The document provides answers to 13 questions about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) operated by the US Department of the Treasury. It summarizes that the TFTP obtains international banking data from SWIFT to identify terrorist financing networks, subject to strict controls and oversight. An agreement between the EU and US governs data sharing and protects privacy and civil liberties. The TFTP has provided valuable intelligence that has helped prevent numerous terrorist attacks in Europe and worldwide since 2001.
Small Wars Journal_Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI)_MAR_16Victor R. Morris
This document summarizes initiatives to enhance international identity operations and intelligence sharing between law enforcement and military organizations to identify transnational threat actors. It discusses several intergovernmental organizations involved in this effort, including INTERPOL, Europol, NATO, OSCE, and Frontex. The goal is to support threat network analysis and engagement through compliant biometric data sharing once an interoperable framework has been established between these organizations. This will help with identifying threat actors from civilian populations in contexts involving transnational terrorism and political violence.
Persons accused of terrorist acts can ask for legal representation and advice from our team of criminal defence solicitors in London. We are at your service with ample legal assistance if you contact us at: www.defencesolicitorslondon.co.uk
Final Act Switzerland: Federal Act on the Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets Held by Foreign Politically Exposed Persons (Men and Women) or Foreign Illicit Assets Act FIAA
This document is the Federal Act on the Freezing and the Restitution of Illicit Assets Held by Foreign Politically Exposed Persons (Foreign Illicit Assets Act) passed by the Swiss Federal Assembly on December 18, 2015. The act allows Switzerland to freeze and confiscate assets located in Switzerland that were acquired through corruption or criminal acts by foreign politically exposed persons or their close associates. It establishes procedures for freezing assets pending mutual legal assistance requests from other countries, confiscating frozen assets if legal assistance fails, and returning confiscated assets to improve conditions in the country of origin.
The document provides information about the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) of Switzerland. It details that the FIS collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence to support decision making for national security. It operates according to Swiss law to monitor threats and provide early warnings. The FIS serves federal and cantonal authorities as well as supports law enforcement and counterespionage efforts. It utilizes human sources, communications monitoring, and foreign partnerships to collect both open and covert information in a manner respecting proportionality and human rights.
The document discusses the controversial EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system, which provides for the storage and exchange of passenger data among EU member states and non-EU countries. While proponents argue it enhances security by helping authorities combat terrorism and crime, opponents argue it threatens privacy and data protection rights. The document provides background on PNR data and systems, the ongoing debate around establishing an EU-wide PNR system, and issues of balancing security needs with the right to privacy. It examines arguments on both sides and outlines international human rights standards regarding privacy.
Executive Order Lecture by Cynthia Farinanslscornell
Cornell Law Professor Cynthia R. Farina gave an informal talk on executive orders on April 9, 2009. The talk was organized by the Cornell Law School chapter of the National Security and Law Society.
Small Wars Journal_Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI)_MAR_16Victor R. Morris
This document summarizes initiatives to enhance international identity operations and intelligence sharing between law enforcement and military organizations to identify transnational threat actors. It discusses several intergovernmental organizations involved in this effort, including INTERPOL, Europol, NATO, OSCE, and Frontex. The goal is to support threat network analysis and engagement through compliant biometric data sharing once an interoperable framework has been established between these organizations. This will help with identifying threat actors from civilian populations in contexts involving transnational terrorism and political violence.
Persons accused of terrorist acts can ask for legal representation and advice from our team of criminal defence solicitors in London. We are at your service with ample legal assistance if you contact us at: www.defencesolicitorslondon.co.uk
Final Act Switzerland: Federal Act on the Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets Held by Foreign Politically Exposed Persons (Men and Women) or Foreign Illicit Assets Act FIAA
This document is the Federal Act on the Freezing and the Restitution of Illicit Assets Held by Foreign Politically Exposed Persons (Foreign Illicit Assets Act) passed by the Swiss Federal Assembly on December 18, 2015. The act allows Switzerland to freeze and confiscate assets located in Switzerland that were acquired through corruption or criminal acts by foreign politically exposed persons or their close associates. It establishes procedures for freezing assets pending mutual legal assistance requests from other countries, confiscating frozen assets if legal assistance fails, and returning confiscated assets to improve conditions in the country of origin.
The document provides information about the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) of Switzerland. It details that the FIS collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence to support decision making for national security. It operates according to Swiss law to monitor threats and provide early warnings. The FIS serves federal and cantonal authorities as well as supports law enforcement and counterespionage efforts. It utilizes human sources, communications monitoring, and foreign partnerships to collect both open and covert information in a manner respecting proportionality and human rights.
The document discusses the controversial EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system, which provides for the storage and exchange of passenger data among EU member states and non-EU countries. While proponents argue it enhances security by helping authorities combat terrorism and crime, opponents argue it threatens privacy and data protection rights. The document provides background on PNR data and systems, the ongoing debate around establishing an EU-wide PNR system, and issues of balancing security needs with the right to privacy. It examines arguments on both sides and outlines international human rights standards regarding privacy.
Executive Order Lecture by Cynthia Farinanslscornell
Cornell Law Professor Cynthia R. Farina gave an informal talk on executive orders on April 9, 2009. The talk was organized by the Cornell Law School chapter of the National Security and Law Society.
Policy brief “Almost There: The Carrots of Visa Liberalization as An Impetus ...Europe without barriers
Policy brief by Europe without barriers exploring why and how Germany can benefit by visa liberalization for Ukraine as well as how German NGOs and government can help in implementing Ukrainian reforms
The document discusses the debate around monitoring and controlling internet use and mass surveillance programs. It notes arguments from politicians and experts on both sides of the issue, with some arguing for more surveillance powers to fight crime and terrorism, while others see mass surveillance as a threat to civil liberties and an ineffective means of preventing attacks. The document also examines oversight of surveillance programs and public opinion on privacy and government monitoring of communications data.
