Sabra Capital Institutional Presentation

• The Company
• Brazilian Public Equity Investments
• Sabra Academy
• Venture Capital – Israeli Startups
• The Team
• Investment Philosophy
• Sample of Investment Case: Marcopolo (POMO4)
• Previous Track Record
• Historical Performance – Oren Fundamental FIA
• Analysis of Returns – Oren Fundamental FIA
• Historical Performance – Nest FIA + Oren FIA
• Portfolio Management
• Decision Process
• E.g.: Sell Direcional (DIRR3) + Buy AmBev (AMBV4)
• Sabra Fundamental FIA
• Characteristics
• Description
• Managed Account
• Basic Features / Description
• Contact Information
Dec 2014 2
Contents

• The Company
• Sabra Academy
• The Team
• Characteristics
• Description
• Managed Account
Dec 2014 3
Contents

• Independent Asset Management Company;
• Founded in Oct/12 (operational since Apr/13) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;
• Our team brings together the best in terms of academic background and practical experience.
• Internal Training: all junior professionals take our Financial and Valuation Modeling online course and
get an accompanying 45-page proprietary booklet in which qualitative and quantitative aspects of the
investment process are introduced.
• Partnership: we seek to promote continuous learning, so that our talents remain motivated and increasingly
contribute to the company’s development. The idea is that they acquire over time – through a meritocratic
criterion – relevant equity stakes in the company.
Dec 2014 4
The Company

• Sabra Fundamental FIA (local fund)
• Cedar Sabra (offshore managed account)
Dec 2014 5
The Company
Brazilian Public Equity
Investments
Sabra Academy Venture Capital
Sabra Capital
• Course: Financial and
Valuation Modeling (online)
• Sabra Capital @ Facebook
• Short Videos @ YouTube
• Israeli Startups (offshore fund)

Investment Philosophy:
• Based on fundamental analysis;
• We conduct an in-depth analysis of all companies we invest in.
• We concentrate on companies in which we feel comfortable with, especially when it comes to their business
models and competitive environment. I.e., we restrict the scope to our so-called "circle of competence".
• Our portfolio is concentrated on a few (usually ~15) promising companies.
• The investment is only undertaken if it offers margin of safety, i.e., if the price-value gap is sufficiently large.
Internal processes:
• Research:
• Standardized Reports - investment cases, summary of meetings with public companies and other industry players;
conference calls; daily market highlights;
• DCF Models;
• Industry Comparables.
• Portfolio Management / Risk Management:
• Daily discussions about current events and portfolio positions.
• Risk reports (VaR, Stress, and Liquidity).
Dec 2014 6
The Company – Brazilian Public Equity Investments

Course: Financial and Valuation Modeling
• The course brings together the best in terms of theoretical background and hands-on experience. The
student learns financial and valuation modeling on spreadsheets, as well as how to calculate and interpret
financial ratios. The student also learns how to evaluate a company on a qualitative basis, especially when
it comes to the company’s business model, competitive environment, and quality of the management. By
the end of the course, the student may choose to take a quiz and get a certificate of completion.
• Online course at Edools platform: http://sabraacademy.edools.com/
Social Media: Sabra Capital @ Facebook
• We occasionally post reading suggestions, videos, and information that we find relevant to share:
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Sabra-Capital/321187141336891.
Short Videos @ YouTube
• Sample: “What Distinguishes Exceptional Companies from Other Companies”
• Concepts extracted from “Good to Great” and “Built to Last” by Jim Collins
• http://youtu.be/E_9OB8CRE0M
Dec 2014 7
The Company – Sabra Academy

