STRIDE is a popular threat modeling technique commonly used to dis.docx

STRIDE is a popular threat modeling technique commonly used
to discover the security weaknesses of a software system.
For this assignment (a) research and discuss the limitations
associated with STRIDE, (b) Create your own attack tree using
the example in Chapter 4 "Example Attack Tree" p95 as a
reference point, (c) research and discuss the limitations
associated with attack trees and attack libraries. Please state
your answer in a 1- 4 page paper in APA format. Include
citations and sources in APA style.
Grading Criteria Assignments
Maximum Points
Meets or exceeds established assignment criteria
40
Demonstrates an understanding of lesson concepts
20
Clearly presents well-reasoned ideas and concepts
30
Uses proper mechanics, punctuation, sentence structure,
spelling and APA structure.
10
Total
100
CHAPTER 13
. [ Imperative
The Categorica
Im manuel Kant

. h 11 iges to morality, we turn next to 'd . d ranous c a e, . . . I
• ,
J-lwing cons1 crc . 1 theo ries compeung exp anat,ons ' . ortant
mor a '
some of the most 1111P .
1
d others are wrong. One of t he most · . • . are ng 11 an
ofwhvcrrta111 actions . tint developed by the German phi-
, . II I ical systems is ' . .
infl11cn11al of a ct 1 (J?<J4_1804), a dominant figure 111 the
hi story
losophcr ln11n anuel Kant ;se his views arc not easy to grasp, I
shall
of modern philosophy. Bcca1
r b . f overview of them. . d d
of,cr a ne
1
.. 1 vorth of an act ion is to be JU ge not by
K . . rs that t 1e mor ,1 ' . . ant '11 gu
1 1
. turc of the max im or pr111 c1ple that moli-
. • • 1enccs but JY I ie na . •
11s conscqi . · .· It 1•,ons arc not necessarily those with favor-I
I . won Thus 11g 1 ac ' .
vatec I ie '1 · b L those performed in accordance with correct
·,ble consequences 11 • K h
' . ·8 1 . ·I 111.1xims are correc t? Accordmg to ant, t e only
maxims. ut w 11c 1 , · · . h

. I e tli·11 can serve as u111versal laws because t ey are correc
t ones are t 10s , · .
I. bl · I L except ion to every person at any ume. In other app
IGI e Wit 1011 • . . .
d I Id act Ollly 011 a max im that can be umversahzed w1th-wor
s. you s 1ou ·
ou1 co~trndiction.
To sec what Kant has in mind, consider a specific example he
uses to
illusira1c his view. Suppose you need to borrow money, but it
will be lent
to you only if you promise to pay it back. You realize, however,
that you
will not be able to honor the debt. ls it permissible fo r you to
promise to
repay the money, knowing you will not keep the promise? Kant
argues
th at doing so is not permissible because if it were a universa l
law that
promises could be made with no intention of keepi ng them,
then the
practice of promising would be destroyed.
Kant refers to his supreme moral principle as the "categorical
imperative•-categorical because it does not depend on anyone's
par-
ticular desires, and an imperative because it is a com mand of
reason.
Kant also claims that the ca tegorical imperative can be refo
rmulated as
~m l~manuel Ka 111 , Gro,mdwork for the Metaphysirs of
Morals, 1ransla1ed by Arnulf Zweig.
pyng it (:) 2002. Reprinted by permission of Oxford Uni1·ersity

Press.
102
•
C IIAPT!cl{ 13 TllE C:ATJ•;(;()JUC:AI. JMl't: J<ATJVt: J03
('ollows: So act that you trea t human ity, whether in your ow11
perso11 or
,n any other person, always at the sa me time as a11 end. 11evrr
merely a~
a mea ns. Using this version, Kant argues that a ckccit.ful
promise- is im-
moral because a person making such a prom ise is using another
person
on ly as a mea ns, not treating that indivi dual as an e nd , a
ratio nal being
worthy of respect.
It is impossible to imagine anything at a ll in the wo rld , o r
even h eyond
it, that can b e called good without q ualifi cation- except a
Kood will.
Intelligence, wit,judge me nt, and the other men tal ta le nts ,
whateve r
we m ay call them , or courage, decisiveness, and p e rseve ra n
ce, are, as
qua lities of temperament, certainly good and d esirable in many
re-
spects; but th ey can also be extre mely bad and h armful whe n
th e will
which makes use of these gifts of naLu rP a nd whose specific
quality
we refe r to as character, is not good. It is exactly th e same
with gifts of
fortune. Power, wealth , ho nou r, even health a nd th a t total

well-being
a nd contentment with one's co ndition which we call "h a
ppiness," can
make a person bold but conseque ntly often reckless as we ll ,
unless a
good will is present to correct their influe n ce on the mind,
thus ad-
justing the whole principle of one's action to render it co
nformab le to
universal ends. It goes without saying that the sight o f a
creature e n-
j oying uninterrupted prosperity, but never feeli ng the slightest
pull
of a pure and good wi ll, ca nnoL excite approval in a rationa l
and im-
partial spec tator. Consequently, a good will seems Lo
constitute th e
indispensable condition even of o ur wo rthin ess to be h appy.
Some qualiti es, even though th ey are h elpful to thi s good will
a nd ca n m a ke its task very much easier, neve rtheless have no
intrin-
sic unconditional worth. Ra ther, th ey pres uppos e a good wi ll
whi c h
puts limits on the es teem in which they a re rightly held and
forbids
us to regard them as abso lutely good. Mode ra tio n in emotio n
s and
passio ns, self-control, and sober reflection are n o t only good
in
many respects: they may even seem to co nstitute part of th e
inne r
worth of a person. Yet they are far from being properly d
escribed as
good without qualification (however unconditionally th ey were
prized by the ancients). For without the principles of a good

