Χαζάρα: οι Καταπιεσμένοι Τουρκόφωνοι Σιίτες του Αφγανιστάν αποτελούν την Ανατολική Λαβίδα του Μυστικού Κινήματος των Κιζιλμπάσηδων

Χαζάρα: οι
Καταπιεσμένοι
Τουρκόφωνοι Σιίτες του
Αφγανιστάν αποτελούν
την Ανατολική Λαβίδα
του Μυστικού Κινήματος
των Κιζιλμπάσηδων
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/09/17/χ
αζάρα-οι-καταπιεσμένοι-τουρκόφωνοι/
====================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής –
Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή
Αυτοκρατορία
Σε δύο πρότερα κείμενα περιέγραψα από
πολλές απόψεις την τερατουργηματική δομή και
την οικτρή σύσταση του ψευτοκράτους
‘Αφγανιστάν’, το οποίο χωρίς καμμιά πρότερη
ιστορικότητα στήθηκε για να εξυπηρετηθούν τα
αγγλικά συμφέροντα στην ευρύτερη περιοχή
της Κεντρικής Ασίας, του ιρανικού οροπεδίου,
της Κοιλάδας του Ινδού και της Δυτικής Κίνας.
Τα κείμενα αυτά βρίσκονται εδώ:

Τατζίκοι, Παστούνοι, Χαζάρα, Ουζμπέκοι:
Καταπιεσμένα Έθνη του Αφγανιστάν, ενός
Τερατουργηματικού Ψευτοκράτους
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/0
9/15/τατζίκοι-παστούνοι-χαζάρα-ουζμπέκοι/
(και πλέον:
https://www.academia.edu/51129166/Τατζίκοι_Π
αστούνοι_Χαζάρα_Ουζμπέκοι_Καταπιεσμένα_Έ
θνη_του_Αφγανιστάν_ενός_Τερατουργηματικού
_Ψευτοκράτους)
Βακτριανή, Αριανή, Αραχωσία και Αφγανιστάν:
το Ανύπαρκτο Παρελθόν ενός Ψευτο-κράτους
Παρασκευασμένου από Μηχανορραφίες
Άγγλων
9/16/βακτριανή-αριανή-αραχωσία-και-αφγανι/
(και πλέον:
https://www.academia.edu/51162047/Βακτριανή
_Αριανή_Αραχωσία_και_Αφγανιστάν_το_Ανύπ
αρκτο_Παρελθόν_ενός_Ψευτο_κράτους_Παρασ
κευασμένου_από_Μηχανορραφίες_Άγγλων)
Το Αφγανιστάν δεν είναι ένα έθνος, δεν έχει μία
γλώσσα, δεν πιστεύει σε μια θρησκεία, δεν έχει
ιστορικό παρελθόν και δεν αποτελεί μια
γεωγραφική ενότητα παρά μόνον αν αυθαίρετα
συρθούν γραμμές πάνω στον χάρτη της Ασίας
από τον οιονδήποτε. Σήμερα, οι Τατζίκοι, οι
Παστούνοι, οι Χαζάρα, οι Ουζμπέκοι και
πληθυσμιακά μικρότερα έθνη απαρτίζουν –

εντός του ψευτοκράτους ‘Αφγανιστάν – ένα
καζάνι που βράζει και όπου Σουνίτες
μουσουλμάνοι, Δωδεκατοϊμαμιστές Σιίτες
μουσουλμάνοι και Εβδομοϊμαμιστές Σιίτες
μουσουλμάνοι, μαζί με μερικές άλλες
θρησκευτικές μειονότητες, αλληλοσφάζονται
πάνω στην θεατρική σκηνή ‘Ισλαμικός
Φονταμενταλισμός από Πολιτικό Ισλάμ και
Ουαχαμπιστές’ που έστησαν δυτικά
αποικιοκρατικά συμφέροντα κατά τις δικές τους,
ανάμεσα σε δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες,
διαμάχες.

Χαζάρα: ένα Τουρκομογγολικό
Σιιτικό Έθνος – Τμήμα του
Κιζιλμπασικού Κινήματος
Αν οι Ουζμπέκοι του Αφγανιστάν συνενωθούν
με την μητέρα πατρίδα τους, το Ουζμπεκιστάν,
αν οι Τατζίκοι του Αφγανιστάν αποτελέσουν μια

επαρχία του Τατζικιστάν, κι αν οι Παστούνοι του
Αφγανιστάν συνενωθούν με τους ομοεθνείς
τους στο Πακιστάν σε ένα νέο ανεξάρτητο
κράτος-έθνος – και προσθέτω ότι όλοι αυτοί θα
επιθυμούσαν κάτι τέτοιο –, τότε στο Αφγανιστάν
θα απομείνουν μόνον οι Χαζάρα και η χώρα θα
ονομαστεί Χαζαρεστάν, ή Χαζαρατζάτ, όπως
λέγεται στην γλώσσα των Χαζάρα. Και είναι
αυτονόητο ότι κάτι τέτοιο αποτελεί την ευχή
όλων των Χαζάρα.
Με άλλα λόγια, αν εξετάσει κάποιος το αγγλικό
αποικιοκρατικό σχέδιο της σύστασης ενός
ψευτοκράτους ονόματι ‘Αφγανιστάν’ στις αρχές
του 19ου αιώνα μόνο σε τοπικό επίπεδο, τότε
αμέσως καταλαβαίνει ότι τα περισσότερο
ζημιωμένα έθνη ήταν τελικά οι Χαζάρα και οι
Παστούνοι που μέχρι σήμερα δεν απέκτησαν

δικά τους κράτη-έθνη. Και ακόμη χειρότερη είναι
η κατάσταση για τους Χαζάρα που στο συνήθως
παστουνο-κρατούμενο Αφγανιστάν – επί
βασιλικού, κομμουνιστικού, ταλιμπανικού ή
ρεπουμπλικανικού καθεστώτος – οι Χαζάρα
ήταν το περισσότερο καταπιεσμένο έθνος.
Εάν λοιπόν συμβούν τα παραπάνω, το
Χαζαρεστάν θα αποτελεί περίπου το 40% της
συνολικής έκτασης του σημερινού Αφγανιστάν
και θα το θυμίζει αρκετά ως γεωγραφική έκταση,
επειδή οι Χαζάρα κατοικούν στο κέντρο του
Αφγανιστάν, σε μια ελλειπτικού σχήματος
(όπως και το ίδιο το Αφγανιστάν) έκταση που
μοιάζει να είναι ομόκεντρη με την μεγαλύτερη,
σημερινή, συνοριακή γραμμή του Αφγανιστάν.
Η έκταση αυτή χαρακτηρίζεται από μικρότερη

αστυφιλία, αραιότερο πληθυσμό και
εντονώτερη νομαδική ζωή από τις άλλες
περιοχές του Αφγανιστάν.
Οι Χαζάρα είναι ένα τουρκομογγολικό φύλο,
πιθανώτατα καταγόμενο από τους Τσαγατάυ
Τούρκους (που σήμερα θεωρούνται ανύπαρκτο
κι αφομοιωμένο σε άλλα έθνη φύλο), το οποίο
αναμείχθηκε με τον εντόπιο πληθυσμό της
συγκεκριμένης περιοχής.
Γλωσσικά επηρεάστηκαν από τα φαρσί σε ένα
κάποιο βαθμό και, αν και σουνιτικής αρχικά
πίστης, αποδέχθηκαν το Εβδομοϊμαμικό Σιιτικό
Ισλάμ στα χρόνια των Σαφεβιδών.
Για πρώτη φορά στην Ιστορία, οι Χαζάρα
αναφέρονται από τον Μπαμπούρ, ένα
πολυμαθέστατο φιλόσοφο, ιστορικό,
συγγραφέα και ηγεμόνα, ο οποίος ήταν ο
θεμελιωτής της δυναστείας των Γκορκανιάν
(των Μεγάλων Μογγόλων) που έστησε στις
αρχές του 16ου αιώνα την τεράστια Μογγολική

Αυτοκρατορία της νότιας Ασίας με κέντρο την
βόρεια Ινδία.
Οι Χαζάρα ενσωμάτωσαν στις παραδόσεις τους
στοιχεία της πρότερης ιστορίας της Βακτριανής
στα νότια άκρα της οποίας εγκαταστάθηκαν
αρχικά, για να επεκταθούν αργότερα στα
ανατολικά άκρα της Αριακής και στα βόρεια
σημεία της Αραχωσίας.
Έτσι, για παράδειγμα, τα τεράστια λαξευτά
αγάλματα του Βούδα στο Μπαμιγιάν δεν ήταν
για τους Χαζάρα ένα άχρηστο υλικό υπόλειμμα
πρότερων πολιτισμών και αλλόθρησκων εθνών
αλλά ενσωματώθηκαν στις παραδόσεις τους κι
έγιναν στοιχείο της παιδείας και των δοξασιών
τους.