Investment Opportunity:
• Over the last decade, Israel has grown steadily, despite the 2008 economic crisis. Its growth has shown little correlation
with worldwide economic growth, which is good news for diversification purposes.
• Its growth is mostly innovation driven. Innovation is concentrated on High-Tech sectors such as Clean Tech, Life
Sciences, Medical Devices, IT, Software, Agro-Technology, Pharmaceuticals, Communications, Electronics,
Semiconductors, Industrial Equipment, Homeland Security, Biopharma, among others.
• Israel has the highest R&D expenditure as a % of GDP in the world. It also has one of the richest ecosystems for high-
tech startups, raked #2 in the world after Silicon Valley.
• There are currently ~6,000 startups in Israel. In 2013, 977 new startups were founded, while 300 startups close every
year. Also, the number of startups has been growing by 10% p.a. on average over the last decade. (source: IVC)
• In 2013, Israeli High-Tech Startups raised US$ 2.3 bn (vs. US$ 1.5 bn in 2004), of which US$ 1.7 bn came from VC
funds. In 2013, Exits totaled US$ 6.64bn, of which US$ 4.21bn were VC-backed Exits. In fact, since 2011, there has
been a dramatic improvement in investment results, measured by the exits to investment ratio. Over the last years, the
Average Exit has been growing. In 2013, it reached US$ 120.2mn for VC-backed Exits.
Structure:
• Sabra Capital will co-invest with local (Israeli) VC partners;
• Investment vehicle: offshore fund at BVI;
For more information, please refer to the presentation:“Sabra Capital: Venture Capital Investment in Israel”
Dec 2014 8
The Company – Venture Capital – Israeli Startups

• The Company
• Sabra Academy
• The Team
• Characteristics
• Description
• Managed Account
Dec 2014 9
Contents

Fernanda Torós, PhD
•Founding partner at Sabra Capital, portfolio manager
•Portfolio Manager - Oren Investimentos - Aug/11-Aug/12
• Fully responsible for Oren Fundamental FIA;
• Performance: +26.65% (vs. -3.00% Ibov) from Aug/11 to Aug/12
•Portfolio Manager /Head of Equity Research - Nest Investimentos - Dec/09-Jul/11
• Book with 15% of AUM at Nest Ações FIA
• Gross Return: +5.25% (vs. -9.96% do Ibov) no 1H11
•Equity Analyst - Investidor Profissional / Leblon Equities - 2007-2009
•Economist (Credit Suisse, 2005-06) and Specialist (Ambev, 2004-05)
•Academic Experience
• Visiting Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech – USA (International Finance, 2003)
• Lecturer., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign – USA (Corporate Finance, 1999-2002)
•Academic Background
• PhD in Economics - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign – USA (1999-2003)
• MS in Finance - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign – USA (1999-2001)
• MA in Economics and BA in Economics – PUC-Rio – Brazil (1995-98; 1991-94)
The team also includes a junior Equity Analyst and a junior professional responsible for Compliance,
Risk, and Back-Office.
Dec 2014 10
The Team

• The Company
• Sabra Academy
• The Team
• Characteristics
• Description
• Managed Account
Dec 2014 11
Contents

Main Value Investing Pillars:
1. Circle of Competence – We only buy stocks of companies whose business models and competitive
environments we understand and in which we feel comfortable to be invested.
2. Portfolio Concentration – Theoretically, the only way to have above-average returns, consistently
outperforming the benchmark, is by concentrating the portfolio. Statistically, a portfolio with 30 stocks is
well-diversified enough, deviating very little from the average or benchmark. On the other hand, a portfolio
with less than 5 stocks holds very strong idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, a concentration of 10 to 15 stocks
seems adequate. Empirically, the deviation from the benchmark may be favorable (overperformance) or
unfavorable (underperformance). That is why it is important to conduct an in-depth analysis of each
company in the stock picking process.
3. Price-Value Gap – At a certain point in time, a stock may not be correctly priced. But, in the medium/long
term, the stock price tends to converge to the company’s intrinsic value. Finding price-value gaps is not
always trivial and, often times, requires a “perception detachment” relative to other market participants, i.e., it
requires an unique perception about a company or investment case.
Dec 2014 12
Investment Philosophy

Main Value Investing Pillars:
4. Margin of safety – An investment should only be carried through if the price-value gap is sufficiently large
so as to offer a certain margin of safety to the investor, no matter how good a company may seem in
qualitative terms.
5. Emotional discipline – Buying stocks with a certain margin of safety helps reduce losses during periods in
which the price-value gap may increase. Having a well-grounded conviction and emotional discipline is
crucial for a successful investment.
Note: Mispriced stocks may take months until the price-value gap closes. Any investment carries an opportunity
cost. Therefore, the longer it takes for the gap to close, the least appealing the investment will be. So, often times, it
is intereting to hold stocks that have triggers that may accelerate the convergence process. Even though it is
important to monitor developments and potential triggers in all positions that we hold, we do not specifically seek
stocks that are subject to imminent triggers or events.
Dec 2014 13
Investment Philosophy

