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Invest	
  in	
  security	
  
to	
  secure	
  investments	
  
13	
  Real	
  ways	
  to	
  destroy	
  business	
  by	
  breaking	
  	
  
company’s	
  SAP	
  Applica<ons	
  and	
  a	
  guide	
  to	
  
avoid	
  them	
  
	
  
Alexander	
  Polyakov	
  
CTO	
  ERPScan,	
  President	
  EAS-­‐SEC	
  
	
  
	
  
SAP	
  Security	
  made	
  easy.	
  	
  
How	
  to	
  keep	
  your	
  SAP	
  systems	
  secure	
  
About	
  ERPScan	
  
•  The	
   only	
   360-­‐degree	
   SAP	
   Security	
   solu<on	
   -­‐	
   ERPScan	
   Security	
  
Monitoring	
  Suite	
  for	
  SAP	
  
•  Leader	
  by	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  acknowledgements	
  from	
  SAP	
  (	
  150+	
  )	
  
•  60+	
  presentaAons	
  key	
  security	
  conferences	
  worldwide	
  
•  25	
  Awards	
  and	
  nominaAons	
  
•  Research	
  team	
  -­‐	
  20	
  experts	
  with	
  experience	
  in	
  	
  different	
  areas	
  
of	
  security	
  
•  Headquartered	
  in	
  Palo	
  Alto	
  (US)	
  and	
  Amsterdam	
  (EU)	
  
	
  
	
  
2	
  
•  Working	
  together	
  since	
  2007 	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Senior	
  Director,	
  Head	
  of	
  Global	
  Security	
  Alliance	
  Management	
  
Product	
  Security,	
  Technology	
  and	
  Innova<on	
  PlaWorm	
  
SAP	
  Labs,	
  Palo	
  Alto,	
  USA	
  
3	
  
“We	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  thank	
  the	
  world-­‐class	
  
security	
  experts	
  of	
  ERPScan	
  for	
  the	
  highly	
  
qualified	
  job	
  performed	
  to	
  help	
  us	
  assess	
  the	
  
security	
  of	
  our	
  pre-­‐release	
  products”.	
  
ERPScan	
  and	
  SAP	
  
•  How	
  to	
  protect	
  ourselves	
  from	
  fraud	
  and	
  cyber-­‐a^acks?	
  
•  How	
  to	
  automate	
  security	
  monitoring	
  for	
  big	
  landscapes	
  and	
  get	
  
smart	
  reports	
  ?	
  
•  How	
  to	
  priori<ze	
  updates?	
  
•  How	
  to	
  comply	
  with	
  regula<ons?	
  
•  How	
  to	
  iden<fy	
  and	
  test	
  most	
  cri<cal	
  vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  SAP	
  
•  How	
  to	
  address	
  industry-­‐specific	
  solu<ons’	
  security?	
  
	
  
	
  
4	
  
Client	
  needs	
  
2007	
  –	
  Architecture	
  vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  RFC	
  protocol	
  
2008	
  –	
  A^acks	
  via	
  SAPGUI	
  
2009	
  –	
  SAP	
  backdoors	
  
2010	
  –	
  A^acks	
  via	
  SAP	
  WEB	
  applica<ons	
  
2010	
  –	
  Stuxnet	
  for	
  SAP	
  
2011	
  –	
  Architecture	
  and	
  program	
  vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  ABAP	
  
2011	
  –	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  	
  J2EE	
  engine	
  
2012	
  –	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  SAP	
  solu<ons	
  (SolMan	
  ,Portal,	
  XI)	
  and	
  Services	
  Dispatcher,	
  Message	
  Server	
  
2012	
  –	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  Protocols	
  -­‐	
  XML	
  ,	
  DIAG	
  
2013	
  –	
  SAP	
  Forensics	
  and	
  An<-­‐forensics	
  
2014	
  –	
  SAP	
  BusinessObjects,	
  SAP	
  HANA	
  and	
  other	
  specific	
  plaWorms	
  
	
  
5	
  
How	
  to	
  prevent?	
  