This document discusses Russia's interference in the UK, including through cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and accepting wealthy Russians. It examines the UK government's response, including how it allocates resources across cyber defense, intelligence analysis, and legislative tools. It analyzes strategy and coordination and whether the government took its eye off the ball. It finds that Russia presents a unique challenge that requires a strong and coherent response.
This document proposes a work plan to address three issues in Burma: 1) the 2008 constitution, 2) elections in 2010, and 3) the issue of impunity. For the constitution, it recommends pressuring the UN to declare it null/void or revising impunity provisions and military power. For elections, it recommends promoting freedoms and democratic standards if the constitution remains. For impunity, it recommends an international inquiry commission and national reforms to provide accountability, reparations, and end the culture of impunity in Burma. Detailed strategies and plans are outlined for lobbying the UN/international bodies and raising awareness on these issues.
Access to competition file as a precondition of access to justiceEmanuela Matei
This document outlines the research questions and premises for a PhD thesis on access to competition documents and effective competition. The thesis will examine:
1) When a court can restrict access to documents while balancing procedural autonomy, good administration, and the right to damages.
2) When the free movement of documents between courts is restricted, and if evidence can be used in multiple courts.
3) Whether access to documents is a precondition for access to justice or if "document shopping" threatens public interest. The thesis will draw on writings by former ECJ judge Federico Mancini on related issues.
This document provides background information on the European Union Committee simulation for IUMUN 2016. It introduces Ryan Van Slyke and Maya Fews as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the committee. It then provides an introduction to the Council of the European Union and the topics that will be discussed: Topic A on protection of immigration and refugee rights, and Topic B on EU-Russian economic and military relations. Delegates are advised to consider questions on both topics to guide committee discussion.
The EU Council expressed grave concern over China's national security law imposed on Hong Kong. The law undermines China's commitments to granting Hong Kong autonomy and erodes rights and freedoms. As a response, the EU agreed to a coordinated package including considering implications for asylum, limiting exports of sensitive equipment, supporting civil society, and not launching new negotiations with Hong Kong for now. The EU will closely monitor the situation and implementation of the law.
"Irrespective of the nature of the crimes committed when establishing cross-border groups with the mere appearance of lawfulness, financial gain seems to be the main triggering factor.", Mircea TEIS, Senior Associate specialising in Criminal Law at Tuca Zbarcea & Asociatii.
This document examines barriers to accessing international protection for asylum seekers in Greece. It finds that the backlog procedure for asylum applications submitted before 2013 continues to have deficiencies, including a lack of information provided to asylum seekers about the status of their long-pending applications. Further, appeal committees responsible for reviewing rejected applications have been inactive for long periods, and there is a legal gap between the backlog procedure and new regional asylum office system.
Summer School “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, July 1-3, 2017
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
The Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, in collaboration with the Jean Monnet Chair of the Democritus University of Thrace organize a summer school entitled “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, that will take place in July 1-3, at the Conference Room of the University of Macedonia.
The EU established a multi-annual policy cycle in 2010 to ensure effective cooperation between member state law enforcement agencies, EU institutions, and third parties in the fight against serious international and organized crime. The policy cycle involves continuous collection of data, setting priorities every four years based on threat assessments from Europol, and developing multi-annual strategic plans and operational action plans to combat the identified priorities, which for 2013-2017 included areas like human trafficking, drug trafficking, and cybercrime. Progress is reviewed regularly and strategies are adapted as needed based on the latest threat information.
Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the republic of moldovaincluziune
The Committee considered the third periodic report of the Republic of Moldova (CCPR/C/MDA/3) at its 3309th and 3311th meetings (see CCPR/C/SR.3309 and 3311), held on 18 and 19 October 2016. At its 3329th meeting, held on 31 October 2016, it adopted the present concluding observations.
The document discusses the EU's policies for managing migration crises, including asylum seekers and external borders. It outlines several EU treaties that established policies and agencies related to migration. It also provides statistics on asylum applications and irregular border crossings into Europe in recent years, which increased substantially during the migration crisis beginning in 2015. The EU is working to reform its asylum system and border controls to better manage the unprecedented increases in migration.
The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 aims to update terrorism offences to reflect the evolving threat and nature of radicalization, disrupt terrorism by enabling earlier police intervention, and ensure sentences properly reflect the seriousness of offences. Key measures include expanding terrorism offences to include online activity, increasing maximum penalties for preparatory offences, strengthening management of terrorist offenders after release, and conferring new stop and search powers at borders to counter hostile state activity. The Act is intended to ensure police and security services have the necessary powers to tackle terrorism and threats to national security.
The Politics and Institutions of EU Crisis Managementcomcentre
The document discusses the EU's institutional structures and processes for crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty reforms. It outlines the roles of the High Representative, European External Action Service, and Council in coordinating the EU's diplomatic and security responses to crises. The typical crisis management procedures involve information gathering, political discussions, evaluation of response options, and adoption of frameworks and decisions to authorize civilian or military missions. Case studies of the EU's responses to crises in Georgia and Somalia are provided as examples.
The document summarizes new Russian laws regarding the processing and storage of personal data of Russian citizens. Key points include:
- From January 1, 2015, all personal data of Russian citizens must be stored on databases located in Russia, with some exceptions.
- The law broadly defines personal data in a manner similar to the EU's definition. Personal data includes any information that can directly or indirectly identify an individual.
