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Power Matters.
© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Power Matters.
Safety Critical Applications
Rufino Olay
Microsemi Industrial Business Manager
June 26, 2012
Power Matters. 2© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Introduction to functional safety
 Different safety standards
 Design techniques
 Deployment examples
 Further resources
Agenda
Power Matters. 3© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
History of Microsemi FPGAs in safety critical applications
Tactical MissilesCommercial Avionics Military Avionics
Military Ground VehiclesMedical Equipment Space Systems
Power Matters. 4© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Increasing safety critical design focus
 Safety-Critical Systems
• Avionics
• Medical
• Industrial automation
• Power plants
• Railmotive
• Gas/Oil industry
• More...
 S-C System Characteristics:
• Reliability
• Availability
• Secure operation
• System integrity
• Data integrity
• System recovery
• Maintainability
Market Drivers:
Industrial manufacturers upgrading products to include more electronics for higher
dependability involving reliability, safety, availability, and security
 Device selection considerations
• Prior deployment in safety critical application
• Length of time device has been in the market
• Number of devices shipped over current product lifetime
• Accessibility to reliability data
Power Matters. 5© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Industrial Application Examples
Configurable Safety Modules Safety Laser Scanners
Safety Light CurtainsSafety Drives & Motors,
Motor Control
Safety PLCs
Other Examples from IEC website:
 Emergency shut-down systems
 Fire and gas systems
 Turbine control
 Gas burner management
 Crane automatic safe-load indicators
 Guard interlocking and emergency stopping systems for
machinery
 Medical devices
 Dynamic positioning
• Control of a ship's movement when in proximity to an
offshore installation
 Railway signaling systems (including moving block train
signaling)
 Variable speed motor drives used to restrict speed as a
means of protection
 Remote monitoring, operation or programming of a network-
enabled process plant
*Images copyright of owners
Power Matters. 6© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Numerous Functional Safety Standards
Functional Safety Standards for Different Markets
 IEC 61508: Functional safety in industrial equipment
 DO-178B/DO-254: Functional safety in avionics
 IEC 6060: Functional safety in medical equipment
 EN 50128/9: Railway application - software for railway control & protection
 ISO 26262: Functional safety in road vehicles
Power Matters. 7© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 All systems will have a possibility of failure in time
• It is impossible for a system with absolute zero failure rate
 Each application has a failure rate level
• Goal is to significantly increase the time between any failures
• Example in a US Nuclear power plant goal is failure in 110,000 years*
– Many exceed this to 1 failure in 1M years with target of 1 failure in 10M years
 Tolerable failure rates/levels vary per application
• Depends on potential for direct or indirect physical injury
 Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) are categories to quantify levels of risks
Functional Safety Overview
*Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html
Power Matters. 8© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Developed by International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
• Certification through TUV
 Functional safety in industrial equipment
• Originally applied at system level but has been also applied to product &
components
• Addresses Electrical, Electronic, Programmable Electronics including
hardware and software
IEC 61508: Industrial functional safety standard
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - IEC 61508
SIL
Level
Availability Probability of Failure Consequence Application Example
4 >99.99% 1 failure in 110,000 yrs Potential for fatalities in the community Nuclear Power Plant Control
3 99.9% 1 failure in 11,100 yrs Potential for multiple on-site fatalities Hazardous area laser curtain sensors
2 99% 1 failure in 1,100 yrs Potential for major on-site injuries or fatalities Hazardous liquid flow meter
1 90% 1 failure in 110 yrs Potential for minor on-site injuries Thermal Meter
Power Matters. 9© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Safety standards for different markets
Source: TUV
Power Matters. 10© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Our Devices Deployed at the Highest Reliability Levels
