Short analysis of large scale russian offensive operations and their implications of strategic options for Ukraine and its Western supporters

1. A
f
C
Bagration II invasion plan
1st offensive operations
A. Odessa and Izmayil cut-off
attacks
B. Krim breakout attack
C. Mariupol invasion
D. Donetsk combined attack
operations for easter
salient
E. Kharkov Salient
F. Sumy Salient
G. Kiev attack operation and
creation of Cherniv salient
2nd offensive operations
a) Kiev by pass attack
b) Eastern relieve attacks
c) Dniepropetrevosk attack
d) Meliopol attacks
e) Mykolgiyv attack
f) Western enlargement
offensive
3rd Victory operations
I. Cherkasy central offensive
II. Southern Zaporishshya
attack
D
E
F
G
B
a
b
b
c
d
e
I
II

2. Consequences
Possible three pillars of attack (Cripling the UA central defences)
A) Use Kiev attack scenario’s to threaten the city as well as “the back” of central Ukrainian defences
B) Use breakout of occupied territories (Krim, Donetsk / Luhansk) to threaten whole eastern front and provide cut-off from
Black Sea
C) Use limited sources of Transnistria to cut-off Odessa sector and threaten the back of Ukrainian central defences
UA Counteractions (Defence against southern Nova Russia and concentrating defending Kiev)
-> UA needs to strengthen northern defences of Kiev to counter any threatening attacks
-> UA needs to strengthen the southern, near Odessa to counterattack and threat against the central front
-> UA needs to contain any Mariopol / Krimea link up offensive
Consequences
Giving up the Westernmost territories

3. What can the West do
In any case (first analysis and second level Game Theory) Russia can exploit any scenario by surprise
-> A General case of multiple front attack advantage [Russia can shift angles of attacks freely to irritate or diverse UA defence operations
-> UA can put up only limited heavy resistance and has to sacrifice other territories therefore
-> Result is that Russia could shift and adapt any offensive operation freely and surprising the UA therefore
Strategic goal: costly stalemate, with even crippling local Russian offensive operations is necessary
 The West can try to exploit any time delay by enhancing the strategic UA defence capabilities the following way: Providing two fold
capacities to fight Russian army
-> Delivery effective defence weaponry to UA forces
• Providing tank defence infantry weapons
• Providing Sigint counter-artillery electronics
• Providing Air defence capabilities (from portable to tactical anti-aircraft weaponry)
• Drones to counter possible Russian air dominance
• Anti-marine weaponry to deny any Russian navy dominance
-> Long-term sustainability of defence operations
• Excluding Russia from global financing and providing financing of UA armed forces operations