The Ahvaz Attack
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Summary of the 22 September attack against a military parade in Ahvaz, Iran. Research based on open sources. Osint, Geopolitics, Terrorism, Iran, Gulf, Ahvaz, Ahwaz, UAE, Saudi Arabia
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ISIS EXPORT GATEWAY TO GLOBAL CRUDE OIL MARKETS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to take over oil fields in late spring 2014.
Since then, ISIS has expanded its operations by creating a loosely integrated and thriving
black economy, consisting of approximately sixty percent of Syria's oil assets and seven
oil producing assets in Iraq. The terrorist organisation has also managed to set up an
extensive network of middlemen in neighbouring territories and countries, with the aim of
trading crude oil for cash and in kind. Upon extraction, the commodity is first lightly
refined on site and then a shadow supply-chain network takes over, to bring it to the
market.
2015-12-22 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
2016-01-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
2016-01-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
2016-01-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
2015-12-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
2015-12-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
2016-03-29 CTP Update and Assessment
The document provides a summary and assessment of critical threats from terrorist and militant groups around the world in 3 pages divided into regional sections. Some key events summarized include:
1. A suicide bombing in Lahore, Pakistan claimed by Jamatul Ahrar that killed over 70 people.
2. Pro-GNC militias in Libya preventing the UN-backed unity government from establishing itself in Tripoli.
3. Continued fighting in Yemen between Houthi-Saleh forces and coalition-backed forces with additional fractures appearing as peace talks continue.
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ISIS EXPORT GATEWAY TO GLOBAL CRUDE OIL MARKETS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to take over oil fields in late spring 2014.
Since then, ISIS has expanded its operations by creating a loosely integrated and thriving
black economy, consisting of approximately sixty percent of Syria's oil assets and seven
oil producing assets in Iraq. The terrorist organisation has also managed to set up an
extensive network of middlemen in neighbouring territories and countries, with the aim of
trading crude oil for cash and in kind. Upon extraction, the commodity is first lightly
refined on site and then a shadow supply-chain network takes over, to bring it to the
market.
2015-12-22 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
2016-01-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
2016-01-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
2016-01-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
2015-12-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
2015-12-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
2016-03-29 CTP Update and Assessment
The document provides a summary and assessment of critical threats from terrorist and militant groups around the world in 3 pages divided into regional sections. Some key events summarized include:
1. A suicide bombing in Lahore, Pakistan claimed by Jamatul Ahrar that killed over 70 people.
2. Pro-GNC militias in Libya preventing the UN-backed unity government from establishing itself in Tripoli.
3. Continued fighting in Yemen between Houthi-Saleh forces and coalition-backed forces with additional fractures appearing as peace talks continue.
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Yemen; Rival Factions and the Resilience of AQAP
This document provides background on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and discusses how rival political factions in Yemen have contributed to AQAP's resilience. It outlines AQAP's history, leadership structure, and major attacks. It then discusses the various armed and non-armed political factions in Yemen, including the Houthi rebels in the north, and how the country's political fragmentation draws attention away from eliminating AQAP and undermines security efforts against the group.
2015 03-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
2017-09-26 CTP Update and Assessment
The Critical Threats Project releases a weekly update and assessment on the al Qaeda network. Sep 26, 2017
2015 04-28 ctp update and assessment
The summary provides the key takeaways from the document in 3 sentences:
The document summarizes developments related to al Qaeda, Iran, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb/Sahel region, and Mali over the period of April 19-24, 2015. Saudi Arabia ended Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen and began Operation Restoring Hope, while continuing airstrikes. Al Shabaab conducted attacks against UN personnel in Somalia and killed a Kenyan police chief. Iran condemned continued Saudi airstrikes in Yemen and maintained its position that military sites will not be subject to nuclear inspections.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo latest_french_intel...