 Immunity to Firmware Errors
• Ensures Data & System Integrity & Control
• Fully functional to 100KRads
 Fault Tolerance through Redundancy
• Hardware redundancy through parallel, dissimilar processes
• Cortex-M3 & FPGA running in lockstep
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - IEC 61508
SIL
Level
Availability Probability of Failure Consequence Application Example
4 >99.99% 1 failure in 110,000 yrs Potential for fatalities in the community Nuclear Power Plant Control
3 99.9% 1 failure in 11,100 yrs Potential for multiple on-site fatalities Hazardous area laser curtain sensors
2 99% 1 failure in 1,100 yrs Potential for major on-site injuries or fatalities Hazardous liquid flow meter
1 90% 1 failure in 110 yrs Potential for minor on-site injuries Thermal Meter
Microsemi FPGA Inherent Strengths
 Extreme Temperature Operation
• Fully operational in harshest conditions
• Up to 200oC
Power Matters. 11© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Single Event Upset issue was first discovered in 1979 by Intel and Bell
Labs as failures in DRAM’s
 In 1999 Sun Microsystems noticed errors in cache SRAM’s for mission
critical servers
 2000’s saw an increasing concern over SEU in logic devices like FPGAs
 Historically neutron interactions have been associated with electronics
used in Aircrafts due to the high neutron flux at these altitudes
 As more electronics is incorporated in everyday applications, likelihood
of interference has increased
Neutron Induced Single Event Upset Background
Power Matters. 12© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 As nodes shrink, the amount of charge on each node is smaller, but charge in
Cosmic rays remain same thus causes a bigger “disturb”
 As nodes shrink, circuits require less charge per switch to operate
 In FLASH FPGAs when neutron or alpha particles strike Configuration Cells in:
• Routing Matrix  No change
• Logic Block  No change
Flash FPGAs immune to Single Event Upset
Power Matters. 13© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 In SRAM FPGAs when neutron or alpha particles strike the CM’s in
• Logic Block  results in a misconnected signal which in turn results in
functional failure
• Routing Matrix  results in a misrouted or missing signal
 In both cases it’s a CM upset leading to severe consequences!
• These errors persist until detected
• Need rebooting OR power cycling of the FPGA
SRAM FPGAs are effected by stray particles
Power Matters. 14© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
No SEU Configuration Failures in Microsemi FPGAs
FPGA Technology
Equivalent Functional Failure – FIT Rates per Device
Ground-Level Applications
Commercial
Aviation
Military Aviation
Sea Level 5,000 Ft 30,000 Ft 60,000 Ft
Microsemi
Antifuse FPGA
1M-Gate
150nm Antifuse
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
Microsemi
Flash FPGA
1.5M-Gate
130nm Flash
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
Microsemi
Upcoming Next Gen
Flash FPGA
65nm Flash
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
No Failures
Detected
SRAM FPGA
Vendor 1
1M-Gate
90nm SRAM 320 FITs 1,100 FITs 47,000 FITs 150,000 FITs
SRAM FPGA
Vendor 2
1M-Gate
90nm SRAM 730 FITs 2,500 FITs 108,000 FITs 346,000 FITs
Neutron Testing Results: iRoC Technologies: www.irochtech.com
Regular testing at Los Alamos National Labs neutron test facility
Power Matters. 15© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 IEC61508 Annex E04
• 7.4.5.4 Especially for application of FPGAs and PLDs in E/E/PE
safety related systems the following systemic faults shall be controlled
Fewer Requirements for Flash Based FPGAs
Due to Non Volatility & SEU Immunity
Requirement Applicability to
Microsemi
Loss of information in Configuration RAM (RAM Based FPGAs) na: SEU immune
Malfunction of erase feature (EEProm based FPGAs/PLDs) na: Flash is non-volatile
Power supply drops, EMC (RAM based) na: Flash is non-volatile
Incorrect initialization during power-on (RAM based) na: Live at power-up
Faults in individual programming / configuration bits (all technologies) Yes
Modification of coarse functionality (macro cells, FPGA & CPLD) Yes
Coupling between “independent” channel (temperature, supply voltage, EMC,
cross-talk) if implemented on a single chip (all technologies)
Yes
Single point of failure (e.g. compare logic, efficient self testing even if system uses
long time static data during normal operation)
Yes
Malfunction in design and implementation tools Yes
Power Matters. 16© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Meeting Security Requirements
From IEC 61508, Part 1, P. 8
 …this standard demands that any malicious and unauthorized actions
are to be examined during the hazard and risk analysis.