will
those qualit ies may beco me exceedingly bad; th e passionless
co m -
posu re of a villain makes him not merely more dangerous but a
lso
direc tl y more detestable in our eyes than we would h ave take
n him
to b e without it.
A good will is not good because of its e ffec ts or
accomplishments,
a nd no t b ecause of its adequacy to achieve a ny proposed end:
it is good
l
10•1
p,l(r 11 I
TllfORll•: S
~!ORA .
. . •. rood in itsdf'. Co11sidered in
. 1· ' I hat ,s. ,1 ,s g . I .
• ·t ,c 0 fits ll'il mg- . 1 .. 1bl)' Ingber t 1an a11yth111g it onh
hy , ·11 t . . . I . s i11co111p,1 ' . . . . . ...
. · . . . 10 he 1rcas111t c ,1. . . 1,. 10 sausly some
111cl111<1t1on or ,tsdf 11 ts ·el)' 111 01 ct I • • • • • • ,
I . , . brino ahoul JllCI . _1
. . 1-0 11 s. Evc11 ii 1t wu c Lo happen coulc e,c1 i.. . I f ·tll in
c ,n,1 ' . . .

. . 1-,. the s111n tot,t
O
' 1. 'lllll'tte lace or the miserl y b<'-if you ,,_r , iicularlv 1111
o1 ,
I . 1 because ot solllC P·
11 ·
1
. , •ill were completely powerless Lo
t i,1. ·I , n·11111c. t 11s ' . ·11 .
. . 1 ir ·i stcp-11101 hct ) ' . . 1 nos! effort tl st I accomplisiiect
qu( s < • • • ith c,·cn it s 11 1 • .
("UT)' out its a1111s; if w I ·11 'tsclf rc mai11cd (not, of
course, as a
• . ) , r()l)( WI I . . • . .
noihing, so that on) g . irofcvcry 111cans 1110111 poe1), even
. · ·1hes111111110111nl'l . ·· t . . 1 ·
me re wish , but ,ts . . . , ·I ,listell in ,ts ow11 11g 1t, as somet
11ng
. lcts1ill hkcaJc c,g
then 11 wou · · . : . .
11
.
. 1· II •01'lh 111 itse . . . . . I I . . · 11·
tint has 11s 11 11 •111 of -1 will es t1111a J e 111 Ilse and • . I
. 1, ,,Jo1J1hc co11 cc • .
We 11111s1 I Hts cc(:: . This co11cept 1s aln:ady present in

. f · . t}' furl her atlll. · . .
good apa1 I 10 111 '
11
.
1 1
.. 1 reotiircs 11 ot so muc h 111stn1cuon as
I I ' Ith)' llllll( ' w ]I( l ' I . the na111ra , ,ca .
1
. . icetJt that alwa)'S ho lds the h1ghes1
. ·'f' . · l ft IS t m COi . :
merely cl,u I ic,ll_
101
·
1
oi·th of our actions and II co ns11111tes
• . . · . 1 no the Iota w .
place 111 (
st1111
•
1
.' n
1
. . 1 el 115 1 hen take up th e co ncept of rluly 1·t'nolall11e
1est. " · . '
th(' rotK 1 10 . 1 ·11 the htte r h o wever be ing- here whirh

includes that of a gooc w1 , ' . ,
. • . · , 1· ·ntions and obstacles. These, so far from
unde r rrrta111 sub1ccuve urn • . .
. . 1 ·1·1 - . 1· ·gruisitl" it rather bnng tt out by co ntrast and
h1d1ng a gooc w1 o1 c ts ·. n '
make it shine forth more bnghtly. .. . . . . .
• 1 I I )tlie,·s where one ca n , and bes ides this many It 1s a c
uty to 1e p l . .
. . ass·1011-1tel)' dis1Josed that, without any further souls arc
so com p · ' . .
· 1· . ·t • • selt~·,n1ercst th ey find an inn e r pleasure 111
spread-mouvc o ,an1 y 01 , .
· · . c tt1,. 111 t·iking delight in the conte ntme nt of others, so
mg J O)' aI0llll ~ ' ' . . .
far as they have brought it about. Yet I ma11~ta1n that,
however dutiful
a nd kind an action of this sort may be , II still has n o ge
numcly moral
worth. 11 is 011 a lc·el with other inclinations-for exa mple,
the inclina-
tion to pursue honour, which if' fortunate enough to _aim at
something
generally use f'ul and co nsistelll with duty, someth111 g
conseq uently
honourable, clcsern::s praise and e ncouragemenL but not
esteem. For
its maxim lacks the moral me rit o f such actions done not out
of incli-
nat ion but nut or duty. Suppose I hen that the mind of th is h
umanitar-
ian were overclouded by sorrows of his own which exting uish
ed a ll