1. According to confidential sources, the Algerian government was surprised by the hostage crisis carried out by Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group at an Algerian gas plant. The Algerian security forces saw the attack as a resumption of the country's civil war and were determined to destroy Belmokhtar's group with extreme force, prioritizing security over the lives of the hostages.
2. Belmokhtar carried out the attack at the request of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to support Malian rebels facing a French military intervention. Belmokhtar has a long history with AQIM and owes them support.
3. The hostage crisis
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2015 03-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthis reported that they signed an economic deal with Iran to improve Yemen’s power grid as well as al Hudaydah seaport. Iran appears to be bolstering the al Houthi-led government by providing this support. Saudi economic assistance ended in December 2014 and the al Houthis face increasing regional isolation.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader reacted negatively to the open letter signed by Republican senators citing concern that President Barack Obama will not be able to generate congressional support for a nuclear deal with Iran.
3. Al Murabitoun, an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb splinter group, conducted an attack in Bamako, Mali, that killed five people, including two Westerners. The attacl is the farthest south the group has operated.
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.]
3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
2017 12-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2017 09-19 CTP Update and Assessment
Hamza bin Laden is emerging as a senior leader in al Qaeda alongside al Zawahiri. The Tunisian government's decision to pardon corrupt officials is generating unrest. The leader of Yemen's al Houthi movement threatened for the first time to attack the UAE homeland.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
2017 06-28 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight.
2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president.
3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
2017 08-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
Iran iraq war (1)
The Iran-Iraq War began in 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran and lasted until 1988. There were several longstanding territorial disputes over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and religious and ideological tensions between the two countries' governments that contributed to the outbreak of war. Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein hoped to take advantage of Iran's weakened military and divided new revolutionary government to achieve influence in the region. The war resulted in over a million casualties before a UN-brokered ceasefire.
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This document summarizes key information about the terrorist group ISIS and lessons that can be learned from historical analysis of terrorism. It describes ISIS's capabilities, including its demonstrated ability to fight and control territory in Iraq and Syria, establish governance structures, and generate funding through oil sales and taxation. The document also notes ISIS's willingness to commit atrocities like beheadings. It argues that ISIS represents a unique threat due to its state-building ambitions and that combating the group will test the US's ability to address future asymmetric threats that control territory and populations. The document concludes by outlining lessons from history that could inform how the US responds to ISIS, such as providing long-term military support to local forces and addressing
The Middle East Cold War
Source: Looking Glass Publications
By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.
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Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes in Yemen against Houthi rebel who have been protesting since 2014 and have recently turned violent.
Yemen; Rival Factions and the Resilience of AQAP
This document provides background on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and discusses how rival political factions in Yemen have contributed to AQAP's resilience. It outlines AQAP's history, leadership structure, and major attacks. It then discusses the various armed and non-armed political factions in Yemen, including the Houthi rebels in the north, and how the country's political fragmentation draws attention away from eliminating AQAP and undermines security efforts against the group.
2015 03-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
2017-09-26 CTP Update and Assessment
The Critical Threats Project releases a weekly update and assessment on the al Qaeda network. Sep 26, 2017
2015 04-28 ctp update and assessment
The summary provides the key takeaways from the document in 3 sentences:
The document summarizes developments related to al Qaeda, Iran, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb/Sahel region, and Mali over the period of April 19-24, 2015. Saudi Arabia ended Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen and began Operation Restoring Hope, while continuing airstrikes. Al Shabaab conducted attacks against UN personnel in Somalia and killed a Kenyan police chief. Iran condemned continued Saudi airstrikes in Yemen and maintained its position that military sites will not be subject to nuclear inspections.
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo latest_french_intel...
1. According to confidential sources, the Algerian government was surprised by the hostage crisis carried out by Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group at an Algerian gas plant. The Algerian security forces saw the attack as a resumption of the country's civil war and were determined to destroy Belmokhtar's group with extreme force, prioritizing security over the lives of the hostages.