Marcopolo (Aug/11 to Aug/12)
• Description: Marcopolo is the leading bus producer in the Brazilian market, with a market share of ~45%. The
company has global footprint, with ~8% of the global bus market, with plants in India, Egypt, Mexico, Argentina,
Colombia, South Africa, and Australia – besides its plants in Brasil (Caxias do Sul and Rio de Janeiro). With the
exception of South Africa, the company operates through JVs with local partners, which minimizes the risk of the
operation. The company also has a plant that produces components in China and a sales partnership in Russia.
Dec 2014 14
Sample of Investment Case
MARCOPOLO
Main Figures (R$ mn)
POMO4 2010 2011 2012E*
Net Revenue 2.964,5 3.368,9 3.600
EBITDA 398,3 464,1 -
EBITDA mg 13,4% 13,8% -
Net Profit 295,8 344,0 -
Capex 81,5 74,7 140
* Company guidance
Share Price (31/Jul/12) R$ 10,10
# of shares (000) 448.450
Market Cap (R$mn) 4.529
Net Debt (R$ mn) 464
EV (R$ mn) 4.993
EV/EBITDA - 2011 10,8
Free Float 75%
3-Month ADTV (R$ mn) 7,8
R$ 10,10
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
11,00
1/8/11
31/8/11
30/9/11
30/10/11
29/11/11
29/12/11
28/1/12
27/2/12
28/3/12
27/4/12
27/5/12
26/6/12
26/7/12
POMO4
01/Aug:
85.000
6,39

• Long Term Growth Drivers: The goal is to double the company’s size in 5 years. Much of the growth will come
from international markets, especially India, where the company eventually plans to have the biggest bus production
site in the world. According to estimates, India is expected to reach, in 2019, a market size of 80,000 units/year (vs.
42,000 units/year in Brazil). Today, ~ 33% of revenues come from the company’s international markets, share that is
expected to rise to 50% in 5 years. Among all countries where Marcopolo operates, Brazil and India seem to offer the
greatest growth potential.
• Main Short/Mid Term Drivers - Brazil: (i) Renewal of interstate concessions, limiting average fleet age to 10 years
(vs. 14.7 years currently); (ii) Extension of Finame line coupled with mandatory use of buses with Euro 5 (cleaner)
engines; (iii) Investments in BRTs as a way to improve traffic and prepare cities for the World Cup and the Olympics;
(iv) Implementation of the JV with Caio for manufacturing parts (domestic) and buses (external market), as well as a
possible purchase, through this JV, of the assets of the bankrupt competitor BUSSCAR; and (v) Favorable FX rates
for exports.
• Competitive Structure - Brazil: Today, the competition among manufacturers is healthy, but it was not always this
way. From 2003 to 2006, Marcopolo’s market share dropped from 47% to 39%. In the same period, BUSSCAR went
from ~5% to ~15%, due to a price war that was in place. This strategy proved unsustainable and BUSSCAR went
bankrupt (again) in 2010. With this bankruptcy, Marcopolo’s market share jumped from 41.7% in 2009 to 46.3% in
2010.
Dec 2014 15

• Growth Drivers and Competitive Structure - India: The Indian market has low bus penetration, with 0.75
buses/1,000 inhabitants (vs. 1.5 in Brazil). The government has the goal, through the National Highway Development
Programme (NHDP) Project, to develop roads linking the 4 main cities of the country, changing the transportation
matrix from rail (quite scrapped) to road – which will favor local bus manufacturers. Marcopolo went to India in 2006
through a JV with Tata (49% Marcopolo, 51% Tata). Therefore, Tata Marcopolo Motors is well positioned to capture
much of this potential growth. In 2009, the market share of the major manufacturers was: Tata (50%), Ashok Leyland
(33%), Swaraj Mazda (7%), Mahindra (5%), and Eicher (5%).
• Risks: Other than the risk of economic deceleration, rising input prices, and bottlenecks in workforce, the most
relevant matter for the investment case is the execution risk in the international expansion strategy. Unsuccessful
experiences in Portugal and Russia in the past have certainly contributed to the company learning process, especially
when it comes to corporate structure and business environment. Also, in 2011, when analyzing the performance of its
JV in India, Marcopolo decided to slow down the pace of growth there, privileging profitability over growth at all
costs. This attitude is comforting and helps ease the perception of execution risks in international expansions. It is
also worth mentioning that the company decided to access the Russian market once again, but this time only through a
commercial JV (where imported Chinese kits are assembled in Russia) and not via local production as before.
Dec 2014 16