- Companies will need to notify authorities of the location of databases storing personal data and could face fines or blocking of websites for non-compliance.
- There is debate around whether some personal data can still be stored abroad if it is also stored in Russia, or if all personal data of Russian citizens
Khurts Bat, the Head of Mongolia's Office of National Security, was arrested at Heathrow Airport in 2010 based on an extradition request from Germany related to his alleged involvement in kidnapping a Mongolian national living in France in 2003. Khurts Bat claimed immunity from prosecution as his visit to the UK was a special diplomatic mission. The UK court accepted this and blocked his extradition, finding his alleged crimes were committed in his official capacity on orders from Mongolia. However, legal analysts criticized the court's interpretation of immunity and evidence of a special diplomatic mission. The case highlights issues with immunity claims in international extradition proceedings.
The international human rights legitimacy of the Italian criminalization and ...MigrationPolicyCentre
This document examines the Italian system of criminalizing, detaining, and expelling irregular migrants. It finds that:
1) Only a small percentage (around 1.2%) of irregular migrants are detained each year, and even fewer (around 0.6%) are actually expelled.
2) The detention centers (CIEs) operate with a lack of transparency and their internal regulations and costs are kept secret.
3) The system violates both the Italian Constitution and EU law, by detaining migrants without proper legal justification and by using detention and expulsion as a first resort rather than a last option.
This document outlines the competition policy and antitrust cooperation framework between two parties. Key points include:
- Both parties will maintain antitrust legislation addressing anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive mergers.
- They will each have independent competition authorities responsible for enforcing these laws in a transparent, non-discriminatory manner.
- The parties agree to cooperate on competition cases and policy where compatible with each other's laws, including coordinating investigations and exchanging confidential information.
- Dispute settlement procedures will not apply to matters arising under this competition chapter. Cooperation and consultations are emphasized instead of litigation.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes legislation passed in Sweden in 2008 that allows the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to conduct surveillance of communications. Key points include:
- Telecom operators must transfer all international communications to nodes controlled by FRA for signal intelligence collection.
- FRA is authorized to intercept communications and collect data to monitor external threats like terrorism and weapons proliferation.
- FRA shares information with government agencies and may partner with intelligence organizations in other countries like the NSA and GCHQ.
- A defense intelligence court and committee provide oversight of FRA's activities and access to databases of communications metadata.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes Sweden's legislation authorizing surveillance of communications by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). It discusses how the law requires telecom operators to transfer all international communications to FRA nodes for intercept. FRA can then intercept communications and collect data for signal intelligence purposes. The document also reviews similar intelligence laws and programs in other countries like the US, UK, France and Germany.
Policy brief “Almost There: The Carrots of Visa Liberalization as An Impetus ...Europe without barriers
Policy brief by Europe without barriers exploring why and how Germany can benefit by visa liberalization for Ukraine as well as how German NGOs and government can help in implementing Ukrainian reforms
The document discusses the debate around monitoring and controlling internet use and mass surveillance programs. It notes arguments from politicians and experts on both sides of the issue, with some arguing for more surveillance powers to fight crime and terrorism, while others see mass surveillance as a threat to civil liberties and an ineffective means of preventing attacks. The document also examines oversight of surveillance programs and public opinion on privacy and government monitoring of communications data.
This document discusses Russia's interference in the UK, including through cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and accepting wealthy Russians. It examines the UK government's response, including how it allocates resources across cyber defense, intelligence analysis, and legislative tools. It analyzes strategy and coordination and whether the government took its eye off the ball. It finds that Russia presents a unique challenge that requires a strong and coherent response.
This document proposes a work plan to address three issues in Burma: 1) the 2008 constitution, 2) elections in 2010, and 3) the issue of impunity. For the constitution, it recommends pressuring the UN to declare it null/void or revising impunity provisions and military power. For elections, it recommends promoting freedoms and democratic standards if the constitution remains. For impunity, it recommends an international inquiry commission and national reforms to provide accountability, reparations, and end the culture of impunity in Burma. Detailed strategies and plans are outlined for lobbying the UN/international bodies and raising awareness on these issues.
Access to competition file as a precondition of access to justiceEmanuela Matei
This document outlines the research questions and premises for a PhD thesis on access to competition documents and effective competition. The thesis will examine:
1) When a court can restrict access to documents while balancing procedural autonomy, good administration, and the right to damages.
2) When the free movement of documents between courts is restricted, and if evidence can be used in multiple courts.
3) Whether access to documents is a precondition for access to justice or if "document shopping" threatens public interest. The thesis will draw on writings by former ECJ judge Federico Mancini on related issues.
This document provides background information on the European Union Committee simulation for IUMUN 2016. It introduces Ryan Van Slyke and Maya Fews as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the committee. It then provides an introduction to the Council of the European Union and the topics that will be discussed: Topic A on protection of immigration and refugee rights, and Topic B on EU-Russian economic and military relations. Delegates are advised to consider questions on both topics to guide committee discussion.
The EU Council expressed grave concern over China's national security law imposed on Hong Kong. The law undermines China's commitments to granting Hong Kong autonomy and erodes rights and freedoms. As a response, the EU agreed to a coordinated package including considering implications for asylum, limiting exports of sensitive equipment, supporting civil society, and not launching new negotiations with Hong Kong for now. The EU will closely monitor the situation and implementation of the law.
"Irrespective of the nature of the crimes committed when establishing cross-border groups with the mere appearance of lawfulness, financial gain seems to be the main triggering factor.", Mircea TEIS, Senior Associate specialising in Criminal Law at Tuca Zbarcea & Asociatii.