Στο δεύτερο μισό της 2ης χιλιετίας, οι Χαζάρα
υπήρξαν ως επί το πλείστον ένα ανεξάρτητο
έθνος, το οποίο συνδέθηκε με το κιζιλμπασικό
κίνημα και απετέλεσε την ανατολική λαβίδα του.
Χάρη σ’ αυτό το κίνημα, οι Χαζάρα διετήρησαν
σε μεγάλο βαθμό την ανεξαρτησία τους μέχρι τα
τέλη του 19ου αιώνα και τις αρχές του 20ου
αιώνα, όταν μετά από παστουνική, αφγανική,
σουνιτική τζιχάντ εναντίον τους βιαίως και μετά

από πολύ αίμα προσαρτήθηκαν στο ψευτο-
βασίλειο ‘Αφγανιστάν’.
Αντίθετα από τους Παστούνους που πίστεψαν
τις υποκριτικές φιλοφρονήσεις, τις άθλιες
κολακείες και τις ψεύτικες υποσχέσεις των
Άγγλων αποικιοκρατών του 19ου και του 20ου
αιώνα (κι έτσι χρησιμοποιήθηκαν εις βάρος των
δικών τους συμφερόντων και μετατράπηκαν σε
εργαλείο της αγγλικής και της αμερικανικής
διπλωματίας μέχρι και σήμερα στον
σχηματισμό του αφγανικού ισλαμιστικού
ταλιμπανικού κινήματος), οι Χαζάρα εξυπαρχής
απέρριψαν κάθε αποικιοκρατική προσέγγιση,
αντιμετώπισαν κάθε δυτικό διπλωμάτη
αρνητικά, απορριπτικά και με δυσπιστία (το
οποίο και πλήρωσαν γιατί οι Άγγλοι κι οι
Αμερικανοί έστρεψαν τους Παστούνους και τις
αρχές του ψευτοκράτους ‘Αφγανιστάν’ εναντίον
των Χαζάρα για να τους εκδικηθούν), και
παραμένουν έτσι ένα από τα ελάχιστα έθνη
στον κόσμο που δεν έχει διαβρωθεί από την
δυτική νοοτροπία και διαφθορά και μια από τις

πολύ σπάνιες κοινωνίες μέσα στις οποίες δεν
έχουν διηθηθεί και παρεσιφρύσει (με τον ένα ή
με τον άλλο τρόπο) δυτικοί ή άλλοι πράκτορες.
Η νομαδική φύση της καθημερινής ζωής για την
πλειοψηφία των Χαζάρα και η συνεχής
παρουσία του κιζιλμπασικού κινήματος
προστάτεψαν το έθνος αυτό και το διετήρησαν
ανέπαφο από ξενικές επιδράσεις.
Γι’ αυτό κι ο ρόλος των Χαζάρα στις εξελίξεις
στην ευρύτερη περιοχή της Κεντρικής Ασίας,
του Καυκάσου, του ιρανικού οροπεδίου και της
Ανατολίας κατά τα επόμενα χρόνια δεν μπορεί
παρά να αυξηθεί.
Μια μυστική γραμμή συνδέει την Κεντρική
Ανατολία της Τουρκίας, την Τσετσενία, το
Νταγεστάν, το Αζερμπαϊτζάν, το βορειοδυτικό
(αζερικό) και το νότιο (Κασκάι) Ιράν, καθώς και
τους Χαζάρα του Αφγανιστάν που φαίνεται να
είναι εντελώς δυσδιάκριτη ακόμη και τις
μυστικές υπηρεσίες των μεγαλυτέρων χωρών
του κόσμου.

Περισσότερα για το ιστορικό κίνημα των
Κιζιλμπάσηδων και την παρουσία του σήμερα
θα βρείτε εδώ:
Υπάρχουν ακόμη Κιζιλμπάσηδες;
9/03/υπάρχουν-ακόμη-κιζιλμπάσηδες/
Αλεβίδες, Μπεκτασήδες, Κιζιλμπάσηδες κι η
Τουρκία σήμερα
9/04/αλεβίδες-μπεκτασήδες-κιζιλμπάσηδες/
Τουρκία, Ιράν, Κιζιλμπάσηδες, Κασκάι: Υπόγεια
Κυκλώματα ανάμεσα στις Δύο Χώρες
9/05/τουρκία-ιράν-κιζιλμπάσηδες-κασκάι-υπ/
Κασκάι: η Μουσική, τα Ήθη και τα Έθιμα τους,
οι Μεταναστεύσεις τους στα βουνά του Νότιου
Ζάγρου – Ιράν
9/09/κασκάι-η-μουσική-τα-ήθη-και-τα-έθιμα-το/

Προσθέτω την διευκρίνιση (επειδή φίλοι με
ερώτησαν ήδη) ότι δεν πρέπει να συσχετίζει
κανείς τους Χαζάρα του Αφγανιστάν με τους
Ασκενάζι Χαζάρους που ζούσαν και ζουν στα
βόρεια ακρογιάλια της Κασπίας και
προσποιούμενοι τους Ιουδαίους δημιούργησαν
το σιωνιστικό κίνημα και έστησαν στην
Παλαιστίνη το ψευτοκράτος Ισραήλ.

Στην συνέχεια μπορείτε να δείτε ένα βίντεο, να
ακούεστε ένα τραγούδι σε χαζαράτζι (την
γλώσσα των Χαζάρα), και να διαβάσετε
επιλεγμένα άρθρα ιστορικού κι εθνογραφικού
περιεχομένου αναφορικά με τους Χαζάρα.

Δείτε το βίντεο:
Хазарейцы – Афганистан: тюркская шиитская
нация против американцев, англичан,
саудовцев и талибов
https://www.ok.ru/video/1509294475885
Περισσότερα:
Οι τουρκομογγολικής καταγωγής Χαζάρα είναι
Σιίτες Κιζιλμπάσηδες που προσαρτήθηκαν στο
ψευτοκράτος ‘Αφγανιστάν’ μόνον στις αρχές
του 1900 και μετά από πολύ αίμα. Και στάθηκαν
πάντοτε ενάντια στους Παστούνους ισλαμιστές
Ταλιμπάν που ΗΠΑ, Αγγλία, Ισραήλ, Σαουδική
Αραβία και Πακιστάν έχουν χρηματοδοτήσει
από το 1980.
The Hazaras (Persian: ‫;هزاره‬ Hazaragi: ‫)آزره‬ are an
ethnic group native to the mountainous region
of Hazarajat in central Afghanistan. They speak
the Hazaragi variant of Dari, one of the two
official languages of Afghanistan. They are the

third-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, also
making up a significant minority group in the
neighboring Pakistan, with a population of
between 650,000–900,000, largely living in the
region of Quetta.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazaras
Самоназвание хазарейцев — хезаре. Слово
хезар в иранских языках означает «тысяча».
По всей видимости, костяк этого народа
составили воины, оставленные чингизидами
после завоевания Афганистана в 1221-1223
гг.
По мнению Л. Темирханова, «хазарейцы —
народ, сформировавшийся в результате
синтеза монгольских и таджикских
элементов».
Монгольские воины охранных гарнизонов-
тысяч, в результате длительного
проживания в Афганистане смешались с
местными ираноязычными народами,
переняв их язык.
Ученые считают, что язык хазарейцев
является диалектом старотаджикского языка
(хазараги) с некоторой долей монгольских и
тюркских слов. Эту долю монголизмов и
тюркизмов исследователи определяют в 10
%.
По мере ослабления Монгольской империи,
хазарейцев все сильнее вытесняли из
благодатных долин северо-востока. В

результате, хазарейцы оказались зажатыми
в центральных, сплошь горно-каменистых
частях Афганистана. Хазарейцы ведут
кочевой или полукочевой образ жизни.
Кочевники живут в шалашах, покрытых
войлоком. Основная же масса народа
проживает крупными родовыми
поселениями по склонам гор. Эти селения
обнесены глинобитными стенами со
сторожевыми башнями по четырем углам.
Богатые жилища напоминают монгольские
юрты, бедные живут в глинобитных хижинах,
крытых соломой.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Хазарейцы
Hazara – Afghanistan: a Turkic Shia Nation
against Americans, English, Saudis and Taliban
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240304

από το 1980.
Хазаре́йцы — ираноязычные шииты
монгольского и тюркского происхождения,
населяющие центральный Афганистан (8—10
% от общей численности населения страны).
Самоназвание хазарейцев — хезаре. Слово
хезар в иранских языках означает «тысяча».
По всей видимости, костяк этого народа
составили воины, оставленные чингизидами
после завоевания Афганистана в 1221-1223
гг.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Хазарейцы
Babur, founder of the Mughal Empire in the
early 16th century, records the name Hazara in
his autobiography. He referred to the populace
of a region called Hazaristan, located west of
the Kabulistan region, east of Ghor, and north of
Ghazni.

Χαζάρα-Αφγανιστάν: ένα Τουρκικό Σιιτικό
Έθνος ενάντια σε Άγγλους, Αμερικανούς,
Σαουδάραβες, Ταλιμπάν
από το 1980.
The origins of the Hazara have not been fully
reconstructed. Significant inner Asian
descent—in historical context, Turkic and
Mongol—is probable because their physical
attributes, facial bone structures and parts of

their culture and language resemble those of
Mongolians and Central Asian Turks.
Genetic analysis of the Hazara indicate partial
Mongolian ancestry. Invading Mongols and
Turco-Mongols mixed with the local Iranian
population, forming a distinct group. For
example, Nikudari Mongols settled in what is
now Afghanistan and mixed with the native
populations.
A second wave of mostly Chagatai Mongols
came from Central Asia and was followed by
other Mongolic groups, associated with the
Ilkhanate and the Timurids, all of whom settled
in Hazarajat and mixed with the local
population, forming a distinct group.
The Hazara identity in Afghanistan is believed
by many to have originated in the aftermath of
the 1221 Siege of Bamyan. The first mention of
Hazara is made by Babur in the early 16th
century and later by the court historians of Shah
Abbas of the Safavid dynasty. It is reported that
they embraced Shia Islam between the end of
the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century,
during the Safavid period.
Hazara men along with tribes of other ethnic
groups had been recruited and added to the
army of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 18th
century. Some claim that in the mid-18th
century Hazara were forced out of Helmand and
the Arghandab District of Kandahar Province.

