The Dissertation (COMPLETE)

Daniel Bassilios 11000878
i
The background to the outbreak of the First World War
An assessment of the developments in the European political,
social and economic environment which contributed to the
onset of World War I
Daniel Bassilios – 2014
A special study submitted at Liverpool Hope University in part
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of BA Combined
Honours in Politics.
This dissertation is the original work of the candidate and has not
been submitted previously as part of any qualification or course
Signed: __ ___ ____
Dated: ____ _____

ii
Abstract
My personal gratitude tothe multitude of academicsandscholars,whose workinseveraldifferent
disciplineshasgreatlycontributedtomythesis,aswell asLiverpool Hope University’shistoryand
politicsdepartmentfortheirsupportduringthe pastthree academicyears.
The originsand causesof the First WorldWar remainan area of intense scrutinyandfascination
withinvariousacademicdisciplinessince itsoutbreakone hundred yearsago.Explanationsand
augmentscomprise the basisof vastquantitiesof discourses,rangingfromblockbusterfilmsto
satirical sketches,andwhiledebatescontinuesodoesthe war’simpacton the contemporaryworld,
followingonfromthe severe consequencesithadonthe worldduringthe previouscentury.Ihave
conducteda thesiswhichwill presentananalysisandevaluationof the numerousdifferentfeatures
of Europe’spolitical,social andeconomiclandscape whichconditionedthe outbreakof the First
WorldWar. Thiswill be examinedthroughthe use of avarietyof differentsourcesfrom
contemporaryscholars’booksandjournal articlesandoriginal publicationsbypolicymakersand
influential personsorgroups.Additionally,graphical materialandbroadquotationswill be addedto
an appendix.Thisworkwillprimarilybe concernedwithhow the belligerentsof Europe developed
throughoutthe nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesandhow andwhythese developments
createdthe atmosphere whichfavouredconflictamongststates.Three of the mostinfluential
componentsinthe builduptoWorld War I will be examined;the structure of the international
political environment,the domesticsocial andpolitical characteristicsandbothdomesticeconomics
and the international political economy.Whencombined,these environmental facetspresenta
clearmechanisminsupportof the build-upof the hostilitywhichestablisheditself acrossnations
and eruptedrapidlyinthe summerof 1914.

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Table of Contents
Introduction: 1-3
Chapter 1:
The background to the international political environment between 1815-1914:4-13
Chapter 2:
The context of the internal social dynamics of states between 1815-1914:14-24
Chapter 3:
The background to the European economic environment between 1815-1914:25-33
Conclusion: 34-35
Bibliography: 36-41
Appendix: 42-53

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Introduction
‘All the evidence goestoshowthatthe beginningof thiscrisis, whichhasbeenstudiedsolargely
witha viewtodiscoveringanddistributinghumanresponsibility,wasone of those momentsin
historywheneventspassedbeyondmen'scontrol.Noone governmentwasprimarilyresponsible for
the turn of events.’1
Expressed byinternational historian SirFrancisHarry Hinsley,thisperspective
on responsibilityassignsthe blame notonone manor one state but onthe unrelentingsequence of
eventswhichtookfive weekstobringall the majorpowersintoconflict.Governments were
conditionedtorespondtotheiranxietiesbasedlargelyonthe structures,identitiesandnormsthey
representeddomesticallyandoperatedwithinaspartof the Europeancommunity.Itisthe
combinationof the international anddomesticEuropeancivilizational background whichdeveloped
overseveral decadespreceding1914 whichwill be examinedinthisthesis.If the primaryblame rests
not withthe state leadersorthe legislative governments,thenthe granderenvironmentand
systemicconditionsbecome the focusof analysis.The principal areastobe discussedinthe
followingchapterswillbe the frameworkof the internationalpolitical system, the evolvingEuropean
social dynamicsandthe economicconditionsandtheirimplicationsonstate’sforeign policiesand
the international politicsof the period1815-1914, witha greaterfocuson conditionsbetween1870
and 1914.
The originsof the FirstWorldWar begantotake shape inthe aftermathof Napoleon’sdefeatinthe
earlynineteenthcentury;resolutionsandconditionsforthe Europeancommunity’sfuture were thus
laidoutat Viennese Concertof Europe in1815. The international political environmentwasnotto
remainboundedbythe concert’sprinciplesthroughoutthe centuryasthe territorial borders
changedtogetherwiththe balance of power,spawningalliancesamongstthe greatpowersandthe
1 Hinsley,F. H. "International Relations in theTwentieth Century." In Power and the Pursuitof Peace: Theory
and Practicein the History of Relations between States, 296.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1963.

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subsequenttacticsandmethodsfordecisive militarystrikesagainsteachother.2
The culture of
militarismhadpermeatedthe Europeanlandscapethroughout the nineteenthcenturyandbeganto
ingratiate itselfasa central componenttothe state,a conceptthat producedor was producedby a
strongspiritof patriotismandnationalism.Thesecomplex feelingsalsocontributedtothe rise of
separatismandstimulatedthe independencemovementsinSouthEastEurope,not disregardingthe
Bosnian-SerbGavriloPrincipewhose assassinationof the AustrianheirFranzFerdinandinitiatedthe
outbreakof the Great War. Risingclassinequalitiesanda yearningforgreaterpolitical
enfranchisementdevelopedintoepisodesof civilunrestwithinstates,agrowingsupportfor
socialismandthreatstothe reigningestablishment.Finally,the economicdevelopmentsinEurope
had createda systemof globalisationandintegration whichwouldsee continuousincreasesin
prosperity,broughtaboutthroughwidespreadindustrialisation,relaxationsintrade restrictionsand
Europe’sdominationoverthe world’sresources.Domesticinequalities whichspurredmuchof the
internal civil unrestwereexacerbatedbyshiftsinthe economicstructure,whichlikewise affected
inequalitiesamongststatesanddevelopedintocompetitive imperial rivalryandrenewal of effective
protectionistmechanisms.
Thisthesiswill notassignblame orassert a claimon the outbreakof the FirstWorld War from any
perspective.The aimof thispaperisto presentan evaluationof several of the circumstancesthat
developed duringthe preceding centurywhichcreatedanatmosphere in1914 where general War
amongstthe statesand empiresof Europe wasa feasible andlikelyoccurrence.Several arguments
whichassignresponsibilitytostatesandtheirgovernmentspersistoverthe yearsthe topichas
captivatedthe attentionof researchers,3
inadditiontoargumentswhichdeclarethatresponsibility
cannot be restedonstatesbut onsocietyandstructure.These argumentsall have theirclout and
are supportedbycomprehensiveandrelevantevidence andanalysis.Mystudywill examine the
2 Stoessinger, John. "The Iron Dice: World War I." In Why Nations go to War (11th Edition),16-17. Boston:
Wadsworth-Cengage Learning, 2011.
3 BBC News Magazine."World War One: 10 interpretations of who started WW1." http://www.bbc.co.uk.
February 12,2014.

3
correlatingsocietal andstructural dispositions thenwill concludewithanoverview andan
integrationof the three chapter’sanalyses.Whilemuchof the contentwhichwill be assessedis
persistentin the narrative concerningthe originsof the FirstWorldWar, there are several facets
whichwill notbe examineddue tothe impracticalityof researchingandanalysingall components
relatedtothisvast topic.Amongthese missedargumentsisthatconcerningthe convictionwithin
militarybodiesthatwarwouldproduce arapidand decisive victoryasthe offensivecapabilitiesof
armieswere consideredfarsuperiortodefence mechanisms.The preconceivednotionsof warfare
gave rise to ‘the cultof the offensive’whichwasindoctrinatedinthe preparationsandwarplansof
the great powers.4
Asa final introductory point,political science researchutilizesseveral approaches
inexaminingaseriesof events;because of itsmulti-disciplinarynature Ihave precededtowardsan
analysisof three chapterswiththree differentcore categoriesbut whichall relate toone anotherin
a political fusion.
4 Evera, Stephen Van. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the FirstWorld War."International Security,
1984: 58-107.

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Chapter 1: The background to the international political
environment between 1815-1914.
Thischapter will serve toassesshowandwhychangesinthe international systemconditionedthe
outbreakof WorldWar I. The alterationsin balance of powerandgeographicstate structures
constitute the evidence of systemiclevel change duringthe course of a century;suchchangesare a
continuousfacetof internationalrelationsandsubsistas amajor elementinexplainingthe decisions
made by Europe’sstatesandtheirleaders.The centurypriortothe outbreakof war in 1914 had
seenthe establishmentof asystemof international relationsinEurope whichoriginated following
the eighteenth century’s radical philosophical advocacies,the Frenchrevolutionandthe Napoleonic
wars.A precursorto the League of Nationswasthe structure constructedfollowingthe French
defeatin1815. The blueprintsforrelative peace amongstthe statesof Europe were laidoutin
Vienna. One power,GreatBritainabove all emergedasthe dominantforce withitsterritoryintact
and itssubstantial naval supremacyrecognised.The extentof the damage causedtothe continent
duringa periodof continuouswarreflectedBritain’ssupersedingcloutoverthe Europeanmainland
and emphasisedthe importance of maintainingchecksandbalancestothe powerof the four victors
and the re-constitutedFrenchKingdom.Thispresentedamajor developmentininternational
relations;the nextmajorpivotwould notmaterialize until the endof the FirstWorldWar.Like the
GermanEmpire a centurylater,Napoleonhadattemptedtouniformlyconstitute Europe underthe
dominionof post-revolutionaryFrance.A continentdescribedbydelegatesatViennaasconsistingof
‘ancientcities…,the variousstatesfromwhichitiscomposed,were principallyformedfrom the
wrecksof the RomanEmpire.’5
The nineteenthcentury wouldpermanentlyerodethe entitiesand
boundariesEuropeanshadlivedwithinfornumerousgenerations asthe nationstate took form
across the continentwiththe mostnotable transformationinterritorialboundariesoccurringinthe
5 Pradt, M (Dominique Georges Frédéric). "The Congress of Vienna (1816)." 65-66. Philadelphia:Kessinger
Publishing,1816.