New	
  threats	
  
0	
  
10	
  
20	
  
30	
  
40	
  
50	
  
2006	
   2007	
   2008	
   2009	
   2010	
   2011	
   2012	
   2013	
   2014	
  
Research	
  talks	
  	
  
about	
  SAP	
  security	
  in	
  technical	
  conferences	
  
•  3000+	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  all	
  SAP	
  Products	
  
•  2368	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  were	
  found	
  in	
  SAP	
  NetWeaver	
  ABAP	
  	
  based	
  
systems	
  
•  1050	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  were	
  found	
  in	
  basic	
  components	
  which	
  are	
  
the	
  same	
  for	
  every	
  system	
  
•  About	
  350	
  Vulnerabili<es	
  were	
  found	
  in	
  ECC	
  modules.	
  	
  
6	
  
By	
  November	
  2014	
  –	
  3200+	
  notes	
  
SAP	
  vulnerabiliAes	
  
1	
   1	
   13	
   10	
   10	
   27	
   14	
  
77	
  
130	
  
833	
  
731	
  
641	
  
363	
  
364	
  
0	
  
100	
  
200	
  
300	
  
400	
  
500	
  
600	
  
700	
  
800	
  
900	
  
2001	
   2002	
   2003	
   2004	
   2005	
   2006	
   2007	
   2008	
   2009	
   2010	
   2011	
   2012	
   2013	
   2014	
  
7	
  
Public	
  vulnerabiliAes	
  
8	
  
Incidents	
  
•  Espionage	
  
–  Thek	
  of	
  financial	
  informa<on	
  
–  Corporate	
  trade	
  secret	
  thek	
  	
  
–  Thek	
  of	
  supplier	
  and	
  customer	
  lists	
  
–  Stealing	
  HR	
  data	
  Employee	
  Data	
  Thek	
  
•  Sabotage	
  
–  Denial	
  of	
  service	
  
–  Tampering	
  with	
  financial	
  reports	
  
–  Access	
  to	
  technology	
  network	
  (SCADA)	
  by	
  trust	
  rela<ons	
  
•  Fraud	
  
–  False	
  transac<ons	
  
–  Modifica<on	
  of	
  master	
  data	
  
9	
  
Why	
  should	
  we	
  care	
  
•  Manipulate	
  data	
  about	
  quan<ty	
  of	
  material	
  resources	
  (S)	
  
•  Blocking	
  of	
  materials	
  for	
  pos<ng	
  (S)	
  
•  Changing	
  the	
  goods’	
  price	
  (F,S)	
  
•  Changing	
  tolerance	
  limits	
  for	
  opera<ons	
  (F,S)	
  
•  Money	
  stealing	
  (F)	
  
•  Changing	
  credit	
  limits	
  	
  
•  Modifica<on	
  of	
  price	
  by	
  changing	
  condi<ons	
  (F,S)	
  
•  Stealing	
  credit	
  card	
  data	
  (E)	
  
•  Modifica<on	
  of	
  financial	
  reports	
  (S)	
  
Risks:	
  (S-­‐sabotage,	
  F	
  –	
  fraud,	
  E-­‐	
  espionage)	
  
	
  
10	
  
Other	
  risks	
  
•  SAP	
  is	
  owned	
  and	
  managed	
  by	
  business	
  
•  Businesses	
  rarely	
  care	
  about	
  security	
  (only	
  SOD	
  )	
  
•  CISO’s	
  some<mes	
  don’t	
  even	
  know	
  about	
  SAP	
  
•  CISO’s	
  care	
  about	
  infrastructure	
  security	
  
•  But	
  if	
  breach	
  will	
  happen	
  it	
  will	
  be	
  their	
  responsibility	
  
	
  
11	
  
	
  
Our	
  mission	
  is	
  to	
  close	
  this	
  gap.	
  
	
  
Problem	
  
SAP	
  Security	
  
•  Complexity	
  	
  
	
  Complexity	
  kills	
  security.	
  Many	
  different	
  vulnerabili<es	
  in	
  all	
  
levels,	
  from	
  network	
  to	
  applica<on	
  
•  CustomizaAon	
  
	
  Cannot	
  be	
  installed	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  box.	
  They	
  have	
  many	
  (up	
  to	
  50%)	
  
custom	
  codes	
  and	
  business	
  logic	
  
•  Risky	
  	
  
	
  Rarely	
  updated	
  because	
  administrators	
  are	
  scared	
  they	
  can	
  be	
  
broken	
  during	
  updates;	
  also,	
  it	
  is	
  down<me	
  
•  Unknown	
  	
  
	
  SAP	
  is	
  Mostly	
  available	
  inside	
  the	
  company	
  (closed	
  world).	
  