The giant Buddha statues had long been central
to the identity of the Hazara community.
Although not built by the Hazaras themselves,
who only came to have an ethnolinguistic
identity based in the region some centuries
later, they have their own myths associated with
the statues, unrelated to Buddhism. In Hazara
folklore, the statues are of a star-crossed couple
Salsal and Shahmama, whose doomed love
ends tragically in both their deaths. The two
remain forever separated, petrified in stone,
looking across the Bamyan valley.
https://minorityrights.org/minorities/hazaras/
==============================

Διαβάστε:
Hazāra
Hazāra: the third largest ethnic group of
Afghanistan, after the Pashtuns and the Tājiks,
who represent nearly a fifth of the total
population. Their name most probably derives
from the Persian word hazār, which means
“thousand,” and may be the translation of the
Mongol word ming or minggan, a tribal-military
unit of 1000 soldiers of the Mongol army at the
time of Gen-ghis Khan (Bacon, 1958, p. 4;
Schurmann, p. 115; Poladi, p. 22; Mousavi, pp.
23-25). The term hazār(a) could have replaced
ming in what is today Afghanistan, and has thus
come to designate a specific group of people.
Such an evolution may be witnessed also in the
district of Hazāra, north of Islamabad (Pakistan),
which takes its name from troops based in the
region during the Timurid period.
The Hazāras speak a Persian dialect with many
Turkish and some Mongolian words. They

originally occupied the central part of the
country, a mountainous zone called the
Hazārajāt.
Though some inhabitants of the eastern fringe
of the region are Sunnis (Ḡorband Valley) or
Ismaʿilis (Ka-yān, Šibar), most Hazāras—unlike
the majority of the Afghan population—are
Twelver Shiʿites, a factor which has contributed
to their political and socio-economic
marginalization. The history of the Hazāras is
marked by several wars and forced
displacements.
Many of them fled from the Hazārajāt at the end
of the 19th century, when Amir ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān
Khan subjugated the region; they settled in
Quetta (then in British India, today in Pakistan)
and around Mašhad. Driven by poverty, the
Hazāras have migrated throughout the 20th
century. Many went to the cities, especially to
Kabul but also to Mazār-e Šarif and Herat, while
others traveled to Pakistan or to Iran in search
of employment.
This trend dramatically increased after the
communist coup of April 1978 and the Soviet
intervention in 1979.
Τις βιβλιογραφικές παραπομπές θα βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hazara-1

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Hazāra i. Historical geography of
Hazārajāt
Hazārajāt, the homeland of the Hazāras, lies in
the central highlands of Afghanistan, among the
Kuh-e Bābā mountains and the western
extremities of the Hindu Kush (q.v.). Its
boundaries have historically been inexact and
shifting, and in some respects Hazārajāt

denotes an ethnic and religious zone rather than
a geographical one–that of Afghanistan’s Turko-
Mongol Shiʿites.
Its physical boundaries, however, are roughly
marked by the Bā-miān Basin to the north, the
headwaters of the Helmand River (q.v.) to the
south, Firuzkuh to the west, and the Salang
Pass to the east. The regional terrain is very
mountainous and extends to the Safid Kuh and
the Siāh Kuh mountains, where the highest
peaks are between 15,000 to 17,000 feet.
Both sides of the Kuh-e Bābā range contain a
succession of valleys. The north face of the
range descends steeply, merging into low
foothills and short semi-arid plains, while the
south face stretches towards the Helmand
Valley and the mountainous district of Besud
(Fayż-Moḥammad, III; Thesiger, 1955, p. 313).
A series of mountain passes (kotal) extend
along the eastern edge of the Hazārajāt, of
which the Salang is blocked by snow for six
months of the year or more, while the Šebar, at
a lower elevation, is similarly snowed in for two
months (Humlum, p. 64). In the spring and
summer, the Kuh-e Bābā range accounts for
some of Afghanistan’s greenest pastures.
A number of the country’s rivers, including the
Helmand, Harirud, Kābul, Morḡāb, and Panjao
flow from the Hazārajāt (Mostawfi, tr. Le
Strange, p. 212). Natural lakes and caves are
also found in the Hazārajāt, many in the

environs of Bāmiān (q.v.), and these sites have
become the subject of legends and folktales
told by the Hazāras about the geography and
history of their homeland. In some cases, these
natural landmarks are attributed to the works of
ʿAli ebn Abi Ṭāleb (Mousavi, p. 71).
In Ferdowsi’s Šāh-nāma, the Hazārajāt is
referred to as Barbarestān, an independent
region in Turān. The Arab geographer Maqdesi
knew the region as Ḡarj al-šahr–Ḡarj meaning
“mountain” in the local dialect–an area ruled by
chiefs. In the later Middle Ages the region was
called Ḡarjestān, though the exact location of its
main cities was still unknown (Le Strange, tr.,
1919, pp. 415-16; see also Mousavi, p. 39).
According to the 10th-century Persian
geographical text Ḥodud al-ʿālam (ed. M.
Sotuda, Tehran, 1961; q.v.), the area was
“entirely mountainous” and its people were
“herdsmen and farmers,” cultivating land, which
was partly non-irrigated (lalmi) and partly
irrigated (ābi; Ḥodud al-ʿālam, p. 105).
The Hazārajāt was then considered part of the
larger geographic region of Khurasan (Kušān),
the porous boundaries of which encompassed
the vast region between the Caspian Sea and
the Oxus River (Āmu Daryā; q.v.), thus including
much of what is today northern Iran and
Afghanistan.
Northwestern Hazārajāt encompasses the
district of Ḡor, long known for its mountain

fortresses. The 10th-century geographer Estaḵri
wrote that mountainous Ḡor was “the only
region surrounded on all sides by Islamic
territories and yet inhabited by infidels”
(Barthold, p. 51). Ebn Ḥawqal described Ḡor as
a mountainous country full of mines and
running streams (Ebn Ḥawqal, tr. Kramers and
Wiet, II, pp. 429-30).
Ḡor’s rivers, cultivated fields, and pastures were
praised by Edrisi, who surmised that the
province’s boundaries were Herat, Juz-jān,
Qarawāt, and Ḡarjestān (tr. Amedee Jaubert, p.
458). The long resistance of the inhabitants of
Ḡor to the adoption of Islam provides an
indication of the region’s inaccessibility;
according to some travelers, the entire region is
comparable to a fortress raised in the upper
Central Asian highlands: from every approach,
tall and steep mountains have to be traversed to
reach there. The language of the inhabitants of
Ḡor differed so much from that of the people of
the plains, that communication between the two
required interpreters (Barthold, p. 52).
The Bāmiān Basin, the northeastern part of the
Hazāra-jāt, is the site of ancient Bāmiān, a
center of Buddhism and a key caravanserai on
the Silk Road. The town is situated at a height of
7,500 feet and surrounded by the Hindu Kush to
the north and Kuh-e Bābā to the south. Ebn
Ḥawqal referred to Bāmiān as “the cold part of
Khurasan,” where winters are reportedly severe
(Ebn Ḥawqal, p. 227). Bāmiān is famous for the

two giant Buddhas carved into its sandstone
cliffs, which stood at 165 and 114 feet tall,
respectively, until they were destroyed by the
Taliban in 2001.
It was not until the rule of the Ghaznavid
dynasty in the 11th century that Islam was
established in Bāmiān, Ḡor, and the rest of the
Hazārajāt. According to Ḥamd-Allāh Mostawfi, at
the time of the Mongol invasions Prince
Mutukin, the son of Jaghatay Khan, was killed
during the siege of Bāmiān. To avenge his
grandson’s death, “Chingiz Khan ordered
Bāmiān and its people to be laid in ruins,
renaming the place Mav Baliq (“Bad Town” in
Mongolian) and commanding that no one
should ever build or settle there” (tr. Le Strange,
p. 152)
The subjugation of the Hazārajāt, the mountain
fortresses of Ḡor in particular, proved difficult
for the Mongols after their conquest of the
region, and ultimately Mongol military
detachments left behind in the region “adopted
the language of the vanquished” (Barthold, p.
82). During the late 14th century, Timur’s armies
made expeditions into the Hazārajāt, but after
his death the Hazāras were once again free in
their mountains (Ferrier, p. 221).
In the Mongol period, most Hazāras were
pastoralists who lived in yurts and whose
language was Moḡol. By the early sixteenth
century however, they were living in fortified
villages (qalaʿ), speaking a Persian dialect, and

farming the land to produce their own grains in
the high steppes. They continued to keep flocks
however, and some Hazāras on the more arid
northern slopes of the Kuh-e Bābā remained
nomadic, migrating between yeilaq, or highland
summer pastures, and qishlaq, or lowland
winter pastures (Humlum, p. 87).
It is probable that the Hazāras were mostly
Sunnis who converted to Shiʿism in the Safavid
era, though some have suggested that traces of
Shiʿism in the region can be dated back to at
least the Ilkhanid period. Most are Twelver
Shiʿis, but there also exist Ismaʿili, Zaidi, and
Sunni Hazāras (Mousavi, pp. 73-76).
In the 18th and 19th centuries, as a sense of
“Afghan-ness” developed among the Sunnite
Pashtuns, the Shiʿite Hazāra tribes began to
cling together (Canfield, p. 3). Once the Ḡilzi
(q.v.) Afghans became independent of the
Safavids in the 1720s, Pashtun nomads (kuči,
ilat) began to migrate into the pastures of
Hazārajāt, pushing the Hazāras westward
(Raverty, p. 35).
It has been suggested that in the nineteenth
century there was an emerging awareness of
ethnic and religious differences among the
population of Kabul. This brought about
divisions along “confessional lines” that
became reflected in new “spatial boundaries”
(Noelle, p. 22).