This document examines barriers to accessing international protection for asylum seekers in Greece. It finds that the backlog procedure for asylum applications submitted before 2013 continues to have deficiencies, including a lack of information provided to asylum seekers about the status of their long-pending applications. Further, appeal committees responsible for reviewing rejected applications have been inactive for long periods, and there is a legal gap between the backlog procedure and new regional asylum office system.
Summer School “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, July 1-3, 2017
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
The Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, in collaboration with the Jean Monnet Chair of the Democritus University of Thrace organize a summer school entitled “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, that will take place in July 1-3, at the Conference Room of the University of Macedonia.
The EU established a multi-annual policy cycle in 2010 to ensure effective cooperation between member state law enforcement agencies, EU institutions, and third parties in the fight against serious international and organized crime. The policy cycle involves continuous collection of data, setting priorities every four years based on threat assessments from Europol, and developing multi-annual strategic plans and operational action plans to combat the identified priorities, which for 2013-2017 included areas like human trafficking, drug trafficking, and cybercrime. Progress is reviewed regularly and strategies are adapted as needed based on the latest threat information.
Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the republic of moldovaincluziune
The Committee considered the third periodic report of the Republic of Moldova (CCPR/C/MDA/3) at its 3309th and 3311th meetings (see CCPR/C/SR.3309 and 3311), held on 18 and 19 October 2016. At its 3329th meeting, held on 31 October 2016, it adopted the present concluding observations.
The document discusses the EU's policies for managing migration crises, including asylum seekers and external borders. It outlines several EU treaties that established policies and agencies related to migration. It also provides statistics on asylum applications and irregular border crossings into Europe in recent years, which increased substantially during the migration crisis beginning in 2015. The EU is working to reform its asylum system and border controls to better manage the unprecedented increases in migration.
The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 aims to update terrorism offences to reflect the evolving threat and nature of radicalization, disrupt terrorism by enabling earlier police intervention, and ensure sentences properly reflect the seriousness of offences. Key measures include expanding terrorism offences to include online activity, increasing maximum penalties for preparatory offences, strengthening management of terrorist offenders after release, and conferring new stop and search powers at borders to counter hostile state activity. The Act is intended to ensure police and security services have the necessary powers to tackle terrorism and threats to national security.
The Politics and Institutions of EU Crisis Managementcomcentre
The document discusses the EU's institutional structures and processes for crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty reforms. It outlines the roles of the High Representative, European External Action Service, and Council in coordinating the EU's diplomatic and security responses to crises. The typical crisis management procedures involve information gathering, political discussions, evaluation of response options, and adoption of frameworks and decisions to authorize civilian or military missions. Case studies of the EU's responses to crises in Georgia and Somalia are provided as examples.
The document summarizes new Russian laws regarding the processing and storage of personal data of Russian citizens. Key points include:
- From January 1, 2015, all personal data of Russian citizens must be stored on databases located in Russia, with some exceptions.
- The law broadly defines personal data in a manner similar to the EU's definition. Personal data includes any information that can directly or indirectly identify an individual.
- Companies will need to notify authorities of the location of databases storing personal data and could face fines or blocking of websites for non-compliance.
- There is debate around whether some personal data can still be stored abroad if it is also stored in Russia, or if all personal data of Russian citizens
Khurts Bat, the Head of Mongolia's Office of National Security, was arrested at Heathrow Airport in 2010 based on an extradition request from Germany related to his alleged involvement in kidnapping a Mongolian national living in France in 2003. Khurts Bat claimed immunity from prosecution as his visit to the UK was a special diplomatic mission. The UK court accepted this and blocked his extradition, finding his alleged crimes were committed in his official capacity on orders from Mongolia. However, legal analysts criticized the court's interpretation of immunity and evidence of a special diplomatic mission. The case highlights issues with immunity claims in international extradition proceedings.
The international human rights legitimacy of the Italian criminalization and ...MigrationPolicyCentre
This document examines the Italian system of criminalizing, detaining, and expelling irregular migrants. It finds that:
1) Only a small percentage (around 1.2%) of irregular migrants are detained each year, and even fewer (around 0.6%) are actually expelled.
2) The detention centers (CIEs) operate with a lack of transparency and their internal regulations and costs are kept secret.
3) The system violates both the Italian Constitution and EU law, by detaining migrants without proper legal justification and by using detention and expulsion as a first resort rather than a last option.
This document outlines the competition policy and antitrust cooperation framework between two parties. Key points include:
- Both parties will maintain antitrust legislation addressing anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive mergers.
- They will each have independent competition authorities responsible for enforcing these laws in a transparent, non-discriminatory manner.
- The parties agree to cooperate on competition cases and policy where compatible with each other's laws, including coordinating investigations and exchanging confidential information.
- Dispute settlement procedures will not apply to matters arising under this competition chapter. Cooperation and consultations are emphasized instead of litigation.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes legislation passed in Sweden in 2008 that allows the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to conduct surveillance of communications. Key points include:
- Telecom operators must transfer all international communications to nodes controlled by FRA for signal intelligence collection.
- FRA is authorized to intercept communications and collect data to monitor external threats like terrorism and weapons proliferation.
- FRA shares information with government agencies and may partner with intelligence organizations in other countries like the NSA and GCHQ.
- A defense intelligence court and committee provide oversight of FRA's activities and access to databases of communications metadata.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes Sweden's legislation authorizing surveillance of communications by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). It discusses how the law requires telecom operators to transfer all international communications to FRA nodes for intercept. FRA can then intercept communications and collect data for signal intelligence purposes. The document also reviews similar intelligence laws and programs in other countries like the US, UK, France and Germany.