co mpassion for th e fate or others, but that he stil l had the
power to
assist o thers in distress; suppose though that I he ir a dve rsity
no longer
stirred him , because he is preocrnp ie d with his own ; and now
imag-
ine that, though no longer m1wed by any inclin a ti o n , he n
eve rtheless
tears himself out of this deadly apath y and does th e action
without
a ny inclination , so lel y out of duty. Then for the first time his
action
has its genuine moral worth. Furthermo re , if nature had p111
little
C:l!AP'fER 13 TJIE CATECORICAJ. JMPEl<ATIV~. J05
sympathy into this or that person's h ea rt; if he, though an hon
est
JJ1at1, were cold in tempera m e nt and indifferent to the
sufferings of
others-perhaps because h e has the special gifts of patience and
for-
tiLUde in his own su fferings and he assumes or even demands
the
same of others; if suc h a man (who would in truth not be the
worst
product of nature) were not exactly fashioned by nat.ure to be a
hu-
manitarian, would he not still find in himse lf a source from
which he
might give himself a worth far higher than that of a good-
natured
temperament? Assured ly he wou ld . It is precisely in this that
the
worth of character begins to show-a moral worth , and

incompara-
bly the highest-namely, that he does good , not out of
inclination,
but out of duty .. . .
The moral worth of an action done out of duty has its mora l
worth , not in the objective to be reac hed by that action , but in
the
maxim in accordance with which the action is d ecided upon ; it
de-
p e nds , therefore, not on a c tualizing the object of the actio n
, but
solely on the princi/Jle of volition in accordance with which the
action
was clone, without any regard for o~jects of the facu lty of
desire. It is
clear from our previous discussion that th e objectives we may
have in
acting, and also our actions' e ffe c ts considered as ends and as
what
motivates our volition , can give to actions no unconditional o r
moral
worth. Where th e n can this wo rth be found if not in th e
willing of
the action 's hoped for e ffect ? It can be found nowhere but in
the prin-
ciple of the will, irrespective of the ends that can be brought
about by
s uch action . .. .
Duty is the necessity of rm act don f' out of respect for the law.
While I can
certainly have an inclination fo r an object that results from my
pro-
pose d action , I can never respect it, precisely because it is
nothing but

an effect of a will and not its ac tivity. Similarly I cannot
respect a ny
inclination whatsoever, whether it be my own inclination or that
of
a nother. At most I ca n approve of that towards which I feel an
inclina-
tion , a nd occasionally I can like the object of somebody else's
inclina-
tion myself-that is, see it a s conducive to my own advantage.
But the
o nly thing that could be an o~ject of respect (and thus a
command-
ment) for me is something that is cortjoined with my will purely
as a
ground and never as a consequence , something that does not
serYe
m y inclination but overpowers it or a t least excludes it entirely
from
m y dec ision-making-conseque ntly, nothing but the law itself.
Now if
an action clone o ut of duty is supposed to exclude totally the
influ-
ence of inclination, and , a long with inclination, every object
of voli-
tion , then nothing remains that could determine the will except
tOli . resf1rct for this practi cal law . (vely jll/.1C 1·1 .
1
•111d subjec
1 bey this sort o aw eve n when
·ectivcl}' !hi' /rw ' , . the maxim, to o. .
oq] - f therefore is inclinations. .

What 1s le t . .1·1c1·.11 to all 111}' . lefJe nds neithe r on th e
res ult · • Jf C)llll ' • I 1011 C
doing so is I · ·al worth of an ,ic i·inciple of ac tio n that has to
Tl . the m
0 • . on any P 1115 · tli ·~t action no• d i·esult. For a ll these
results
cl frolll ' • pecte ·
rxpectc . oti vc from this ex .1 •t' on or even th e prom otion of
.. w 1ts Ill . ble con111 1
h011 0 , 0 11, 11 pleas111 a I een bro ught about by other (. ch
,1s one s ) ild have ) . . sn . css of oth ers cot . tlie will of a
ratio na l bemg to
I c happ1n . . d t require .
t 1 • • ~ell. It woul no .
1
will that the highest and un-
causcs ,1s , . . . only 10 sue 1 a . d I .
d
. them but 1t is . d Th t pre-eminent goo w 11ch we
pro ucc ' I , foun . a . .
d·tional good can Jt . othing but the idm of the law 111 con I " •
.• therefore in n . . f .
. 11 "moral consi
sts l • 1 n rational bring- so a r as th at r,1 . 1 · tnes1ml on Y
11 . .
. If which certain Y 15 1 . th e determ111111g ground of the 1t
sc , cted resu t, 1s .

•c103 ancl not an expc d . I ready prese nt 111 the person who 1
, , • . . • it goo 1s a .
will. And 1h1s p1e-cin_mei .. . d . e need not await the res ult
of the
. ' ·1ccord ancc with this • ea, w arts 11 , .
· ·der to fi nd it. · · · · } I O I · art ion Ill OJ · ·k. . . ccord ance
wit 1 aws. n y a rat 10-
. · . . (llf(' WOI S 111 a .
Everythin g 111 11 '1 • . accord ance wi th the idea of laws-
.. I . . the power to ac t. m .
nal being ms . . • !es- and thus h as a will. . . .
. . I nee with pnnc1p . .
that 1s, rn accorc a . . . ci'ple in so fa r as it constrams a will,
•c1 ,. f . 1 ob1ec11ve pnn , · . . Th(' 1 c,i O '11 ·. c1· ( f reason)
and the formul au on of thts
is rail ed a comman menl o . '
. . d ent is ca ll ed an Imperauve. . . . .
comm,ui m . d either hypoth etically or categon cally.
All imperattvcs comman • . .
• 1 · .. · ·s declare a possible act10n to be p ractically
Hypotheuca 1mpe1 auve. . .
. to tlie ·ltlainment of somethmg else th at one necessary as a
means ' . .
wants (o;. that one may want). A categori ~al •_mperauve woul
d ~e one
that represe nted an action as itself obJecllvely necessary,
without
regard to any further encl. . .