Historical Performance – Oren Fundamental FIA – Aug/11-Aug/12
Performance 2011-12
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year Inception
Oren Fundamental FIA - - - - - - - 1,28% -4,27% 9,04% 1,96% -2,73% 4,86%
Ibovespa - - - - - - - -3,96% -7,38% 11,49% -2,51% -0,21% -3,52%
Out/Under-Perf - - - - - - - 5,45% 3,36% -2,20% 4,59% -2,52% 8,68%
Oren Fundamental FIA 6,91% 8,81% 4,56% -0,14% -5,61% -0,33% 4,08% 1,55% - - - - 20,78% 26,65%
Ibovespa 11,13% 4,34% -1,98% -4,17% -11,86% -0,25% 3,21% 1,72% - - - - 0,54% -3,00%
Out/Under-Perf -3,80% 4,28% 6,67% 4,21% 7,09% -0,08% 0,84% -0,17% - - - - 20,13% 30,56%
20112012
Dec 2014 17
Previous Track Record

Dec 2014 18

Dec 2014 19

Analysis of Returns – Oren Fundamental FIA
The graph below shows the returns for the stocks (A to J) that were the core positions of Oren FIA during the period Aug/11-
Aug/12 against the CDI and the Ibovespa. Note that (i) the cash position varied between 10%-30% in the period, and (ii) the stocks
did not have equal weights in the portfolio.
Dec 2014 20
Statistics
Best Month +9,04% (vs. +11,49% Ibov)in Oct/11
Worst Month -5,61% (vs. -11,86% Ibov)in May/12
Best Outperf. +7,09% (-5,61% FIAvs. -11,86% Ibov)in May/12
Worst Underperf. -3,80% (+6,91% FIAvs +11,13% Ibov)in Jan/12
# Trading Days 15 days (10 Aug, 1 Sep, 1 Oct, 2 Nov, 1 Dec, zero 2012)
Analysis of Returns - Aug/11-Aug/12

Analysis of Returns – Oren Fundamental FIA
Dec 2014 21
Sector Alocation % of AUM Market Cap (R$) % of AUM
Consumer / Retail 42% > 10 bn 9%
Real Estate 15% 3 bn - 10 bn 43%
Capital Goods / Infrastructure 14% 1 bn - 3 bn 36%
Food & Beverages 9% 0 - 1 bn 0%
Healthcare 5% Caixa 11%
Transp. / Logistics 3%
Technology 1%
Cash 11%
Liquidity - 3-month ADTV (R$) % of AUM Concentration % of AUM
> 10 mn 65% 5 largest positions 72%
1 mn - 10 mn 24% 10 largest positions 89%
< 1 mn 0% Cash 11%
Cash 11%
Portfolio - May 2012

Historical Performance:
Nest Ações FIA (Book with 15% of AUM) & Oren Fundamental FIA
Performance 2011
Book at Nest FIA -2,46% -1,80% 2,57% 6,23% 3,14% -2,10% -3,78% - - - - - 1,27% 1,27%
Ibovespa -3,94% 1,21% 1,79% -3,58% -2,29% -3,43% -5,74% - - - - - -15,13% -15,13%
Out/Under-Perf 1,54% -2,97% 0,77% 10,17% 5,56% 1,38% 2,08% - - - - - 19,33% 19,33%
Performance 2011-12
Oren Fundamental FIA - - - - - - - 1,28% -4,27% 9,04% 1,96% -2,73% 4,86%
Ibovespa - - - - - - - -3,96% -7,38% 11,49% -2,51% -0,21% -3,52%
Out/Under-Perf - - - - - - - 5,45% 3,36% -2,20% 4,59% -2,52% 8,68%
Ibovespa 11,13% 4,34% -1,98% -4,17% -11,86% -0,25% 3,21% 1,72% - - - - 0,54% -3,00%
Out/Under-Perf -3,80% 4,28% 6,67% 4,21% 7,09% -0,08% 0,84% -0,17% - - - - 20,13% 30,56%
Performance 2011-12
Book Nest / Oren FIA -2,46% -1,80% 2,57% 6,23% 3,14% -2,10% -3,78% 1,28% -4,27% 9,04% 1,96% -2,73% 6,19%
Ibovespa -3,94% 1,21% 1,79% -3,58% -2,29% -3,43% -5,74% -3,96% -7,38% 11,49% -2,51% -0,21% -18,11%
Out/Under-Perf 1,54% -2,97% 0,77% 10,17% 5,56% 1,38% 2,08% 5,45% 3,36% -2,20% 4,59% -2,52% 29,68%
Ibovespa 11,13% 4,34% -1,98% -4,17% -11,86% -0,25% 3,21% 1,72% - - - - 0,54% -17,67%
Out/Under-Perf -3,80% 4,28% 6,67% 4,21% 7,09% -0,08% 0,84% -0,17% - - - - 20,13% 55,78%
20122011201220112011
Note: The performance for the book in Nest Ações FIA is not audited and represents gross returns.
Dec 2014 22