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formof Germanand Italianunificationandthe decline of Ottomancontrol inthe Balkans.67
Imperialismwouldsubsequently extendastate’sterritorybeyondthe European continent;itwould
connote andreflect prestige,poweranda growingsense of territorialrivalry inaglobal environment
of zero-sumgains.The revolutionary industrialisation processwithinEurope’sdomesticeconomies
extendedthe state’scapacitytobuildupitsmilitaryandtechnological capabilities andmoreoverits
formidable control overits native subjects andthose of dissimilarethnicitiesinmaritimeand
continental empires. The nineteenthcenturytherefore served asaperiodof radical change in
international relations,particularly asthe fracturedstructurespeoplelivedwithinbecameredefined
intonationstates and consequently restructuredthe balance of powerbetweenthe ascending,
formalisedpolitical entities.WorldWarI broughtaboutthe collapse of the evolutionalterritorial
changes,andthe Europeanmapfollowingthe wardisplaysgreattransformationsinthe wake of the
capitulationof fourmajordynastieswhohadexercisedcontrol overvastterritoriesand
populations.8
The long termbuildupto the FirstWorld War and the directaltercations betweenthe greatpowers
inthe summerof 1914 followed manyof the themesbehindthe realistnarrativeininternational
politics.The anarchic,self-helpandegoisticnature of politicsamongnationsisthe conclusive norm
inan environmentof unevenpowerand defacto sovereignty.HansMorgenthauregardsstabilityas
beingdependentonacertaindegree of equilibriuminthe balance of powerbetweenthe prominent
statesengagedininternational politics.9
The inabilitytomaintainthe equilibriumcontributedto
nationscontestingforglobal hegemony,drawing the internationaliststatesof Europe intoconflict.
The powerstructuresevolvedoverthe course of acenturywhichbeganwitha clearlydefined
6 Boston College. "Europe after the Congress of Vienna, 1815." https://www2.bc.edu/. See Appendix A for
European Map of 1815.
7 London Geographical Institute."London Geographical Institute_The Peoples Atlas_1920:Europe at the
Outbreak-of War." http://www.hipkiss.org/. 1920. See Appendix B for the European Map of 1914.
8 Ibid^.See appendix C for the European Map of 1919.
9 Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Balanceof Power." In PoliticsAmong Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace,
179-181.New York: McGraw-Hill,1948.

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hegemonicpowerinthe decadesfollowingNapoleon’sdefeat.Britishsupremacy,althoughrelative
was unequalledworldwidein1815. Thisdegree of powerforBritainconditionedthe state topioneer
advancesinitsown economicandmilitarycapabilitiesandtomaintainanedge overthe restof the
world.KennethWaltzarguesthatuni-polarityishoweverashortlivedphenomenonaschallengesto
a state’sdominationarisesinthe formof lesserpowers withhegemonicpotential aimingtoshiftthe
balance intheirfavour.Furthermore the systemisimbalancedwherebyone state dominatesandthe
hegemonicpower,although powerfulisnotunbounded because itspowerdoesn’texcel thatof all
otherscombined.10
The evolutionof powerdynamics inEurope’sincreasinglywell-structurednation
statesthroughoutthe latterhalf of the centuryestablishedamulti-polarworldinthe runup to
1914; challenges toBritishhegemonyalsoemergedmore prominentlyasimperial developments
acceleratedwiththe colonisation of Africaandmuchof Asia.This system, describedbyrealismas
the most unstable became the customintothe twentieth century.While hegemony oftenconnotes
stability,itwouldbecomeintenselychallenged followingthe nineteenthcentury’snumerous
political changes. Relative stabilitysustaineduntil 1914 inpart owingto the strengthof diplomacyin
a periodfundamentallydifferentfromthe characteristicsof the previouscenturies.Statesmen
containedvariousregionalconflicts, the revolutionsof the mid-nineteenthcenturyand prominent
imperial rivalry,althoughthesedangerstostabilitywere pronounced,theybecame managedand
contained effectivelythroughdiplomaticefforts11
.Diplomacywasthe force guidingthe greatpowers
throughthe periodbetweenFranzFerdinand’sassassinationandthe Britishdeclarationof war,as
the German diplomatandambassadortoBritain Karl Max, Prince Lichnowskydescribesinhis
memoirs,‘attemptsatmediation,collaborationamongststatesmentoensure ‘the localisationof the
conflict’.12
10 Waltz,Kenneth. In Realismand International Politics ,213-214.New York: Routledge, 2008.
11 Schroeder, Paul W."The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure." World Politics,1986:
2-4.
12 Karl Max,PrinceLichnowsky."My Mission to London, 1912-1914."London: Cassell & Co,May 1918

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The incidentatFashodain 1898 betweenBritainandFrance demonstratesthe restrainingforces on
the great powerswhenfacedwiththe possibilityof war.Negotiationsandcompromise of two
traditional enemiesprevailedinthe formof establishingspheresof influence.WinstonChurchill
describesthe easingof tensionsasanunforeseenoccurrence;‘Thisstupendouspartitionof half a
continentbytwoEuropeanPowerscouldscarcelybe expectedtoexcite the enthusiasmof the
rest’13
.Inadditiontodiplomaticmerit,the easingof tensionsbetweentraditionalenemiesalso
demonstratesagesture of clemencyandcruciallyanaccurate realisationof the multi-polar
Europeanstructure.Britain’spolicyof relative isolation inEuropeanaffairs came toan endwiththe
enforcementof the Triple Entente,where aonce hegemonicpowerconsolidatedanalliance withits
imperial rivals.The solidifyingof the alliance betweenBritain,France andRussiacame aboutat a
periodof foreignpolicydifficultiesorcrisesforall three statesas the future of peaceful co-existence
became evermore uncertain14
.Britishauthoritywascriticallychallengedbythe BoersinSouth
Africa;France underwentchallengestoitsrule inMorocco byGerman interventionandRussia’s
defeattoJapanin 1905 followedonbyinternal revolutionarymovementsheightenedthe anxiety
surroundingtheiroverseasauthority. The rivalryandtensionsof the pastbetweenthe threewould
be allieshadgivenwaytoa mutual abilitytocontrol andmanage one another’sinterestsinattempts
to consolidate powerratherthanengage inany foreignprogrammes whichcouldbe deemed
reckless.Allianceswere,inpractice typicallyconservative andattimescharacterisedbyinstabilityas
a resultof state interestsoftenoverrulingallianceagreementsandmisunderstandingsbetween
state officials.15
BritainwhileinalliancewithFrance andRussiahaddeclaredwaruponthe violation
of Belgianneutrality,while the Germanpresence inBelgiumpresentedagreaterriskthanan attack
on France throughAlsace-Lorraine,the Britishgovernment amongstthose acrossthe continentwere
13 Churchill,Winston S."Chapter XVII: 'The Fashoda Incident'."In The River War:An Account of the Reconquest
of the Sudan, 239. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902.
14 Felix Gilbert,David Clay Large. In The End of the European Era, 1890-Present (Sixth Edition), 90-93.New
York: W.W Norton and Co, 2009.
15 Hinsley,Francis Harry (ed.)."Great Britain and France(1911-1914)."In British Foreign Policy Under Sir
Edward Grey, by ColeraineK. A. Hamilton, 324-325.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1977.

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alsounderdomesticpoliticalandeconomicpressureswhichwill be examinedlaterhowevertreaty
obligationsproducedthe administration’sexteriorjustifications.
The importance of alliancesinaneverchanginginternational environmentwas laidoutbyGerman
chancellorOttoVonBismarck.The newGermanstate unifiedunderthe directionof the Prussian
statesmanwishedtopreserve andprotectitsintegrityfromwhatBismarckviewedasa hostile
environment.‘Nobodywishestobe a minority…try tobe one of three,as longas the worldis
governedbythe unstable equilibriumof five greatpowers’.16
Bismarck’seffortstoengage the newly
formedGermanEmpire intoallianceswithRussiaandAustriaeffectivelyguaranteedthe continual
existence of the Germanstate.The chancellorincessantlymanoeuvredtosecure the alliance
believingthatthe immobilisationof Russiawill henceforthisolate France andincrease the
probabilityforGermanytoco-existwithitssovereigntysecured.17
The Franco-Prussian war
redefinedthe powerstructuresof continental Europe asthe preeminentpowerFrance wasdefeated
innine monthsandthe Germanstatesunifiedasasingle entityunderPrussianauthority.Germany
soughtto consolidate itsnewfoundpositionamongstthe GreatPowersof Europe yetremained
concerned withaclear and frequentlypresent securitydilemma.While imperial andhegemonic
ambitionswere aconsistentrecurrence throughoutthe GermanEmpire’sdevelopment.The
continual existence of peace amongstthe greatpowerstateswasdependantonsupressing
excessiveandruthless foreignpolicy agendas.ThisdilemmawasalsopresenttoBismarckinthe
unstable characteristicsof alliances,whichoftenshowedbetweenthe Frenchandthe British
followingthe Entente inthe runupto war.18
While favouringanalliance withRussia,Bismarcknoted
that ‘GermanywouldwithregardstoRussiabe in an unequal positionbecauseof the geographic
16 Saburov, Peter Alexandrovich.In The Saburov Memoirs: Or Bismarck & Russia: Being fresh Light on the
League of the Three Emerors 1881,111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1929.
17 Bismarck,Otto Fürst von. "The Second Volume." In Bismarck,the man and the statesman; being the
reflections and reminiscences of Otto, Princevon Bismarck,251-258.New York: Harper & brothers, 1898
18 Lloyd George, David.In The War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 47. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1933.See appendix D for French ambassador Paul Cambon’s remarks on Britain duringtense moments in
Summer 1914.