2. Belmokhtar carried out the attack at the request of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to support Malian rebels facing a French military intervention. Belmokhtar has a long history with AQIM and owes them support.
3. The hostage crisis
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2015 03-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthis reported that they signed an economic deal with Iran to improve Yemen’s power grid as well as al Hudaydah seaport. Iran appears to be bolstering the al Houthi-led government by providing this support. Saudi economic assistance ended in December 2014 and the al Houthis face increasing regional isolation.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader reacted negatively to the open letter signed by Republican senators citing concern that President Barack Obama will not be able to generate congressional support for a nuclear deal with Iran.
3. Al Murabitoun, an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb splinter group, conducted an attack in Bamako, Mali, that killed five people, including two Westerners. The attacl is the farthest south the group has operated.
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.]
3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
2017 12-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2017 09-19 CTP Update and Assessment
Hamza bin Laden is emerging as a senior leader in al Qaeda alongside al Zawahiri. The Tunisian government's decision to pardon corrupt officials is generating unrest. The leader of Yemen's al Houthi movement threatened for the first time to attack the UAE homeland.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
2017 06-28 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight.
2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president.
3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
2017 08-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
Iran iraq war (1)
The Iran-Iraq War began in 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran and lasted until 1988. There were several longstanding territorial disputes over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and religious and ideological tensions between the two countries' governments that contributed to the outbreak of war. Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein hoped to take advantage of Iran's weakened military and divided new revolutionary government to achieve influence in the region. The war resulted in over a million casualties before a UN-brokered ceasefire.
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Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo latest_french_intel...
Hillary blumenthal drumheller original documents hrc memo latest_french_intel...
Similar to The Ahvaz Attack
download
This document summarizes key information about the terrorist group ISIS and lessons that can be learned from historical analysis of terrorism. It describes ISIS's capabilities, including its demonstrated ability to fight and control territory in Iraq and Syria, establish governance structures, and generate funding through oil sales and taxation. The document also notes ISIS's willingness to commit atrocities like beheadings. It argues that ISIS represents a unique threat due to its state-building ambitions and that combating the group will test the US's ability to address future asymmetric threats that control territory and populations. The document concludes by outlining lessons from history that could inform how the US responds to ISIS, such as providing long-term military support to local forces and addressing
The Middle East Cold War
Source: Looking Glass Publications
By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.
Iranian diaspora
The document provides an overview of the Iranian diaspora. It notes that after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and establishment of an Islamic Republic, hundreds of thousands of Iranians emigrated abroad, many to pursue higher education. Key points include:
- Over 100,000 Iranians studied abroad in 1977-1978, with over 45,000 in the US at its peak.
- Emigration increased sharply after the revolution, with hundreds of thousands settling long-term in places like the US, Canada, Germany, UK and Sweden.
- Iran has one of the highest rates of "brain drain" in the world, estimated at 150,000-180,000 educated people leaving per year.
- The
The syrian war
The Syrian war began in 2011 as protests against President Bashar al-Assad's regime escalated into a civil war. As the conflict intensified, various militant groups including al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front and Islamic State emerged and fragmented the opposition. The war became increasingly sectarian as regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia backed opposing sides. Over 220,000 people have been killed and millions displaced in the complex multi-sided war that continues today between the Assad regime, various opposition groups, and Islamic State.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIS originated in 2004 as Al Qaeda in Iraq and rebranded as ISIS in 2013 after expanding into Syria. It gained strength after the US withdrawal from Iraq and amidst sectarian conflict, capturing territory in Iraq and Syria. ISIS generates revenue from oil, taxes, and other means to fund its goal of establishing a global caliphate through violent expansion and inspiring terrorist attacks abroad. A US-led international coalition has made gains against ISIS but it remains a threat through physical territory and online recruitment for lone wolf attacks in line with its extremist ideology.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIS formed in 2004 as Al Qaeda in Iraq and rebranded as ISIS in 2013 after expanding into Syria. It captured territory in Iraq and Syria, implementing strict Sharia law and seeking to establish a global caliphate. The document discusses ISIS's origins, tactics of controlling oil fields and other resources to fund its operations, and goals of erasing borders from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. It also covers military efforts against ISIS and terrorist attacks inspired or conducted by ISIS, including the 2015 Paris attacks.