Research	
  and	
  Pentest	
  community	
  is	
  not	
  familiar	
  with	
  it	
  
	
  
	
  
h^p://erpscan.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/pres/Forgo^en%20World%20-­‐%20Corporate%20Business%20Applica<on%20Systems%20Whitepaper.pdf	
  
12	
  
Myths	
  
13	
  
Myth	
  1:	
  SAP	
  Systems	
  
applica<ons	
  are	
  only	
  
available	
  internally	
  	
  
what	
  means	
  no	
  threat	
  
from	
  the	
  Internet	
  
Myth	
  2:	
  SAP	
  security	
  is	
  a	
  
	
  vendor’s	
  problem	
  
Myth	
  3:	
  SAP	
  applica<on	
  
internals	
  are	
  very	
  specific	
  
and	
  are	
  not	
  known	
  for	
  
hackers	
  
Myth	
  4	
  SAP	
  security	
  is	
  
	
  all	
  about	
  SOD	
  
14	
  
Business	
  logic	
  security	
  (SOD)	
  
Prevents	
  a/acks	
  	
  or	
  mistakes	
  made	
  by	
  insiders	
  
	
  
Custom	
  Code	
  security	
  
Prevents	
  a/acks	
  or	
  mistakes	
  made	
  by	
  developers	
  
	
  
ApplicaAon	
  plaorm	
  security	
  
Prevents	
  unauthorized	
  access	
  both	
  within	
  corporate	
  network	
  and	
  
from	
  remote	
  a/ackers	
  
	
  
3	
  areas	
  of	
  SAP	
  Security	
  
SAP	
  Security	
  
•  Current	
  security	
  solu<ons	
  like	
  VA,	
  SIEM,	
  AST	
  embody	
  very	
  li^le	
  
SAP	
  coverage	
  	
  
•  Solu<ons	
  focused	
  on	
  SAP	
  Security	
  are	
  more	
  effec<ve	
  but	
  only	
  
cover	
  any	
  one	
  of	
  listed	
  fields	
  each	
  and	
  they	
  are	
  not	
  “CISO-­‐
oriented”	
  
•  We	
  see	
  solu<on	
  	
  
–  PlaWorm	
  for	
  everybody	
  
–  Coverage	
  of	
  all	
  aspects	
  
–  Complimentary	
  to	
  SAP	
  offerings	
  or	
  extend	
  them	
  	
  
15	
  
 
	
  
	
  	
  
The	
  only	
  award-­‐winning	
  solu<on	
  in	
  the	
  market	
  to	
  assess	
  3	
  <ers	
  of	
  
SAP	
  Security	
  
16	
  
ERPScan	
  
Architecture	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  	
  
17	
  
JAVA	
  
Presenta<on	
  
	
  	
  
	
  Connectors	
  
Vulnerability	
  	
  
Management	
  
module	
  
Source	
  code	
  
security	
  	
  
module	
  
Control	
  
SOD	
  
module	
  
ERP	
   CRM	
   SRM	
   HANA	
   BOBJ	
   Mobile	
  
SAP	
  
Admin	
  
CISO	
  
Risk	
  
Manager	
  
ABAP	
  
Developer	
  
Pentester	
  
…	
  
API	
   API	
  
SIEM	
  
IT	
  GRC	
  
ITSM	
  
Ticke<ng	
  
18	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Connectors
ABAP	
  JAVA	
  
Security	
  Metrics	
   Export	
  Comparison	
   Reports	
  
PresentaAon	
  level	
  
Project	
  management	
  
Risk	
  Management	
  
Control	
  funcAons	
  
Pentest	
  
Patches	
  
ExploitaAon	
  
Vulnerability	
  Management	
   Source	
  Code	
  Security	
  
VulnerabiliAes	
  
Backdoors	
  
SAP	
  Router	
  SOAP	
   HTTP	
  
SegregaAon	
  of	
  DuAes	
  
Role	
  opAmizaAon	
  
SoD	
  
Task	
  Management	
  
CriAcal	
  privileges	
  
HANA	
  
Whitebox	
  
Compliance	
  
ABAP	
  
JAVA	
  
By	
  System	
  
By	
  Module	
  
By	
  Industry	
  
ABAP	
  
JAVA	
  
HANA	
  
Mobile	
  
Sta<s<cs	
  (Trends)	
  