9
situationandthe autocraticconstitutionof Russia.’ 19
Germanforeignpolicy alterationsfollowing
Bismarck’sdismissal pavedthe wayforGermanyto become everdistantfromRussiaandgreatly
entangledinthe affairsof itsclosestally,Austria-Hungary.The Hapsburgmonarchy suffereddefeat
to the Prussiansin1866 andits powererodedfurtherbyencirclementfroma newly unified
Germany,a hostile Russianempire andeverincreasingvolatilityinthe Balkans.Inessentialsthe
rivalrybecame unviableforAustriaasthe Prussianstate consumedthe entire German
confederation.20
The alterationsingeopoliticsduringthe secondhalf of the nineteenthcenturywereaspronounced
as, and ran inparallel with the changesinthe structure of the balance of power.The political map’s
changeshad itssignificance onthe arrangementof alliancesandthe Europeanpowerstructures,
albeitindirectly.Germanyalthoughrapidlyindustrialisingandexertingitsinfluence andprestigein
the form of a colonial empire was physically encircledbyFrance andRussia,and wouldnot
compromise itsposition inthe Europeanbalance of powerinthe same manneras Austria-Hungary.
The attentionof the dual-monarchyshiftedinresponsetoitslimitedpowerincentral Europe to
contestdominationof the Balkans,21
aswell asthe response of the decliningauthority of the
OttomanEmpire whichhadcontrolledthe regionforoverthree centuries.LordSalisbury
distinguishedthe globalpowerstructuresatthe turn of the centuryas consistingof ‘Livinganddying
nations’22
.The Britishhaddistinguishedtheirnationas lively,active andhealthyduringthisperiodin
the form of the acquisitionof newterritoriesandthe recognitiontheyreceive fromthe greater
international community.The OttomanEmpire representedapowerinturmoil andfragmentationas
the territory contractedinface of separatismand whose territorial declinewasthe primary
19 Bismarck,Otto Furst Von. "The Second Volume." In Bismarck,the man and the statesman; being the
reflections and reminiscences of Otto, Princevon Bismarck,247-249.
20 Schroeder, Paul W."The Lost Intermediaries:The Impact of 1870 on the European System." The
International History Review, 1984:12,17
21 Demeter, Gabor. "Count Andrassy and the Attitude of Austria-Hungary duringthe Great Eastern Crisis1875-
1879." http://www.academia.edu/. 2014
22 Daily Mail and Empire."The Livingand Dying Nations."The Mail and Empire, May 21, 1898: 5

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contributorto the alterationsinthe political mapof South-EasternEurope.BothAustria-Hungary
and Russia;the statesseekingtoenhance theirinfluence inthe regionhadseentheirpowerchecked
throughmilitarydefeatinCrimeaandCentral Europe andwere attemptingtoresuscitate their
authoritybysucceedingthe OttomanEmpire asthe preeminentpowerinthe Balkans. The condition
of a state,whetherlivingordyingismostindicative basedonthe changesinthe political map. War
constitutesthe primarycause of these changes,especiallyinthe contextbeingexamined,
furthermore inconjunction,the internationalsystemrendersastate powerful orimpotentbasedon
the outcome that conflictsproduce. Acquisition of territorybecame aprimaryGermanwaraim as
statedby ChancellorBethmann-HollweginSeptember1914, callingforthe annexationof various
portionsof the neighbouringstatesandGermancolonial expansionin Africa,supersedingthe
dominationof the continentbythe Frenchandthe British.23
The Europeanalliance systemshingedonthe continuationof Franco-Germanenmityandthe
competinginterestsof RussiaandAustria-Hungary.Loose alignments andformerrivalries of a
reconcilable disposition hadbecome rigidplatformsformutual supportby1914 owingto this
persistence of the statusquo.War plansandstrategiesbecame animportantfabricationinthe
entire contextof WorldWar I and the greatpower’splansdependedsignificantlyontheiralliances
as well astheirgeographicpositionsandtheirterritorial ambitions.Franco-Britishco-operation
cementedplansformilitaryco-operationonlandandat sea andthe formeralsosetoutplanswith
Russiafor militaryco-operationagainstGermany.24
France’spreoccupationwithAlsace-Lorraine
servedasits primarymotive foritsplanXVIIanditshistorical grievanceswithGermanycentredon
the restorationof Frenchterritory. Where the Frenchpolicywasdirectedtowardsattack,itsRussian
partnerinitiallyupheldapolicyof defence alongafrontopposingGermany,Austria-Hungaryand
potentially the OttomanEmpire,Russia’sconcurrentadversary. The Militaryconventionof 1892
23 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von. September programof Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg.
Berlin,September 9, 1914
24 Stevenson, David."The FirstWorld War and International Politics."22.Oxford : Oxford University Press,
1988

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exemplifiedboththe defensive nature of the initial alliance aswell asthe explicitantagonismfelt
betweenthe opposingcoalitions of European powers.25
Howeverthe Russian’swere gradually
coercedby France as well as by itsobligationstothe Slavicpopulationof the Balkanstotake a more
offensive approachandattackEast PrussiaandGalicia.The efficiencyandspeedof Russian
mobilizationwouldbecome amajorinstigatorof war, as the Frenchand the German’sco-ordinated
theirarmiesinparallel withthe Russians.26
The alliance of France andRussiarepresentsanevolving
and progressive relationshipbetween the twostates,withgrowinginclinationsforstrongmilitary
cooperationfollowedinaccordance with the continuationandexacerbation of the hostile political
environment.Furthermore,theirshare of worldpowerandtheirintegral state structureshingedon
militarysuccess.FreshinRussianmemorywasthe militarydefeattoJapan whichadverselyaffected
itspowerstatusand the integrityof the Russianautarky.
Thissection will nowexclusivelyexaminethe GermanwarplansdevisedfollowingBismarck’sdeath
and the inabilitytorenewthe adhesionwithRussiathatthe Prussianstatesmanhadaimedto
achieve.AlfredVonSchlieffenstrategicallyenvelopedthe inflexible planfor aquickvictoryina short
war that wouldbearhisname27
,comingintofruitionasGermangeneralshadbeguntoaccept a two
frontwar as the inevitable predicamentof the GermanReich. While all majorpowershaddevised
war plans,Schlieffen’ssuccessor vonMoltke conductedadecree in1912 along withWilhelmIIand
the naval cabinetthat war,soonerrather thanlaterwouldbe mostfavourable toGermany,thatthe
continuingBalkancrisisshouldbe metwithAustro-Hungarianforce andthatupon becoming
belligerent,France andRussiashouldbe made toappearoffensivelyhostile tojustifythe twofront
Germanattack.28
An eighteenmonthwindow of opportunitytostrike atthe surroundinghostile
camps of France andRussiabecame the fixatedpositionof the Germanstate as the geographic
25 World War I Document Archive. "World War I: The Franco-Russian AllianceMilitary Convention."
http://www.gwpda.org/. February 5, 1996.
26 Turner, L. C. F. "The Russian Mobilization in 1914."Journal of Contemporary History, 1968:65-69
27 Keegan, John. In The FirstWorld War,30-32.London: Hutchinson,1998
28 Müller,Georg Alexander von. "Admiral Von Muller and the Approach to War."The Historical Journal;Vol 4,
1969: 661

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situationandthe balance of powerrenderedGermanycapable onlyof manoeuvringata specific
time andin a specificmanner.The theorywassharedbyhighrankingcommanderssuchas Erich
Ludendorff,‘inourunfavourable military-political position,inthe centre of Europe,surroundedby
enemies,we hadtoreckonwithfoesgreatlysuperiorinnumbersandprepare ourselves
accordingly…Russiapressedforwarandcontinuallyincreasedherarmy…inFrance the thoughtof
revenge hadrevivedwithrenewedvigour.’29
The unifiedGermanyhadmeticulouslypreparedfor
war and weighedupthe costsandbenefitsof itsplansforseveral yearspriortothe summerof 1914.
AcrossEurope the reluctance byall powerstodisengage duringthe initial mobilizationrepresentthe
extensive vigilance thathadbeenbuiltupoverseveral decades.
The structure of states,powerandthe international systemsupportedthe initiativesthatwouldlead
to war aftera periodof a centurywherebythe arrangementof the states andentities withinthe
systemhadbeenrestructured considerablysince the deliberationsof Vienna.Thoughstatessuchas
Britainsawlittle change intheirinternational agenda formuchof the nineteenthcentury,the
continental boundaries werereshapedandthe balance of poweralteredsignificantly.Inperiods
withan absence of interstate conflict,the spreadof imperialdevelopmentprovidedadditional
vigourinthe reshapingof the balance of powerand alliances.Pronouncedrivalrybetween
conflictingstatesand empires bothwithstoodandinvigoratedor gave wayto formidable alliancesin
the effortto consolidate peace andfendoff more potentchallenges.The persistence of diplomacy,
while gatheringcloutduringthe nineteenthcenturywasemployedbyvariousstatesinsummer1914
onlyto fail inbringingaboutdemobilization,aggravatedbyconstructedmutual mistrustand
incompatibleinterests.30
Finally,stateswouldbegintodemonstrate cohesionintheirforeignpolicy
and theirmilitarytacticsinthe run upto hostilities.The dilemmasurroundingsecurityandpower,
frequentlythe theme of international relationstheoriesconcernedthe greatpowers of Europe
29 Ludendorff, Erich. In Ludendorff's own story, August 1914-November 1918 , 28-29. New York: Harper, 1919
30 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter."1914 – the failureof and need for diplomacy."http://www.london.diplo.de/.
January 28, 2014

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radicallyjuxtaposingwithaperiodwhere theyexperienced relative peace and growingprosperity.
Bismarckrecognizedthatthe stabilityonthe surface wasmarredby intransigence andinsecurity,
likeningEurope asa powderkegand complacentstatesmencontinually‘smokinginanarsenal’31
.
The continent’splace atthe heart of international politicsanditspositionasthe bedrock of the
global balance of powerwoulddiminishandfail torecoverthroughoutthe twentiethcentury asa
consequence of the FirstWorldWar.
31 Glenny, Misha.In The Balkans 1804–1999:Nationalism,War and the Great Powers , 243. London: Granta
Books, 1999