The Houthi Entanglement_Saudi Arabia and Iran Faceoff in Yemen
This document provides a summary of the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen. It discusses the geopolitical context of the conflict including the Sunni-Shia divide and Saudi Arabia's view of Yemen as within its sphere of influence. It then reviews literature on the major actors - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The research aims to understand how Saudi Arabia may react if Iran continues military aid to the Houthis. The conclusion is that Saudi Arabia would likely lead a coalition in a ground war to eliminate an Iranian-backed government in Yemen and depending on Iran's response, the conflict could escalate further.
Jihadism
Jihadism refers to contemporary armed jihad and Islamic fundamentalism. It has its roots in 19th century Islamic revivalism that developed into ideologies like Qutbism in the 20th century. Groups like Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Al-Shabab practice jihadism and seek to establish an Islamic caliphate governed by sharia law, with ISIS proclaiming a caliphate in 2014 spanning parts of Iraq and Syria. These groups finance their activities through means like oil sales, ransoms from kidnappings, taxation of areas they control, and donations from supporters seeking to advance their mission of armed struggle. They have carried out numerous terrorist attacks against Western targets, most notably the September 11 attacks in
Iran-Saudia Relations.pptx
The document provides a detailed timeline of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1979 to 2023. It outlines the key factors driving tensions between the two regional powers, including religious/sectarian differences and pursuit of influence. Major flashpoints in their rivalry included the Iran-Iraq war, clashes during Hajj pilgrimages, Saudi support for anti-Iran proxies, and disagreements over nuclear issues. However, the timeline also notes periods of improved ties and recent agreements to restore diplomatic relations and cooperation.
Iran_2012.ppt
1) In 1935, Iran's ruler insisted the country's name be changed from Persia to Iran.
2) In 1979, widespread demonstrations and unrest led to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini.
3) The Iranian Revolution transformed Iran from a pro-Western monarchy to a populist theocratic republic led by clerics, with the Ayatollah serving as the Supreme Leader.
Yemen's Power Struggles
The document summarizes the civil war in Yemen, identifying the key players and Saudi Arabia's interests. The Houthi movement called Ansar Allah has gained territory, causing Saudi Arabia to form a coalition to counter Iranian influence. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also operates in Yemen and has expanded in the chaos. The civil war is a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional influence, and as the Houthis and coalition battle, AQAP strengthens its control.
The Hezbollah - Al Qaeda Axis of Terror
The document discusses the alliance formed in Sudan in the early 1990s between Iran, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda, facilitated by Sudan's Islamic regime. Osama bin Laden met with Iranian leadership, and they agreed that Hezbollah would provide explosives training to Al Qaeda recruits. This alliance carried out several terrorist attacks, including 9/11. However, the alliance is partial and opportunistic given the Sunni-Shia divide between Al Qaeda and Iran's backers. The document also describes Hezbollah and Iranian operations in Latin America, including drug and weapons trafficking networks extending to Mexico and the United States.
GBarton-OpEd-HSun-Saudi_Iran-7Jan16
The execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia has exacerbated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The execution was seen as a provocation by Iran and has reignited the proxy conflict between the two regional powers. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran dates back to the Iranian revolution but in recent decades they have exploited sectarian divisions and used proxy militias to counter each other. The execution threatens fragile hopes of resolving conflicts like the Syrian civil war and fighting ISIS.
GBarton-OpEd-HSun-Saudi_Iran-7Jan16
The execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia has exacerbated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The execution was seen as a provocation by Iran and has reignited the proxy conflict between the two regional powers. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran dates back to the Iranian revolution but in recent decades they have exploited sectarian divisions and used proxy militias to counter each other. The execution threatens fragile hopes of resolving ongoing conflicts in the region such as Syria and Yemen.