The document discusses how Brexit may impact criminal law and cooperation in the EU. It describes several EU criminal law frameworks and agencies that the UK currently participates in, such as the European Arrest Warrant, European Judicial Network, Eurojust, and operations they have conducted. Leaving the EU could mean the UK loses access to these systems and procedures, hindering criminal investigations and extraditions between the UK and EU countries.
Summer School “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, July 1-3, 2017
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
The Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, in collaboration with the Jean Monnet Chair of the Democritus University of Thrace organize a summer school entitled “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, that will take place in July 1-3, at the Conference Room of the University of Macedonia.
The Trilogue, consisting of the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of Ministers, committed to adopting the EU Data Protection Regulation and related Police Directive by the end of 2015. The Rapporteur for the European Parliament said agreement could be reached by year's end if all parties compromise. Both directives will be negotiated together as a package. The parties will hold several meetings through July and September to work through the texts article by article. All sides expressed optimism that the tight deadline can be achieved.
i. Cross-border healthcare is a growing market valued at over $400 billion annually, but raises privacy concerns as patient data may pass through countries with differing privacy laws.
ii. The EU has strong directives on sensitive data protection, including healthcare data, and allows cross-border data transfer if an adequate privacy level exists in the receiving country.
iii. The EU and US had an agreement called "Safe Harbor" for data sharing, but it was struck down and replaced with the "Privacy Shield", which allows transfer with certain new protections and oversight.
iv. Trade agreements like the TPP and TTIP aim to facilitate electronic commerce but also recognize the importance of data privacy and protection. There are calls for
Is it legal or illegal to use american cloud services in Europe?
Patricia Ayojedi presentation about the controversial between USA an Europe regarding cloud business.
The EU document proposes reforms to data privacy regulations to give individuals greater control over personal data collected by companies. It acknowledges that current regulations are outdated and do not address today's data practices. The proposed reforms aim to strengthen individual rights by requiring opt-in for data collection and use, data minimization by companies, and a "right to be forgotten." However, the document is criticized for not sufficiently addressing technical implementation details or conflicts with freedom of expression. The implications of the legislation could be significant globally as other regions may adopt similar regulations.
The document discusses border security technologies used in Europe, including the Schengen Information System (SIS) and Spain's SIVE border surveillance system. The SIS is a database containing information on persons banned from entering Europe or wanted for criminal offenses that is used at airports and for visa issuance. Spain uses the SIVE system of radar stations, control centers, and interceptor units to monitor its maritime borders and detect migrant vessels. The development of these technologies has made borders invisible and shifted surveillance to data collection and information sharing between countries.
EU Privacy Shield - Understanding the New Framework from TRUSTeTrustArc
Webinar to understand the new EU-US Privacy Shield Framework which replaces the EU-US Safe harbor framework followed by a demo of the TRUSTe EU data privacy transfer assessment.
Visit https://info.truste.com/WB-2016-02-10-Insight-Series-Privacy-Shield_RegPage-On-Demand_Recording.html to view the complete webinar.
This document discusses the European Arrest Warrant and the concept of mutual recognition between EU member states. It explains that the EAW was created to streamline the extradition process and increase efficiency by accelerating the transfer of individuals wanted for crimes. The document then examines how mutual recognition has affected justice and home affairs cooperation in the EU, leading to the development of the EAW. It notes some benefits of mutual recognition include promoting free movement of judgements, while drawbacks include reduced discretion for individual member states.
1. Compare the similarities and differences between the external b.docxjackiewalcutt
1. Compare the similarities and differences between the external borders of New Europe and the U.S. - Mexico border.
The European Union concluded the Schengen Agreements in 1995, which outlines the steps the EU takes when dealing with their borders. The concept was to allow free movement of European workers to move and settle in any EU State. Part of it states that “Any person, irrespective of nationality, may cross the internal borders without being subjected to border checks.” [1] There is a stipulation that border police can ask for identification during “spot checks”. If there is a serious security risk to an EU state, that state can introduce border security measures but must inform the European Parliament and Commission.
While tightening controls of external borders, rules were implemented in the agreement such as types of visas needed and how the checks at external borders have to be done, improved police cooperation including the right to cross-border surveillance, and a strong judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of enforcement of criminal judgments.
EU’s Smart Borders plan is to improve the management of the external borders, fight against unequal immigration and provide information on people whose visas have expired but have not left, as well as facilitate border crossings for prescreened frequent third country national travelers. [2]
Like the EU, the US and Mexico have agreements on SMART Borders to help ease the flow of people and goods as well as secure the borders by blending efficient border management with state-of-the-art advanced technology. Rules are set in place to help facilitate the crossing of daily workers into the US and those going to Mexico to work at US plants.
Unlike the EU, the US/Mexican government do not have a system for cross border surveillance cooperation nor can any US or Mexico law enforcement agency cross each other’s borders in pursuit of a criminal. Also, the US and Mexico judicial systems are entirely different which makes transferring criminal judgments non-existent.
2. Has your perception of homeland security changed since taking this course? Why or why not? What was and what is now your understanding of border protection? Fully explain your response using course resources and outside resources.
Truthfully, my perception of Homeland Security is a bloated bureaucracy which at times is inept, bad leadership, interagency non-cooperation, and political restraints. Although there are aspects of Homeland Security that have proved effective, the knee-jerk reaction of past and current administrations in the White House does not provide me with the confidence that this overhaul was necessary to the extent that it is today.