Template	
  management	
   Landscape	
  management	
  
No<fica<on	
  Management	
  
Business	
  Objects	
  
BOBJ	
   Oracle	
  DB	
  
Passwords	
   Database	
  
SUP	
  
In	
  details	
  
How	
  to	
  automate	
  security	
  monitoring	
  
for	
  big	
  landscapes?	
  
19	
  
•  Case:	
  CISO	
  of	
  large	
  Oil	
  company	
  	
  
•  Need:	
  To	
  automate	
  monitoring	
  and	
  get	
  high-­‐level	
  reports	
  for	
  
100+	
  systems.	
  
•  Solu<on:	
  	
  
–  Configure	
  weekly	
  scans	
  covering	
  most	
  cri<cal	
  assets	
  
–  Export	
  results	
  	
  to	
  IBM	
  Qradar	
  for	
  correla<on	
  and	
  a	
  consolidated	
  summary	
  
of	
  relevant	
  indicators	
  at	
  a	
  glance.	
  	
  
–  Configure	
  PPTX	
  presenta<ons	
  email	
  with	
  the	
  ‘high-­‐level	
  overview’.	
  
	
  
20	
  
•  Case:	
  BASIS	
  team	
  of	
  every	
  organiza<on	
  	
  
•  Need:	
  To	
  minimize	
  down<me	
  of	
  systems	
  during	
  updates	
  and	
  
priori<ze	
  updates.	
  	
  
•  Solu<on:	
  	
  
–  Scan	
  for	
  missing	
  SAP	
  security	
  	
  notes	
  	
  
–  Scan	
  for	
  remotely	
  exploitable	
  vulnerabili<es	
  (blackbox)	
  
–  System	
  correlate	
  this	
  data,	
  an	
  you	
  can	
  filter	
  results	
  by	
  10+	
  different	
  criteria's	
  to	
  understand	
  
risk	
  
How	
  to	
  prioriAze	
  updates?	
  
21	
  
•  Need:	
  To	
  comply	
  with	
  industry	
  regula<ons	
  and	
  chose	
  step	
  by	
  
step	
  approach	
  for	
  be^er	
  technical	
  compliance	
  
•  Solu<on:	
  
–  Scan	
  to	
  address	
  PCI	
  DSS,	
  	
  SOX	
  or	
  NERC	
  CIP	
  regula<ons	
  	
  
–  Step	
  by	
  step	
  technical	
  compliance	
  approach	
  EAS-­‐SEC,	
  SAP	
  
Guidelines	
  ,ISACA,DSAG	
  
–  Add	
  Industry-­‐related	
  checks	
  and	
  guidelines	
  (Oil	
  and	
  Gas,	
  
Banking,	
  Retail),	
  make	
  your	
  own	
  template	
  
	
  
We	
  have	
  included	
  templates	
  for	
  all	
  of	
  them	
  
	
  
How	
  to	
  comply	
  with	
  regulaAons	
  
How	
  to	
  idenAfy	
  and	
  test	
  most	
  criAcal	
  
vulnerabiliAes	
  in	
  SAP?	
  
22	
  
•  Case:	
  Security	
  consul<ng	
  company	
  
•  Need:	
  To	
  provide	
  SAP	
  Security	
  assessment	
  and	
  penetra<on	
  
tes<ng	
  services	
  with	
  minimum	
  <me	
  
•  Solu<on:	
  	
  
–  Vulnerability	
  management	
  module	
  	
  
–  Blackbox	
  pentes<ng,	
  exploits,	
  business-­‐focused	
  payloads	
  
•  Advanced	
  user	
  management	
  
•  Mul<ple	
  scans’	
  comparison	
  and	
  efficiency	
  analysis	
  
•  Customizable	
  Templates	
  and	
  Landscapes	
  
•  Ability	
  to	
  assign	
  tasks	
  to	
  users	
  
•  Ability	
  to	
  manage	
  risks	
  
•  Largest	
  Built-­‐in	
  knowledge	
  base	
  
23	
  
Matching	
  requirements	
  of	
  Enterprise	
  
customers	
  
24	
  
•  Only	
  360-­‐degree	
  approach	
  can	
  help	
  in	
  maximizing	
  security	
  