Introduction Why We Disagree about International RelationsIn A.docx
Introduction Why We Disagree about International Relations
In April, 2015, ISIS militants pose with their banner in a suburb of Damascus, Syria, that they had just partially captured. What has caused the rise of ISIS, and what can be done to counter it?
Photo by Balkis Press/Sipa USA (Sipa via AP Images)
In spring 2014, an Islamic army known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) swarmed across northern Syria and Iraq conquering territory larger than Belgium, including Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul. Also known as the Islamic State (IS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Daesh, its Arab label, ISIS declared itself a Caliphate, resurrecting the ancient empire of Islam, and proceeded to threaten Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Thousands of jihadists (religious revolutionaries) joined ISIS, some from the United States; and scattered extremist groups from North Africa to Southeast Asia pledged allegiance to ISIS and adopted its black flag. The Caliphate, under its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, imposed a brutal Sunni Muslim law in the conquered territories, and hooded warriors beheaded Western journalists, local Christians and Shiite (non-Sunni) Muslims, captured in terrifying videos that went viral on the Internet. Ben Rhodes, the Deputy National Security Adviser to President Obama, identified the threat to the United States: “They are seeking to establish themselves as the vanguard terrorist organization that is at war with the U.S. and the West on behalf of Islam.”1
What causes a conflict of this sort? And what can be done about it? As students of international relations, we start with the facts, but we have to be careful. There are so many facts, and we can’t know them all or know for certain which ones may be the most important ones that cause other things to happen. Let’s look at what appear to be the salient facts in the case of ISIS and then make a first stab at how we sort out the facts and causes of international events to understand them better.
Syria and Iraq are centrally located in the geographically strategic region of the Middle East. They are Muslim countries that border the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Both Eastern and Western empires have occupied this region. Christian crusaders invaded in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the region was part of the Ottoman Empire for several centuries. The first Muslim Caliphate dated from the thirteenth century. After World War I and the collapse of the Caliphate, Syria became a colonial territory under French administration, while Iraq became a British colony. Both became independent nations after World War II. After World War II, oil became a major resource in the Middle East. Western companies monopolized oil production and remain today major economic players in the region even though the oil-producing states now control their own oil and influence global oil markets through the Organization of Petroleum .
Radical islam and iran s nuclear program
An interview with Ambassador Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata (former Italian Miniter of Foreign Affairs) on Iran and his role in Middle Eastern scenario.
Iran Is Maneuvering ISIS Toward a Regional Checkmate
Iran is using the threat of ISIS to further its goal of becoming the dominant power in the Middle East. It has coordinated with Iraq, Syria, and Russia to share intelligence and military operations against ISIS, extending Iran's sphere of influence across the region. The conflict with ISIS allows Syria and Iraq to crack down on domestic opponents and strengthen Iran's influence. While ISIS poses a threat, many Sunni Arabs see Iran and its backed militias as an even greater danger, fighting a two-front war. Iran has manipulated the fear of terrorism to eliminate Western support for Syrian rebels and justify the growth of its own militias in Iraq and Syria. As a result, Iran now wields significant military and political influence in
Iran
The document provides an overview of various topics related to Iran, including its government and politics, human rights record, terrorism activities, and nuclear program. It discusses Iran's history from the Pahlavi era in the 1920s through the 1979 revolution and Iran-Iraq war. It notes Iran has a complex political system as an Islamic theocracy with elected aspects. The document also examines Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, particularly its close ties to Hezbollah, and support for Palestinian groups. In addition, it provides details on Iran's nuclear program and the debate around how the U.S. should respond.
The 11 September Raid The Impossible Becomes Possible By Abu ‘ Ubayd...