In the past, border protection had more to do with trying to control illegal immigration and drug smuggling. Now border protection includes trying to keep terrorists from crossing the border, protect US citizens along the border from the drug cartels wh ...
The EUI seminar focus on the legal framework in Europe regarding whistle-blowing, leaking confidential information, “illegal” newsgathering and protection of journalistic sources. In its Recommendation 1916 (2010) on the protection of whistle-blowers, on 29 April 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, referring to its Resolution 1729 (2010) on the protection of whistle-blowers, has stressed the importance of whistle-blowing as a tool to increase accountability and strengthen the fight against corruption and mismanagement.
http://cmpf.eui.eu/seminars/whistle-blowing.aspx
A question of trust - uk spying reviewRepentSinner
This document is the report of the Investigatory Powers Review conducted by David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. The report examines the threats facing the UK, the capabilities required to address those threats, the need to protect privacy, challenges posed by changing technologies, and issues around transparency and oversight of investigatory powers. The report aims to inform public debate on these issues and makes 124 specific recommendations, guided by five principles including minimizing restrictions on investigations, complying with human rights, and taking a unified approach to investigatory powers rather than separating intelligence and law enforcement functions.
A question of trust - uk spying reviewAnonDownload
This document is a report by David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, on the effectiveness of existing legislation relating to investigatory powers in the UK. The report was presented to the Prime Minister in June 2015 following an extensive review that examined threats to the UK, capabilities required to address those threats, privacy issues, technological challenges, and oversight mechanisms. The report aims to inform public debate on these issues and makes 124 recommendations for reforming UK laws on investigatory powers.
Keeping our secrets? Shaping Internet technologies for the public goodblogzilla
This document discusses challenges to privacy from technological development, market failures, and authorized access. It then discusses approaches to designing for privacy, including data minimization, user consent, and privacy by design. Finally, it examines shaping technologies for the public good through defining privacy as a public good, limiting government surveillance, new privacy regulations like GDPR, and encouraging competition.
Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation a...Iim Ibrahim
This report from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights updates a previous comparative legal analysis of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in EU member states. It finds that while some countries have strengthened legal protections for LGBT rights, in other countries little has changed or there have been setbacks. The report examines issues related to legal gender recognition, employment non-discrimination, and freedom of expression and assembly for LGBT people. It concludes that further improvements are still needed in legislation across Europe to combat LGBT discrimination.
Your forensics team of professionals has been asked to provide t.docxtaishao1
Your forensics team of professionals has been asked to provide the forensic plan and e-evidence acquisition strategy so European Union (EU) legal representatives can approve it as part of a pre-trial discovery process investigating an international corporate intellectual property case. The civil case revolves around a chemical design cleared for use in the U.S. for insect control in agriculture, is now being mass-produced and used by a E.U. member state being A preliminary investigation by corporate investigators find a former employee may have left and carried the design to a E.U. competitor. Without this e-evidence acquisition strategy, EU legal representatives will not be capable of imaging the suspect drive, analyze the data/email collected, or transporting the evidence to the United States.
In the Small Group area, your team professionals should discuss the following 2 topics. All members of the group should have input to answer these questions in preparation for drafting.
What are the legal procedures for forensic collection, preservation, and transport to ensure that the EU legal representatives will approve the forensics plan?
Provide an outline of a plan that takes into account adherence to the EU directive and the use of e-discovery technology to capture email and attachments without violating privacy laws.
After interacting with the team to discuss the legal procedures and the outline of the plan you should provide a 5-6-page Word document with following structure and content:
Group member #1:
An introduction to the contents of the report
A forensic plan and e-evidence acquisition strategy that can be approved by EU legal representative
Group member #2:
Detailed evidence collection, preservation, and transport procedures to ensure that the EU legal representatives will approve the forensics plan
Group member #3 and #4:
An outline of a plan that takes into account adherence to the EU directive and the use of e-discovery technology to capture forensic IP data without violating privacy laws
A conclusion summarizing the key points of the report
A reference list in APA format
Consider the changes that occur in U.S. and foreign governments as it relates to privacy and data.
Sources should be properly cited in APA format. 5-6 pages
...
The document summarizes responses to terrorism from various governments and international organizations. It outlines the UK's airport security measures, counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST, and counter-terrorism laws. It discusses the US-led war on terror, detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and France declaring a state of emergency after the Paris attacks. It also summarizes counter-terrorism efforts by the UN, NATO, and European Union through intelligence sharing, international cooperation, and military assistance.
Policy Brief on Europe's "Right to be Forgotten"William Nyikuli
This policy brief is an overview of the European Union's proposed policies on digital privacy as announced on January 25, 2012. It has been prepared for the benefit of US business interests as represented by the US Chamber of Commerce
1. The United States
Department of the Treasury
TERRORIST FINANCE
TRACKING PROGRAM
Questions and Answers
After the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, the United States
Department of the Treasury initiated
the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program (TFTP) to identify, track,
and pursue terrorists – such as Al-
Qaida – and their networks. An
agreement between the European
Union (EU) and the United States
(US) on the transfer and processing of
data for purposes of the TFTP entered
into force on August 1, 2010. This
document is intended to answer many
of the most common questions about
the TFTP and the Agreement.