During the reign of Dōst Moḥammad Khan (q.v.;
r. 1242-55/1826-39, 1259-79/1842-63), Mir
Yazdānbaḵš, a diligent chief of the Besud
Hazāras, consolidated many of the Hazāra tribes
and the districts they controlled. Mir
Yazdānbaḵš collected revenues and
safeguarded caravans (qāfela) traveling on the
Ḥājigak route through Bā-miān to Kabul from
Shaikh ʿAli and Besud bandits. The
consolidation of the Hazārajāt thus increasingly
made the region and its inhabitants a threat to
the Durrani state based in Kabul (Masson, II, p.
296).
Until the late 19th century, the Hazārajāt
remained independent and only the authority of
local leaders, ḵāns or mirs, was obeyed
(Barthold, pp. 82-83). Joseph Pierre Ferrier, a
French author who supposedly traveled through
the region in the mid-nineteenth century,
described the inhabitants settled in the
mountains near the rivers Balkh and Ḵolm in an
orientalist vein, casting the Hazāras as savage
criminals:
“The Hazāra population is ungovernable, and
has no occupation but pillage. They will pillage
and pillage only, and plunder from camp to
camp” (Ferrier, pp. 219-20). Subsequent British
travelers doubted whether Ferrier had ever
actually left Herat to venture into Afghanistan’s
central mountains and have suggested that his
accounts of the region were based on hearsay,
especially since very few people dared then to

enter the Hazārajāt; even Pashtun nomads
would not take their flocks to graze there, and
few caravans would pass through (Ferdinand, p.
18).
During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Colonel
T. H. Holdich of the Indian Survey Department
referred to the Hazārajāt as “great unknown
highlands” (Holdich, p. 41). And for the next few
years, neither the Survey nor the Indian
Intelligence Department succeeded in obtaining
any trustworthy information on the routes
between Herat and Kabul through the Hazārajāt
(A. C. Yate, pp. 147-48).
In fact, the region remained largely unmapped in
the modern sense until the work of the Afghan
Boundary Commission between 1884 and 1886.
The Commission, which was set up following
Russia’s annexation of the Tekke Turkman
stronghold of Marv, was a joint Anglo-Russian
effort to establish the northern borders of
Afghanistan. The Commission was a massive
traveling survey, consisting of thirteen hundred
men and two thousand animals. It strained local
economies and became very unpopular among
the people of Khurasan.
Various members of the Afghan Boundary
Commission were able to gather information
that brought the geography of remote regions
such as the Hazārajāt further under state
surveillance. In November 1884, the
Commission crossed over the Kuh-e Bābā
Mountains by the Čašma Sabz Pass.

General Peter Lumsden and Major C. E. Yate,
who surveyed the tracts between Herat and the
Oxus, visited the Qalaʿ-e Naw Hazāras in the
Paropamisus mountain range, to the east of the
Jamšidis of Kušk. Noting surviving evidence of
terraced cultivation in times past, both
described the northern Hazāras as semi-
nomadic with large flocks of sheep and black
cattle.
They possessed an “inexhaustible supply of
grass, the hills around being covered knee-deep
with a luxuriant crop of pure rye” (C. E. Yate, p.
9). Yate noted clusters of kebetkas, or the
summer dwellings of the Qalaʿ-e Naw Hazāras
on the hillsides, and described “flocks and
herds grazing in all directions” (C. E. Yate, pp.
7-8; see also Lumsden, pp. 562-63).
The travels of Captains P. J. Maitland and M. G.
Talbot from Herat, through Obeh and Bāmīan, to
Balkh, during the autumn and winter of 1885,
explored the Hazār-ajāt proper. Maitland and
Talbot found the entire length of the road
between Herat and Bāmīan difficult to traverse.
They reported that the valleys of the Hazārajāt
were well-cultivated and noted “a constant
stream of people migrating from the country
around Kabul, on account of the scarcity in the
Afghan capital” (“Captain Maitlands and Captain
Talbot’s Journeys in Afghanistan,” p. 103).
As a result of the expedition, parts of the
Hazārajāt were “surveyed on one-eighth inch
scale” and thus made to fit into the mapped

order of modern nation-states (ibid., pp. 105-07;
Anderson, pp. 170-78). More thought and
attention was put into demarcating the definite
borders of modern nations than ever before,
which entailed great difficulties in frontier
regions such as the Hazārajāt.
The geographical reach of the authority of the
Afghan state was extended into the Hazārajāt
during the reign of ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan (1880-
1901). Caught between the strategic interests of
foreign powers and disappointed by the
demarcation of the Durand Line (1893) in
southern Afghanistan, which cut into Pashtun
territory, he set out to bring the northern
peripheries of the country more firmly under his
control.
This policy had disastrous consequences for
the Hazārajāt, whose inhabitants were singled
out by ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan’s regime as
particularly troublesome: “The Hazāra people
had been for centuries past the terror of the
rulers of Kabul” (Munshi, ed., p. 276).
Later in the early 1890s, the tribes of the
Hazārajāt were taxed and conscripted, while
thousands were massacred. Pashtun nomads
(kučis) were moved into the Hazārajāt, where
they overran Hazāra farmlands and pastures
(Mousavi, p. 95). Increasingly during summers,
Pashtun nomads would camp in large numbers
in the Hazārajāt highlands.

In the 1920s the ancient Šebar pass road which
leads through Bāmiān and east to the Panjšir
Valley was paved for lorries, and it remained the
busiest road across the Hindu Kush until the
building of the Salang tunnel in 1964 and the
opening of a winter route. A paved road also
has been built through the central mountains
and the upper Harirud Valley to Herat. The
Hazārajāt became increasingly depopulated as
Hazāras migrated to cities and to surrounding
countries, where they became laborers and
undertook the hardest and lowest-paid work.
In 1979, there were reportedly one and a half
million Hazāras in the Hazārajāt and Kabul
(Rubin, p. 26). As the Afghan state weakened,
uprisings broke out in the Hazārajāt, freeing the
region from state rule for the first time since the
death of Amir ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān. Under the
inspiration of the Islamic Revolution, various
Hazāra-Shiʿi resistance groups were formed in
Iran, including Naṣr (Victory) and Sepāh-e
Pāsdārān (Troops of the Revolutionary Guards),
with some being “committed to the idea of a
separate Hazāra national identity”(Rubin, pp.
186, 191, 223).
During the war with the Soviets, most of the
Hazārajāt was unoccupied and free of Soviet or
state presence. The region became ruled once
again by local leaders, or mirs, and a new
stratum of young radical Shiʿi commanders.
Economic conditions are reported to have
improved in the Hazārajāt during the war, when

Pashtun Kučisstopped grazing their flocks in
Hazāra pastures and fields (Rubin, p. 246).
In recent times under the regime of the Taliban,
the Hazārajāt again came under siege, as ethnic
and sectarian violence devastated the region. In
the spring of 1997, a revolt broke out among
Hazāras in Mazār-e Šarif who refused to be
disarmed by the Taliban. In the subsequent
fighting, 600 Taliban were killed as they tried to
flee from the city (Rashid, p. 58). The following
year, in retaliation, the Taliban instituted
genocidal policies reminiscent of Amir ʿAbd-al-
Raḥmān Khan’s time.
In 1998, an estimated five to six thousand
Hazāras were massacred, as the Taliban tried to
“cleanse” the north of Shiʿites (Rashid, pp. 67-
74). At that time, the Hazārajāt was a vernacular
region that did not exist on the official map of
Afghanistan; the area was divided between the
administrative provinces of Bāmiān, Ḡor,
Wardak, Ḡazni, Oruzgān, Juzjān, and
Samangān, with the Hazāras being a minority in
each (Rubin, p. 246).
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hazara-i

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ii. History
The Origins and the Early History
The origins of the Hazāras are uncertain and
much debated among scholars (see Bacon,
1951, 1963; Ferdinand, 1959; Schurmann, pp.
110-58; Gawecki, 1980; Poladi, pp. 1-29;

Mousavi, pp. 19-43). Among the Hazāras
themselves, three main theories exist: they are
of Mongolian or Turko-Mongolian descent
(sometimes, they are even considered to be the
direct heirs of Genghis Khan’s armies); they are
the autochthones of the area, representing a
stock of population preceding the invasions by
Indo-European speaking people (2000-1500
B.C.E.); they are of mixed race as a result of
several waves of migration.
The Mongol contribution seems difficult to deny
considering the common physical appearance
of the Hazāras, even if their features are actually
very variable.
The term hazāra first appeared at the beginning
of the 16th century in the memoirs of Babur
(1987), the founder of the Mughal dynasty in
India. He used it several times to designate
people living in different regions, like the Rustā-
hazāra of Badaḵšān (Babur, p. 196) or the
Turkman Hazāras, a warlike tribe he fought in
911/1506 (Babur, pp. 251-53), and more
generally the inhabitants of the mountainous
area situated west of Kabul, as far as the
historical provinces of Ḡor and Ḡazni (q.v.). Part
of their population spoke a Mongolian language
(Babur, pp. 200, 207, 214, 218, 221).
Babur mentions not only the Hazāras but also
the Nik-dārā or Niku-dārā, a term by which he
designates people of Mongolian origin (Babur,
p. 200). He also uses the word aymāq to refer to
Mongolian tribes (Babur, pp. 196, 207, 221). The

terminology does not seem to be fully defined
and, although the term hazāra had different
referents, it seems to have already served to
designate a population with strong Mongolian
elements living in the area known today as the
Hazārajāt.
Bacon (1951, 1958) argues that the Hazāras are
the descendants of Chaghatay Mongols who
came from Transoxania to the highlands of
central Afghanistan in successive waves
between 626/1229 and 850/1447. Schurmann
(1962) refutes the view that the Hazāras are from
a pure Mongolian descent. For him, the Niku-
dāri Mongols who settled on the eastern fringes
of Persia, combined with the local population
who spoke various Iranian languages, have
played the most important role in the
ethnogenesis of the Hazāras.
Kakar (1973) considers both theories as
plausible: a first contingent of Chaghatay
Mongols may have arrived in the Hazārajāt from
Central Asia, to be joined over time by later
migrating peoples (other Mongols or Turko-
Mongols, Ilkhanids driven out of Persia,
Timurids), and mixed with the local population
of the area who were of Persian origin. In any
case, the Hazāras formed a distinct group
occupying what corresponds approximately to
their present habitat at least since the beginning
of the 16th century C.E. Under the influence of
the Safavids of Iran, they converted to Shiʿism

between the end of the 16th and the beginning
of the 17th century (Mousavi, 1998).
Without taking side in this controversy (see also
Ferdinand, 1959, 1964; Mousavi, pp. 28-31), it
seems probable historically that the origins of
the Hazāras lie with the Mongolian and Turkish
groups which progressively penetrated the
infertile mountainous region situated between
Persia, Central Asia, and India between the 13th
and the 15th centuries, mixed with the local
population and adopted their language.
It must also be pointed out that Turko-
Mongolian people, like the Hephtalites (5th and
6th centuries), were already present in what is
today Afghanistan and therefore may also have
played a role in the ethnogenesis of the Hazāras
(Mousavi, p. 38).
Nevertheless, Fredrik Barth’s work on ethnicity
(1969) has made it evident that group identity is
not defined by objective traits and does not
follow from a common origin or even a common
culture. It is, rather, the result of a constant
process of social interaction by which a
boundary is created and maintained in an
enduring way.
There are many Middle Eastern examples where
distinct groups were formed by people of
heterogeneous origins in marginal regions
following a continuing process of inclusion and
exclusion and of resistance to central powers