The application scope of this analysis includes all relevant phases of the
security life cycle;
 Protection against
• Reverse engineering
• Tampering
• Overbuilding
• Cloning
Power Matters. 17© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Microsemi Security Features
 Secured IP
• FlashLock® controls access to security settings
of the device
• No bitstream communicated from external
configuration device
• Flash cells more secure against micro-probing
than other FPGA technologies
 Secured manufacturing flow
• AES-encrypted programming file sent to
manufacturer
• Devices pre-programmed with matching
AES key sold direct to manufacturer
• Protects against overbuilding and cloning
EEPROM
Configuration
Stream
Power Matters. 18© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Redundancy is mandatory for safety critical systems
• Provides fault-tolerant systems
• Operate properly in the event of a failure
 Dual Modular Redundancy
• Duplicated designs work in parallel
– The same inputs are provided to each processing element
– Fail safe certification engine checks for consistency
 Triple Modular Redundancy
• Three control systems
• Error in one component can be out-voted by the other two
Redundancy Techniques
Power Matters. 19© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Diversity Concept
 What is it – “Diversity”?
• Fundamental differences or dissimilarity between two devices
– usually to implement the same functions
• In case of FPGAs: Silicon (technology & architecture), Software, Hardware development
tools
 Without Diversity:
• In a system is designed with TMR or DMR redundancy,
• if ALL FPGA’s behave similar, then if 1 type of failure causes 1 FPGA to fail,
• then ALL the redundant (backups in case of failures) could possibly also FAIL, and the
system would shut down.
• Redundancy in this case did not keep the system running.
 With Diversity:
• If a system is designed with redundancy, and all FPGA’s are DIVERSE, then 1 type of
failure mode is DIFFERENT between 2 DIFFERENT devices
• If 1 type of failure causes 1 FPGA to fail, the redundant FPGA behaves DIFFERENTLY.
• The system would still RUN.
Power Matters. 20© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Diversity through two different Microsemi FPGA technologies
 Microsemi manufactures Antifuse & Flash FPGAs
 Antifuse technology and flash technology are completely different in terms of the
manufacturing process, how the devices store the design, and how the devices
are programmed with the design.
 Antifuse devices are 1-time-programmable (OTP) and the device design is stored
by permanently creating a conductive path.
 Flash devices are re-programmable and the device design is stored by storing a
charge on a floating gate of a flash transistor.
Power Matters. 21© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Evolution of Programmable Logic
Increasing Levels of Integration
1st Generation
Low Power FPGA
2nd Generation
First Mixed Signal FPGA
3rd Generation
Customizable
System-On-Chip (cSoC)
Flash FPGA Fabric
 Hardware Acceleration
 Customized Pulse Width
Modulation
 I/O Expansion
Programmable Analog
 Voltage & Current Monitoring
 Temperature Monitoring
Flash FPGA Fabric
 Hardware Acceleration
 Customized Pulse Width
Modulation
 I/O Expansion
Embedded ARM® Cortex-M3
 Complex Algorithms
 System Management
Programmable Analog
 Voltage & Current Monitoring
 Temperature Monitoring
Flash FPGA Fabric
 Hardware Acceleration
 Customized Pulse Width
Modulation
 I/O Expansion
Power Matters. 22© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
SmartFusion
Ideal platform to partition software & hardware architecture requirements
Software Platform
- System layer
- Application Layer
Hardware Platform
- Co-Processing
- Customized Drivers
Power Matters. 23© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Safety Implementation Comparison
Microcontrollers
 Two core implementation
• Redundant Similar Processes
 Same code / Algorithm