2. Q.1: What is the value of the TFTP?
A.1: Since its inception in 2001, the TFTP has provided valuable lead
information that has aided in the prevention of many terrorist attacks
and in the investigation of many of the most visible and violent terrorist
attacks and attempted attacks of the past decade, including, for example:
• the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings;
• threats to the 2012 London Summer Olympic games;
• the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to
the US;
• the 2011 attacks in Norway conducted by Anders Breivik;
• the Nigerian Independence Day car bombings in Abuja, Nigeria
in 2010;
• the Jakarta hotel attacks in 2009;
• hijacking and hostage operations by Al Shabaab, including the
hijacking of the Belgian vessel MV Pompei in 2009;
• the attacks in Mumbai in 2008;
• the Islamic Jihad Union plot to attack sites in Germany in 2007;
• the plan to attack New York’s John F. Kennedy airport in 2007;
• the liquid bomb plot against transatlantic aircraft in 2006;
• the bombings in London in 2005;
• the Van Gogh terrorist-related murder in the Netherlands
in 2004;
• the Madrid train bombings in 2004; and
• the Bali bombings in 2002.
A significant number of the leads generated by the TFTP have been
shared with EU Member State Governments, with more than 2,000 such
reports shared through February 28, 2014.
Q.2: What European bodies approved the Agreement?
A.2: Following the completion of negotiations, the Agreement was approved
by the European Commission. The Agreement was then approved by the
Council of the European Union and signed by the US and the EU on June
28, 2010. The European Parliament gave its consent to the Agreement on
July 8, 2010. The Agreement entered into force on August 1, 2010.
Q.3: Have any reviews of the TFTP taken place?
A.3: Yes. In February 2011 and again in October 2012, officials from the EU
and US conducted a Joint Review of the implementation and effectiveness
of the Agreement, pursuant to Article 13 of the Agreement. In accordance
with the Agreement, the EU delegations included European Commission
officials, two data protection experts from EU member state data
3. protection authorities, and a judicial expert from Eurojust. In March 2011
and December 2012, the European Commission issued reports prepared
by the EU delegations of the Joint Review teams. Those reports are
available on the European Commission’s website: ec.europa.eu.
The US Government agrees with the Commission reports’ joint review
findings s that the operation and implementation of the Agreement
are consistent with the US commitment to implement the robust
data protection safeguards contained in the Agreement. The US
Treasury Department will also carefully consider the EU delegations’
recommendations as it continues to implement the Agreement.
In addition, an independent person appointed by the EU conducted two
reviews of the TFTP. Reports issued by the independent person in 2008
and in early 2010 concluded that the US had implemented significant and
effective controls and safeguards which ensure respect for the protection
of personal data. The reports also stated that TFTP leads shared with EU
authorities had not only been extremely valuable in investigating terrorist
attacks which have taken place in Europe over the eight years preceding
the reports, but had also been instrumental in preventing a number of
terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere.
Q.4: How does the TFTP operate?
A.4: Under the TFTP, the US Treasury Department issues administrative
production orders (Requests) to the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), an international member-owned
cooperative providing communications services to financial institutions,
for narrow sets of financial messaging data transmitted between SWIFT
customers which are relevant to terrorism investigations. Requests are
narrowly tailored based on past or current analyses of relevant message
types, geography, and perceived terrorism threats. The subsets of data
transferred to the US Treasury Department pursuant to the Requests are
subject to strict security measures and cannot be read or browsed, nor
can they be searched, except where various elaborate safeguards (detailed
below) are satisfied.
Under the Agreement, the US Treasury Department provides a copy
of any Request for data to be transmitted from the EU, along with any
supplemental documents, to Europol to verify whether the Request
clearly identifies the data requested, is narrowly tailored, substantiates
the necessity of the data, and does not seek Single Euro Payments Area
data. Once that verification occurs, Europol so notifies the data provider
and the data provider transmits the data to the US Treasury Department.
The US Treasury Department has coordinated closely with Europol since
the implementation of the Agreement, including by providing additional
clarifying information in response to Europol inquiries.
4. Q.5: What are the safeguards protecting the data?
A.5: President Obama has made the protection of privacy and civil liberties
a top priority. Consistent with this decision, and in accordance with
past practice, the US Treasury Department has applied extraordinarily
strict controls over the data to ensure data security and integrity, as well
as necessary and proportionate processing of data. Safeguards in the
Agreement include the following:
• Data are maintained in a physically secure, stand-alone computer
network – not connected to any other data system – and subject
to highly limited access rights.
• Data may be searched only for counter-terrorism purposes and
not for any other type of criminal activity or for any other pur-
pose, including counter-proliferation.
• No search may be conducted on data unless a TFTP investigator
provides pre-existing information demonstrating a nexus between
the subject of the search and terrorism or its financing.
• The TFTP may not be used for data mining or any other type of
algorithmic or automated profiling or computer filtering.
• Detailed logs are maintained of all searches made, including the
nexus to terrorism or its financing required to initiate the search.
• A select group of independent overseers, including two persons
appointed by the EU, have access to and authority to review all
searches of the provided data undertaken by a TFTP investigator.
Independent overseers can block searches if they do not satisfy all
of the safeguards.
• The EU and the US jointly review the implementation of the
Agreement – with particular regard to the safeguards, controls,
and reciprocity provisions set out in the Agreement – on a regular
basis, and the European Commission thereafter presents a report
on the review to the European Parliament and the Council.
Reports issued in 2008 and early 2010 by an independent person
appointed by the EU concluded that the US had satisfied strict data
protection safeguards. In conjunction with the publication of the
2011 report prepared by the EU delegation of the Joint Review team,
EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström confirmed
the fulfillment of the data protection safeguards, stating that the
“report shows that all the relevant elements of the agreement have been
implemented in accordance with its provisions, including the data
protection provisions.”
An external auditing firm appointed by the data provider continues to
perform a separate, independent audit. The external auditors have full
access to all TFTP systems and personnel.
