EASA SYLLABUS5.13 Software Management Control Level 2 Awareness of restrictions, airworthiness requirements and possible catastrophic effects of unapproved changes to software programmes.
AIM Awareness of restrictions using the software for aircraft Airworthiness requirements and approval procedure Possible catastrophic effects of unapproved changes to software programs
INTRODUCTION Computer software used to drive many type of system in aircraft Can not be allowed it to fail during operation Requirements to evaluate, test and verify for fail safe design Failure prevention.
APPLICATION OFSOFTWARESome example are: primary and secondary flight controls engine controls electrical generation and distribution brakes radio and navigation equipment flight instruments automatic flight control
SOFTWARE APPROVAL Software must be verify by authority for approval and quality control. Initial certification : ◦ Software must be design by approved company ◦ Approved by Design Organization ◦ Software must comply with authority requirement (BCAR sec A) ◦ Software Validation process approved by local authority. Post-Certification Modifications ◦ Modification must based on rule apply to the application on hardware ◦ Modification which effect software must be approved by the Design Organization
DOCUMENTATION APPROVAL Malaysian AN 57 issue in order to recognize RTCA/EUROCAE document with appropriate guidance material. Include in RTCA/EUROCAE : ◦ DO-178/ED-12 : Application form for software approval and guidance ◦ Requirement for software control ◦ Software documentation procedure ◦ Requirement for configuration management ◦ Rule for upgrading software ◦ Differential of software level
SOFTWARE TESTING Every software must be provide the testing method to maintain its functionality. Purpose is to determine all data process corectly with the correct output. Test should include : ◦ Typical data : test the comonly use program path ◦ Unusual but valid data : test the exception program path ( fail safe design) ◦ Incorrect, incomplete data : test the error
ABOUT RTCA RTCA, Inc. (known as Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics until their re- incorporation in 1991 as a not-for-profit corporation) is a US volunteer organization that develops technical guidance for use by government regulatory authorities. RTCAs objectives include but are not limited to: ◦ ensuring the safety and reliability of airborne systems; ◦ developing minimum operational performance requirements for document-specific systems; ◦ developing guidelines for use by a regulatory authority, the given authority determines appropriate; ◦ providing administrative and logistics resources that enable teamwork among the world-wide aviation community.
ABOUT EUROCAE EUROCAE, the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment was formed in Lucerne on 24 April, 1963. EUROCAE has now been operating for more than 40 years as a non-profit organisation whose membership exclusively comprises aviation stakeholders made up of Manufacturers (aircraft, airborne equipment, ATM systems and ground equipment), Services Providers, National and International Aviation Authorities and Users (Airlines, Airports, operators) from Europe and elsewhere. EUROCAE has developed performance specifications and other documents exclusively dedicated to the Aviation community.
DO 178C DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is the title of the recently published document fromRTCA, Incorporated, in a joint effort with EUROCAE. Replace DO-178B to be the primary document by which the certification authorities such as FAA, EASA and Transport Canada will approve all commercial software-based aerospace systems. Certification Authority approval is pending. The new document is called DO-178C/ED-12C and was completed in November 2011 and approved by the RTCA in December 2011. It became available for sale and use in January 2012.[1
SOFTWARE LEVELJAA AMJ 25 FAA RTCA/EUROCAE Effect on Aircraft and Occupants of Criticality Criticality Failure or Design Error Software Level Category Category 1. Slight reduction of safety margin 2. Slight increase in workload (routine changes inMinor Effect Non-Essential Level D flight plan) 3. Physical effects but no injury to occupants 1. Significant reduction in safety margins 2. Reduction in the ability of the flight crew to copeMajor Effect Essential Level C with adverse operating conditions impairing their efficiency 3. Injury to occupants 1. Large reduction in safety margins 2. Physical distress or workload such that the flight Hazardous crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks/severe-Major Essential Level B Effect accurately or completely 3. Serious injury to or death of a relatively small proportion of the occupantsCatastrophic 1. Loss of Aircraft Critical Level A Effect 2. Fatalities
FAILURE CONDITION Minor ◦ Slight reduce safety margin of functional capabilities, slight increase crew workload and some inconvenience to occupants. Major ◦ Reduce capability of aircraft, significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, increace in crew workload and discomfort occupants. Hazardous ◦ Reduce capability of aircraft , large reduction of safety margin or functional capabilities, physical distresser to crew and serious injury to some of occupant Catastrophic ◦ Failure condition prevent continue safe flight and landing
INTRODUCTION TOSOFTWARE LIFECYCLE Initiation Requirement Design Code, (Implementation) Integration and Test Installation Operation and Maintenance
RESOURCES CAA UK Recommended Books Title AuthorMy Blog Aircraft Electricity and Eisman 0-02-801859-1 Electronics Art of Electronics Horowitz 0-521-37095-7 Horowitz /Hill /Hill Elements of Hickey/ 0070286957 Electronics Villines Modern Aviation Helfrich 0-13-118803-8 Electronics Micro Electronics in E Pallet 0-273-08612-X Aircraft systems