• Potential duplication of code error
 Multiple different code / algorithms
• Requires higher speed processors
• Increases Power Consumption
cSoC (FPGA & MCU)
 MCU & FPGA implementation
• Redundant Dissimilar Processes
 Same algorithm designed twice
• H/W & S/W implemented on same die
 Multiple different code / algorithms
• Build parallel processing elements
• Lowers power consumption
Safety
Controller
#1
Safety
Controller
#2
Oriented
90̊ from
core #1
SmartFusion
Safety Controller #1
Safety Controller #2
Fail Safe Detection Circuitry
Fail Safe
Detection
Circuitry
Power Matters. 24© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Fusion
CoreSPI
Power
Sensor
Power &
Reset
CoreSPI
Aircraft Interface
Control
Logic
Flap
Control
Stabilizer
Control
Brake
Control
Pressure
Sensor
Safety Critical System Requirement
 Firm Error Immunity
 Non-Volatile & Live at Power-up
Solution
 Flight Control Actuator
 Aircraft flaps & spoiler control
 Trim for speed brakes and horizontal stabilizer
 Yaw & roll trim
Deployed Example in Fusion
Programmable
Analog
FPGA Logic
Safety Critical Application Example #1
Flight Control Actuator Example
Power Matters. 25© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Safety Critical System Requirement
 Firm Error Immunity
 Non-Volatile & Live at Power-up
 Dissimilar processing elements
Solution
 Two processing elements
• MCU: IR Interface & laser beam surveillance
• FPGA: Signal processing and pulse detection
Deployed Example in SmartFusion
 Laser Safety Curtain: SIL3
 Second Highest Safety Integrity Level
Safety Critical Application Example #2
SmartFusion
ARM Cortex-M3
FPGA Logic
IR interface
controller,
Laser beam
surveillance
Time to digital
conversion,
Pulse detection
Sensor
Laser Safety Curtain Example
Sensor
Input
Programmable
Analog
Control data
Measurement
Data
Sensor
IR configuration
interface
Rotating Laser beam
interface
Power Matters. 26© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
Quality Management Systems & Certification
 Quality management system
• ISO-9001 (2002)
• TS 16949
• SAE / AS9100
• QML
 Qualification and certification
• MIL-STD-883 Class B
• PURE:
– European packaging Standard
– Commercial components in rugged environments
• QML Class Q
– Cert for components in high reliability / military
• AEC-Q100
– Automotive certification for ProASIC3 devices
Power Matters. 27© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Web pages
• Safety Critical Solutions: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/safetycritical/default.aspx
• Quality & Reliability Data: http://www.actel.com/techdocs/qualrel/default.aspx
• Single Event Effects: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/ser/default.aspx
• Operating in Extreme Environments: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/extremeenv/default.aspx
• Design Security: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/security/default.aspx
 Numerous documentation
White Paper
• Basics on single event effects
• Understanding SEE impact in avionics, networking applications (ground level apps)
• Increasing Fault Tolerance by Using Diverse Design Programmable Logic Technologies
Frequently Asked Questions
– Neutron FAQ
Resources: For more information
Power Matters. 28© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Military & Aerospace
• Radiation Article
 Medical
• FDA articles on radiation emitting products
 EE Times
• Automotive
– Cosmic Rays Damage Electronics
– Alpha particles, DRAMs, SEU, Toyota Acceleration
• General
– Neutron Storm Swirls Around FPGA Reliability
– Soft Errors become hard truth for logic
– Space Particles hit logic chips
– Reliability and Redundancy
 Others
• Electronic Products : Battling Single Event Upsets in Programmable logic
• Tech Focus Media : Gearing up for rain, new soft error tolerant circuits
• EDN : Cosmic Radiation comes to ASIC and SOC Designs
3rd Party Articles, Publications
Power Matters. 29© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.