(Canfield, 1973a, pp. 10-12 and 1973b, pp. 1511-
13).
In the case of the Hazāras, the feeling of
belonging to one group does not proceed from
a supposed Mongolian origin, but from a
process of marginalization which started
several centuries ago. As mentioned already,
the term hazārahas been used to designate a
heterogeneous group, including some Sunni
groups (for instance in the district of Rustāq,
province of Taḵar, or the district of Nahrin,
province of Baḡlān). It seems to refer as much
to a social position as to a common historical
origin.
The Subjugation of the Hazāras by Amir ʿAbd-al-
Raḥmān Khan (r. 1880-1901)
For most of the period since the 16th century,
the Hazāras have evaded the control of the
powerful regional empires (Safavids in Iran,
Uzbeks in Central Asia, Mughals in India). But
since the middle of the 18th century and the
formation of modern Afghanistan, the Hazāras
have faced continual pressure from the
Pashtuns which has forced them to abandon
vast territories in the Helmand and Arḡandāb
basins.
Having visited the area in the 1840s, Ferrier
(1857, pp. 220-21) highlighted the hos-tility
between the Hazāras and the Pashtuns, who
would hesitate to venture into the Hazārajāt.

During the second reign of Amir Dōst-
Moḥammad Khan (q.v.; 1259-79/1842-63), the
administration in Kabul collected taxes in
Bāmiān (q.v.) and certain peripheral areas of the
Hazārajāt (Noelle, 1997). But only his grandson,
ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan, was able to subjugate
the Hazāras after a difficult war and put to an
end Hazāra autonomy.
ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan was brought to power
just after the Second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-
79), concluded by the Treaty of Gandomak: the
territorial integrity of Afghanistan was
guaranteed, but the British gained control over
its foreign policy. The new amir devoted his
reign to the reinforcement of central power and
the unification of the kingdom.
He was an autocrat and rapidly faced several
revolts within his own family as well as the Ḡilzi
(q.v.) and Šinwāri insurrections. Once he had
consolidated his throne, he set out to conquer
the virtually independent Hazārajāt. In the face
of strong resistance, he launched a series of
campaigns marked by a sectarian and ethnic
polarization and many atrocities.
The conflict could have been caused by several
major factors (see Mousavi, pp. 115-20),
including the following: opposite tendencies
towards centralization and decentralization,
which led to tensions between the central
government and the Hazāra tribal leaders; the
amir’s desire to reduce the autonomy of
powerful tribal chiefs and marginal groups,

such as the Hazāras, who represented a threat
for security and communications in the state;
long-lasting tribal feuds and struggles between
competing challengers for central power (ʿAbd-
al-Raḥmān spared large parts of southern
Hazārajāt, once his authority had been accepted
there, and waged war on the Hazāra leaders who
supported the previous ruler of Afghanistan, his
uncle Šēr-ʿAli).
When ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān’s cousin, Moḥammad-
Esḥāq, the governor of Mazār-e Šarif, rebelled
against him, several of the Šayḵ ʿAli Hazāra
tribal leaders joined the revolt. ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān
used the sectarian division among the Šayḵ ʿAli
tribe (some of whom are Sunnis) to crush this
first uprising in 1888. During the following
years, he extended his control over increasingly
large parts of the Hazārajāt, imposing
governmental taxes and dispatching Pashtun
administrators, who committed several kinds of
abuses: they disarmed people and looted
villages, imprisoned, and sometimes executed,
tribal chiefs and elders, and appropriated the
best pastures in order to give them to Pashtun
nomads.
A strong Hazāra uprising began in the spring of
1892; according to Mousavi: “The actual trigger
for the first rebellion was the assault by thirty-
three Afghan soldiers on the wife of a Pahlawān
Hazāra. The soldiers, who had entered the
house under the pretext of searching for arms,

tied the man up and assaulted his wife in front
of him.
The families of both the man and his wife,
deciding that death was one hundred times
better than such humiliation, killed the soldiers
involved and attacked the local garrison, from
whence they recovered their confiscated arms”
(Mousavi, pp. 124-25). Important tribal leaders,
such as Moḥammad-ʿAẓim Beg, from Dāy Zangi,
a former supporter of ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan,
joined the rebellion which soon spread
throughout the Hazārajāt.
Worried about the direction taken by the events,
the amir declared jihad against the Shiʿites, and
raised a powerful army of some 30,000-40,000
governmental troops, 10,000 mounted troops
and some 100,000 civilians (in particular many
Pashtun nomads) assisted by British military
advisers (Mousavi, p. 126, referring to Fayż-
Moḥammad, 1912-14 and Timurkhanov, 1980).
In August 1892, Urozgān, the main center of the
rebellion, was captured, and the local
population massacred: “thousands of Hazara
men, women, and children were sold as slaves
in the markets of Kabul and Qandahar, while
numerous towers of human heads were made
from the defeated rebels as a warning to others
who might challenge the rule of the Amir”
(Mousavi, p. 126). The repression was so harsh
and the Hazāras were treated so unjustly that a
second uprising started in early 1893.

The rebels took by surprise the governmental
forces and quickly regained control over most
of the Hazārajāt. Despite the fact they were
deeply divided, they resisted the
counteroffensive by the amir’s troops, and it
was only in the summer of 1893, after months of
fierce fighting, shortage of food, and the
prospect of famine, that Hazāra forces suffered
a resounding defeat, though skirmishes
continued until the end of the year.
Governmental troops did not refrain from
committing atrocities, including the killing and
deportation of the populations of entire villages.
ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān’s strategy to crush the Hazāra
uprising fostered hatred between the different
groups. The conflict caused a deep ethnic and
religious polarization (Pashtuns vs. Hazāras,
Sunnis vs. Shiʿites) and led to the forced
displacement of populations on a massive
scale; lands were confiscated and the
inhabitants of entire regions fled or were
expelled (especially in the province of Urozgān
and the district of Dāy Čōpān, province of
Zābul; Kakar, 1973, 1979; Poladi, pp. 229-34,
245-55; Mousavi, pp. 136-38).
Basing this statement on the work of
Timurkhanov (1980), Mousavi (p. 129) estimates
that 15,000 Hazāra families escaped from their
land and settled in Afghan Turkistan, near
Mašhad (where they are called Barbaris), in

Quetta (then in British India, today in Pakistan),
and even in Central Asia. He estimates that
more than half of the entire Hazāra population
was massacred or driven out of their villages
(Mousavi, p. 136).
It is difficult to verify such an estimate, but the
memory of the conquest of the Hazārajāt by
ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan certainly remains vivid
among the Hazāras themselves, and has heavily
influenced their relations with the Afghan state
throughout the 20th century. While ʿAbd-al-
Raḥmān may have achieved the political
unification of the country, he failed nonetheless
to incorporate all segments of Afghan society.
The 20th Century
ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Khan’s son and successor,
Amir Ḥabib-Allāh (q.v.), granted a general
amnesty to all who had been exiled by his
father. But the gulf lying between the Afghan
government and the Hazāra population was too
deep; and, during most of the 20th century, the
Hazāras have faced severe social, economic
and political discrimination.
British travelers Moorcroft and Trebeck (II, p.
384) mentioned the presence of Pashtun
nomads in the area of Behsud as early as 1824.
Even if Pashtuns had pastured in the Hazārajāt
before its conquest by Amir ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān, it
was this event that gave them their preeminent
position there. They are known to have seized
the best grazing land for their flocks, but

nomads are not only stockbreeders but traders
as well.
By loaning money and selling manufactured
goods, they were able to gain a further
economic advantage over the sedentary
Hazāras. Farmers were often obliged to
surrender their property to their Pashtun
creditors in order to reimburse their debts, and
thus became mere tenants on their own lands
(Ferdinand, 1962). In consequence, many
impoverished Hazāra farmers were forced to
migrate seasonally in search of employment to
the main cities of Afghanistan, or those of
Pakistan and Iran.
In spite of the general distrust the Hazāras felt
towards the central government, most of them
did not support the anti-Pashtun revolt in 1929
led by the Tājik adventurer Ḥabib-Allāh, known
as Bačča-ye Saqqā (q.v.; McChesney, 1999).
However, local uprisings broke out sporadically
in the Hazārajāt against government abuses, the
most famous of which was led by the Hazāra
rebel from Šahrestān, Ebrāhim Beg, popularly
known as Bačča-Gāw-sawār (“son of the cow
rider”), in the second half of the 1940s. He
revolted against the introduction of a new tax
imposed exclusively on the Hazāras, which was
payable in cooking oil per head of animal (not
only cows and sheep but also horses and
donkeys, which do not produce milk for human
consumption).