•  Specific	
  checks	
  for	
  Industry	
  modules	
  and	
  solu<ons	
  
•  Fast	
  release	
  cycles	
  to	
  address	
  client	
  needs	
  
•  Combina<on	
  of	
  modules	
  gives	
  you	
  more	
  visibility	
  1+1+1=4	
  
Strength	
  
Each	
  SAP	
  landscape	
  is	
  unique	
  and	
  we	
  pay	
  close	
  a/en@on	
  to	
  the	
  requirements	
  of	
  
our	
   customers	
   and	
   prospects.	
   ERPScan	
   development	
   team	
   constantly	
   addresses	
  
these	
  specific	
  needs	
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SAP security made easy

  • 1. Invest  in  security   to  secure  investments   13  Real  ways  to  destroy  business  by  breaking     company’s  SAP  Applica<ons  and  a  guide  to   avoid  them     Alexander  Polyakov   CTO  ERPScan,  President  EAS-­‐SEC       SAP  Security  made  easy.     How  to  keep  your  SAP  systems  secure  
  • 2. About  ERPScan   •  The   only   360-­‐degree   SAP   Security   solu<on   -­‐   ERPScan   Security   Monitoring  Suite  for  SAP   •  Leader  by  the  number  of  acknowledgements  from  SAP  (  150+  )   •  60+  presentaAons  key  security  conferences  worldwide   •  25  Awards  and  nominaAons   •  Research  team  -­‐  20  experts  with  experience  in    different  areas   of  security   •  Headquartered  in  Palo  Alto  (US)  and  Amsterdam  (EU)       2  
  • 3. •  Working  together  since  2007             Senior  Director,  Head  of  Global  Security  Alliance  Management   Product  Security,  Technology  and  Innova<on  PlaWorm   SAP  Labs,  Palo  Alto,  USA   3   “We  would  like  to  thank  the  world-­‐class   security  experts  of  ERPScan  for  the  highly   qualified  job  performed  to  help  us  assess  the   security  of  our  pre-­‐release  products”.   ERPScan  and  SAP  
  • 4. •  How  to  protect  ourselves  from  fraud  and  cyber-­‐a^acks?   •  How  to  automate  security  monitoring  for  big  landscapes  and  get   smart  reports  ?   •  How  to  priori<ze  updates?   •  How  to  comply  with  regula<ons?   •  How  to  iden<fy  and  test  most  cri<cal  vulnerabili<es  in  SAP   •  How  to  address  industry-­‐specific  solu<ons’  security?       4   Client  needs  
  • 5. 2007  –  Architecture  vulnerabili<es  in  RFC  protocol   2008  –  A^acks  via  SAPGUI   2009  –  SAP  backdoors   2010  –  A^acks  via  SAP  WEB  applica<ons   2010  –  Stuxnet  for  SAP   2011  –  Architecture  and  program  vulnerabili<es  in  ABAP   2011  –  Vulnerabili<es  in    J2EE  engine   2012  –  Vulnerabili<es  in  SAP  solu<ons  (SolMan  ,Portal,  XI)  and  Services  Dispatcher,  Message  Server   2012  –  Vulnerabili<es  in  Protocols  -­‐  XML  ,  DIAG   2013  –  SAP  Forensics  and  An<-­‐forensics   2014  –  SAP  BusinessObjects,  SAP  HANA  and  other  specific  plaWorms     5   How  to  prevent?   New  threats   0   10   20   30   40   50   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   Research  talks     about  SAP  security  in  technical  conferences  
  • 6. •  3000+  Vulnerabili<es  in  all  SAP  Products   •  2368  Vulnerabili<es  were  found  in  SAP  NetWeaver  ABAP    based   systems   •  1050  Vulnerabili<es  were  found  in  basic  components  which  are   the  same  for  every  system   •  About  350  Vulnerabili<es  were  found  in  ECC  modules.     6   By  November  2014  –  3200+  notes   SAP  vulnerabiliAes   1   1   13   10   10   27   14   77   130   833   731   641   363   364   0   100   200   300   400   500   600   700   800   900   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014  