The document discusses the 11 September 2001 attacks and provides background information. It summarizes that:
1) The attacks were a major achievement that revived hope for Muslims and lifted up the mujahideen who carried them out.
2) Al-Qaeda spent years preparing, with training camps developing fighters' skills and an extensive financial network funding operations.
3) The 9/11 hijackers received effective guidance and training, allowing them to skillfully carry out the complex mission despite limited individual experience in al-Qaeda camps.
Crude Oil for Natural Gas: Prospects for Iran-Saudi Reconciliation
Despite the sectarian barbs traded between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iran's unique ability to meet the kingdom's fast growing demand for electricity may help spur a reconciliation, according to the Atlantic Council's Jean-François Seznec. In his report Crude Oil for Natural Gas: Prospects for Iran-Saudi Reconciliation, Seznec argues that the two dominant energy producers do not necessarily need to see their energy production as competition.
Saudi Arabia's currently fuels its stunning 8 percent annual rise in demand for electricity with precious crude oil due to little low cost domestic natural dry gas reserves. Iran's vast gas reserves could be used to meet the kingdom's growing needs, but after decades of punishing sanctions its dilapidated gas fields need an estimated $250 billion in repairs. If Saudi Arabia used its investment power or buying power to help revitalize Iran's gas industry, it would both secure the energy it needs to meet its citizens' demands and free up its crude oil for export. While the sectarian rhetoric hurled back and forth may seem unstoppable and the timeline for reconciliation may be long, Seznec contends that both sides are rational at heart and highlights that that the benefit of economic cooperation on energy issues could open up better relations on a range of issues.
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The Ahvaz Attack
- 1. The Ahvaz Attack Reactions, Responsibility, Reporting Research Based on Open Sources October 2018
- 2. Executive Summary • Misleading Reports in Western Media The story of the so-called National Ahwazi Resistance being behind the Ahvaz attack was widely circulated and became a ”fact” in Western media, despite conflicting claims and vague official accounts of events. • Iran Blaimed Gulf-Sponsored Takfiris Official Iranian reactions quickly claimed the perpetrators were trained and sponsored by Iran´s regional adversaries Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), backed by the United States and Israel. • Missile Response to Deter Regional Adversaries The Iranian missile strike against Islamic State targets in Syria, officially in retalition for the Ahvaz attack, was likely also intended for a Gulf audience as a deterrent. That intent was more obviously displayed in a Fars News video released, and later deleted, containing imagery of Iranian missiles targeting Riyadh. • Exploiting the Attack Disregarding the responsibility for the attack, Iran stands to gain more from the event than separatists or jihadis, enabling the former to expand its pursuit of separatists, deflect public attention from domestic grievances, display its missile capabilities and claim it is a victim of Gulf-sponsored terrorism. • Under-Reported Conflict with Geopolitical Significance The restive Khuzestan province has seen outbursts of popular unrest as well as acts of sabotage ever since the Shah era, with numerous separatist groups inside and outside Iran. With rising geopolitical tension, the Ahwaz issue and other regional hotspots in Iran will likely gain international attention.