5. Q.6: What redress provisions are available to EU citizens and residents?
A.6: Under the Agreement, persons may seek access to data, including a
confirmation whether their data protection rights have been respected and
whether improper processing of their personal data has occurred, as well
as rectification, erasure, or blocking of inaccurate data. Requests for data,
confirmations, or rectification may be submitted to the relevant European
national data protection authority, which shall transmit the requests to
the privacy officer of the US Treasury Department. After an appropriate
review, the privacy officer then must: (a) inform the relevant European
national data protection authority whether personal data may be disclosed
to the data subject or whether data have been rectified, as appropriate;
(b) confirm whether the data subject’s rights have been duly respected;
and (c) where access to personal data is refused based on reasonable
exemptions from disclosure or rectification is refused, explain the refusal
in writing and provide information on the means available for seeking
administrative and judicial redress in the United States.
The Agreement further provides that any person who considers his or
her personal data to have been processed improperly may seek effective
administrative or judicial redress in accordance with the laws of the EU,
its Member States, and the US. The US Treasury Department will treat
all persons equally in the application of its administrative processes,
regardless of nationality or country of residence.
All persons, regardless of nationality or country of residence, have
available under US law a process for seeking judicial redress from an
adverse administrative action. The Administrative Procedure Act,
for example, provides a process for persons, regardless of nationality
or country of residence, who have suffered harm as a result of a US
Government action to seek judicial review of that action. Other examples
of relevant laws providing for non-discriminatory judicial redress include
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which authorizes persons who
suffer damage or loss by reason of a violation of the Act to maintain
a civil action against the violator, including, as appropriate, a US
Government official, to obtain damages or other relief, and the Freedom
of Information Act, which allows persons to utilize administrative and
judicial processes to seek Government information.
Q.7: What does rectification mean in the context of the TFTP?
A.7: The TFTP Agreement provides that data provided to the US Treasury
Department “shall not be subject to any manipulation, alteration, or
addition.” Accordingly, in the unlikely event that it is notified of an error
in the financial payments messaging data provided to the US Treasury
Department that warranted rectification, the Treasury Department will
take appropriate steps to prevent the future use or dissemination of the
erroneous data, and will annotate any existing documents produced from
the erroneous data. To date, no such erroneous data have been discovered.
6. Q.8: How can I find out more about available redress options?
A.8: The US Treasury Department has made available on its website a
document detailing the procedures for seeking redress under the
Agreement (see “Redress Procedures for Seeking Access, Rectification,
Erasure, or Blocking,” available at treasury.gov/tftp). For additional
information or inquiries regarding procedures for seeking access,
rectification, erasure, blocking, or redress under the Agreement, you may
also contact the US Department of the Treasury or your national data
protection authority (“NDPA”). Contact information for each NDPA
in each EU Member State can be found via the official website of the
European Commission at ec.europa.eu.
Q.9: To whom should requests for access, rectification, erasure, or
blocking be sent?
A.9: Appropriate requests for access, rectification, erasure, or blocking should
be transmitted by the relevant NDPA to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Privacy, Transparency, & Records of the US Treasury Department
or an appropriate delegate at the following address: Director, Office of
Privacy and Civil Liberties, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (ATTN:
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 8125), Washington, DC 20220.
Q.10: How long are data stored under the TFTP?
A.10: The US has agreed to destroy data after five years, which is the same time
period the EU uses under Directive 2005/60/EC (on the prevention of
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing) and Regulation (EC) No. 1781/2006 (on information
on the payer accompanying transfers of funds). Leads generated for use
in specific matters are retained for no longer than necessary for specific
investigations or prosecutions for which they are used.
In addition, the Agreement required the EU and the US to prepare a
joint report regarding the value of TFTP data, with particular emphasis
on the value of data retained for multiple years and relevant information
obtained from the Joint Review conducted pursuant to the Agreement.
That joint report on the TFTP’s value, transmitted by the European
Commission to the European Parliament and Council in November
2013, concluded: “Taking into account both the unique value of
historical data and its prevalence among the TFTP leads, the reduction
of the TFTP data retention period to anything less than five years would
result in significant loss of insight into the funding and operations of
terrorist groups.” That report is available at ec.europa.eu.
Q.11: I heard that the TFTP may be the reason my bank blocked
a transaction to my account and my goods were stopped at a
border crossing. Is that possible?
A.11: No. The TFTP cannot interdict or view “live” transactions as they occur;
instead, it involves a narrow review of specific, terrorism-related financial
7. transactions that already have occurred in order to further investigations
of terrorist plots and activity.
Q.12: Does the US send an EU customer’s transaction data to countries
outside of the EU?
A.12: The US shares counter-terrorism leads generated by the TFTP with
relevant Governments for counter-terrorism purposes only. We do this
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which
includes provisions stating:
• that States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the commis-
sion of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to
other States by exchange of information;
• that States shall afford one another the greatest measure of as-
sistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal
proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts;
• that States should find ways of intensifying and accelerating the
exchange of operational information;
• that States should exchange information in accordance with
international and domestic law; and
• that States should cooperate, particularly through bilateral and
multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and sup-
press terrorist attacks and to take action against perpetrators of
such attacks.
The Agreement limits the transfer to third countries of EU persons’ data
and authorizes such transfers only for counter-terrorism purposes and
subject to a variety of additional safeguards.
Q.13: Is the US assisting the EU to develop an equivalent to the TFTP?
A.13: If the EU decides to establish an EU system, the US has agreed to
provide assistance and advice to contribute to the system’s effective
establishment, and US and EU authorities would cooperate to ensure
the complementariness and efficiencies of the US and EU systems in a
manner that further enhances citizens’ security.