Decision Process:
• Oriented not only to the return that we can get, but also to the risk involved;
• Great concern with capital preservation.
Decision #1: Equity x Cash
Portfolio management and risk control start with the decision to allocate funds to equity or cash. During periods of
macroeconomic uncertainty and of few good investment opportunities, we tend to keep more cash (with a return close to the
country’s basic interest rate) and less equity (up to the minimum of ~70% of the portfolio).
Decision #2: Reduce, Increase or Zero an Equity Position
Our portfolio typically has ~15 stocks, with a very low asset turnover. The decision to reduce, increase or zero the investment
depends on the interaction of micro (intrinsic to the company) and market factors. “Stop loss” does not exist in the Value
Investing context. The decision to zero/reduce a position relies on factors such as:
(i) a change in the investment case – a close monitoring of the company allows us to identify whether there would be a
fundamental and specific reason to motivate the termination of the investment.
(ii) the absence of a short term catalyst, hindering the price-value convergence – every investment has an opportunity cost;
therefore, we may decide to reduce a position if there is no clear trigger for the stock.
(iii) the absence of margin of safety – when the price-value convergence is close to being complete, and there is no longer room
for updates in the DCF model that would justify a more positive pricing of the asset.
Dec 2014 23
Portfolio Management

E.g.: Sell Direcional (DIRR3) + Buy AmBev (AMBV4)
• In Aug/2011, we witnessed an increase in risk aversion. The soveign debt of Euro Zone countries and the US became more
evident. The risk of an economic slowdown – not only in Europe and the US, but worldwide – brought panic to the markets.
• The speed in which the sell off happened in August was astonishing. The Ibovespa index fell -17.26% in a few days (up to Aug,
8th). In such occasions – where over-reaction takes place – many intereting buying opportunities are created.
• In this context, we made 2 decisions: we kept ~30% of the AUM in cash and we replaced DIRR3 and bought AMBV4 instead.
Direcional (DIRR3) was a real estate company and its stocks had low liquidity. Both companies were cheap at that point, but
AmBev (AMBV4) had the potential to benefit a lot more from “market corrections” in the near future due to its liquidity and
appeal. After all, it was rare to see such a good company trading at such a cheap price – a true bargain with a huge margin of
safety.
Dec 2014 24

E.g.: Sell Direcional (DIRR3) + Buy AmBev (AMBV4)
• The graph below shows the # stocks and the stock price at each specific date. The dotted line indicates that the stock is no
longer in the portfolio, while the solid line indicates the stock is part of the portfolio.
• Note that DIRR3 fell further in Oct/11, but during 2012 the stock returned to levels that were close to the ones in the
beginning of Aug/11, ending Aug/12 at R$ 11.30.
• On the other hand, AMBEV4 went from R$ 44.60 in Aug/11 to R$76.27 at the end of Aug/12.
Dec 2014 25
R$ 9,74
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
11,00
12,00
13,00
1/8/11
31/8/11
30/9/11
30/10/11
29/11/11
29/12/11
28/1/12
27/2/12
28/3/12
27/4/12
27/5/12
26/6/12
26/7/12
DIRR3
01/Aug:
13.000
10,62
24/Ago:
0
9,25
R$ 78,61
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1/8/11
31/8/11
30/9/11
30/10/11
29/11/11
29/12/11
28/1/12
27/2/12
28/3/12
27/4/12
27/5/12
26/6/12
26/7/12
AMBV4
08/Aug:
4.000
44,60
18/Aug:
4.500
50,00
14/Sep:
8.000
55,13