- 3. The Attack ON 22 SEPTEMBER 2018 AT 09:00 LOCAL TIME, SEVERAL GUNMEN OPENED FIRE ON A MILITARY PARADE IN THE CITY OF AHVAZ, KHUZESTAN PROVINCE, IRAN, KILLING AT LEAST 25 PEOPLE FIVE ASSAILANTS, DISGUISED AS SOLDIERS, WERE KILLED IN THE ATTACK, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL IRANIAN INFORMATION INITIAL CLAIMS OF RESPONSIBILITY WERE CONFLICTING, WITH BOTH AHWAZI SEPARATISTS AND ISLAMIC STATE TAKING CREDIT FOR THE ATTACK
- 4. Official Iranian Responses • Assailants branded ”Al-Ahvaziya group”, ”Takfiri terrorists” or ”Takfiri separatists” • UAE and Saudi Arabia blamed for the attack, allegedly backed by USA and Israel • Diplomatic action against Denmark, the Netherlands, the UAE and the UK • Crackdown in Khuzestan • Retaliatory missile strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria
- 5. Claims and Denials of Responsibility 22 September 23 September 26 September Claim: “National Ahwazi Resistance” Source: Interview with Yaqoub Hor al-Tostari, purported spokesperson for the Arab Struggle Movement to Liberate Ahwaz (ASMLA). Claim: Islamic State Source: Amaq News Agency Denial: ASMLA Source: Yaqoub Hor al-Tostari, speaking to a Dutch newspaper Claim: “National Ahwazi Resistance” Source: Tweet by Habib Jaber, purported leader of ASMLA. Denial: Patriotic Arab Democratic Movement in Ahwaz (PADMAZ) Source: Official website Claim: Islamic State Source: Al Furqan Media Foundation Claim: Daesh Source: Amaq News Agency Twitter Denial: ASMLA Source: Official website The denial said claims bearing the oganization´s name were made by a splinter group, referring to statements the previous day. Denial: Ahwazi Democratic Popular Front (ADPF) Source: Official website
- 6. Unofficial Reactions Tweet by Abdulkhaleq Abdulla 22 September ”A military attack on a military target, not a terrorist attack” Video by Fars News Agency 26 September Posted on Twitter, the video contained imagery suggesting potential Iranian missile attacks on Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and other targets. The video was later deleted. Emirati Professor of Political Science, prominent influencer and avid tweeter. Semi-official news agency of the Iranian government.
- 7. • Ahwaz (al-Ahwaz), sometimes referred to by its historical name Arabistan, is a multi-ethnic area in southern Iran, comprising the coastline along the Arabian/Persian Gulf, including the province of Khuzestan and its administrative capital Ahvaz, where the attack took place. The area enjoyed semi- autonomous rule as a sheikhdom under Ottoman control, but became part of the Persian empire in 1925, the year separatists mark as the beginning of the alleged Persian “occupation” of their homeland. • The area remained contested after the Persian annexation, with sporadic outbursts of violence and protests against the Shah-led government, a development which escalated in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution when a popular uprising among Arabs in the area was quelled by the then new interim government. In April 1980, a group of Arab separatists stormed the Iranian embassy in London, UK, demanding the release of prisoners in Khuzestan. As the Iran-Iraq war erupted later that year, Khuzestan, one of the main goals of the Iraqi invasion, went from a hotbed of regional unrest to a major scene in an international conflict. In 2005 riots broke out in Khuzestan, followed by bombings for which separatists claimed responsibility. • The so-called “Al-Ahvaziya group”, a name frequently used in Iranian media to describe the perpetrators of the 2018 Ahvaz attack, refers to the events in 1979-1980 and the escalation of the armed struggle. However, even though some of the groups who were formed in that period are still active, there has been several cases of groups morphing, splintering and forming umbrella organizations. Some of the main Ahwazi separatist groups are based outside Iran, including those who pursue a peaceful struggle and those who adhere to a more violent agenda, such as carrying out sabotage actions against infrastructure targets. • There is no single group or organization by the name “National Ahwazi Resistance”, rather, “national Ahwazi resistance” seems to be an expression used as a collective noun to describe Ahwazi opposition activities in general, including acts of violence. Background: Ahwazi Separatism
- 8. Impact and Exploitation of the Attack Disregarding who was responsible for carrying out the attack, the following could be said in relation to Iran, Ahwazi separatists and the Islamic State: • Deflects attention from economic and other domestic grievances • Escalates repression of separatists inside and outside Iran • Shows adversaries how far its missiles can go • Portrays itself as a victim of terrorism • International attention for the cause • Demonstrates capability to attack high-profile targets • Still a force to be reckoned with • Demonstrates capability to attack high-profile targets all over Iran • Strikes another blow against archenemy on their home turf