 Flash Based FPGAs are an excellent high reliability platform
 History of deployments in Safety Critical Applications
• Industrial & Medical
• Avionics
• Military
• Space
 Dedication to Quality Systems
• Quality management systems & certification
 Next Steps
• Microsemi exploring IEC 61508 certification for FPGAs & dev S/W
– Leveraging knowledge and techniques from other certifications for Industrial
• Developing safety documentation package
Summary

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Safety Critical Applications of FPGAs

  • 1. Power Matters. © 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Power Matters. Safety Critical Applications Rufino Olay Microsemi Industrial Business Manager June 26, 2012
  • 2. Power Matters. 2© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Introduction to functional safety  Different safety standards  Design techniques  Deployment examples  Further resources Agenda
  • 3. Power Matters. 3© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. History of Microsemi FPGAs in safety critical applications Tactical MissilesCommercial Avionics Military Avionics Military Ground VehiclesMedical Equipment Space Systems
  • 4. Power Matters. 4© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Increasing safety critical design focus  Safety-Critical Systems • Avionics • Medical • Industrial automation • Power plants • Railmotive • Gas/Oil industry • More...  S-C System Characteristics: • Reliability • Availability • Secure operation • System integrity • Data integrity • System recovery • Maintainability Market Drivers: Industrial manufacturers upgrading products to include more electronics for higher dependability involving reliability, safety, availability, and security  Device selection considerations • Prior deployment in safety critical application • Length of time device has been in the market • Number of devices shipped over current product lifetime • Accessibility to reliability data
  • 5. Power Matters. 5© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Industrial Application Examples Configurable Safety Modules Safety Laser Scanners Safety Light CurtainsSafety Drives & Motors, Motor Control Safety PLCs Other Examples from IEC website:  Emergency shut-down systems  Fire and gas systems  Turbine control  Gas burner management  Crane automatic safe-load indicators  Guard interlocking and emergency stopping systems for machinery  Medical devices  Dynamic positioning • Control of a ship's movement when in proximity to an offshore installation  Railway signaling systems (including moving block train signaling)  Variable speed motor drives used to restrict speed as a means of protection  Remote monitoring, operation or programming of a network- enabled process plant *Images copyright of owners
  • 6. Power Matters. 6© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Numerous Functional Safety Standards Functional Safety Standards for Different Markets  IEC 61508: Functional safety in industrial equipment  DO-178B/DO-254: Functional safety in avionics  IEC 6060: Functional safety in medical equipment  EN 50128/9: Railway application - software for railway control & protection  ISO 26262: Functional safety in road vehicles
  • 7. Power Matters. 7© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  All systems will have a possibility of failure in time • It is impossible for a system with absolute zero failure rate  Each application has a failure rate level • Goal is to significantly increase the time between any failures • Example in a US Nuclear power plant goal is failure in 110,000 years* – Many exceed this to 1 failure in 1M years with target of 1 failure in 10M years  Tolerable failure rates/levels vary per application • Depends on potential for direct or indirect physical injury  Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) are categories to quantify levels of risks Functional Safety Overview *Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html
  • 8. Power Matters. 8© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Developed by International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) • Certification through TUV  Functional safety in industrial equipment • Originally applied at system level but has been also applied to product & components • Addresses Electrical, Electronic, Programmable Electronics including hardware and software IEC 61508: Industrial functional safety standard Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - IEC 61508 SIL Level Availability Probability of Failure Consequence Application Example 4 >99.99% 1 failure in 110,000 yrs Potential for fatalities in the community Nuclear Power Plant Control 3 99.9% 1 failure in 11,100 yrs Potential for multiple on-site fatalities Hazardous area laser curtain sensors 2 99% 1 failure in 1,100 yrs Potential for major on-site injuries or fatalities Hazardous liquid flow meter 1 90% 1 failure in 110 yrs Potential for minor on-site injuries Thermal Meter