Pashtun nomads were not only exempted from
taxes but even received financial allowances
from the state administration. The rebels
captured and killed several government
officials. Confronted with such a violent
reaction, the government sent a force to pacify
the region and withdrew the tax. The exploits of
bandits (yāḡi) who revolted against the state’s
arbitrary treatment are told in popular tales,
such as those of Yusof Beg, who is supposed to
have evaded the police for nineteen years
before finally being captured and executed
(Edwards, pp. 208-11; Poladi, pp. 384-85, 396-97;
Mousavi, p. 163).
All the events are kept alive in folk and
revolutionary songs (Bindemann, 1988), in
which Fayż-Moḥammad (the Hazāra secretary of
ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān, who reported the bloody
conquest of the Hazārajāt), ʿAbd-al-Ḵāleq (the
young Hazāra who took part in a family and
political feud between two Pashtun factions and
murdered Nāder Shah in 1933), and Sayyed
Esmāʿil Balḵi (an important Shiʿite religious
leader who was imprisoned between 1949 to
1964) are all celebrated like heroic rebels
against an oppressive power.
Hazāra identity is thus reinforced by the
evocation of past injustices and protests
against social exploitation and discrimination.
Since 1978: War and Exile

In the early 1970s, the Hazārajāt, like other parts
of Afghanistan, faced a severe drought, which
led to a shortage of food. It was the first step in
the series of dramatic events which paved the
way for the seizure of power by the Communists
in 1978, many of whom were young, recently
urbanized and detribalized people seeking
social advancement. Within a few months, most
of the country was in rebellion, and in 1979 the
Soviet Union intervened militarily.
A bitter guerrilla war ensued over the next ten
years between the Red Army and the
predominantly Islamist Afghan resistance
fighters, or mujahideen [mojāhedin], during
which about 1.5 million Afghans died and
millions more left the country. The Soviet
withdrawal in 1989 and the fall of the
Communist regime in 1992 led to an explosion
of tensions and expressions of dissatisfaction.
While the 1980s were marked by the
development of Islamist resistance parties, the
1990s were characterized by the rise of ethnic
clashes, which were more a result, rather than a
cause, of the civil war.
An accurate account and analysis of the war in
the Hazārajāt between 1978 and 1992 may be
found in Harpviken (1996; see also Roy, pp. 194-
205). Relatively spared by the Soviet forces, the
Hazārajāt was the scene of bitter internal
conflicts during the 1980s.

The main competing parties involved during this
decade were: the Tanẓim-e nasl-e naw-e Hazāra-
moḡol, a party based in Quetta and inspired by
Hazāra nationalists and secular intellectuals
(some of whom were discreetly affiliated to
Maoist movements like the Šoʿla-ye jāwid); the
Šurā-ye enqelābi-e ettefāq, dominated by the
traditional leaders (mirs, or tribal leaders, and
sayyeds, or descendants of the Prophet); the
Ḥarakat-e eslāmi, representing non-Hazāra
Shiʿites, some sayyeds, and secular
intellectuals under the guidance of Shaikh Āsef
Moḥseni (a Shiʿite scholar from Kandahar); the
Sāzmān-e naṣr and the Sepāh-e pāsdārān, who
were competing Islamist parties backed by Iran
and led by young pro-Khomeini militants.
It was the traditional leaders, the mirs and
sayyeds, who led the uprising against the
Communist regime as an allied force, and
liberated the Hazārajāt from central control as
early as 1979. In the following years, the
sayyeds backed by the Islamists, turned against
the secular forces, including the mirs as well as
the intellectuals, and took control of most of the
Hazārajāt. Between 1982 and 1984, after severe
fighting, this group lost their position of
dominance to the Islamists, who were strongly
supported by Iran.
The Šurā-ye ettefāq was obliged to take refuge
in its stronghold of the region of Nāwor. After
the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Hazāra
leaders felt the necessity to bypass their

antagonism in order to play a role on the
national scene. The Islamist leaders shifted their
discourse on ethnic identity in response to this
development, and broadened their political
legitimacy. This trend was marked by the
creation of the Ḥezb-e waḥdat, a vast alliance
joined by most of the former Hazāra resistance
groups, with the notable exception of Ḥarakat-e
eslāmi.
After the fall of Kabul in April 1992, deep
tensions did not take long to appear between
the different factions. While Ḥarakat-e eslāmi
and most of the former Sepāh-e pāsdārān
became closely linked with Rabbāni’s
government, the majority of Ḥezb-e waḥdat
(controlled by for-mer Sāzmān-e naṣr leaders)
joined the opposition.
The Ḥezb-e waḥdat was obliged to beat a retreat
from Kabul in March 1995, when their leader,
ʿAbd-al-ʿAli Mazāri, was treacherously captured
and killed by the Taliban (ṭālebān).
It was only after the capture of the Afghan
capital by the Taliban in September 1996 that
the different Hazāra factions were able to unite
as part of the wider Northern Alliance, against
this common enemy.
In spite of a fierce resistance, they were unable
to prevent the fall of the Hazārajāt, which
became totally surrounded and isolated from
the outside world in September 1998.

The international intervention following the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington has removed the Taliban
regime from Afghanistan, but the situation is
still very volatile.
In spite of all their internal conflicts during this
time and the hardships of fighting and exile, war
has paradoxically opened new doors to the
Hazāras, who have in consequence undergone a
process of political and economic
empowerment.
Today, they have gained a role on the national
scene they had never been able to reach since
their incorporation into the Afghan state at the
end of the 19th century.
————————————————

iii. Ethnography and Social
Organization
Tribal Organization
Apart from the scholarly work of Elphinstone
(1815) and the writings of diplomats, officers,
and travelers of the 19th century (Burnes, 1834;
Moorcroft and Trebeck, 1841; Masson, 1842;
Ferrier, 1857), among the best sources on the
Hazāra tribal system prior to 1892-93 are the
reports of the Afghan Boundary Commission, in
particular those of Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland
(1891), who was a member of the mission in
Afghanistan between 1884 and 1886.
He reported an oral tradition according to which
the Hazāras were originally divided into eight
tribes: Dāy Zangi, Dāy Kondi, Dāy Čōpān, Dāy
Kalān (the modern Šayḵ ʿAli), Ḵatay, Behsud,
Fōlādi, and Dahla (Maitland, p. 284). He added
that the first five tribes are always mentioned,

while any one of the last three is sometimes
replaced by the Dāy Mirdād.
At the time of his visit, Maitland (p. 286) gave
the following list of tribal and territorial
divisions of the Hazāras: Behsud (region of
Behsud, east of the Hazārajāt), Dāy Zangi
(region of Dāy Zangi, to the north and northwest
of the Hazārajāt, with Yak-awlang), Dāy Kondi
(region of Dāy Kondi, west of the Hazārajāt),
independent Hazāras (southeast and south of
the Hazārajāt, in today’s province of Urozgān
and nearby areas, including the Dāy Fōlādi, Dāy
Čōpān, and Qalandar), Ḡazni Hazāras (Jā-ḡori,
Moḥammad Ḵᵛāja, Čahār Dasta, Jaḡatu
Hazāras), Šayḵ ʿAli Hazāras (northeast of the
Hazārajāt, including Karam-ʿAli, Dāy Kalān,
Karluq, ʿAli Jām, and Turkman Hazāras, some of
whom are Sunnis), Hazāras of Bāmiān (only
small sections are given, including the Tatars of
Kahmard and Dō-āb), Hazāras scattered in
Afghan Turkistan.
This list is heterogeneous, and several terms
stand merely for a regional unit. It suffices to
say that it would be misleading to present a
fixed and definitive image of the main Hazāra
tribes, as the affiliations are changing over time
and the designations reflect the political
situation.
Furthermore, the incorporation of the Hazārajāt
into the Afghan state has disorganized the tribal
system of the Hazāras considerably. As several
scholars have remarked, previous tribal

names—like Behsud, Dāy Kondi and Jāḡōri—
tend today to become territorial designations
(Schurmann, p. 121; Gawecki, 1986, p. 16).
Lineages (ḵān(a)war) have kept their social
relevance, but wider tribal affiliations are no
longer the main way of self-identification.
Habitat and Land Use
In most of the Hazārajāt, settlements consist of
small hamlets (qaria or āḡel); fortified farms
(qalʿa) dominate in the south, while smaller
houses and huts (čapari) are found towards the
north. The basic territorial unit of social life in
the Hazārajāt is the manṭeqa (literally “area,
region”). In most of the region, these
communities are made up of several descent
groups—often, though not always, claiming a
common ancestor—which are split into separate
hamlets.
They have external kinship ties and maintain
local solidarity with their neighbors (Monsutti,
2000a; 2002, pp. 111-66). In some areas of
eastern Hazārajāt where non-irrigated
agriculture dominates, factionalism may be
expressed in the form of sectarian alignments
between Twelver Shiʿites and Ismaʿilis (Canfield,
1973a and 1973b).
The Hazāras dwelling south of Kuh-e Bābā are
mostly highland sedentary farmers. Those who
live to the north (between Yak-awlang and
Bāmiān) have a more pastoral economy.
However, on the northern part of the Hazār-ajāt,

high altitude settlements (aylāq) are
distinguished from permanent villages situated
in the valley (qešlāq). Irrigated land (zamin-e
ābi) may be worked jointly by a group of
brothers or even cousins (especially due to the
fact that several male adults may have left), but
it tends to be owned privately by an individual.
However, it may not be sold to strangers, and
the members of the owner’s descent group have
a pre-emptive right to it. Most grazing land
(čarāgāh, zamin-e ʿalafčar) is held communally
and used by the inhabitants of the same hamlet,
or sometimes by the members of the same
lineage. Many farmers cultivate land they do not
own: they customarily keep a quarter of the
crop and give three quarters to the landlord,
who normally also provides the water and the
seed.
Wheat is the main crop. Irrigated wheat may be
classified into two groups: autumn wheat
(gandom-e termāhi), which is sowed in autumn
and harvested in summer, and is common in the
south; and spring wheat (gandom-e bahāri),
which has a shorter cycle (it is generally sowed
in April and harvested just before the winter)
and tends to be predominant in the higher and
colder areas of the center and the north of the
Hazārajāt. Non-irrigated wheat may also be
found; it is considered to be of better quality but
has a much smaller yield.
The economy of the Hazārajāt is not self-
sufficient but depends on migration and