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Chapter 2: The context of the internal social dynamics of states
between 1815-1914.
Domesticlevel developmentandelementsof continuitywithinindividual stateswill be examined
and assessedinthischapterasfundamental componentsinthe originsandcausesof the FirstWorld
War. The focuswill centre onnationalism, state culture,identityandnormsandthe meansinwhich
these characteristicsdevelopedinnumeroussocieties,particularlyinCentral andEasternEurope.In
discordwiththe rigidsystemicstructures,the themesbeingdiscussedhave strongsocial dimensions
and thusare more arbitraryand fluidinnature,therefore difficulttoaccuratelycategorise and
theorise.The social constructivistelementstothese themesare mostpronounced, asdescribedby
BenedictAnderson; ‘statesare animaginedandlimitedpolitical communityintermsof size and
sovereignty.’32
The developmentof similarcharacteristicsamongstsocietiescanaidthe construction
of a state or inverselythe formalisedstate caninturn constructthe societyforits citizens.Political
principlesenhance the state’slegitimacyandstate buildersactas archetypal figureswhich
reinforcesthe nationalistsentiments.Citizensbecome boundedbythe state’svaluesandculture
and alsoby the state institutionsanditsestablishedabilitytoenforce law andorder33
. Amongst
these recurringdistinctionsisalsothe constructionof territorialboundariesbasedaroundan
oppositiontodifferencesamongstpeople’sidentitiesandnorms,chieflylanguages,religionsand
ethnicities.The Europeanmap’sevolutionoverthe course of the centuryillustratessignificant
alterationsinthe social dynamicsof the Europeanpeople,andthe waritself producedapatchwork
of smallernationsarisingfromdynasticcollapsesinCentral andEasternEurope.34
BritainandFrance
while experiencingnegligible territorial change experiencedacertaindegree of transformation
32
Anderson, Benedict. In Imagined Communities, 5-7. London: Verso, 1991.
33
Geller, Ernest. In Nations and Nationalism,1-7.New York: Cornell University Press,1983
34 See appendices A and B

15
withintheirdomesticlevel characteristicsalthoughnotasprominentasthe alterationsinotherparts
of the continent.France’snationalidentityarose outof itsrevolution,inspite of defeatand
monarchicrestoration,the principlesof revolutionaryFrance remainedapotentmechanismfor
social change whichwouldalterEuropeansocial identityof the followingcentury.
Serbia’sinitialstrike againstthe Austro-Hungarianthrone wouldeventuallytranscendintothe First
WorldWar. The apparentmotive of GavriloPrincipe wastodestabilisethe HabsburgMonarchy’s
control of the Slavicpeople throughviolentintimidation,causingrebellionamongstgroupsaimingto
forman all Slavicstate,Yugoslavia.Principeoperatedwithinapan-Slavicgroup,the BlackHandas a
studentwithresolute grievancestowardsthe Hapsburgmonarchy.Principe’sorganisationendorsed
theirmotivesunderthe maxim‘unificationordeath’andpurposefullygave the ‘prioritytothe
revolutionarystruggle ratherthantorelyon cultural striving.’35
The oathtakenbyPrincipe andall
members demandedthatthey’ll onlyactinaccordance withthe BlackHand’s principles orface the
brutal deathpenalty,36
thusPrincipe’smotivesmirroredthatof the Black Hand,as he exclaimedat
histrial.‘The mainmotive whichguidedme inmydeedwas:the avengingof the Serbianpeople....I
am a nationalist.Iaimedtofree the Yugoslavs,forIam a Yugoslav.’37
The defiantnationalist
passionsof Principe’s testimony suggestedSerbiagrievance withitsoppressive neighbour,however
thistestamentcame incontrast to the Serbianresponse tothe Austro-Hungarianultimatumof July
1914. Uncharacteristicof the defiantnationalistsentimentsthatdrove Principeandthe BlackHand
to Sarajevo,the Serbiangovernmentaccepteddemandswhichwouldsignifythe state’simpotence
inthe wake of pressure fromits apparentoppressor.Forexample ‘The [Austro-Hungarian]
governmentexpectedtobe invitedtocooperate inthe investigationof the crime,anditwasready,
inorder to prove itscomplete correctness,toproceedagainstall personsinregardtowhomit would
35 Pozzi, Henri. "War is Coming Again." In Black Hand Over Europe, 268-273.London: The Francis Mott Co,
1935.
36 Ibid^.See appendix E for the Black Hand’s oath of allegiance.
37 Princip,Gavrilo (translation and editingby W.A. Dolph Owings,Elizabeth Pribic and Nikola Pribic).The
Sarajevo trial.Chapel Hill:Documentary Publications,October 1914

16
receive information’.38
The state’srejectionof one clause wouldleadtothe Austro-Hungarian
invasionwhichSerbiawasadamantlytryingtooppose.The nationalistfactionoperatingwithinthe
Serbstate ultimately carriedthe symbol of theirstate intheirendeavoursandpermittedthe state to
bearresponsibilityfortheiractionsinspite of the governmentwillinglyacceptingtoAustria-Hungary
that a gross injustice hadbeendone andwouldwishtoco-operateonseveral matterstodefuse pre-
existingtensions.Serbiawaspositionedasacountry witha collectionof differentvoices;the newly
independentstate containedelementsof disunity,whereasnationalismcollatesthe people of the
state undersimilarprinciplesandguidelines,inparticularthose concerningterritorial expansionand
the incorporationof correspondingracial andethnicgroups.NikolaPašić’sgovernmentconcededto
much of Austria-Hungary’spressure,yetthe statesmanwasaware thatnationalisttendenciesrun
deepwithinthe Serbpopulation,‘the Serbsstrive forthe unificationof all Serbtribeson the basisof
tradition,memoryandthe historical pastof the Serbrace’.39
A successionof small andintermediatescale warsthroughoutthe nineteenthcenturyfrequently
resultedinterritorial changes.The Serbianstate emergedinthe Balkanenvironmentamidstseveral
competingnational claimsfromethnicminoritiesonce ruledbythe OttomanEmpire and
increasinglythe targetof the Austro-HungarianEmpire’sexpansion.The Bosnianannexationof 1908
broughtthe dual-monarchy’s domaintothe Serbianborder.Nationalistexpansionhadoccurred
widelythroughoutthe centuryandthe continentasGreece,Belgium, ItalyandGermanyfoughtfor
and achievedindependence,national unityandterritorial integrity.40
The BalkanWarsof 1912-1913
redefinedbordersandrenderedthe Serbstate the mostpotentchallengertoAustria-Hungary,while
at the same time the regionwasmarredbyinstabilityowingtothe resurfacingof ethnictensions
and relative economicunderdevelopment. Political groupstypicallyexploitedcenturiesold
nationalistattitudes;contradictingattitudeswhichformedauniformalliance inthe face of Ottoman
38 Royal Serbian Government. "The Serbian Response to the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum- World War I
Document Archives."http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/. July 25, 1914.
39 Pašić,Nikola.In Sloga Srbo-Hrvata,54.Belgrade : Vreme Knjige,1995.
40 Ferguson, Niall.In The Pity of War,144. London: Penguin Books, 1998

17
control,howeveralsoleadtoin-fightinginanethnicallydiverseregioncomprisingof states
experiencingautonomyforthe firsttime incenturies41
.The insecurityof the regionwasapparentto
the great powerswhomediatedinthe resolutionsof the BalkanWars.The RussiansandAustro-
Hungariansupheldthe mostinfluence inthe regionwithclearopposingviews,the Austriannaval
officerFranzConradvon Hötzendorf callingfor‘the total suppressionof the Serbiannestof
revolutionaries’.42
Russia’straditional kinshipwith the ethnicSlavswasinvigoratedbythreatsfrom
the Austro-Hungarians,arelationshipwithstronghistorical andcultural bondsbroughtabout
Russia’sinvolvementinitsfifthBalkanconflictinacentury.43
Nationalism’sclashingprinciples,it
beingof a constructive anddestructive nature leadtothe Balkanstatesformalizingintosovereign
entitiesfollowingthe fragmentationof the OttomanEmpire’sEuropeanprovinces;howeverthe
diversityof the regionandthe fragilityof the ascendinggovernmentsandpolitical systemsfuelled
subsequent internal strife.
LouisP. Bénézet,anAmericanacademicconceivedof aEuropeanmapin1918 definedbyethnicand
racial boundaries,juxtaposedwiththe mapof the previouscenturywhichcontainedill-defined
bordersconstructednotby nature butartificiallythroughwarsandthreateninginternational
relationsresultinginthe annexationof territories.4445
The ethnicdividesof Europe were mostpotent
inthe Austro-HungarianEmpire,comprisingof severalracesruledoverbyonlythe Hapsburg
Monarchy and the HungarianMagyars. As well asthe Serbiandiscontentwiththe empire’sruling
classes,the multi-ethnicrealmwassubjecttosignificantinternal hostilitiesamongthe most
dissatisfiedpopulations.Followingthe Austro-Hungariancompromiseof 1867, FriedrichFerdinand
41 Pavlowitch,Stevan K. "Europe and the Balkans in a historical perspective,1804-1945."Journal of Southern
Europe & the Balkans,2000:143-144
42 Beaver, Jan G. In Collision Course:Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Serbia and the Politics of Preventive
War,99. London: Lulu, 2009
43 Jelavich,Barbara.In Russia'sBalkan Entanglements (1806-1914),260-265.Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,1991
44 Benezet, L. P. "XXVI: Europe as itShould be." In The World War and What Was Behind It (The Story of the
Map of Europe). Chicago:Scott, Foresman and Company, 1918.
45 Ibid^.See Appendix F for Benezet’s map with regions separated based on ethnic bourdaries