Since every pract ical law presents a possible action as good
and
therefore as necessary for a subjec t whose actions are
determtned by
reason, all imperatives are therefore formula e for determining
an
action which is necessa ry according to the principle of a wi II
in some
way good. If the action would be good only as a mea ns to so
mething
else, the imperative is hypoth etical; if th e action is thought of
as good
in itself and therefore as necessary for a will which of itself
conforms
to reason as its principle, th en the imperative is categorical. . .
.
There is: however, one end that we may presuppose as actua l in
all
r~uonal berngs (so far as they are dependent bein gs to who m i
mpera-
uves ap~ly); and thus there is one aim which they not on ly
might have,
but which we can assume with certai nty that they all do have
.., p
C II A l'T l-:l< I ; ·11ft. C:ATH;O J<l C:A f. I M l'El< AT J V
t .
l07
by a n ec_essi ty 01_· n atu~e and _ th at a im is f1e_1/ecl
hrl/1/lir~m- ·1:hc_hy~o-
th e tical tmperative wh ich affi rms th e prac ti cal necessit y of
a n ,tc t 11 ,_11

. s a means to the promotio n of perfect ha ppiness is a n
asserton c
d 1·
impe rative. We must not characte rize it as necessa r y merely
or ~oir'.~
uncertai n, merely possible purpose, but as necessary fo r a p1
11 po~c
that we can presuppose a priori a nd with ce rta inty to be
presen t 111
ever yone beca use it belongs to the esse nce o f huma n be ings.
Now we
can call skill in the choice of the mea ns to o ne 's own great~:st
well-
being "prude nce" in the na r rowes t sense of th e word . So th
e 1rn pe 1:a-
tive co ncerning the choice of mea ns to one 's ow n happiness-
t~a t •>
the precept of pntde nce- still remains hypoth eti cal; th e ac u o
n is
comma nd ed not absolutely but on ly as a mea ns to a fu rt he r
end . .
Fina lly, there is one im perative wh ic h co mm a nds a certain
line ol
conduct di rec tly, witho ut assuming o r being condi tion a l o n
any fw_·-
ther goal to be reac hed by th at conduct. T his im pe rat ive is
catego'.·1-
cal. It is concerned not with the material of the ac ti o n and rts
anticipated result, but with its form an d with t he p rinciple
from
wh ich th e action itself results. And what is esse ntia ll y good
in t h e
action consists in the [age nt's] d ispositio n, wha teve r th e

resu lt may
be. This imperative may be called the imperative o f mora li ty .
. ..
The question now a rises "How arc a ll these imperatives
possible?n
This questi on does not ask how an ac tio n commanded by th e
im pera-
tive can be performed , but merely how we can un de rsta nd th
e con-
stra ining of the will, which im peratives exp ress in setting us a
task.
How a n imperative of skill is possible req ui res no special
discussion.
Whoever wills the end also wills (so far as reaso n h as dec
isive in flu-
ence on his actions) the means which are ind ispensably
necessary
a nd in his power. .. .
Hy con tras t, "How is t he imperative o f mora lity p oss ibl e?
n is
beyo nd all doub t the one q uestion in need of soluti o n . Fo r
th e
mo ral impe rati ve is in no way hypo th e tica l, a nd conseq ue
ntl y t h e
o bj ecti ve necessity, which it a ffi r ms, ca nn o t be suppo rte
d by a ny
p res uppositio n, as was the case with hypo th et ica l im perati
ves. Bu t
we must n eve r fo rge t tha t it is imp ossible to sett le b y a n y
exa m -
ple , i.e.: ., e m pirically, whether there is any impe ra tive of
thi s kin d
at a ll ; we sh ould rather worry th a t all imperatives that seem
to be

catego r ical may ye t be hy p o th et ical in some hi d d e n
way. For
example , wh e n it is said , "You must a bstain from making
dece it-
ful prom ises ," one assumes t hat th e necessity for this abs tent
ion is
no t mere adv ice so as to avo id som e fu r ther evil-as tho u gh
t h e
meaning of wh at was said was, Yo u o ugh t not to ma ke a
dece it ful
. ou destroy your cre dit. On
o 1iuht, y b 'd
JOB
•t comes t o Id hwe to e cons1 ered as
. wh en 1 . k' d wou ' . '
Prorn1se lest, tion of this 111 I prohibition would be there-. f'
an ac . e oft 1e . .
the conua . ' d he imperauv
I
an show with certamty that
. If an t . mp e c,
bad in itse '. I Ere n so, no exa lelY by the law without an)'
tegonca • . d here so . c . .
fore ca uld be determine . a. a ear to b e so; 1or 1t 1s always
the will wo .. ti·on although it 111'
1

) ppalso hidden dread o f other
1 111 ouva • per rnps furt 1er I cear of disgrace, I e will. ·who
can prO·e bv cx-
'ble t 1at l' • fl ience t l '
possi nconsciously in t e; For e xperie n ce s h ows only
isks may u . e of a caus ·
r . ' the non-ex1stenc h a case howe,·e r, th e so-called
Penence . ·t In sue ' ' ' . do not perceive 1 · a rs to be ca
tegoncal and un -
that we . · 1 as such appe, . .· . .
I ·n1perauve, whic
1
1
pi·ag mauc presc r rptr o n ca llrn g
mora 1 . f 1 be on Y a ' . •
d ' tional. would rn ac d merely 111stru c t1n g u s to take
con •. to our own advant age an
attenuon
this into account. · · · . . .. tire as such, I d o not know before-
. / ,11 ti ellcal unper a . . . .
If! tlunk ofa 1Yr 0 1 -1 1 am gi,·en ns condrtron. But rf . ·11
tain-not unu . .
hand what Jl wr con . . 1 know right awav wha t It cont a m s.
·cal 1111pera/lt1e. · .
I think of a categon . . . besides th e Jaw. only the necessrt,·
. . rauve contarns, ·

