The document summarizes information from a presentation on the transport security of radioactive sources. It discusses the importance of security during transport given vulnerabilities, provides an update on training workshops being conducted by ARPANSA, and outlines requirements for developing transport security plans depending on the source category. Specific or generic security plans must be prepared, endorsed, and provided to regulators in advance of shipments of Category 1-3 radioactive sources according to regulations. The design and evaluation process for security plans is also summarized.

1. The Security in TransportThe Security in Transport
of Radioactive sources.of Radioactive sources.
ARPS 2010ARPS 2010
Peter Ellis, Senior Security Advisor,Peter Ellis, Senior Security Advisor,
APANSA Policy and Source Security UnitAPANSA Policy and Source Security Unit

2. 2
Presentation Outline
• The importance of Security in Transport
of Radioactive Material
• An update on ARPANSA’s
Transport Security Training Workshops
• Transport Security Plan Types
• Security Plan preparation

3. The importance of Security in
Transport of Radioactive Material
• Transport is potentially the most vulnerable
phase in the life cycle of a radioactive material
• Occurs in the public domain, not in a well
secured fixed facility
• If conveyance is seized, it could be used to
quickly move the material to high consequence
locations for dispersion or coercion
3

4. 4
The Many Aspects of
Transport Security
• Transport security is one of the most complex
aspects of radioactive material control
– involves multiple national authorities
– may involve multiple operators
• Transport results in multiple security interfaces
that must function seamlessly for continuous
security
This presents a challenging
situation!
4

5. Training
• ARPANSA have completed initial source
security training of users and regulators
• We are currently rolling
out a 1 Day Transport
Security Workshop for
regulators, users,
importers and transport
operators
5

6. Training Workshop for the
Security in Transport of Radioactive Sources
• The workshop will provide participants with the
practical knowledge and tools to plan and
execute cost effective risk based security for the
transport of radioactive sources in accordance
with the Code of Practice for the Security of
Radioactive Sources.
• The workshop will include the transport of
mobile sources in the normal course of
business, for example Well Logging and
Industrial radiology.
6

7. Category 1 Security Plans
RPS 11: 5.1.1(b) (i)
a Category 1 security enhanced
source, the endorsed plan is
provided to the regulatory
authority at least 7 calendar
days in advance of the
proposed date of shipment
7

8. Category 2 & 3 Security Plans
RPS 11: 5.1.1(b)(ii)
a Category 2 or 3 security enhanced source,
the endorsed plan is provided to the
regulatory authority, at least 7 calendar days
in advance of the proposed date of the
shipment or, if shipments are likely to occur on
a frequent basis, the first occasion a shipment
occurs
8

9. Category 2 & 3 Security Plans
(RPS 11) 5.1.1(b)(ii)
a Category 2 or 3 security enhanced source,
the endorsed plan is provided to the
regulatory authority, at least 7 calendar days
in advance of the proposed date of the
shipment or, if shipments are likely to occur on
a frequent basis, the first occasion a shipment
occurs
9

10. Transport Security Plan Types
Plan Type
Source Category
1
A/D≥1000
2 3
10>A/D≥1A > 100 D A < 100 D
Specific A Specific Security Plan is required
for Category 1 and large Category 2
sources. These sources are not
shipped regularly.
A Specific Security Plan is required for
any “one off” shipment of a Security
Enhanced Source, see 5.1.1(b)(ii)
Generic Not applicable for Category 1; and
large Category 2 sources do not
usually move frequently therefore
Generic Security Plans are generally
not applicable.
A Generic Security Plan should be
prepared when shipments occur on a
frequent basis, see 5.1.1(b)(ii).
For example:
 Regular changeover of short life isotopes,
e.g. Ir 192 sources for Industrial Radiography
and HDR Brachytherapy; and
 Sources regularly transported in the normal
course of business practice, e.g. Well Logging
and Industrial Radiography.
Threat
Assessment
A Specific Threat Assessment may be
required.
The current threat level should be used
unless advised otherwise

11. Transport Security Plan
Design and Evaluation Process
Define PS
Requirements
Design PS & Prepare
Security Plan
Para 5.1.1(a)
Evaluate
Security Plan
Para 5.1.1(a)
Provide Plan
to Regulator
Para 5.1.1(b)
Revise PS
and/or
Security Plan
Plan
OK?
Y
N
Implement
11

12. Any Questions?

13. Peter’s Contact Details
peter.ellis@arpansa.gov.au
02 9541 8320
0419 953 996
ARPANSA PSSU
sourcesecurity@arpansa.gov.au
Code of Practice available at:
www.arpansa.gov.au