  • 9. Power Matters. 9© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Safety standards for different markets Source: TUV
  • 10. Power Matters. 10© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Our Devices Deployed at the Highest Reliability Levels  Immunity to Firmware Errors • Ensures Data & System Integrity & Control • Fully functional to 100KRads  Fault Tolerance through Redundancy • Hardware redundancy through parallel, dissimilar processes • Cortex-M3 & FPGA running in lockstep Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - IEC 61508 SIL Level Availability Probability of Failure Consequence Application Example 4 >99.99% 1 failure in 110,000 yrs Potential for fatalities in the community Nuclear Power Plant Control 3 99.9% 1 failure in 11,100 yrs Potential for multiple on-site fatalities Hazardous area laser curtain sensors 2 99% 1 failure in 1,100 yrs Potential for major on-site injuries or fatalities Hazardous liquid flow meter 1 90% 1 failure in 110 yrs Potential for minor on-site injuries Thermal Meter Microsemi FPGA Inherent Strengths  Extreme Temperature Operation • Fully operational in harshest conditions • Up to 200oC
  • 11. Power Matters. 11© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Single Event Upset issue was first discovered in 1979 by Intel and Bell Labs as failures in DRAM’s  In 1999 Sun Microsystems noticed errors in cache SRAM’s for mission critical servers  2000’s saw an increasing concern over SEU in logic devices like FPGAs  Historically neutron interactions have been associated with electronics used in Aircrafts due to the high neutron flux at these altitudes  As more electronics is incorporated in everyday applications, likelihood of interference has increased Neutron Induced Single Event Upset Background
  • 12. Power Matters. 12© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  As nodes shrink, the amount of charge on each node is smaller, but charge in Cosmic rays remain same thus causes a bigger “disturb”  As nodes shrink, circuits require less charge per switch to operate  In FLASH FPGAs when neutron or alpha particles strike Configuration Cells in: • Routing Matrix  No change • Logic Block  No change Flash FPGAs immune to Single Event Upset
  • 13. Power Matters. 13© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  In SRAM FPGAs when neutron or alpha particles strike the CM’s in • Logic Block  results in a misconnected signal which in turn results in functional failure • Routing Matrix  results in a misrouted or missing signal  In both cases it’s a CM upset leading to severe consequences! • These errors persist until detected • Need rebooting OR power cycling of the FPGA SRAM FPGAs are effected by stray particles
  • 14. Power Matters. 14© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. No SEU Configuration Failures in Microsemi FPGAs FPGA Technology Equivalent Functional Failure – FIT Rates per Device Ground-Level Applications Commercial Aviation Military Aviation Sea Level 5,000 Ft 30,000 Ft 60,000 Ft Microsemi Antifuse FPGA 1M-Gate 150nm Antifuse No Failures Detected No Failures Detected No Failures Detected No Failures Detected Microsemi Flash FPGA 1.5M-Gate 130nm Flash No Failures Detected No Failures Detected No Failures Detected No Failures Detected Microsemi Upcoming Next Gen Flash FPGA 65nm Flash No Failures Detected No Failures Detected No Failures Detected No Failures Detected SRAM FPGA Vendor 1 1M-Gate 90nm SRAM 320 FITs 1,100 FITs 47,000 FITs 150,000 FITs SRAM FPGA Vendor 2 1M-Gate 90nm SRAM 730 FITs 2,500 FITs 108,000 FITs 346,000 FITs Neutron Testing Results: iRoC Technologies: www.irochtech.com Regular testing at Los Alamos National Labs neutron test facility
