The RoSPA OS&H Journal January 2018 17 In April 2013, the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh collapsed, a disaster that killed 1,134 garment workers and injured 2,500 more. The immediate cause of the disaster was the overloading of two (illegal) upper storeys of a weak building with 3,500 workers, thousands of industrial sewing machines and two power generators. Thin floors and the addition of too much sand to the concrete used to construct the building also contributed to the eight-storey collapse. But the soil nurturing the seeds of this disaster was the economic and political system in which the garment industry grew. The ready-made garment (RMG) industry accounts for 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s export earnings and depends on a ready supply of the cheapest labour in the world often crammed into factories which can be all too often unstable and full of fire hazards. Overwhelmingly, these factories are owned not by the brand names and retailers in western countries but by local factory owners, whose influence with the government mitigates against effective health and safety enforcement. And the fact that the industry’s workforce, approximately 3.5 million workers, is largely female and not well-educated makes it easier to dominate. On-the morning of collapse in 2013, the building was showing signs that it was unsafe but workers were bullied into entering it. There were no unions to stand up to them. Pressures on local factory owners in Bangladesh add to the problems. Not only do they struggle to compete with each other but also with RMG factories in other countries such as China. To succeed they must meet the tight prices and even tighter deadlines demanded by western brands and retailers. The firms working on the unsafe floors of Rana Plaza supplied well-known brands and retailers in Europe and the USA. These included Primark (UK), Matalan (UK), Bon Marche (UK) Mango (Spain) Joe Fish Working Life “ Major life-threatening safety concerns remain outstanding in too many factories.” (Canada) and Benetton (Italy). Given the economic importance of the ready-made garment industry to the Bangladesh economy, it is not surprising that government officials turn a blind eye as manufacturers cut corners to meet these demands. But tragically, many of those cut corners are health and safety corners. Nor are poorly made buildings the only problem. Fires are frequent and deadly. Just five months before the Rana Plaza disaster, a factory fire killed at least 111 people. In 2013, the same year as Rana Plaza, it is estimated that (largely unreported) fires in garment and textile factories killed Following the deaths of over a thousand Bangladeshi garment workers when a factory building collapsed in 2013, western retailers were forced to take action to improve health and safety. Nick Cook discusses what progress had been made. Rana Plaza revisited © I.

1. The RoSPA OS&H Journal January 2018 17
In April 2013, the Rana Plaza
building in Bangladesh collapsed, a
disaster that killed 1,134 garment
workers and injured 2,500 more. The
immediate cause of the disaster was
the overloading of two (illegal) upper
storeys of a weak building with 3,500
workers, thousands of industrial sewing
machines and two power generators.
Thin floors and the addition of too much
sand to the concrete used to construct
the building also contributed to the
eight-storey collapse.
But the soil nurturing the seeds of this
disaster was the economic and political
system in which the garment industry grew.
The ready-made garment (RMG) industry
accounts for 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s
export earnings and depends on a ready
supply of the cheapest labour in the world
often crammed into factories which can be
all too often unstable and full of fire hazards.
Overwhelmingly, these factories are owned

2. not by the brand names and retailers in
western countries but by local factory
owners, whose influence with the
government mitigates against effective
health and safety enforcement. And the fact
that the industry’s workforce, approximately
3.5 million workers, is largely female and not
well-educated makes it easier to dominate.
On-the morning of collapse in 2013, the
building was showing signs that it was
unsafe but workers were bullied into entering
it. There were no unions to stand up to them.
Pressures on local factory owners in
Bangladesh add to the problems. Not only do
they struggle to compete with each other but
also with RMG factories in other countries
such as China. To succeed they must meet
the tight prices and even tighter deadlines
demanded by western brands and retailers.
The firms working on the unsafe floors of
Rana Plaza supplied well-known brands and
retailers in Europe and the USA. These
included Primark (UK), Matalan (UK), Bon
Marche (UK) Mango (Spain) Joe Fish
Working Life
“ Major life-threatening safety
concerns remain outstanding
in too many factories.”
(Canada) and Benetton (Italy).
Given the economic importance of the
ready-made garment industry to the

3. Bangladesh economy, it is not surprising
that government officials turn a blind eye as
manufacturers cut corners to meet these
demands. But tragically, many of those cut
corners are health and safety corners.
Nor are poorly made buildings the only
problem. Fires are frequent and deadly. Just
five months before the Rana Plaza disaster, a
factory fire killed at least 111 people. In
2013, the same year as Rana Plaza, it is
estimated that (largely unreported) fires
in garment and textile factories killed
Following the deaths of over a thousand Bangladeshi garment
workers
when a factory building collapsed in 2013, western retailers
were forced
to take action to improve health and safety. Nick Cook
discusses what
progress had been made.
Rana Plaza
revisited
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January 2018 The RoSPA OS&H Journal 18
Working Life
more than 800 people.
The economic and political reality of the
RMG industry in Bangladesh led to the Rana
Plaza disaster. But is there a positive note?
Did the disaster trigger measures that have
led to fairer and safer employment for
thousands of workers? After all, the last
thing major brand names and retailers want
is the health and safety killing fields of the
Bangladesh RMG industry threatening their
collective image.
This threat to their collective image led to a
collective response to the disaster, or to put
it more accurately, two collective responses.
One of these was by brands and retailers
based mainly in Europe and was popularly

