that modeled driving preference, or D.C. traffic. Traffic and consumer’s preference to
drive likely has a large impact on Metrorail ridership, but the thesis regressions cannot account
for this.
Lastly, the conclusions from the Metrorail ride time data are inconclusive because I could
only use my own Metrorail rides for data. My Metrorail trips might not be representative of
Metrorail service system wide. There are certain Metrorail lines I rarely use, and areas I never
visited in the six months I collected data, which could have biased my results. Despite these
potential research issues, ultimately this thesis’ conclusion fits the conventional wisdom that the
subsidization formula does undervalue Metrorail’s benefit to the suburbs. Maryland and Virginia
pay less than their fair share.

35
APPENDIX
Figure 5.1. Google Map Estimation 1

36

37

38

39
2.38217109 33 .072187003 Root MSE = .07001
.137231961 28 .004901141 R-squared = 0.9424
2.24493913 5 .448987826 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 5, 28) = 91.61
SS df MS Number of obs = 34
Total 2.38217109 33 .072187003 Root MSE = .08077
sidual .202225968 31 .006523418 R-squared = 0.9151
Model 2.17994512 2 1.08997256 Prob > F = 0.0000
F( 2, 31) = 167.09
Table 5.1. Whole System Results Basing Fares on Boarding Fare
Table 5.2. Whole Systems Results Based on Boarding Fares (Dropped Variables)
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Metro Real
Fare (using
Boarding Fare)
-.00709 0.972
Miles of Metro .0115 0.002
Log Population
DC Metro
.0544 0.941
Log Bus
Ridership
.249 0.101
Constant 8.107 0.444
Log Metro
Ridership
Coefficient P>|t|
Log Real Metro
Fare (using
Boarding Fare)
-.461 0.003
Log Population
DC Metro
2.545 0.000
Constant -24.685 0.000

40
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