18
Countvon Beustregardedthe empire’sfragilitywouldbe the productof the impendingunification
of the Germanstatesintoa confederationandthenasingle realm, butmore significantlythe
yearningforindependence fromseveral racial groupswithinthe empire’sdominion.VonBeust
advocatedthe systemof absolute monarchical rule tomaintainingorderandstabilityasthe
revolutionsof 1848 remainedinrecentmemoryof statesmenaswell asindependence activists.46
EmperorFranz Josephsymbolisedthisstabilityandcontinuityduringhissixtyeightyearreign,yet his
powerdiminishedduringthiselongatedperiodof rule.Initiallythe empire’smandate prevailedin
spite of callsfor greaterautonomyfromthe minoritygroupsandthe increasingknowledge and
awarenessof theirdisadvantagedpositioninsociety.Political concessionsatthe turnof the
twentiethcenturyaimedatresolvingdissidence,paradoxicallyprovidedammunitionforthe
discontentedmassestoexplicitlyinfluence the governmentatthe same time FranzJosef’sinfluence
and personalitywerediminishing.47
AsVonBeusthadpredicted,the recessionfromabsolute rule
and the declininginfluenceof the agingemperorputthe Austro-HungarianEmpire onapath
towardsitsdownfall.Nationalismandethnicdiasporasdestabilisingthe dual monarchyhad
profoundeffectsonthe decisiontodeclare warowingtothe possibilityof accelerated
fragmentationof the empire.
Austria-Hungary’sethnictensionsgatheredmomentuminparallel withthe growingweaknessof its
monarchyand political system.The approachof absolute autarchyandsuppressionof nationalist
sentimentswasamajorfacetin the neighbouringRussianEmpire,whose solidaritywiththe similar
Slavicracesin Serbiawouldprovide the allegedimpetusformobilizationinJuly1914.48
Anelement
of continuityinRussia’shistory; the spreadof Russianculture,traditionsandvaluesbecame
indoctrinatedacrossNorthernAsiaandEasternEurope throughoutthe nineteenthcentury.The
relationshipthe RussiansadoptedwithEasternEuropeanswassomewhatambiguousand
46 Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand von.In Memoirs of (Volume I), 20-25. London: Remington and Co., 1887.
47 Ebeling, Richard M. In Political Economy,Public Policy and Monetary Economics:Ludwig Von Mises and the
Austrian Tradition,59.New York: Routledge, 2010
48 Florinsky,Michael."The Russian Mobilization of 1914."Political ScienceQuarterly,1927:214-215.

19
characterisedbythe assimilationof certainnon-Russiangroupsalongside violentreprisalstowards
others.Predominantly,arace’sfate was subjecttotheircohesionwithRussia’slanguage,religion
and theircompliance withthe Russianmandates.49
Massacrestowardsdissidentssuchasthe Poles
and the anti-Jewishpogromsencouragedbyreligiousantipathymaintainedthe Tsar’sandthe
Russianrulingclasses’statute.A state attunedtothe valuesof the pastand the maintenance of
traditionsof the precedinggenerationsalsocontainedseparatistelementsspurredonprimarilyby
economichardshipandcounteractedthe Romanov’sincreasingsense of nationalism.The
phenomenonof patrioticrejectionwasfeltmarginallyamongstvarioussocialgroups,predominantly
the existingdissidents,those accustomedtopersistentandextreme povertyandgroupscoerced
intoadoptingan alienidentitybythe Russianstate.Followingthe revolutionsof 1905, the Tsar
proclaimedthat‘Onlythe state whichpreservesthe heritage of the pastisstrongand firm, we
ourselveshave sinnedagainstthisandGodisperhapspunishingus’.50
The pan-Europeannationalist
attitudesinRussiansocietyunderpinnedthe royal familyanditsaffiliateshoweverthere beganto
emerge aclear distinctionbetweenthe will of the sovereignandthatof the populous.
Where Russiaaimedtopreserve itsdynasticheritage,throughcoercionandvehement
discouragementof diversity,the Italianunificationandnationalisationprogramme demonstrated
that the meansemployedforthe constructionof national identity,loyaltyandrecognitioninthe
nineteenthcenturywere focussedonthe governmentsandtheirlongertermagendasformerging
the local identitiesintothatof the nation-state.State provisionsinthe formof educationand
compulsorymilitaryservice combinedwiththe ongoingmigrationandagglomerationof populations
intourban environmentsensuredagrowingsense of patriotisminseveralstates.Forexample,fewer
than 10% of the population spoke the Italianlanguage atthe time of unification;state provided
educationwouldsee regional dialectsbecamesubduedinfuture generationsowingtotheir
49 Kappeler, Andreas. "The Ambiguities of Russification."Explorationsin Russian and Eurasian History (Volume
5, Number 2), 2004:291-297
50 Steinberg, Mark D. In The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of
Revolution, 11. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press,1995

20
adaptationof a uniformlanguage.51
Followingthe unificationof Italy,the championof unification
MassimoD'Azeglioproclaimed‘Italyhasbeenmade,butwe have yettomake the Italians’(s'è fatta
l'italia,manonsi fannogl’Italia).52
The nationalistunifiersattemptedtoconstructa more robust
autonomousunitaryItalianpolitywhile subsequentlythe governmentwouldattempttopersonify
theirattitudesintothe will of the country’spopulation.Foroldergenerations,the transferinto
manufacturingandparticularlyintoadenselypopulatedurbanlandscapeensuredthe abandonment
of the localised customsandtraditionsof the villagesanda greaterconsolidationof the national
identitythe governmentshopedwouldfilterdownandaffectthe massesaswell asthe nobles,
monarchsand rulingclasses.Thiswouldprove critical inanenvironmentwith growingdemocratic
propensitiesaspeople whoassociatewiththeirgovernmentsdevelopagreaterloyaltytoitand the
state it represents.Amongstthe vastanddiverse social change advocatedbythe revolutionsof 1848
were movementsdedicatedtothe expanse of democracyentwinedwithgrowingnational identities
inlooselyalignedstatesaswell amongstpeople underforeigngovernments.5354
The previousparagraphdenotesthe nationalistmechanismsasa vehicle fordissolvingabsolutism
and creatingan impetusforpopulationstoenvisionthemselveswithinasystemupholdinggreater
democraticandliberal ideals;howeverthe followingsectionswill explore nationalismand
particularlymilitarismasfactorswhichleadstatestothrive onconflict.Througha combinationof
fact and mythology,governmentsandstate buildersindoctrinate the sharedhistorical foundations
of the state.The theme of war, victoriousbattlesandtragicdefeatsrecursfrequentlyinthe
concurrentcharacter of Europe’sgreatpowers.ConflictwithFrance createdthe SecondGerman
ReichinJanuary1871, withthe Prussianaristocracyas itsfundamental componentingovernance
51 Guerini,Federica. "Language policy and ideology in Italy."International Journal of the Sociology of Language,
2011: 109
52 D'Azeglio, Massimo.In My Memoirs, 5. Florence: Firenze, G. Barbèra,1891
53 Hobsbawm, E.J. "Nationalism."In The Age of Revolution: Europe from 1789-1848,132-145.London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1962
54 Deutsche Bundestag. "The Constitution of March 27, 1849." http://www.bundestag.de/. September 2008.
See Appendix G for the Philipp Veitpainting‘Germania’.

21
and the military.Bismarck’sadhesiontomilitarypowerisevidentinhismemoirs‘ourstrength
cannot proceedfroma pressandparliamentary,butonlyfromthe policyof a greatmilitary
power.’55
The Clausewitziandiscourseadoptedbythe Prussiansandthenthe Germansregardswar
as beingthe continuationof politicsbyothermeans.56
The armywasa meansof pursinga frequently
expansionistforeignpolicy,butalsoasa meansof social mobilityinastructure characterisedby
hierarchy,historical traditionsanddisciplinarians.Strengthandunityof the Germanpopulace
dependedonthe subjugationof bothitsperceived andauthenticenemieswhichsurroundit.
Maintenance of a disciplinarystance wasdue inpartto the conscriptsdevelopingloyaltyand
devotiontotheirstate,andthe perceptionof Germansupremacywasemittedacrossthe
continent.57
France,whileembitteredbythe defeatof 1871 was anxioustoformits allianceswith
Britain,the historical enemyandRussia,the empire builtonabsolutisminthe face of German
militarypotency.The antipathyof bothstatesforgedanationalistpersonificationof the territorial
borders,France equatingthe lossof Alsace-Lorraine asthoughthe rightarm of France had been
amputatedanddramatizingthe goal of reconqueringthe lostprovince inthe national mindset.58
The German anthem‘Die Wacht amRhein’ glorifiedthe Rhinelandandemphasisedthe commitment
the army made in itsdefence inthe wake of the growinganimositytowardsthe French.59
Throughpersonificationof astate’sfeaturessuchasimportantterritories,passionsarise andthe
impetusforconflictexacerbates.The epitome of nationalism’shumanface duringthe late
nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturieswasthe sovereignandinthe majorityof states,a monarch.
Monarchs alsorepresentedthe militaristicfervourthatintertwinedwithnationalism.Portraitsand
55 Bismarck,Otto, Fürst von. "The Second Volume." In Bismarck,the man and the statesman; being the
reflections and reminiscences of Otto, Princevon Bismarck,4.
56 Clausewitz,Carl Von. In On War,75-89.Princeton: Princeton University Press,1989
57 Fischer,Fritz. In From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History,3-4,39-40.
London: Routledge, 1986
58 Tuchman, Barbara.In The Guns of August, 30. New York: Macmillan,1962. See Appendix H for Victor Hugo’s
quote regardingFrance’s passionateaimatthe recapture of Alsace-Lorraine.
59 Wilhelm,Carl."Library of Congress. Music Division."http://memory.loc.gov/. 1870.
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/h?ammem/mussm:@field(NUMBER+@band(sm1870+01744)) (accessed
March 27, 2014)

22
photographswere frequentlytakenof the monarchinfull militaryuniformanddecorations,60
and
theirupbringingrevolvedaroundthe culture andnormsof the militaryapparatus,beingthe
descendantsof powerful,distinguisheddynasty’swhoaccrued theirpositionthroughvictoriesin
war. Upon hisascentto the throne,WilhelmIIdistinguishedhispersonalloyaltytothe armyand
pronouncedhisdedicatedaffectiontowardsthe militarypublically.61
Aswithmonarchs,the military
standsout as a representationof astate’slegitimacyandendurance.The continental powers
continuouslymaintainedlarge armiesowingtopowerfulhistorical leadersemployingmilitaryforce
to establishtheirsovereignenterprise andlaythe foundationsof the state,whichleaderssuchas
FrederickIIof PrussiaandPeterI of Russiaachievedinthe 18th
Century,eventuallybothleaders
wouldcome to bearthe epithet‘the great’,asrecognitionfortheirdistinctionsinthe expanseof the
territorytheyinherited.The continuationof the militaristicdoctrine aswell asthe conditionsof the
alliance systemsandthe balance of powerpromptedcarefulplanning,precisionandrevisionof war
plans.Furthermore the variouslocal conflictsandskirmishesof the earlytwentiethcenturyarose
reassertedthe militarystance of the greatpowers;fearfulandanxiousof theirrivalsandoften
bringingtolightmisperceptionof theircapacityaswell asthatof neighbouringpowers.62
In the everincreasingtensions,amidstthe decisionmakersconstantlypreparingforwarwith
scrupulousdetermination,prideandallegiance tothe militarycame toaffectsignificantportionsof
the middle andupperclasses,those inparticularwhobenefittedsignificantlyfromthe increasesin
wealthandprosperity.Insocietiesbecomingincreasinglydividedbywealthandclass,domestic
political interestgroupsbroughtinternalchallengestothe establishment.A meetingof the
International SocialistBureauoccurredinBrusselsinJuly1914, the delegatesfromaroundthe world
60 See appendix I for photos of the monarchs of Britain,Russia,Germany and Austria in full military uniforms
and decorations.
61 California Digital Newspaper Collection."Daily Alta California,Volume 42,Number 14169,17 June 1888."
http://cdnc.ucr.edu/. See appendix J for Emperor WilhelmII’s inaugural address to soldiers and sailorsof the
German Reich
62 Stevenson, David."Militarization and Diplomacy in Europebefore 1914." International Security, 1997:125-
161.