Characteristics:
• AUM: ~R$ 400K
• The track record should be taken with caution because:
• Fixed costs have a considerable impact on performance. In a given year, the fund starts with -6.65% due to fees.
• Strategies cannot be fully implemented. E.g.: 100 shares of a stock worth R$ 380,00 per share would mean a position of
R$38,000.00 , i.e., 9.5% of the portfolio. The buy and hold strategy may not be implemented if we conclude that 9.5%
would be too much to have of such a stock at a given time.
• Weighting/calibration of the portfolio may not be viable due to discontinuity in sizes. E.g.: 100 shares of a stock worth R$
100,00 per share would mean a position of R$10,000.00 , i.e., 2.5% of the portfolio. If we were to buy 100 more shares,
the position would automatically reach 5% of the portfolio, which may not be desirable.
• The fund is kept open for strategic reasons only – it is a vehicle which is fully operational and ready
for local seed money.
Dec 2014 26
Sabra Fundamental FIA
AUM 400.000,00
Fees Year Month Impact Y Impact M
Auditing 6.832,52 569,38 1,71% 0,14%
Custody 7.200,00 600,00 1,80% 0,15%
Anbima Fee 324,00 27,00 0,08% 0,01%
CVM Fee 2.400,00 200,00 0,60% 0,05%
Selic Fee 1.200,00 100,00 0,30% 0,03%
Notary/Mail/Bank 500,00 41,67 0,13% 0,01%
CBLC Fee 131,04 10,92 0,03% 0,00%
Sub-total 18.587,56 1.548,96 4,65% 0,39%
Management Fee 8.000,00 666,67 2,00% 0,17%
Total 26.587,56 2.215,63 6,65% 0,55%

Description:
• Equities fund (Bovespa), long-only, no leverage;
• Portfolio concentration: ~15 stocks;
• Max. exposure per stock: 20%;
• Scalability: it is possible to keep the positions we currently have, with no liquidity problems, with up to ~R$
450 mn in AUM (the simulation assumes that all positions would have to be zeroed in 30 trading days, and
our volume would correspond to 1/3 of the ADTV for each stock);
• Internal liquidity rule: to zero at least 80% of our portfolio in 30 trading days, doing 1/3 of the ADTV for
each stock;
• Capacity: this product (long only equity fund) in Brazil can reach more that R$ 2 bn in AUM.
Dec 2014 27

Description:
• Anbima Classification: “Ações Livre”
• Subscription: D+0 business days
• Redemption: D+30 business days
• Management Fee: 2% p.a.
Performance Fee: 20% of the positive difference, if any, between the NAV of the portfolio and Ibovespa,
subject to HWM
• Target Investor: general public
Min. Investment and Min. Balance: R$ 20,000.00
• For more information, please go to our website: www.sabracapital.com.br
Dec 2014 28

Basic Features / Description:
• Offshore
• AUM: USD 5 million;
• Custodian / Broker: J.P. Morgan NY, EUA;
• Assets: Brazilian equities traded at Bovespa;
• Investment Philosophy: long-only, no leverage;
• Concentration: it must have, at most, 5 stocks at any given moment (required by the investor);
• Redemption Rules: not to be disclosed;
• Liquidity Rules: not to be disclosed;
• Benchmark: IGP-M index + 6% p.a.;
• Management Fee: 1% p.a.;
• Performance Fee: 15% of the positive difference, if any, between the NAV of the portfolio and the
benchmark, subject to HWM;
• Track Record: not audited; also diversification strategies cannot be fully implemented due to the
concentration restriction imposed by the investor (at most 5 stocks in the portfolio at a given time);
Dec 2014 29
Managed Account

Av. Ataulfo de Paiva, 1079 / 603
Leblon
22440-034
Rio de Janeiro – RJ - Brazil
www.sabracapital.com.br
Sabra Capital @ Facebook
+55 21 2274-6700
contato@sabracapital.com.br
Dec 2014 30

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