For since thrs impe h' law while the law, as we h m·e seen,
. onform to t rs ' '
that the maxim c_ . . . . .t there is nothing le ft O'er to which
• 1druon lrm1ung 1 , . . contams no cor . Id corm except the
u111,·ersaln,· ofa law
. f acuon shou con 1, .
the maxim~ . h' formit,· that the imperall'l' asscrcs to be
as such; and Jl rs only t is con .
necessary._ c . 1 .- one categorical imperati,·e and it is this:
There rs there,01 e on ~ . , . . .
1 .· b)' which rnu can at the sa me t1111t 11 Ill th ,tt "Act only
on t mt maxim .
it should become a universal law." • • ·
We shall now enumerate some duties .. • • . . _ _
I A feels sick oflife as the result of a mounun g scn cs of nllS-.
man
fortunes that has reduced him to hopelessness, but he still
posses ·cs
enough of his reason to ask himself whether it wo uld 11 01 be
rnntra rT
w his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he tests wh e th
e r the
maxim of hi s action could really become a unive rsa l law o f'
nature.
His maxim, however, is: "I make it my principle out of
sclf~lm·c to
shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it
promises
advantage." The only further question is whe the r this pri11

ciple of
sel f-love can become a universal law of nature. But one set's at
o nce
that a nature whose law was that the very same feeling 111 c,lllt
to pro-
mote life should actually destroy life would contradi c t it sc i r.
and
hence would not endu re as nature. The maxim the refore co uld
no t
possibly be~ g~neral law of nature and thus it wholl y co
ntradicts the
supreme pnnople of all duty.
C II Al'TER 1:1 THE CATE<;o 1uc.-1 1. l ~ll' ER ,'I 11· t: 109
2. A n o the r finds himself driven by need to borrow m o n ey.
H e
kno's ver y well that he will not be a ble to par it back, b ut he
sees too
that nobody will lend him anythi ng unless he fir mly p rom ises
to pay
it back within a fixed time. He wants to m a ke s uch a promise,
but he
still has e n o ug h conscience to ask himself; "Isn't it
impermissible a nd
co ntrary to duty to get o ut o f o ne 's diffi culti es thi s way?"
Suppose,
however, that he did d ec ide to do it. The maxim of h is action
would
run thus: "When I belie ve myself short o f money, I will
borrow m o ne y
a nd promise to pay it back, en'.n though I know that this will n
ever be
done." Now this princ iple of self~lol'e o r personal advantage
is per-
haps quite compatibl e with my own e111ire future welfare; on

ly th ~•:e
re main s t h e questio n "Is it right?" I t herefore tra n sform
the unfarr
d e mand of sel f-love into a universal law a nd fram e my
question thus:
" I-low wo uld thin gs sta nd if my maxim became a universal
law?" I
th en sec immediately that this maxim ca n never qu a li fy as a
self-
consistc111 unin:rsal law of nat ure, but must necessarily
contradic t
it self. For th e uni,·c rsali ty of a law that per mits anyon e who
believes
himself to be in need to m ake a ny promise he pleases with the
inten-
tion of 11 0 1 keeping it wo uld m a ke promi sing. and the ver
y purpose
one has in p ro misi ng , itself impossible. For no o ne wo uld
believe he
was be in g promised anvt hing, but would laugh at a n y s u ch
uttera nce
as ho llow pretence.
:t .- th ird finds in himself a ta le n t that , with a certa in a m o
unt of
cu lti,·a tion. could make him a useful m an fo r all sorts of
purposes.
But he secs himself in comfortable ci rcu mstan ces, and h e
prefers to
g i'l' him sel f up to pleasme rathe r than to bother about
increasing
a nd impro'ing hi s fortunate na tura l apt itudes. Yet he asks
himself
further "Does my maxim of neglec ting my natural g ifts ,
besides
ag- rl'eing- with mv taste for a muse ment, agree a lso with what

is called
dul·?" I le th en sees that a nature could indeed e ndure unde r
suc h a
uni ,·ersa l law, e,·c n if (li ke the South Sea Island e rs) every
m a n should
let hi s talent s rust and should be bent o n devoting his life
solely to
iclll'nl'ss. amusement. proc reation-in a word , to e rtjoymen t.
Only he
can not possibly will t hat th is sh ould become a uni'e rsal law
of n ature
o r should be implanted in us as su ch a law by a n atu ral
instinct. For
as a ra ti onal being he necessa rily wills that all hi s powers
should be
d<"l'('loped , sin ce they arc after all use ful to him and given to
him for
all surts of' possible purposes.
-L .- fourth man, who is himself flourishing but sees o the rs
wh o
h ;m· to struggle with g reat hardships (and whom he co uld easi
ly
he lp) 1 hinks 10 himself: "'v'hat do I ca re? Let e,·e r y one be
as happy as
L
I nU:ORitS MORA ,
I I 0
. ke himself; I won ' t d e p r ive hirn of
. hecannl<l ll ' k .