remittance networks. These have been set up
throughout the 20th century, but have played an
increasingly important role since 1978.
Kinship and Marriage
The domestic group typically consists of a man,
his wife, his sons as well as their spouses and
children, and the unmarried daughters. The
family’s heritage may sometimes be divided up
even while the father is still alive, or it may
remain as one whole even after his death. As
long as there are no serious conflicts, brothers
are reluctant to split up the heritage. There is
actually no compelling rule on this matter.
Male and female roles are strongly
differentiated. The public sphere is the domain
of men, and the domestic one is the realm of
women. Women take care of young children,
cook for the household, and clean the house.
They may have a small garden to tend and a few
chickens. They weave and sew and, in some
areas, make rugs and felt.
In a peasant family, men look after the sheep
and goats and plow, sow and harvest, thresh
and winnow the crops. Among both rural and
urban people, a man must not stay at home
during the day. War, however, has led women to
take over many traditionally male duties, while
men who have migrated abroad have had to
learn to cook, sew, and do the laundry.
Hazāragi has a very rich kinship terminology
(Heslot, 1984-85; Monsutti, 2002, pp. 407-11),

and its social use is very flexible. Cooperation is
not exclusively determined by kinship and
lineage. There are multiple registers of
solidarity, especially in the context of migration.
Relationships of trust and rivalry overlap. Three
social domains emerge: agnates; other
collaterals, affines, and friends; external
relations.
Patrilateral kinship determines the strongest
level of solidarity but is also the arena of
intense conflicts. It is structurally opposed to
friendship and, to some degree, to matrilateral
kinship and alliance, which are the domain of
connivance, freedom of speech, and, very often,
of trade partnership.
Because of their intensity, they are all distinct
from the external relations with strangers, which
are unpredictable and dominated by hostility.
Face-to-face rivalry between patrilateral cousins
differs markedly from the general distrust
between strangers. Among the Hazāras—as in
many parts of Afghanistan and the Middle
East—relationships between close agnates are
alternately dominated by solidarity or hostility.
Generally in Afghanistan, patrilateral kinship
terms imply respect, but also rivalry,
competition, and jealousy at a given
generational level. They may even be
characterized by avoidance behavior. Indeed,
the main stakes and conflicts arise between the
heirs of the same man, especially among
sedentary farmers. They will, for instance, fight

over land and water resources. Heavy
obligations also imply acute tensions.
Paradoxically, the circle of solidarity is also the
most frequently violent.
Matrilateral kinship terminology does not imply
the same degree of formalism, and
interpersonal relations are often more
affectionate between distant members of one’s
lineage, matrilateral relatives and affines, than
between close agnates. Cross cousins (bačča-
ʿamma, or father’s sister’s son, and bačča-
māmā, or mother’s broth-er’s son) represent a
positive social sphere where solidarity and
affection dominate relationships.
This feature may derive from the strong ties
which exist between brother and sister. These
are the persons of choice for borrowing money
and for setting up a joint venture. Matrilateral
parallel cousins (bačča-ḵāla, or mother’s
sister’s son, or bola in Hazāragi) also play an
important role. The relationships between bola
(sons of two sisters) and bāja (husbands of two
sisters) are symmetrical and affectionate, a
light-hearted kind of classification of kinship.
They seem to be rarely the basis for building
commercial partnerships, and their way of
interaction has similarities with friendship.
Another interesting term is ḵʷār-zāda (sister’s
son or sister’s daughter)—or jeya, the term used
in some places such as Šahrestān—which
Hazāras tend to use for every man whose
mother is from their own lineage, even if they

are older (especially for the father’s sister’s
children).
Schurmann (1962, p. 140) considers this to be a
legacy of the Omaha terminology of the old
Mongols. Marriage is considered an obligation,
and divorce is rare and stigmatized. Polygamy
is uncommon and occurs primarily when a man
feels obliged to marry the widow of his dead
brother. The general pattern is to marry kin,
although families also try to diversify their
social assets through marriage.
Marriage between patrilateral parallel cousins
seem to be less common among the Hazāras
than marriage between cross-cousins (Monsutti,
2002, pp. 139-42). In such a cultural context,
cross-cousins, distant collaterals, and also
affines are preferred to agnates for borrowing
money and setting up commercial partnerships.
Some long-term relationships, grounded in a
common interest as well as friendship, have
also been developed with members of other
Afghan groups or with host societies (guides,
transporters, smugglers, etc.), even if war and
exile have generally deepened social
fragmentation and distrust.
Social and Political Stratification
Hazāra society is stratified. The descendants of
the Prophet, or sayyeds, form a sort of religious
aristocracy, even if many of them are simple
farmers. They receive external marks of respect,
tend to practice endogamous marriages, and

play an important role as mediators, relying on
prestige rather than personal wealth.
The tribal chiefs, or mirs, were very powerful
until the end of the 19th century, but their
influence has been undermined during the 20th
century by the increasing penetration of the
central administration system, even if local
communities are still dominated by the richest
landlords. In today’s Hazārajāt, people use the
term ḵān rather than mir for men whose
influence is based on kinship, social capital,
and personal wealth.
The village headmen (arbāb or malek), who work
as intermediaries between their local
communities and government officials, are often
chosen from among the family elders (riš-
safid,or muy-safid). Since 1978-79, all these
leaders have lost part of their power to the
commanders (qomāndān) of the resistance
parties and the leaders of the militant religious
groups formed in Iran (usually called šayḵān in
the Hazārajāt). Hazāra society is thus facing a
dramatic evolution and political roles follow
increasingly new patterns (Roy, pp. 194-205;
Harpviken; Monsutti, 2000a).
Religious Practices and Life-cycle Ceremonies
The great majority of Shiʿites in Afghanistan are
Hazāras. David Edwards (1986, p. 204) has
commented that “their practice of Islam was one
that had little connection to scriptural

traditions” and was characterized by “the
development of an insular tradition focused on
the person of ʿAli.” There are no real mosques
in the Hazārajāt.
The religious life of the villages is centered on a
build-ing called the membar (from menbar, the
pulpit of a mosque), which fulfils the function of
a prayer hall, meet-ing room, and guest room,
and is sometimes used as a classroom as well.
Isolated from the intellectual Shiʿite centers,
Hazāra religious practice is dominated by
reverence for saints (pirān), whose authority
comes from their ability to transmit God’s
blessing, and is expressed by visits to their
shrines. Most of these saints were also sayyeds.
Village mullahs in the Hazārajāt receive the
basic level of religious education required to
enable them to at least teach children and lead
the Friday prayers. Since 1978-79, an Iranian-
type of clerical hierarchy has slowly emerged,
introducing a new kind of religious leader: the
young militant Islamist. Often born into a
modest family, they challenge the authority of
traditional practitioners and propose a more
political conception of religion.
Besides the commemoration of the martyrdom
of Imam Ḥosayn, the Prophet’s grandson
through his daughter Fāṭema and his cousin
ʿAli, which is the most important event in the
religious calendar for the Hazāra Shiʿites, the
community also observes the Persian New Year
(nowruz), the fast of Ramażān, and the two main

Muslim festivals, or ʿids (called locally ʿid-e qor-
bān and ʿid-e ramażān).
Other major social and religious events are the
various rites of passage which mark the life of
each individual: birth, circumcision for the boys,
marriage, and death (the Hazāras have very
specific mourning songs).
The commemoration of the martyrdom of
Ḥosayn ebn ʿAli is an event of central
importance for all Shiʿites in the world. While it
seems to have not been of major relevance
among the Hazāras until the last decades of the
20th century, it has become increasingly
significant since then.
This is because it has become part of a larger
process of politicization, serving as an occasion
to remember the injustice and violence that the
Hazāra community too has suffered, as they see
their own painful history reflected in the tragic
fate of Imam Ḥosayn. Repressed under the
Taliban regime, the most spectacular
expressions of the commemoration of Mo-
ḥarram are found in urban centers (Kabul and
Mazār-e Šarif in Afghanistan, and Quetta in
Pakistan), rather than the Hazārajāt.
At the beginning of the month of Moḥarram,
flags (ʿalam) are put up on each side of the
entrance of the religious centers, signaling a
period of sorrow for the whole community,
during which, for instance, no wedding is
celebrated. Men wear black or green shirts and

white pants as a sign of mourning, and women
avoid dressing in elegant clothes.
All music is forbidden during this period except
for dirges (nawḥa). Other activities are now
suspended, as if time has stopped for the sake
of the events organized to commemorate the
martyrdom of Imam Ḥosayn. If they have the
means, many families take advantage of this
period to organize meritorious meals for the
needy and the pious (naḏr, or more specifically
naḏr-e emām Ḥosayn), and every evening
people gather to pray.
Specialists (ḏāker) invoke the name of God and
narrate, day by day, the detailed unfolding of the
events as they are reported by tradition, until
reaching the paroxysm on the tenth day of the
month of Moḥarram, the ʿĀšurā (q.v.), which is
the anniversary of Ḥosayn’s death.
Groups of penitents (dasta) form a procession,
some flagellating themselves with razor blades
and chains. After three, seven, and fourteen
days following the ʿĀšurā the Hazāras again
commemorate Ḥosayn’s death but in a less
spectacular and public way, and forty days later
a new mourning ceremony takes place, the
čelom (čehelom, lit. the “fortieth”).
The commemoration of Moḥarram can be seen
to function as a kind of outlet for tensions and
frustrations accumulated during the year; and,
within the sermons (rawża), the sufferings