  • 9. •  Espionage   –  Thek  of  financial  informa<on   –  Corporate  trade  secret  thek     –  Thek  of  supplier  and  customer  lists   –  Stealing  HR  data  Employee  Data  Thek   •  Sabotage   –  Denial  of  service   –  Tampering  with  financial  reports   –  Access  to  technology  network  (SCADA)  by  trust  rela<ons   •  Fraud   –  False  transac<ons   –  Modifica<on  of  master  data   9   Why  should  we  care  
  • 10. •  Manipulate  data  about  quan<ty  of  material  resources  (S)   •  Blocking  of  materials  for  pos<ng  (S)   •  Changing  the  goods’  price  (F,S)   •  Changing  tolerance  limits  for  opera<ons  (F,S)   •  Money  stealing  (F)   •  Changing  credit  limits     •  Modifica<on  of  price  by  changing  condi<ons  (F,S)   •  Stealing  credit  card  data  (E)   •  Modifica<on  of  financial  reports  (S)   Risks:  (S-­‐sabotage,  F  –  fraud,  E-­‐  espionage)     10   Other  risks  
  • 11. •  SAP  is  owned  and  managed  by  business   •  Businesses  rarely  care  about  security  (only  SOD  )   •  CISO’s  some<mes  don’t  even  know  about  SAP   •  CISO’s  care  about  infrastructure  security   •  But  if  breach  will  happen  it  will  be  their  responsibility     11     Our  mission  is  to  close  this  gap.     Problem  
  • 12. SAP  Security   •  Complexity      Complexity  kills  security.  Many  different  vulnerabili<es  in  all   levels,  from  network  to  applica<on   •  CustomizaAon    Cannot  be  installed  out  of  the  box.  They  have  many  (up  to  50%)   custom  codes  and  business  logic   •  Risky      Rarely  updated  because  administrators  are  scared  they  can  be   broken  during  updates;  also,  it  is  down<me   •  Unknown      SAP  is  Mostly  available  inside  the  company  (closed  world).   Research  and  Pentest  community  is  not  familiar  with  it       h^p://erpscan.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/pres/Forgo^en%20World%20-­‐%20Corporate%20Business%20Applica<on%20Systems%20Whitepaper.pdf   12  
  • 13. Myths   13   Myth  1:  SAP  Systems   applica<ons  are  only   available  internally     what  means  no  threat   from  the  Internet   Myth  2:  SAP  security  is  a    vendor’s  problem   Myth  3:  SAP  applica<on   internals  are  very  specific   and  are  not  known  for   hackers   Myth  4  SAP  security  is    all  about  SOD  
  • 14. 14   Business  logic  security  (SOD)   Prevents  a/acks    or  mistakes  made  by  insiders     Custom  Code  security   Prevents  a/acks  or  mistakes  made  by  developers     ApplicaAon  plaorm  security   Prevents  unauthorized  access  both  within  corporate  network  and   from  remote  a/ackers     3  areas  of  SAP  Security  
  • 15. SAP  Security   •  Current  security  solu<ons  like  VA,  SIEM,  AST  embody  very  li^le   SAP  coverage     •  Solu<ons  focused  on  SAP  Security  are  more  effec<ve  but  only   cover  any  one  of  listed  fields  each  and  they  are  not  “CISO-­‐ oriented”   •  We  see  solu<on     –  PlaWorm  for  everybody   –  Coverage  of  all  aspects   –  Complimentary  to  SAP  offerings  or  extend  them     15  
  • 16.         The  only  award-­‐winning  solu<on  in  the  market  to  assess  3  <ers  of   SAP  Security   16   ERPScan  
  • 17. Architecture           17   JAVA   Presenta<on        Connectors   Vulnerability     Management   module   Source  code   security     module   Control   SOD   module   ERP   CRM   SRM   HANA   BOBJ   Mobile   SAP   Admin   CISO   Risk   Manager   ABAP   Developer   Pentester   …   API   API   SIEM   IT  GRC   ITSM   Ticke<ng  