23
degreedbya unanimousvote thatpan-socialistmovementsmust‘notonlycontinue butstrengthen
theirdemonstrationsagainstwarinfavourof peace’.63
The movementhadgatheredmomentumfor
several decadesinindustrialisednationsamidstgrowingdisparityinwealth,withthe disadvantaged
wieldingagrowingawarenessandresentmentof the establishedeconomicandsocietal order.
AcrossEurope,groupsof dissidentswere gatheringthe political cloutneededforreformsandthe
socialistcommunitymade upsignificantportionsof national assembliesinthe limiteddemocracies.
The German electionof 1912 highlightsthe growthinsocial democratapproval wheretheyemerged
as the largestparty inthe Reichstag.64
Withonlylimitedparticipation bycitizensingovernments,the
political authorityremainedwiththe monarchs,the rulingclassmalesandmilitarypersonnel who
exercisedgreaterautonomythanthe majorityof the population,howeverthe economicand
industrial capabilitiesof astate were markedlydependantonmanylowerclasscitizenswhose
growingsolidarityamongstworkersof all nationswasinconflictwithtraditionalnationalist
attitudes.The strongimpetusforstructural change hadbeenfirmlyestablishedandleaders
recognised thatlarge scale warwouldsignificantlyaffectthe course of thisimpetus,Russianinterior
ministerPyotrDurnovo,believingthe Russo-Japanese warhadfirmlyentrenchedthe motivationfor
social revolution,cautiouslywarnedthe Tsarthatdefeatwouldmake thisrevolutionan
inevitability.65
Socialistideology,whilstpronouncedinthe majorityof stateswasmore destabilising
to some establishmentsoverothers;similarlythere weredifferencesinthe mannerinwhich
governmentsmanagedthe developmentsandthiscorrelatedsomewhatwiththeirregime structure
and the extentandnature of the socialistprogramme. The fierce suppressionof socialismbythe
Russianautocracywouldinadvertentlycontribute tothe revolutionwhichproducedthe monarchy’s
downfall.
63 National Library of New Zealand. "International SocialistBureau:Maoriland Worker,Volume 5, Issue192, 7
October 1914, Page 3." http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/. October 7, 1914.
64 Administration of the German Bundestag. "Elections in the Empire: 1871-1918."http://www.bundestag.de/.
November 1, 2005
65 Durnovo, Pyotr. "Durnovo's Memorandum; February 1914." In Documents Of Russian History:1914 1917,by
Frank Alfred Golder, 3-23.London: The Century Co., 1927. See Appendix K for a paragraph of Durnovo’s
memorandum illustratingthe social impactsof war with Germany.

24
The precedingchapterhasexploredseveral social aspectsof the backgroundtothe First WorldWar.
The characteristicsof nationalismappearprominentlyinthe majorityof Europeanstatesduringthe
nineteenthcenturyandprofoundlyinfluencedthe verdictsandjudgementsof state leadersaswell
as guidedindividualsandgroupstostand insupportof theirstate and sovereignty,orengage in
conflictandhostilityagainstthe opposingclaimantof theirlandanditsinhabitants.The opposition
to dissimilaritiesgrippedthe leadersof stateslikewisewhoengagedinconflictwithneighbouring
statesor regionsselectedaspart of an empire’sexpansioninordertoadvance theirnation’sclaim
overterritory,subjugatingethnologicallydifferentcommunities.Througheducation,militaryservice
and the urban expansioninindustrialisednations,individualsbecameindoctrinatedwiththe ideals
and normsof the state,amongstwhichwere longstandingmilitaristictraditions,personifiedinthe
formof monarchy(excludingFrance post1870) and maintainedthroughsubstantialtechnological
and economicdevelopments.Nationalismandmilitarismbecamepotentlychallengedatthe
beginningof the twentiethcenturyinthe formof the growinginfluenceof socialismand increased
democraticparticipation,thisinspite of enfranchisementbeinglimitedtoapproximately25% of the
populations. 66
Thislimitedsuffragedemonstratesthe misrepresentedmajorityinEuropeansociety
and the frequentlyrecurringtheme of the will of the sovereignandotherdecisionmakersbeingin
oppositiontothatof the populace.Combined,these elementsunleashedfirmbitternessand
resentmentcohabitingalongsidepride andaffluenceandthisdichotomyconditionedan
environmentof unstable andferventpersonalitieswhichtraversedthe social,economicandpolitical
spectrum.The FirstWorldWar illuminatedthe poignancyof the social facetswhichhadbeen
developingforthe precedingcentury.
66 Goldstein,Robert J. In Political repression in 19th century Europe, 4-5. London: Routledge, 1983

25
Chapter 3: The background to the European economic
environment of the period 1815-1914.
The economicanalysisof the yearsfollowingthe FirstWorldWarstrongly indicates thatthe war was
a major pivotbetweentwofundamentallydifferenteconomicsystems. JohnMaynardKeynes
established the primarycritiqueof the Versaillesconference proceedingsanddirectives of 1919. The
memberof the Britishtreasury observedthe treatytobe an instrumentforglobal economic
disintegrationand renewedpovertythroughoutEurope;aswith unjustsettlementsbefore it had
threatenedto‘throwbackhumanprogressfor centuries’.67
The forthcomingplightof the European
populations intothe followingdecadeswasalsorecognizedbyHerbertHoover,stressing thatthe
populationof Europe wasdestinedtostarve withoutthe re-emergence of itsgloballyconnected
marketsforthe importsof foodcombinedwith‘demoralisedproductivity’ of the Europeanlabour
force.68
Thischapterwill explore the economicenvironment whichprecededWorldWarI however
it’simportantto brieflymentionthatthe war’simplicationshadmore elongated,detrimentaleffects
on the state of global anddomesticeconomicsthanonsocial dynamicsandthe international
political system. Economicstrengthandweaknessmouldsthe tensionsconcerningthe balance of
powerandnational andethnicintegrity,all of which persistedintothe followingdecades andupon
whichhad developednewresentments. Fromaneconomicstandpoint,the level of international
trade integrationwouldnot recovertopre-WorldWarI levels untilthe 1970s, furthermore capital
and financial marketintegrationasapercentage of worldoutput hasyetto reach the level of
integrationof the earlytwentiethcentury,likewisemigrationfigures asa percentage of world
population.69
Whilethe reliabilityof economicstatisticsislimitedandEurocentric,itsexpediencyis
67 Keynes, John Maynard.In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 226-230.New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Howe, 1920
68 Hoover, Herbert. "The Economic Situation in Europe." In The World's Work,Volume 39,98-102. New York:
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1919.
69 Joseph Grieco, John Ikenberry. In State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy,15-
16. New York: W.W Norton & Co, 2003

26
enforcedbythe growthof bureaucracy,recordkeepingandthe Europeandominationovermuchof
the world’s land,labour,capital andenterprise.
The followingsections will examine the changingeconomicenvironmentof Europeanstatesand
theircolonial empires,the challengestheyconfrontedandthe benefitstheyprocuredbothwithin
theirbordersandin the internationalenvironment,theirpolicy andcapacityformilitary andnaval
expansion,andthe competitivenessandco-operationundertakeninaneraof increasing
globalisation.The latterisaphenomenonwhichunderpinsthe contemporaryeconomic climate,
whichhad initiallyacceleratedduring the nineteenthcentury,fuelledbyindustrialisation,
technological innovations suchasrailroadsandtelegraphnetworks aswell aspioneeringchangesin
consistenteconomicfoundationsandprinciples suchasthe adaptationof the goldstandardby
several states. Integrationhowevercomesaboutthroughwillingnessforstatestoengage intrade
and commerce.Atthe heartof Britain’seconomicpolicywasthe growingavocationof trade
liberalisation, the faithinwhichwaspronounced inBritishpolitics owingtothe resultingpeace and
stabilityitcouldbringtothe world.70
Subsequently,free tradingrightswouldbe imposedonits
coloniesand itsspheresof influence and wouldbecome acustomandfactor of global economic
integration. The one-sidednature of imperialism, asystemdependantonone political entity
extendingitscontrol overanother thereforeresultswith statesbenefittingdisproportionallyfrom
the economicrelationship andliberalizedtrade wasfrequently enforced throughintimidationand
violentreprisalsbycolonial powers againstweakerstates.71
Europeanstates of similareconomic
capacities initiallyengaged innumerous trade agreements duringthe 1860’s followingthe modelof
the Cobden–ChevalieragreementbetweenBritainandFrance.The impetusforequal,bilateral
tradingregimesconstructedloose alliancesbetweentradingpartners whichhadpolitical alliance
70 Cobden, Richard."Vol. 1 (Free Trade and Finance) [1870]." In Speeches on Questions of Public Policy.,by
John Bright & J.E. Thorold Rogers, 188. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1870. See appendix L for an extract from a
Cobden speech in justification of the free trade principles (1846)
71 Pottinger, Henry. "Treaty of Nanjing(Nanking),1842." http://china.usc.edu/. June 26, 1843.
http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=403&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed March 31,
2014).