endured by the Hazāras are constantly
compared with those endured by Ḥosayn and
his family.
For instance, the thirst which tortured the
Imam’s companions when they were prevented
from getting water from the Euphrates is
compared with the blockade of the Hazārajāt by
the Taliban between the summer of 1997 and the
fall of 1998, and the profanation of Ḥosayn’s
body is compared with the tragic end of ʿAbd-al-
ʿAli Mazāri, the Hazāra leader captured and
killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
More generally, the fate of the victims of Karbala
is compared to the past and recent massacres
suffered by the Hazāras (e.g., the slaughter of
several hundred civilians in Afšār Minā, a
district of Kabul, by troops allied to Aḥmad-Šāh
Masʿud in January 1993, and the mass
executions by the Taliban in Mazār-e Šarif in
August 1998).
The Hazāras identify strongly with the suffering
of Imam Ḥosayn, and also declare that they are
ready to fight for him and for a return to justice.
By mortifying themselves, they hope to expiate
their sins and accelerate the coming of an era of
justice. Sadness and mourning thus open a
more positive perspective on the basis of the
conviction that a better future will follow.
The ʿĀšurā, is thus not only the occasion to
mourn the martyrdom of Imam Ḥosayn but also
to declare oneself ready to seek revenge. In the

conception that many Hazāras have of the end
of time, there is a pronounced emphasis on
revenge.
The Hidden Imam will come back then to punish
the guilty and redress injustices. The world is
corrupted, and the faithful must remain attentive
to the sign of its destruction.
Migration and Remittance Networks
During the past 20 years, Afghanistan has been
torn apart by war and civil strife, which have
generated the largest refugee population in the
world. Like most Afghan groups, the Hazāras
fled in large numbers after the coup of April
1978 and the Soviet intervention in 1979.
Most of them went to one of the neighboring
countries of Afghanistan. Migrants and refugees
have thus come to overlap and can hardly be
distinguished from each other. Their
movements follow various patterns: thousands
of farmers from the Hazārajāt migrate every
winter to work in coal mines near Quetta for a
few months, while young men migrate for longer
periods to Iran to take on me-nial jobs.
During the last two decades, the Hazāras have
formed very efficient migratory and economic
networks, based on the dispersion of relatives
in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Each place
has its own advantages and drawbacks. In Iran
(especially in the big cities), it is relatively easy
to find a job but almost impossible to settle
down on a long-term basis with a family; on the

other hand, in Quetta, Hazāras can move freely,
but very few employment opportunities are
available to them; however, in the Hazārajāt,
social, political, and economic prospects are
grim even if one’s family possesses its own
property and farmland (Monsutti, 2000b, 2002).
Hazāra migrants and refugees in Iran cannot
use the official banking system, since many of
them are illegal workers and therefore unlikely
to have any recognized documents as proof of
identity. In any case, banks do not operate in
the Hazārajāt itself. Therefore, when they wish
to send their savings back to their families in
Afghanistan, they must entrust their money to a
businessman who specializes in remittances
(known locally as a ḥawāla-dār).
Various actors are involved in a typical case of
the ḥawāla (credit note) system, the three main
ones being the migrant worker (kārgar; Afghans
often use mosāfer, lit. “traveller”) who wants to
send his savings to his family left behind in
Afghanistan, the remittance specialist, and a
middleman (dallāl), when the migrant worker
and the remittance specialist do not know each
other already; the middleman collects the
migrant worker’s money and gives it to the
remittance specialist, who is usually also a
trader.
The middleman, as a type of broker, takes a
commission which generally amounts to 1
percent (0.5 percent from the remittance
specialist and 0.5 percent from the customer).

Once he has collected the money of the migrant
worker, the remittance specialist based in Iran,
passes on a letter to a partner in Pakistan,
stating the details of the transaction, and gives
the equivalent of a credit note to the customer
himself, to send it on to his family in
Afghanistan (usually via a friend going back
home).
In Pakistan, a merchant (tājer) associated with
the remittance specialist (they are always close
relatives) retrieves the money sent through the
official banking system. He may invest the
money in different commercial activities and
may also work as a moneychanger (ṣarrāf), as
this is a way to invest the money that they
collect and thus diversify their sources of
income.
This merchant in Pakistan purchases some
goods (wheat, rice, cooking oil, sugar, tea,
shoes, cloth, cooking pots, etc.) and dispatches
them by truck to the family’s village in the
Hazārajāt, where a third partner runs a shop.
This shopkeeper (dokkān-dār) receives the
goods, sells them, and uses the proceeds to
reimburse the migrant’s family. In the meantime,
they have been independently informed that
they would receive this money from the
shopkeeper, by the migrant worker’s associate
on his arrival there from Iran.
These categories are ideal types. In practice, the
middleman and the remittance specialist in Iran,
the merchant in Pakistan and the shopkeeper in

Afghanistan may even be the same person. If
they are different individuals, they are invariably
close relatives. However, if the migrant worker
and the remittance specialist do not know each
other, the mediation of a middleman becomes
necessary.
As the amounts remitted increase, the more the
functions tend to be differentiated. In such
cases, the remittance specialist sometimes
collaborates with an important trader (who may
be Iranian) to transfer the money directly to a
bank in Pakistan. Finally, it should be
mentioned that the entire remittance system
could not function without transport contractors
and smugglers, most of whom tend to be
Baluch, between Iran and Pakistan, and
Pashtuns between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
There are three main sources of profit for the
remittance specialist: (1) his commission; (2)
exploiting advantages in the exchange rate
between the different currencies (riāl, rupee,
and afḡāni); (3) profits from the sale of the
merchandise purchased with the money
collected from the migrant. Usury is in theory
prohibited for Muslims; interest on money,
whether it is a loan or an investment, is illicit.
But commercial transactions do not exclude the
payment of a fixed commission, which is
considered as the fair recompense for services
rendered. Usually, the commission does not
exceed 5 percent, and ranges from 2 to 3

percent among the Hazāras between Iran,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
The remittance specialist’s profit is earned
mainly from the transaction itself and depends
on factors, such as how distant the deadline for
repayment is, and how close his relationship is
with the migrant worker for whom he is
providing this service.
Since most Hazāra remittance specialists do not
keep any precise accounting records, and the
different local currencies tend to get devalued
very quickly, it is very difficult to determine the
profit made in a single cycle of a ḥawāla credit
transaction by the individual participants in the
different locations. All of the commodities are
much more expensive in the Hazārajāt than in
Quetta.
The wide networks of transfer of funds set up by
Hazā-ras and other Afghan refugees and
migrants, which serve to facilitate sending their
savings back to their families in Afghanistan,
provide the basis for many economic and
trading activities. All of the shops of the
Hazārajāt operate according to this system,
which provides them with all of their supplies.
Its significance extends beyond its economic
dimension.
Migration is not only a response to violence,
war, and poverty, for it has also become a
systematic strategy by means of which a

community, such as the Hazāras, can widen
their social and cultural horizons.
The transfer of funds is both a means of
survival and a way to structure a transnational
society. Indeed, it serves as a most efficient tool
with which to reproduce social ties in the face of
war and the dispersion of members of each
domestic and solidarity group.
Despite the trauma of war and exile, the Hazāras
have thus managed to take advantage of their
geographic dispersion and the resulting
economic diversification, by developing new
transnational cooperation structures.
Facing a very difficult situation, Hazāra refugees
and migrants, like other Afghans, have
demonstrated their ability to adapt.
Using their existing cultural assets, while
moving constantly between Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iran, and beyond, they have been able
to open new social, economic, and political
perspectives.
The multiplicity of the registers of solidarity,
which are not limited to lineage or tribal
affiliation, the diversification of the basis of
cooperation, the multidirectional migratory
displacements, and the vast amount of money
remitted to Afghanistan are some of the most
striking features of the social strategies
employed by the Hazāras in recent times.

————————————
Κατεβάστε το άρθρο του Said Reza Huseini,
Destruction of Bamiyan Buddha:

https://vk.com/doc429864789_618303058
https://www.docdroid.net/vT9KJru/said-reza-
huseini-destruction-of-bamiyan-buddha-pdf
———————————————–

Επιπλέον:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhas_of_Bamy
an
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bamyan_Province

——————————————————

—————————————————
Ali Yaser Shoayb – Salsal and
Hazara 2013, Afghanistan

Ο πίνακας ζωγραφικής Σαλσάλ και Χαζάρα
(Salsal and Hazara) του Αλί Γιάσερ Σουέιμπ (Ali
Yaser Shoayb) δείχνει πόσο σημαντικό ρόλο τα
πελώρια λαξευτά αγάλματα του Βούδα στο
Μπαμιγιάν έπαιζαν στις παραδόσεις, τις
δοξασίες και την παιδεία των Τουρκοφώνων
Σιιτών Χαζάρα του Αφγανιστάν.
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, κατά τις παραδόσεις των
Χαζάρα – που έφθασαν στην περιοχή πολλούς
αιώνες μετά την λάξευση των αγαλμάτων στους
εκεί βράχους – τα αγάλματα ανήκαν στο αστρικό
ζεύγος ψυχικών οντοτήτων Σαλσάλ και
Σαχμάμα των οποίων ο αποτυχημένος έρωτας
επέφερε τον θάνατο.
Έτσι, οι δυο εραστές του ψυχικού κόσμου
παρέμειναν για πάντα χωρισμένοι αφού
μετατράπηκαν σε λίθο κι αποτυπώθηκαν πάνω
στους εκεί βράχους για να κυττάζουν συνέχεια
την γη και τον ουρανό.
Ο 23 ετών Χαζάρα Αφγανός καλλιτέχνης
φιλοτέχνησε τον πίνακα αυτόν το 2013 στα 17
του χρόνια.
http://www.imagomundiart.com/artworks/ali-
yaser-shoayb-salsal-and-hazara

Χαζάρα: οι Καταπιεσμένοι Τουρκόφωνοι Σιίτες του Αφγανιστάν αποτελούν την Ανατολική Λαβίδα του Μυστικού Κινήματος των Κιζιλμπάσηδων

Χαζάρα: οι Καταπιεσμένοι Τουρκόφωνοι Σιίτες του Αφγανιστάν αποτελούν την Ανατολική Λαβίδα του Μυστικού Κινήματος των Κιζιλμπάσηδων

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