5. known as the “Accord”. Or, to give its full title
The Accord on Factory and Building Safety -
a legally binding agreement between brands
and trade unions designed to work towards a
safe and healthy Bangladeshi ready-made
garment industry. The Accord also gave
workers a voice in the form of equal garment
representation with brands and retailers on
its Steering Committee, which is chaired by
the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Originally, 40 brands and retailers signed the
Accord. By the end of the first year this had
grown to 180. As of December 2017, the
Accord has been signed by over 200 apparel
brands, retailers and importers from over 20
countries in Europe, North America, Asia and
Australia; two global trade unions; and eight
Bangladesh trade unions.
To improve working conditions and buildings
each signatory brand name and retailer
joining the Accord contributes funding
according to its volume of trade with the
Bangladesh RMG industry. Individual
contributions are capped at half a million
dollars per year (averaged over five years).
Any extra money the Steering Committee
can wheedle from government sources
supplements this income, as does
international aid distributed via the ILO.
Not all brands and retailers were keen to join
the Accord, especially those based in the US.
For American retail giant Walmart, one of the

6. sticking points was the Accord’s most
positive features - its extensive involvement
of trade union. Walmart harbours a deep
distrust of trade unions. Another sticking
point was the law. The Accord is a legally
binding contract between signatories. Any
Accord signatory shirking its obligations can
face a binding and legally enforceable
arbitral award. Many US companies were not
so keen on this degree of legal obligation, so
instead of joining the Accord these
companies started their own initiative. This
was the “Alliance”, more formally known as
The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety.
Not surprisingly, Walmart was a founder
member. Equally unsurprisingly, labour
representatives such as trade unions have no
role in governing, organising, running or
developing the policy the Alliance. Nor are
legal obligations for anywhere near as
stringent. Alliance brand names and retailers
may opt-out at any time. The only penalty
they may face is having to honour their
five-year financial promises in full. Money
provided by the Alliance is provided in the
form of loans.
The Alliance and Accord also differ in their
view as to who is responsible for health and
safety in Bangladesh factories. Both agree
that this responsibility should be shared
between western brands and retailers on one
side, and the factories and Bangladesh
Government on the other. The Accord,
“ ...the Accord has been signed

7. by over 200 apparel brands,
retailers and importers...”
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Aerial view of the collapsed eight-storey Rana Plaza building
The RoSPA OS&H Journal January 2018 19
however, believes that the main
responsibility should lie with the former
while the Alliance puts more emphasis on
the factories and government.
In some ways, however, the Alliance and

8. Accord are similar. For example, they worked
together on a common safety standard.
Both organisations carry out fire and
building inspections and worker training.
And, despite its aversion to worker/union
representation within its own organisation,
the Alliance, like the Accord, encourages
RMG industries within Bangladesh to develop
a culture of worker representation on health
and safety issues.
The Alliance covers 700 factories and
approximately 1.28 million workers,
approximately half the number of factories
and workers covered by the Accord.
Early progress
Reviewing progress after its first six months
the Alliance listed its first accomplishment
as the development of a “common standard
to guide all factory inspections”. This it
achieved in conjunction with the Accord.
Specific progress in dealing with the RMG
health and safety shortcomings included
training for managers and workers in a third
of the factories covered by the Alliance.
The Accord also reported early progress in
the year following the Rana Plaza disaster.
By June 2014, 110 Accord inspectors had
done 800 inspections. Key findings from
these inspections included: safety risks in all
areas, excessive loads on some factory
floors, the need to strengthen building

9. columns, electrical wiring needed to be
properly connected, many areas unprotected
by fire doors and smoke detectors, and fire
protected exits were lacking.
Although both the Accord and the Alliance
appeared to hit the ground running, a unified
approach under one initiative would have
been so much better. Two different initiatives
inevitably led to confusion and a lack of
focus.
Four years on
So where are we now? Four years after Rana
Plaza and less than a year away from 31 May
2018, the termination date agreed for the
initial Alliance and Accord contracts, a
statement issued by the Accord claims
“significant progress” in achieving its goal of
“a working environment in which no worker
needs to fear fires, building collapses, or
other accidents that could be prevented with
reasonable health and safety measures”.
Currently, the Accord covers 2.5 million
workers in ready-made garment factories,
and its inspectors have completed fire and
building safety inspections at 1,800 facilities
which supply more than 200 signatory
brands. Accord engineers have identified
over 118,500 fire, electrical and structural
hazards at these factories.
Nearly 80 per cent of workplace dangers
discovered in the Accord’s original round of