H
,en intends 0 1 as 1 . . but I don 't fee 1 e contributing ea, , n
envy 11m, . . l . d' "
thing· I wont eve helping him 111 11s 1st ress! Now
any ' . 11 being or to f
)•thing to his we · . d e i·e a universal law o nature the an I
atutu e w ,
. drnittedly if sue 1 a n '. -i c tly well a nd doubtl ess eve n b e
tter
,l Id survive pe1 e d .
human race cou I ·s about sympathy an good w11l, a nd
' ·vbody c 1atte1 . h b
than when e,ei , . d then to practise t em, ut, wh en
effort now an , .
even makes an . '. _ . dies traffics in huma n n g hts, or vio-
. y with 1t, sw1n , . .
one ca n get awa . B t . !though it is possible that a u111versal
I · 1 other ways. u a . • • . !ates t 1em 11 d . 1 tllis maxim could
exist, 1t 1s impossible . . 1 acco r wit 1
Jaw ofn atui e 11 ' .· . le should h old everywh ere as a law of
to will that such a pi ~ncip ded thi s wou ld be in co nflic t with
itself
For a will that m ten ,
nature. . . . ht arise in which the m a n needs love and
. any situauons m1g .
smce 111
1

. din which by such a law ot nature gener-
. th)' from ot 1ers, a n '
sympa . .11 1 , •ould rob him self of a ll hope of the h elp ated
by l11s ow n w1 ' 1e ,
he wants. · I f h
f the many actual duues-or at east o w at we These are some o .
. .· . .
b I
whose derivation from the single p1111c1ple cited
take to e actua - . .
. · We must be able to will th a t a maxim of our
above 1s perspicuous. . . . .
• h Id b nle a universal law-tlus 1s the authoritative model
acuon s ou eco . .
I· d ing of ac tion genera lly. Some actions are so co nstituted
for mora JU g . • I h · ·
h Ot evel1 Co
nceive without contrad1ct1on t 1at t e1r maxim t at we cann .
be a universal law of nature, let alone that we could will th at
_n _ought
to become one. In the case of oth er actions, we do not find this
mner
impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their m ax im
shou!d
be raised to the universality of a law of nature, b ecau se such a
will
would contradict itself .. . .

lf we now look at ourselves whenever we transgress a duty, we
find
that we in fact do not intend tha t our maxim should become a
uni-
versa l law. For this is impossible for us. What we really in tend
is
rather that its opposi te should remain a law generally; we on ly
take
the liberty of making an exception to it, for ourselves o r (of
course
just this once) to satisfy our inclinat ion. Co nsequently if we
we ighed
it all up from one and the same perspective-that of reason - we
should fin d a contradiction in ou r own wi ll, the contradiction
that
a certain pr inciple should be objectively necessary as a
universa l law
and yet subjectively should not hold uni versally but shou ld a
dm it of
exceptions . . ..
Suppose, however, there were something whose existence in
itself
had an absolute worth , something that, as an end in itselj; could
be a
Cl-l Al'Tt: 1< 13 T Ii l', C:A'fEGCJRICAI. JMl't: «ATIVt: 111
o und of d e finite law · "fh · · · · gr . . s. en rn 1t and rn 1t a
lone, wou ld th e ground
fa. possible categoric I · · o a 1mperat1vc, that is, of a practical
law, reside .
Now I say a h uma1·1 be,· d · · · .' ' . . ng, an 111 general every
rational bemg,

does exist ~s an _end 111 himself, not merely as a means to be
used by this
or tl~at wil l as It pleases. In a ll his ac tions, whe th er th ey a
rc directed
to himself or to ot her rat ion al be in gs, a human being must a
lways
be viewed at the srm'.e time as an end . ... Bei ngs whose ex
istence d e -
p e nds not on ou r will but on na ture still have on ly a re lative
va lu e as
mea n s and are therefore called things, if they lack reason. Ra
tional
b e ings, on the ot her hand, are called /Jersons because, their
nature
already marks them o ut as ends in them selves- th a t is, as
some-
thing which o ught n ot to be used merely as a mea 11 s- and
conse-
quently imposes restr ictio ns on a ll choice mak ing (a nd is an
o~ject
of respect). Persons , therefore, are not merely su~jective e nds
wh ose
existence as a n effect of our act io ns has a va lue for us. They
are objec-
tive ends-that is, things whose ex istence is in itself a n end,
and
indeed a n end such that no other end can be substituted for it, n
o
e nd to whi ch they should serve merely as a means. For if this
were not
so, th ere wou ld be nothing at all having absolute value
anywhere. But
if a ll va lue were conditional, and thus contin ge nt, th e n no
supreme
principle could be fou nd fo r reason at all.

If th e n there is to be a supreme practical principle and a
categori-
cal impera tive for the human wi ll, it must be such that it forms
an
o bjective principle of the will from the idea of something wh
ich is
n ecessarily an end fo r everyone because il is an end in itself, a
principle
tha t can therefore serve as a un iversal practica l law. The
ground of
this pri nciple is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This
is the way
in whic h a human being necessarily conceives his own
existence, and
it is therefore a subjective principle of human actions. But it is
also the
way in which eve ry other rat io n al being conceives his
existence, on
the same rational ground which holds also for me; hence it is a t
the
sa m e time a n objective principle from wh ich , sin ce it is a
supreme prac-
tical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. T
he
prac tical imperative will therefore be the followi ng: Act in
such a way
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any
other f,erson,
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. We
will now see
whe ther this can be ca rried o ut in practice.
Le t u s keep to o ur previous examples.
First, .. . the man who contemplates suicide will ask himself
whethe r