27
potential inthe future,althoughthirdpartystate’sexclusionleadtotrade restrictionsbetween
statesdisengagedfromthe two-partycontract.72
These initial drivestowardsfreetrade and
integrationprovedthatamidstaveil of co-operationandgrowingprosperitywasanotable
accelerationtowardsinequalityamongststatesbothgloballyandwithinthe Europeanrealmasthe
zero-sumproponents materializes, irrespective of the intentions toconstructanassuredeconomic
alliance.
Beginninginthe 1870s, the economicgrowthandintegrationof the industrialisedworldbecame
firmlyconditionedbyadecade of rapidand substantial change inthe geographical andpolitical
landscape.ItalianandGermanunification,the preservationof the UnitedStatesasa single polity
and the restorationof the chrysanthemumthrone inJapanhadconstructedmore formidable nation
statesbut alsomore formidable economicinstitutions.The unityandagglomerationof peoples
withinamore inelasticenvironmentleadstoagreater maximisationof productivity,centralised
governmentsexercise greatercontrol overfiscal andmonetarypolicyandimproved stabilityof the
economicapparatus.Conversely,well-assembledintegrationmechanismsgraduallyprovide the
impetusforpolitical unificationashadthe German‘zollverein,’whichexpandedthe economicclout
of the Germanstatesand establishedthe connectivitywhichwouldaideconomicgrowthfollowing
unification.73
Betweenstates,alliancesof apolitical nature canbecome entwinedwiththe
communal economicconditionsasthe Franco-Russianbondmarketsdemonstrate.The evolution
duringthe late nineteenthcenturyof sizableandwell-structuredfinancialmarketspermittedthe
growthof capital marketintegration.The economicallyineptRussianmarketbecame France’smost
significantoverseasrecipientof capital andfinancial investments duringthe three decades
precedingWorldWarI, withmutuallybeneficial principlesthese loansandbonds correlatedwith
improvingpolitical relationsandthe alliance of 1892, subsequentlyRussianinvestmentin
72 Lampe, Markus."Explainingnineteenth-century bilateralism:economic and political determinants of the
Cobden–Chevalier network." Economic History Review, 2010: 1-2.
73 Lalor,John J. "Zollverein." Cyclopædia of Political Science,Political Economy,and the Political History of the
United States, 1881: 1102-1105

28
infrastructural projectsincreased providinglongtermmaterialbenefits. 74
Nevertheless,the growing
unpredictablenature of the Russianelitesworriedfinanciersinsummerof 1914 as the political crisis
threatenedtodestroythe commercial interestsof bothstates,leadingtoinfluentialinvestors
lobbyingthe rulingpolitical classes.75
The exampleof France andRussia’seconomicaccords
reinforcesthe alliancestructures asthe growingriskof financial breakdownrestrictsstate’sabilityto
act unscrupulouslytowardseachother,furthermore the leverageof the economicelite underlines
international political economy,the distinctive andoften close relationship betweenpoliticsand
economics emergingasthe influenceof economicconstraints beingplacedonpolicymakers.
The principlesunderpinningBritain’srelationshipwith itscontinental neighbours,whilefrequently
followingthe ethosof relativeisolationfrom European entanglements,Britainfurtherattempted to
separate itseconomicagendafromitspolitical philosophy aswill be exploredinthe following
example.Alongwiththe bilateral trade agreementsof 1860, inspite of apparentFrench aggression
towardsGermanyin 1870, the Britishcontinuedtheirexporttrade withFrance amongwhichwas
the frequentdispatch of warmaterials.The Britishsecretary of state forforeignaffairsconcluded
that ‘there isnonecessitytohamperthe trade withneutral countriesbypreventingthe exportation
of contrabandof war to the belligerents.’76
WithFrance beingitsprimarycontinental partner,the
disruptionof trade wouldhave hadnotable setbackonBritain’seconomy andpotentiallydamaged
the incentivesforthe triple entente.The majorityof overalltrade atthe time of the Franco-Prussian
war was howeverwithBritain’s colonial empire, whichitdirectlyadministeredpolitically.The British
Raj havingbeenunderthe defacto control of the East IndiaCompanywasformallyincorporatedinto
the Empire and the Britishpolitical domain followingthe Governmentof Indiaact.Greaterpolitical
supervisionraninconjunctionwithafivefold increaseinoverall trade volume inlessthanadecade
74 Ukhov, Andrey. "Financial Innovation and Russian Government Debt Before 1918." YaleInternational Centre
for Finance,2003: 19-21
75 Ferguson, Niall.In The House of Rothschild:Volume 2: The World's Banker:1849-1999,431-436.London:
Penguin Books, 1999
76 GranvilleGeorge Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville."Memorandum communicated by Count Bernstorff to
Earl Granville."London: British Foreign Office,September 1, 1870

29
and a half.77
The expansion of colonial trade didnothoweverdevelopinproportiontothe vast
growthof the BritishEmpire atthe turnof the century,the tradingrelationshipeventuallyshiftingto
one of importdependence anddemand-ledgrowth.Britain’seconomicprestige andhegemonic
statuswas indecline parallelingwiththe risingindustrial growthof the Germanempire andthe
UnitedStates,withthe latterbecomingBritain’sprimarytradingpartneramongstthe greatpowers,
supportedbya reconciliationof feelingsandinterestsandsubsequentlybecome afundamental
lifeline followingthe declarationof warin1914.7879
Havingexercisedaformof economichegemony
duringthe nineteenthcenturybasedonmaritime imperial expansionandthe policyof indifference
towardsthe Europeanpolitical economy, multi-polarityandthe powerstructureswere allowedto
alterprogressively.Discussedinchapterone,thisatmosphere enhancesthe attractivenessof war
basedon the perceptionof clearandpresent relativegainswhichcouldbe accruedfromstatesof
similareconomicandmilitarycapacity.The militarycapabilitiesandthe economicmeanstomilitary
powerwill hence be examined inthe followingparagraph.
Germany’sascenttowardsbecomingapotentchallenge toBritishsupremacywasstrongly
dependantonitsindustrial strength,aswell asitscommercial standingaspartof a cohesive network
of tradingnations. WilhelmIIwas directinhisDailyTelegraphinterview,‘Germanyisayoungand
growingempire.She hasaworldwide commerce whichisrapidlyexpanding…Germanymusthave a
powerful fleettoprotectthatcommerce andher manifoldinterestsineventhe mostdistantseas’.80
The naval expansionwasatthe forefrontof Anglo-Germanrelationsandadestabilisingomenina
fragile relationship,combinedwiththe changingfortunesof bothstates.Britain’simport
dependencyhadpositionthe Germanexpansionasameansfor Germany to become aviable
77 Myers, A.B. Diagramshowingthe Shipping,Exports, Imports and combined Import and Export Trade.
Colombo: Colonial Office(UK), July 28, 1880.
78 United States Library of Congress."A union in the interest of humanity - civilization - freedom and peace for
all time." http://www.loc.gov/. 1898. See appendix M for a US poster in recognition and celebration of the
shared interests of the United States and Great Britain.
79 United Department of Commerce. Imports and Exports by Grand Divisionsand Countries.Washington D.C:
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, October 27, 1915
80 Daily Telegraph."The Daily Telegraph Affair." http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/. October 28, 1908

30
successorto Britain’sonce supreme navy.The naval prominence of the periodwas amongstseveral
mechanismof projectingnationalprestige,butmoreovertheyprovedtobe economicallyviableas it
enabledimperial expansions,combinedwiththe defensive and protectionistundertakingsthe navy
provided. Economicprotectionistmeasureswere increasinginthe formof tariffsandchargeson
commercial activity,while avocationsforfree trade were apparent inthe previousdecades,the
Britishattitude shiftedinthe 1890’s as theyattemptedtorestructure theirpoliciesindiscordwith
the mechanismstheyhad strongly supportedpreviously.81
The Britishcommercialattitudewas
perceivedby Germanyasa defensive measureagainstgrowingGerman strength, diplomaticpapers
state ‘nowthat the superiorityof Germanindustryisrecognized,[the British] will soonmake efforts
to destroyit.’82
The escalatingtensionsallowedforwarmaterials tobecome astrongeconomic
factor, the supplyof whichbecominganecessityinbothBritainandGermanyasthe rivalry entered
a cyclical phase of constant arms build-up.Anexample from1906 saw a tariff proposedbythe
Swedishgovernmentonironore exports.Thiswasbitterly andsomewhatdisingenuously resented
by Britainand more so by Germanyas an affrontto the establishedcommercialrelationswith
Britain’sforeignoffice frequentlyaffirmingthe growingGermandemandinparallel withdwindling
importsintoBritain.83
Forfearof losingoutandbeingill preparedinrelationtothe competition,the
arms build-upcontinuedandreliedonthe domesticeconomiccapacity of the greatpowers andan
opencommercial environmenttoensure agreaterprobabilityof survival. These needsmirroredthe
tense environmentthatstatesperceivedwasomnipresent.
81 Copeland, DaleC. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations." International
Security, 1996: 5–41
82 trans.E.T.S. Dugsdale. "Volume. II." In German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914,486-487.New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1930
83 Foreign Office. "Sweden: Files 688-5154."Export duty on iron ore. London: W B Peat and Co, 1906