  • 18. 18               Connectors ABAP  JAVA   Security  Metrics   Export  Comparison   Reports   PresentaAon  level   Project  management   Risk  Management   Control  funcAons   Pentest   Patches   ExploitaAon   Vulnerability  Management   Source  Code  Security   VulnerabiliAes   Backdoors   SAP  Router  SOAP   HTTP   SegregaAon  of  DuAes   Role  opAmizaAon   SoD   Task  Management   CriAcal  privileges   HANA   Whitebox   Compliance   ABAP   JAVA   By  System   By  Module   By  Industry   ABAP   JAVA   HANA   Mobile   Sta<s<cs  (Trends)   Template  management   Landscape  management   No<fica<on  Management   Business  Objects   BOBJ   Oracle  DB   Passwords   Database   SUP   In  details  
  • 19. How  to  automate  security  monitoring   for  big  landscapes?   19   •  Case:  CISO  of  large  Oil  company     •  Need:  To  automate  monitoring  and  get  high-­‐level  reports  for   100+  systems.   •  Solu<on:     –  Configure  weekly  scans  covering  most  cri<cal  assets   –  Export  results    to  IBM  Qradar  for  correla<on  and  a  consolidated  summary   of  relevant  indicators  at  a  glance.     –  Configure  PPTX  presenta<ons  email  with  the  ‘high-­‐level  overview’.    
  • 20. 20   •  Case:  BASIS  team  of  every  organiza<on     •  Need:  To  minimize  down<me  of  systems  during  updates  and   priori<ze  updates.     •  Solu<on:     –  Scan  for  missing  SAP  security    notes     –  Scan  for  remotely  exploitable  vulnerabili<es  (blackbox)   –  System  correlate  this  data,  an  you  can  filter  results  by  10+  different  criteria's  to  understand   risk   How  to  prioriAze  updates?  
  • 21. 21   •  Need:  To  comply  with  industry  regula<ons  and  chose  step  by   step  approach  for  be^er  technical  compliance   •  Solu<on:   –  Scan  to  address  PCI  DSS,    SOX  or  NERC  CIP  regula<ons     –  Step  by  step  technical  compliance  approach  EAS-­‐SEC,  SAP   Guidelines  ,ISACA,DSAG   –  Add  Industry-­‐related  checks  and  guidelines  (Oil  and  Gas,   Banking,  Retail),  make  your  own  template     We  have  included  templates  for  all  of  them     How  to  comply  with  regulaAons  
  • 22. How  to  idenAfy  and  test  most  criAcal   vulnerabiliAes  in  SAP?   22   •  Case:  Security  consul<ng  company   •  Need:  To  provide  SAP  Security  assessment  and  penetra<on   tes<ng  services  with  minimum  <me   •  Solu<on:     –  Vulnerability  management  module     –  Blackbox  pentes<ng,  exploits,  business-­‐focused  payloads  
  • 23. •  Advanced  user  management   •  Mul<ple  scans’  comparison  and  efficiency  analysis   •  Customizable  Templates  and  Landscapes   •  Ability  to  assign  tasks  to  users   •  Ability  to  manage  risks   •  Largest  Built-­‐in  knowledge  base   23   Matching  requirements  of  Enterprise   customers  
  • 24. 24   •  Only  360-­‐degree  approach  can  help  in  maximizing  security   •  Specific  checks  for  Industry  modules  and  solu<ons   •  Fast  release  cycles  to  address  client  needs   •  Combina<on  of  modules  gives  you  more  visibility  1+1+1=4   Strength  
  • 25. Each  SAP  landscape  is  unique  and  we  pay  close  a/en@on  to  the  requirements  of   our   customers   and   prospects.   ERPScan   development   team   constantly   addresses   these  specific  needs  and  is  ac@vely  involved  in  product  advancement.  If  you  wish   to   know   whether   our   scanner   addresses   a   par@cular   aspect,   or   simply   have   a   feature  wish  list,  please  e-­‐mail  us  or  give  us  a  call.  We  will  be  glad  to  consider  your   sugges@ons  for  the  next  releases  or  monthly  updates.   25           About   228  Hamilton  Avenue,  Fl.  3,   Palo  Alto,  CA.  94301     USA  HQ   Luna  ArenA  238  Herikerbergweg,     1101  CM  Amsterdam       EU  HQ     www.erpscan.com    info@erpscan.com