his ac tion could be compatible with the Idea of humanity as an
end
l
I I:!
1•.-1RT II
. If . . rder to escape from a painful situ-
. r s t,unse in o . . .
. .
1
.
1
,ft If he damage . . ·on merely as a means to mamta111 a
111 , .1 .,. . I ' C of a pe1 s . h .
. i he is making i s . l ., d of his life. But a uman bemg is
auo1 . . . If- irs ull L 1e en
tcnhlc state of •1 ' 1 . . 1 e used merely as a means: he must to ,
. 111eth1ng to J . . . .
not a thing-not so_. . I , ·egardcd as an e ncl 111 hunself. Hence
I
· II his act10ns Je I b · ·ilwavs 1n a · ' . being in my own person
, y manning
. , 1· . ·e ol a hunian . . . ,
ca nn ot c 1spos . . . . (I rnnst here forego a more p1 ectse
defini-
. · r killing hun . · d d' corrupung, 0 . . . 11 forestall any m1sun

erstan mg-for . I . . . c11Jlc th,tl wou c .
tion of L us P1 in .
1
. . b .. mputated to save myself or exposing my
I , to Invmg 1111 s a h' d' . t'xamp c. as . ' . reserve it, and so
011-t ts 1scuss1on be-
life to danger 111 orde1 to p
thics proper.) • f • longs toe ·
1
•ho has in mind mak111g a alse promise to
<· lfll)' t ,e man ' .,erm . · · · · , tint he is intending to make
use of another
1 , . wi II see al once , · ot 1e1 s · to ·in end which that perso n
does not share.
Jcrson merel)• as a mrans ' . . . b I ·
1
I seek to use for my own pu1 poses y such a
For the person w wm . h'
. ·sibly agree with my way of treatmg 1m, and so
P
ronuse ca nnot pos . . Tl . . . ' b• .
I
• . 11· ·liarc the end of the acuon. 11s mcompau 1hty
ca nnot 11mse s . .
.

1
h .· ·1pte of duty to others ca n be seen more d1stmctly wll 1 t e
pi inc . .
,
1
e· i, we bring in examples of attacks on the freedom a nd
property
111 . , f'h 'h
I
. I .. Foi· tlic· n it is manifest that a v10 ator o t e ng ts of
O ot 1e 1s.
human beings intends lO use the person of o~hers me_rely as a
means
without taking into considerati on th at, as rauonal _bemgs ,
they must
always al the same time be valued as ends-that 1s, trea ted only
as
beings who musl themselves be able LO share 111 the end of
the very
same ac tion.
'/1iirdly, . . . it is nol enough that an action not conflict with
human-
ity in our ow n person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize
with this
,;ul. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfec
tion that
form pan of nature's purpose for humanity in our own person.
To
neglect these can perhaps be compatible with the survival of
human-

ity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of that end .
Fourthly, . . . the natural end that all human beings seek is their
own perfect happiness. Now the human race might indeed exist
if
everybody comributed nothing to the happiness of others but at
the
~ame _Lime refrained from deliberately impairing it. This
harmoniz-
i~g with humanity as an end in itself would, howeve r, be me
rely nega-
uve and not positive, unless everyone also endeavours as far as
he
~an'. to ('urt~er the ends of o~hers. For the ends of any ;erson
who is
an end 111 h11nsclf must, ti this idea is to have its full effect in
m e be
also, as far as possible, my ends. '
CHAPTER 13 THt: CATF:COR ICA I. IMl't: RAT I Vt: J ) 3
Study Questions
I. According to Kant, what is the only thi ng in t he world that
is good
without limitation ?
2. What does Kant ~ ean by acting from duty?
3. How does Kant differentiate between a hypothetica l and a
cate-
gorical imperative?
4. By what argum ent does Kant seek to prove that the first
formula-
tion of th~ categoric~! imperative demonstrates the immorality

of
your makmg a promise you don't intend to kee p?
-
CHAPTER 4
-=================~=
;;mplijied Account of Kant's Ethics
Onora O'Neill
0nora O'Neill is Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge. In
the
next selection she explains Kant's second formulation of his
categorical
imperative, the requirement that each person be treated as an
end and
never merely as a means.
Kant's moral theory has acquired the reputation of being forbid-
dingly difficult to understand and, once understood, excessively
demanding in its requirements. I don't believe that this reputa-
tion has been wholly earned, and I am going lo try to undermine
it. .. .
The main method by which I propose to avoid some of the
difficulties of Kant 's moral theory is by explaining only one
~art of the the~ry. ~his does not seem to me to be an irrespon-
sible approach 111 this case. One of the things that makes Kant
's
~oral theory _hard to understand is that he gives a number of
different versions of the principle that he calls th e S -

p .· · 1 f . upi eme
i 1~c1p e o Morality, and these different versions don ' t look at
all hke one another ... .
Kant calls his S p · · I . . . upreme nncip e the Categorical
hn/umttive;
us vanous versions also have sonorous names· 1·1 , wh · h I h
11
· • • • 11c one on
Itseiif. . .. s a concentrate is known as the Formula of th e End
in
From Tom Reg M
3rd cct · ·. •
3 11
'.
1111
"' of l,ife and Death · M . . ,
Hill C~um~ . ~opyngh1 0 ll/93 by McGraw-Hill ~w
l,'.t,uduclory Essa)•S i11 Mom/ PhilosopilJ•,
, mpaiucs. · eprmted by permission of The McGraw-
114
CI-I A l'TER 14 A SIMl'LIFll':U ACCO U NT OF KANT ' S t
:TIIICS J J5
The Formula of the End in Itself
Kant states the Formula of the End in Itse lf as follows:

Act in such a way that you always trea t humanity, whether in
your
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means but
always at th e same time as an end.
To understand this we need to know what it is to treat a person
as a
means or as an end. According to Kant, each of our a cts
reflects one
or more maxims. The maxim of the act is the principle on which
one sees oneself as acting. A ma xim expresses a person's
policy, or if
he or she has no settled policy, th e principle underlying the
particu-
lar intention or d ecision on which he or she acts. Thus, a
person who
decides, "This year I'll give 10 percent of my inco me to famine
relief,"
has as a maxim the principle of tithing his or her income for
famine
relief. In practice, the difference between intentions and
maxims is
of little importance, for given any intention, we can formulate
the
correspo nding maxim by del eting references to particular
times,
places, and p ersons. In what follows I shall take the terms
."maxim"
and "intention" as equivalent.
Whenever we act intentionally, we have at least one maxim and
ca n, if we reflect, state what it is. (There is of course room for
self-

deception he re-''l'm only keeping the wolf from the door," we
may
claim as we wolf d own enough to kee p ourselves overweight,
or, more
to the point, en o ugh to feed some one else who hasn't enough
food. )
When we want to work out whe ther a n act we propo se to do is
right
or wrong, according to Kant, we should look at our maxims and
not
at how much misery or happin ess the act is likely to produce,
and
whether it do es b etter at increasing happiness than other
available
a cts. We just have to check that the act we have in mind will
not use
a nyone as a me re means, and, if possible, that it will t reat
other per-
sons as ends in themselves.
Using Persons as Mere Means
To use someone as a mere means is to involve them in a scheme
o f
a ction_ to which_ they could not in principle consent. Kant
does not say that
the re 1s anythmg wrong about using someone as a means.
Evidently
we have to do so in any cooperative scheme of a ction. If I cash
a
check I use the teller as a means, without whom I could not lay
my
hands on the cash ; the teller in turn uses me as a means to earn
his

r
r
I I 6
PART II
•I THEORIES MOR,~,
. ch party consents to her or his pa.
. . · this case, ea lt
r her 1Iv111g. But 111 Id say that though they us e one anothe 0
· 1 Kant wou r in the transacuoi · 1e another as mere means.
Each person
1 ey do not use o1 I d . as means, t I h axi·ins of his or 1er own
an 1s notJ· list.,
1 ther as m, "
assumes that t 1e o . 1 ted
. . . rop to be rnampu a .
tlung 01 a P ·r ations where one person uses another in a
B I ere are other s1 u . . ut t J . I . could not in pnnople consent.
For example
t rbich the ot 1e1 . . ,
way O " k a promise to another with every mtention of
Person may ma e ' one . . If I romise is accepted , then the
person to whom it
breakmg it. t 1e P · , · ·
. b · norant of what the prom1sor s 111tent10n (maxim)

was given must e ig . . d
. If k ew that the promisor did not mten to do what he
really 1s. one n
I
. mi·s·ing one would after all, not accept or rely on the or s 1e
was pi o , ' .
promise. It would be as though there had bee_n. no promise
made.
Successful false promising depends on dece1v111g the person
to
whom the promise is made about what one's real maxim is. And
since the person who is deceived doe~n ' t know that_ real m ax
im, he
or she can't in principle consent to his o r her part 111 the
proposed
scheme of action. The person who is deceived is, as it were, a
prop or
a tool-a mere means-in the false promisor's scheme. A person
who promises falsely treats the acceptor of the promise as a
prop or
a thing and not as a person. In Kant's view, it is this that makes
false
promising wrong.
One standard way of using others as mere means is by deceiving
them. By getting someone involved in a business scheme or a
crimi-
nal activity on false pretenses, or by giving a misleading
account of
what one is about, or by making a false promise or a fraudulent
con-
t~act , one involves anmher in something to which h e or she in
prin-

nple cannot consent, smce the scheme requires that he or she
doesn't
know w_hat is goin~ on. Another standard way of using others
as mere
means 1s_by coercmg them. If a rich or powerful person
threatens a
debtor "'.1th ,bankruptcy unless he or she joins in some scheme,
then
th
e creditor~ mtention is to coerce; and the debtor, if coerced ,
cannot
consent to his or her part in the creditor's scheme. To make the
ex-
ample more specific- If a m I d . . .
. · oney en er 111 an Indian village threatens
not to renew a vital loan u I h . .
uses the d bt n ess e is given the debtor's la nd, then he
e or as a mere mea ns He coer th d b h
truly consent to th· " ff, h · ces e e tor, w o cannot
form of such trant t~ er e can't refuse." (Of course the outward
in gs but we kn ac ions may look like ordina ry commercial
deal-
' ow very well that some ff,
that form are coerc· ) 0 ers and d emands couched in 1ve.
CI-IAl'TER 14 A SJMPL!Flk:D ACCOUNT OF KA NT ' S
ETHICS J ]7
In Kant's view, acts that are clone on maxims that require d
ecep-
tion or coercion of others, and so cannot have the consent of
those

others (for consent precludes both deception and coercion), are
wrong. When we act on such maxims, we treat others as mere
means,
as things rather than as ends in themselves. Ifwe act on such
maxims,
our acts are not only wrong but unjust: such acts wrong the
particular
others who are deceived or coerced.
Study Questions
1. According to Kant, is using someone as a means always
wrong?
2. What does Kant mean by the maxim of an action?
3. Why is it wrong to deceive others?
4. Can you imagine circumstances in which breaking a promise
would not be wrong?

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