31
The stronglycompetitiveeconomicapproachwasalsoreflectedinthe imperial ambitionsof the
great powers.Inmentioning‘greatpowers’,coloniespresentedameansof poweracquisitionand
vast economicbenefitsthroughanexploitativetrade relationship.Economicgrowthandpopulation
increasesbecame greatlyfacilitatedbya state’sabilitytoexpandandconsolidateitsterritorialgains.
The Berlinconference of 1884-1885 allowedforthe partitionof Africatobe a triumphof diplomacy
overaggression,withagreementsreachedonspheresof influence,tradingandnavigational
regulationsandarespectfor the internationallaw recognisedbythe signatorypowers.84
Aswiththe
Concertof Europe seventyyearsearlier,the principlesandsuccessesof the agreementsinBerlindid
not transcendintoa stable longtermcolonisationprocess. The continuationof territorialexpansion
was fuelledsignificantly bythe growingneed forraw materialsinheavilyindustrialisednationsand
securingmarketsforwhicha growingquantityof goodscouldbe traded.Maritime imperial
expansionstoodasthe foreignpolicyobjective of Britain,France andGermany,withcontinental
expansionbeingthe intentionsinRussiaandAustria-Hungary. Furthermore,un-colonisedregions
were frequently categorizedandidentifiedbythe powersof Europe as spheresof influence and
consequentlycoerced intoco-operationwithEuropeanpowers.The vastChinese marketsof the
Qingdynasty servedasthe model forindirectimperialdealings.85
The resourcesof the Middle East
were stronglysoughtafterby several powers,with Germany challengingthe predominantlyBritish
strongholdonPersiaandMesopotamia. Diplomaticeffortsbetween powers predominatedfor
several yearsalongsidethe pressuringinfluence of loansandpolitical patronage. The crumpling
OttomanEmpire increasingly becamethe subjectof GermaninterestswithheavyGermanoutflows
of capital andproposalsforinfrastructural projectssuchasthe Berlin-Baghdadrailway.86
Resource
scarcity andeconomicregressionwouldfirststrike Germanyoveritsrivalsowingtoitsindustrial
cloutjuxtaposingwithitsterritorial inferiorityasthe Germanswere to remainaminorimperial
84 The Berlin Conference (1884-1885)."The Berlin Conference General Act (1885)."
http://21548675.nhd.weebly.com/. February 26, 1885.
85 Caswell,Thomas. "Global History:Imperialism(China)."http://www.regentsprep.org/. 2003. See appendix
N for a map denoting the various spheres of European influencein China.
86 Fischer,Fritz. In War of illusions:German Policies from1911-1914,298-308.London: Chatto & Windus,1975

32
powerintothe twentiethcentury. Rivallingambitionsdisruptive tothe statusquointhe Middle East
and elsewhere were frequentlycheckedthrough the triedandtested diplomaticmanoeuvrings.
Neverthelessclashesincontestedterritorieswere equallypervasive inexamplessuchasthe
Moroccan crisis,the Spanish-Americanwarandthe Russo-Japanesewar.The FirstWorldWar
therefore seemedassuredasthe impendingstruggle foreconomicsupremacy followingonfromthe
increasingpropensityforconflict. Anemergentargumentforthe increasingprobabilityof warcame
fromthe emergentMarxisttheorisationsandphilosophers,suchas Karl Kautsky,whoarguesthat
capitalistmodusoperandihavingbecome firmly indoctrinated intothe Europeanmind-setultimately
culminatingindesperate attemptsatthe total control of variousfactorsof production. The reason
being‘The growth of industryinthe capitaliststatestodayisso fastthat a sufficientexpansionof the
marketcan no longerbe achievedbythe methodsthathadbeenemployeduptothe 1870’s.’87
The economicstructure increasinglythe subjectof Marxistinterpretationarisesowingtothe
dominatingcloutthateconomicconditionshave onfacilitatinginstability, bothinternationaland
domesticand spawnedlargelybythe fertilityof inequalityamongstclassesaswell asthatamongst
states.Troubledgovernmentsby1914 hadbecome exceptionally concernedwiththeirstates
economicfuture andtransfiguredfromdiplomacytowar.88
A transfigurationwhichwould
destabilise globaleconomics duringthe twentiethcentury,Keyneswouldwritethat ‘an
extraordinaryepisode inthe economicprogressof man…came toan endinAugust 1914.’89
Although
thischapterhas identifiedthe systemprecedingthe warasa constituentpartof the formulawhich
ultimatelyconditioned itsonset,withinthe realmof relative peace of the precedingdecades,the
Clausewitzian philosophyemerges againowingtothe frequentcontinuationof diplomacyduring
periodsof skirmishesandhostilitiesbetweengreatpowersaswell asmediationbyneutral states.
87 Kautsky,Karl."Ultra-Imperialism."DieNeue Zeit (The New Times) , 1914:41-46
88 Gordon, Michael R."Domestic Conflictand the Origins of the FirstWorld War:The British and the German
Cases."The Journal of Modern History,1974 : 200-205.
89 Keynes, John Maynard.In The economic consequences of the peace, 10-11. New York: Harcourt, Bruce &
Howe, 1920.

33
The economicrisksentailedallowedfornumerousattemptsbystatestocompromise andretreatin
the face of danger,risksthat hadgrown outof everincreasingintegrationandco-operationamongst
the statesat the centre of worldpower. The liberal attitudesadvocatedduringthe nineteenth
centurywere frequentlyconfrontedwithprotectionistpolicies,which embroiled withthe colonial
trade,imperial expansionandthe profoundlynationaliststate of mindensuredthatthe
environmentwouldbe fundamentallybasedonrelative gainsandlosses.Allianceswouldbe
somewhatfirmedupamongststateswith bilateral economicrelationsandmeagre rivalry,with
statesweighingupthe relativecostsandbenefitsof alliances.Forinstance,BritainfavouringFrance
and RussiaoverGermanydespite the historicrivalry andwasmore capable of reconcilingand
compromisingwiththe FrenchinSudanandthe RussiansinAsia;the feeling wasequally mutualin
all three states.90
Germany’sadhesiontoeconomicandnaval supremacyrevealingthe paralleling
anxietiesof the earlytwentiethcenturyasterritorial andresource gainsreachedtheirclimax with
the continentdividedpoliticallyaswell aseconomically.
90 Taylor,A.J.P. In The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918,412-451.Oxford:Oxford University Press,
1971

34
Conclusion
All the themesandactivitiesinEuropeansocietythathave beendiscussedcorrespondtothe notion
of continental wide instabilityand insecurity,acenturyof transformationsfollowingonfromthe
calamityof the FrenchRevolutionarywars.Inthe same convention,historianFritzSternwritesof the
FirstWorld War as, ‘the firstcalamityof the 20th century,the calamityfromwhichall other
calamitiessprang.’91
The war’simpactproducedthe pivotinthe economicandinternational political
narrative inEurope,andwas the culminationof the pressure compiledonnationsfordecades,
whichultimatelyhadfollowedadangerousandriskynarrative.The balance of powerbeingata
positionwhere anoligopolyof statesshare analmostequal proportionof the world’seconomicand
militarycapacity,combinedwiththeirimperial motivesinazero-sumenvironmentstirredupthe
competitivedrive whichcharacterisedthe laissez-fairephilosophyandthe nationalismdoctrine
whichflourishesinthe competitive andhostile climate betweenstates.The policymakersand
influential conformistsupheldadistinctivelydifferentethostothe massesof disenfranchised
people,whosoughtradical changesthroughutilisingnationalistorsocialistsentimentsfor
destabilisingthe rigidstructuresaroundthem.These evolutionsleadgovernmentsandstatesmen
towardsanxietyanddistress,parallelingwiththe unsettlingsituationaroundthemastheirstate’s
power,prestige andsocial structure seemedtobe injeopardy.Furthermorethe culture of militarism
and itscomprehensive apparatusrepresentedabelief thatwarand directconfrontationwasthe
mostpotentmeans of drasticallyreversingtheirfortunes.Onlycombineddidthese characteristicsof
the Europeanenvironmentmake the phenomenonof the FirstWorldWar conceivable.The context
that saturatedthe worldin1914 leadnumerousof the greatpower’sgovernment personnel and
subsequentlypolitical commentatorstodecree thatthe war wasinevitableandgrew outof the
multitude of the inhospitable characteristics.92
91 Clark,Christopher."Introduction." In The Sleepwalkers - How Europe Went to War in 1914 , xix. London:
Penguin Books, 2012.
92 Ferguson, Niall."Introduction."In The Pity of War,xxxvii-xxxix.London: Penguin Books, 1998.

35
Competingargumentsregardingenvironmentalconditionsandresponsibilitywill vehemently
disagree withsome of the issuesraisedanddiscussedinthispaper.The lackof uniformityin
providinganswersanddefinitiveclaimsonatopicwhichhas perplexedacademicsfora century
ensuresthatthe legitimacyof thisanalysisisextensive andcontemporary.Itsprimarydrawbacksare
associatedwiththe depthof analysis,whichisn’tasmultidimensional asitcouldbe ina longerand
more robustpiece andthe same istrue forthe solitaryapproachadopted.Thisacknowledgesthat
there islittle considerationforthe outbreakof the FirstWorldWar beingconditionedbythe
deliberateactionsof individualpolicymakersorthe singulardomesticcharacteristicsof astate
whichactedirrationallyandoutof sync withitsneighbours.Inadditionthereisnodirect
acknowledgementforone theme orsubjectbeingthe mostpotentdestabilisingfactorasthey’re
intertwinedandoftencontradictorywhenwieldedbydifferentindividualsandgroups.The most
prominentof whichisnationalism,astructure whichcanorder and spellbindpeopleintothe upmost
loyaltytotheirstate and government,yetcanalsobe a mechanismforthe internal breakupof the
national authority,followedbythe state’sterritory.Conflictsof ideasalsoaffectthe viewpointson
economicpolicy,whetherstatesoptfortrade liberalisationorprotectionism, andpolitical
representation;the extentof democraticparticipationorthe traditional convictionforthe rightsof
monarchyand aristocracy.
The effectsof the FirstWorldWar and the subjectsitsoughtto addresshave beeninfusedacrossthe
Europeanmosaicof nations.Illuminatingthe factorsinthe societyandstructure of Europe which
leadto the destructionof whatsuperficiallyseemedtobe acontinentinthe midstof relative peace
and prosperityexperiencedbyacenturyof progresshasbeenthe primaryaimof thisthesis.
Althoughadditionally,aclearunderstandingthatthe complexity,the breadthandthe broadnessof
the topichave onlygiventhe readeran illustrationwhichrepresentsonlyafractionof the plentiful
discoursesthatshroudinformationpublications.

36
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