  • 15. Power Matters. 15© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  IEC61508 Annex E04 • 7.4.5.4 Especially for application of FPGAs and PLDs in E/E/PE safety related systems the following systemic faults shall be controlled Fewer Requirements for Flash Based FPGAs Due to Non Volatility & SEU Immunity Requirement Applicability to Microsemi Loss of information in Configuration RAM (RAM Based FPGAs) na: SEU immune Malfunction of erase feature (EEProm based FPGAs/PLDs) na: Flash is non-volatile Power supply drops, EMC (RAM based) na: Flash is non-volatile Incorrect initialization during power-on (RAM based) na: Live at power-up Faults in individual programming / configuration bits (all technologies) Yes Modification of coarse functionality (macro cells, FPGA & CPLD) Yes Coupling between “independent” channel (temperature, supply voltage, EMC, cross-talk) if implemented on a single chip (all technologies) Yes Single point of failure (e.g. compare logic, efficient self testing even if system uses long time static data during normal operation) Yes Malfunction in design and implementation tools Yes
  • 16. Power Matters. 16© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Meeting Security Requirements From IEC 61508, Part 1, P. 8  …this standard demands that any malicious and unauthorized actions are to be examined during the hazard and risk analysis. The application scope of this analysis includes all relevant phases of the security life cycle;  Protection against • Reverse engineering • Tampering • Overbuilding • Cloning
  • 17. Power Matters. 17© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Microsemi Security Features  Secured IP • FlashLock® controls access to security settings of the device • No bitstream communicated from external configuration device • Flash cells more secure against micro-probing than other FPGA technologies  Secured manufacturing flow • AES-encrypted programming file sent to manufacturer • Devices pre-programmed with matching AES key sold direct to manufacturer • Protects against overbuilding and cloning EEPROM Configuration Stream
  • 18. Power Matters. 18© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Redundancy is mandatory for safety critical systems • Provides fault-tolerant systems • Operate properly in the event of a failure  Dual Modular Redundancy • Duplicated designs work in parallel – The same inputs are provided to each processing element – Fail safe certification engine checks for consistency  Triple Modular Redundancy • Three control systems • Error in one component can be out-voted by the other two Redundancy Techniques
  • 19. Power Matters. 19© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Diversity Concept  What is it – “Diversity”? • Fundamental differences or dissimilarity between two devices – usually to implement the same functions • In case of FPGAs: Silicon (technology & architecture), Software, Hardware development tools  Without Diversity: • In a system is designed with TMR or DMR redundancy, • if ALL FPGA’s behave similar, then if 1 type of failure causes 1 FPGA to fail, • then ALL the redundant (backups in case of failures) could possibly also FAIL, and the system would shut down. • Redundancy in this case did not keep the system running.  With Diversity: • If a system is designed with redundancy, and all FPGA’s are DIVERSE, then 1 type of failure mode is DIFFERENT between 2 DIFFERENT devices • If 1 type of failure causes 1 FPGA to fail, the redundant FPGA behaves DIFFERENTLY. • The system would still RUN.
  • 20. Power Matters. 20© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Diversity through two different Microsemi FPGA technologies  Microsemi manufactures Antifuse & Flash FPGAs  Antifuse technology and flash technology are completely different in terms of the manufacturing process, how the devices store the design, and how the devices are programmed with the design.  Antifuse devices are 1-time-programmable (OTP) and the device design is stored by permanently creating a conductive path.  Flash devices are re-programmable and the device design is stored by storing a charge on a floating gate of a flash transistor.
  • 21. Power Matters. 21© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Evolution of Programmable Logic Increasing Levels of Integration 1st Generation Low Power FPGA 2nd Generation First Mixed Signal FPGA 3rd Generation Customizable System-On-Chip (cSoC) Flash FPGA Fabric  Hardware Acceleration  Customized Pulse Width Modulation  I/O Expansion Programmable Analog  Voltage & Current Monitoring  Temperature Monitoring Flash FPGA Fabric  Hardware Acceleration  Customized Pulse Width Modulation  I/O Expansion Embedded ARM® Cortex-M3  Complex Algorithms  System Management Programmable Analog  Voltage & Current Monitoring  Temperature Monitoring Flash FPGA Fabric  Hardware Acceleration  Customized Pulse Width Modulation  I/O Expansion
  • 22. Power Matters. 22© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. SmartFusion Ideal platform to partition software & hardware architecture requirements Software Platform - System layer - Application Layer Hardware Platform - Co-Processing - Customized Drivers