10. inspections have been remediated, and 500
Accord factories have completed 90 percent
or more of the necessary fixes.
The Accord Steering Committee warns,
however, that “major life-threatening safety
concerns remain outstanding in too many
factories and need to be fixed urgently”.
These include: inadequately protected fire
exits, inadequate fire alarm and fire
protection systems, and outstanding
structural retrofitting work.
The Accord has so far terminated business
with over 70 RMG companies. Reasons given
for termination are varied but failure to
implement workplace safety measures is the
most common. Terminations last for at least
18 months, after which the factory can then
reapply to be part of the Accord.
In November 2017, the Alliance announced
its fourth-year results. It now covers 785
factories and 1.4 million garment workers.
Achievements claimed to date by the
Alliance include:
85 per cent of all required factory repairs
completed (including 80 per cent of high
priority repairs)
162 no-compliant suppliers have been
suspended from the Alliance factory list
171 factories have democratically elected
safety committees

11. “ Nearly 80 per cent of
workplace dangers discovered
in the Accord’s original round
of inspections have been
remediated...”
January 2018 The RoSPA OS&H Journal 20
Working Life
groups representing workers when it was
announced in June 2017. They see the new
agreement as maintaining progress to date
and helping to ensure that factory owners
don’t slip back into their old ways. But
factory owners are clearly pining for their old
ways. They objected to the new agreement
and were backed by the Bangladesh
Government. However, following a court
hearing at the end of last year and further
discussions between brand and trade union
signatories to the Accord, the BGMEA and the
Government of Bangladesh, it was agreed
that the Accord will continue to operate past
its original deadline - until a set of “rigorous
readiness conditions” are met by local
regulatory bodies. These conditions include:
demonstrated proficiency in inspection
capacity, remediation of hazards, quick
enforcement of the law against non-
compliant factories, full transparency of
governance and remediation progress, and
investigation and fair resolution of workers’

12. safety complaints. A joint monitoring
committee (comprised of Accord brand
signatories, Accord trade union signatories,
BGMEA, ILO and government officials) will
products from Rana Plaza so that injured
workers could claim compensation.)
What next?
So where does Bangladesh ready-made
garment industry health and safety go from
here?
The Alliance had always planned to allow its
contract to expire (one suspects with a sigh
of relief) at the end of May 2018. Health and
safety in the factories it covers will be
handed over to local stakeholders, e.g.
factory owners, the Bangladesh Garment
Manufacturers and Exporters Association
(BGMEA) and the International Labour
Organization (ILO).
The Accord, on the other hand, realise there
is still much to be done. Companies and
global unions have agreed on a second
(transition) Accord on Fire and Building
Safety in Bangladesh. The agreement will
enter into effect when the current Accord
expires in May 2018.
This news was greeted enthusiastically by
“ 1.3 million workers have
access to a confidential worker
helpline”

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1.3 million workers have access to a
confidential worker helpline
1.4 million workers trained in basic fire
safety
The four-year reports from both the Accord
and the Alliance are very positive, although
to be fair there is an admission that far more

14. still needs to be done. Other stakeholder
organisations, particularly those
representing the interests of workers, are not
always so upbeat. Human Rights Watch
points to a lack of transparency. Along with
other organisations representing workers’
interests it is urging brands and retailers to
publicly disclose all sites that manufacture
their products. Knowing which factories
manufacture which brand products they buy
allows not only the supply chain but
consumers to exercise choice, for example,
by avoiding those products produced by a
manufacturer with bad health and safety
practices. (Rana Plaza starkly highlighted a
lack of transparency in the supply chain.
Investigators had to scramble through the
rubble for brand labels on clothes in order to
identify which brand names sourced their
The RoSPA OS&H Journal January 2018 21
review the progress towards meeting these
handover conditions.
The Accord secretariat and its signatories
say “the ultimate solution for Bangladesh is
effective public regulation by Bangladeshi
authorities” but add “until the goal is
achieved, the Accord that will continue, in
cooperation with the Bangladeshi
authorities, its inspection, remediation,
safety committee training programmes, and
complaints mechanism to achieve its goal of

15. a safe and sustainable garment industry in
Bangladesh.”
All companies sourcing from Bangladesh are
being urged to sign the renewed Accord and
work towards a “collective goal of safe and
sustainable RMG and related industries”.
So far, only around 50 have.
Main measures included
in the Accord agreement
Safety inspections, remediation and
fire safety training at facilities.
Appropriately qualified and
independent inspectors to do
inspections.
Publicly disclosed inspection reports.
Factories responsible for remedial
work identified by the inspector.
Workers given right to refuse to enter
buildings they reasonably suspect to
be unsafe. There will be no redress
from their employers.
Training in fire and building safety for
workers, managers and security staff.
Factory health and safety committees
with 50% of committee being workers
and trade unions can be represented.

16. Complaints process.
Legally binding requirement on
supplier to undertake remedial action
required by national law.
Key new elements of the
2018 (Transition) Accord
include:
Safety committee and safety training
in all covered factories.
Training and complaints protocol to
cover Freedom of Association (FoA)
protections in relation to workers
protecting their own safety under the
scope of the Transition Accord.
Workers’ severance payments in
Accord related factory closures and
relocations.
Potential, voluntary expansion of
scope to related industries.
Transition of Accord functions to a
national regulatory body when such
body is ready.
Release of brand responsibility for
inactive factories after 18 months.
Conditional possibility for signatories

17. who stop sourcing from Bangladesh to
terminate agreement.
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