  • 23. Power Matters. 23© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Safety Implementation Comparison Microcontrollers  Two core implementation • Redundant Similar Processes  Same code / Algorithm • Potential duplication of code error  Multiple different code / algorithms • Requires higher speed processors • Increases Power Consumption cSoC (FPGA & MCU)  MCU & FPGA implementation • Redundant Dissimilar Processes  Same algorithm designed twice • H/W & S/W implemented on same die  Multiple different code / algorithms • Build parallel processing elements • Lowers power consumption Safety Controller #1 Safety Controller #2 Oriented 90̊ from core #1 SmartFusion Safety Controller #1 Safety Controller #2 Fail Safe Detection Circuitry Fail Safe Detection Circuitry
  • 24. Power Matters. 24© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Fusion CoreSPI Power Sensor Power & Reset CoreSPI Aircraft Interface Control Logic Flap Control Stabilizer Control Brake Control Pressure Sensor Safety Critical System Requirement  Firm Error Immunity  Non-Volatile & Live at Power-up Solution  Flight Control Actuator  Aircraft flaps & spoiler control  Trim for speed brakes and horizontal stabilizer  Yaw & roll trim Deployed Example in Fusion Programmable Analog FPGA Logic Safety Critical Application Example #1 Flight Control Actuator Example
  • 25. Power Matters. 25© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Safety Critical System Requirement  Firm Error Immunity  Non-Volatile & Live at Power-up  Dissimilar processing elements Solution  Two processing elements • MCU: IR Interface & laser beam surveillance • FPGA: Signal processing and pulse detection Deployed Example in SmartFusion  Laser Safety Curtain: SIL3  Second Highest Safety Integrity Level Safety Critical Application Example #2 SmartFusion ARM Cortex-M3 FPGA Logic IR interface controller, Laser beam surveillance Time to digital conversion, Pulse detection Sensor Laser Safety Curtain Example Sensor Input Programmable Analog Control data Measurement Data Sensor IR configuration interface Rotating Laser beam interface
  • 26. Power Matters. 26© 2012 Microsemi Corporation. Quality Management Systems & Certification  Quality management system • ISO-9001 (2002) • TS 16949 • SAE / AS9100 • QML  Qualification and certification • MIL-STD-883 Class B • PURE: – European packaging Standard – Commercial components in rugged environments • QML Class Q – Cert for components in high reliability / military • AEC-Q100 – Automotive certification for ProASIC3 devices
  • 27. Power Matters. 27© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Web pages • Safety Critical Solutions: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/safetycritical/default.aspx • Quality & Reliability Data: http://www.actel.com/techdocs/qualrel/default.aspx • Single Event Effects: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/ser/default.aspx • Operating in Extreme Environments: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/extremeenv/default.aspx • Design Security: http://www.actel.com/products/solutions/security/default.aspx  Numerous documentation White Paper • Basics on single event effects • Understanding SEE impact in avionics, networking applications (ground level apps) • Increasing Fault Tolerance by Using Diverse Design Programmable Logic Technologies Frequently Asked Questions – Neutron FAQ Resources: For more information
  • 28. Power Matters. 28© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Military & Aerospace • Radiation Article  Medical • FDA articles on radiation emitting products  EE Times • Automotive – Cosmic Rays Damage Electronics – Alpha particles, DRAMs, SEU, Toyota Acceleration • General – Neutron Storm Swirls Around FPGA Reliability – Soft Errors become hard truth for logic – Space Particles hit logic chips – Reliability and Redundancy  Others • Electronic Products : Battling Single Event Upsets in Programmable logic • Tech Focus Media : Gearing up for rain, new soft error tolerant circuits • EDN : Cosmic Radiation comes to ASIC and SOC Designs 3rd Party Articles, Publications
  • 29. Power Matters. 29© 2012 Microsemi Corporation.  Flash Based FPGAs are an excellent high reliability platform  History of deployments in Safety Critical Applications • Industrial & Medical • Avionics • Military • Space  Dedication to Quality Systems • Quality management systems & certification  Next Steps • Microsemi exploring IEC 61508 certification for FPGAs & dev S/W – Leveraging knowledge and techniques from other certifications for Industrial • Developing safety documentation package Summary